

MALAYSIA

Selected Historical Readings

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compiled by

JOHN BASTIN

and

ROBIN W. WINKS

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Introduction

The Federation of Malaysia, the newest of the national states of South-East Asia, came into being on 16 September 1963. Comprising Malaya, Sabah (North Borneo), Sarawak and, until its secession in 1965,¹ Singapore, Malaysia's internal lines of communication are divided by the enormous expanse of the South China Sea, so that its frontiers facing Thailand in the north-west and Indonesian Kalimantan in the east are separated at their furthest points by nearly twelve hundred miles of the globe's surface. The Malaysian states of Borneo, moreover, share an inland frontier with the independent sultanate of Brunei which, until the rebellion of December 1962,² seemed likely to join the new Federation. Geographical contiguity, which was once considered to be a necessary prerequisite to the successful functioning of a federal system of government, does not therefore obtain in Malaysia.

Ethnic homogeneity is also lacking in Malaysia. Of the total population of nearly eleven millions, four-and-a-quarter millions are Malays and slightly more than four and-a-half millions are Chinese. The remainder is made up of one million Indians and Pakistanis, 725,000 indigenous (but non-Malay) peoples of Borneo, and nearly one-quarter of a million others, including Europeans and some 25,000 Indonesians. The Chinese, who constitute a common element in all the Malaysian states, are heavily concentrated in Singapore and in Malaya, especially in the western half of the country, where they number one-and-a-quarter and nearly three millions respectively. There are also about one-quarter of a million Chinese in Sarawak, mainly in the First Division in the area of the capital, Kuching, and also in the Third Division. Over ninety per cent of the Malay population is in Malaya, with a proportionately heavy concentration along the eastern seaboard, but there are one-quarter of a million Malays in Singapore, and 175,000 in the two Borneo territories. The vast majority of the Indians live in Malaya.

Many factors contributed to the creation of Malaysia, but the most important was undoubtedly the desire to fashion a permanent eco-

¹ See reading II in Chapter Eleven.

² See reading VIII in Chapter Ten.

conomic and political union between Malaya and Singapore. This union was not achieved by the British before independence was granted to Malaya in 1957, and subsequently the Malay leaders were opposed to sacrificing the numerical superiority enjoyed by their compatriots in the Peninsula. In the long run, however, fear that an independent Singapore would develop an unduly strong movement to the left through domination by Chinese Communist elements proved decisive,¹ and the British-administered Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah were called in to redress the racial imbalance between Malays and Chinese which the merger between Malaya and Singapore alone would have effected.² Until Singapore seceded, the Chinese slightly outnumbered the Malays in the Malaysian Federation.³

If Malaysia was something of an exercise in political arithmetic, it was not, as has been asserted by the Indonesian Government, simply a device foisted by the politicians of Kuala Lumpur and Singapore on an unwilling Malaysian population. Whatever the main-springs of the idea, there is no doubt that Malaysia, as expressed and defined by the political leaders, especially by the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the Singapore Premier, Lee Kuan Yew, sparked the initial enthusiasm of the large mass of the peoples of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah for economic and political association within a broad constitutional framework. Though strongly opposed for a variety of reasons in certain quarters, especially in Singapore and the Borneo territories,⁴ the majority of the peoples in those states, in referenda and elections, and in sampling devices employed by United Nations observers, expressed their support for Malaysia.⁵ The subsequent political opposition to Malaysia mounted principally by Indonesia in the form of economic, political and military 'confrontation'⁶ paradoxically did something to foster a nationalist feeling among the peoples of Malaysia.

A feeling, however vague, of identity engendered by an outside threat, though itself an important ingredient in the development of nationalism, must ultimately find its sanction in a shared past experience—from, in fact, a common history. This experience may be mythical or real, or, as is most frequently the case, a mixture of both; but it would appear to be a *sine qua non* of genuine nationalism. Do the Malaysian territories possess a common history?

¹ M. Leifer, 'Politics in Singapore: The First Term of the People's Action Party 1959-1963', *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, II, 2, 1964, 104. See also, Lee Kuan Yew, *The Battle for Merger*, Government Printing Office, Singapore, 1961.

² T. E. Smith, *The Background to Malaysia*, Chatham House Memoranda, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1963, 1.

³ In 1964 the figures were 4,675,000 Chinese and 4,335,000 Malays according to *The Times*, London, 6 January 1965.

⁴ See introduction to reading V in Chapter Ten.

⁵ See reading IV (b) in Chapter Ten.

⁶ See reading I in Chapter Eleven.

It is, of course, easy enough to fit historical evidence into moulds dictated by present needs, and the historian often finds himself unwittingly clothing the contemporary political reality in a garment of historical inevitability; but no matter with what personal sympathy the Malaysian Federation is viewed it would be extremely difficult to argue that it constitutes in itself an integral and long-standing historical entity. Even if the history of the Malaysian territories can be viewed as revolving round the Malay sultanates of Brunei and Malacca and their successor states—a theme which we have attempted to develop in the early readings in this book—only extremely tenuous trading links, indigenous and Western, can be found connecting the parts of Malaysia that are separated by the South China Sea.¹ In any case, the sultanate of Brunei, which might give meaning to this historical pattern, is itself not part of the Federation of Malaysia although some of her former domains are; and Singapore, which provides an integral component of the early history, has now opted out of the Federation.

The countries that go to make up Malaysia are, in fact, only part of a larger Malayo-Indonesian world, which was partitioned in very recent times, more often by accident than design, by the forces of Western colonialism. The only claims that Malaysia has to being any kind of distinctive historical entity is that her territories were subject, to varying degrees, to British and not to Dutch or Spanish colonial control. It is British colonial rule during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that constitutes the one unique element that divides the existing Malaysian territories from the remainder of the Malayo-Indonesian world, and thus provides the one real integrating theme of modern Malaysian history.

Inevitably, this theme is reflected in this book and in the historical writings which have been available to us for the selection of readings; for the rest we have tended to focus attention on the economic, political and social history of the region, and on aspects of purely local Malay history. We have attempted to balance the Western language material by introducing translations of indigenous sources wherever possible. In the latter part of the book we have chosen readings from a diverse range of printed materials in order to indicate the kind of sources that are available for the study of modern Malaysian history; generally, however, the readings have been selected from standard books and articles. It goes without saying that we do not necessarily agree with all the interpretations advanced in these readings.

Collections of source materials, or books of readings and documents, fall into three broad categories. There are those books which may be called discrete, in that each document is presented to stand

¹ See readings IV and V in Chapter Two.

alone, the book as a whole comprising a general reference-work rather than a history or connected narrative. There are collections of sources which are, in effect, integral, in that the readings form a coherent and connected pattern, often dealing with divergent viewpoints on a single controversial issue, but do not attempt to deal with all aspects of the history of the particular nation involved. This collection of readings is intended to represent a third and less frequently followed path to the understanding of sources: one that might be called 'organic', for the sources form a fairly coherent and consecutive account of the modern history of Malaysia.


For this reason and because of the problem of making editorial additions to copyright material, annotations have been kept to a minimum. A bibliography is appended to assist the student who wishes to pursue the subject further. Collections of readings can, of course, only provide a brief introduction to the subject; but we have been encouraged to undertake the task of preparing this book because of the rapid development of South-East Asian studies in schools and universities, not only in South-East Asia itself but also in the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, with the consequent need for basic teaching materials. We hope that this book, by introducing students to some of the important writings, will stimulate further interest in the history of the Malaysian region.

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Modern Malaya A sketch map showing the present names and situation of some of the places mentioned in the development of the states of Malaya to their present form.

Chapter One

THE EARLY MALACCA AND BRUNEI SULTANATES

Two Javanese historical texts, the *Pararaton* and the *Nagarakrtagama*, suggest that Singapore (Tumasik) once lay within the confines of the Hindu-Javanese empire of Majapahit. According to the former, Gajah Mada, the famous chief-minister of Majapahit, swore that he would not again eat his favourite dish until he had conquered ten countries, including Tumasik; in 1365 the *Nagarakrtagama* mentions that Tumasik was then actually subject to Majapahit. It was presumably this conquest of Singapore, some time before 1365, which *Sijarah Melayu*, or the *Malay Annals*, (wrongly?) allege to have caused the flight of Parameswara to Malacca. Some corroboration of a Majapahit conquest is perhaps attested by the discovery of a number of gold bracelets and other gold ornaments of Majapahit origin on Fort Canning, the Hill Tabu, where the island's governors lived. But by the time Parameswara, a Palembang princeling fleeing from a Javanese enemy, landed at Tumasik towards the end of the fourteenth century, it was most unlikely that he found any Javanese governor there because by then Singapore had come under Siamese influence.

I *The Flight of the Parameswara from Singapore and the Founding of Malacca*

Parameswara's subsequent expulsion from Tumasik, and his flight to Malacca, was therefore likely to have been occasioned by a Siamese and not, as suggested by the *Malay Annals*, a Javanese attack. Sir Richard Winstedt, the leading scholar of Malayan history, in his *A History of Malaya* [revised and enlarged edition, Singapore, 1962, 42] argues cogently that the Malay source is in error in ascribing the attack to Javanese origin: '... the story in the *Malay Annals* agrees

neither with the Chinese nor with any of the Portuguese sources except one (whose author was librarian at Goa and had access to the *Malay Annals*), nor does it tally with the salient dates in the life of Parameswara. There can be no doubt that his flight from Singapore to Seletar and thence to Muar and finally to Malacca was due to a Siamese expedition sent to avenge his killing of Siam's governor on landing at the island.'

The following reading is taken from *Sjjarah Melayu*. [Translated by C. C. Brown, *Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society*, xxv, 2-3, 1952, 51-2.]

AND Sultan Iskandar Shah [=Parameswara (?)]¹ having been expelled from Singapore] came to Muar, where he took up his abode at a certain place. As soon as night had fallen a vast horde of monitor-lizards came, and when day dawned the place was seen to be covered with them. People killed them and threw them into the sea, though they ate some. That night however the monitor-lizards came again in great masses and the following night they came again. And so great was the stench there that to this day the place is known as Biawak Busok.

And Sultan Iskandar Shah moved from there and went on to another place. There he had a fort built, but by the night of the very day on which it was built the fort had fallen into decay. Wherefore the place is known as Kota Burok to this day. And Sultan Iskandar moved on again up the coast until presently he struck inland and came after a few days to Sëning Ujong. And perceiving that this was a good place he left a minister there—which is why the place has a minister to this day—and from there he went straight back to the sea shore, to a river called Bertam. And as the king, who was hunting, stood under a tree, one of his hounds was kicked by a white mouse-deer. And Sultan Iskandar Shah said, "This is a good place, when even its mouse-deer are full of fight! We shall do well to make a city here." And the chiefs replied, "It is indeed as your Highness says." Thereupon Sultan Iskandar Shah ordered that a city be made, and he asked, "What is the name of the tree under which I am standing?" And they all answered, "It is called *Malaka*, your Highness"; to which he rejoined, "Then *Malaka* shall be the name of this city."

And Sultan Iskandar Shah took up his abode at Malaka, where he established a system of court ceremonial. It was he who first instituted the appointment of four ministers who were to sit in the hall of audience and hold inquiries; and the appointment of heralds who were to stand on the steps leading up to the throne, forty on either side, and transmit any command given by the king; and the appointment of

¹ See reading II.

youths of good family as pages, their duty being to act as bearers of the Raja's personal requisites.

Now as for Sultan Iskandar Shah, when he had just completed three years on the throne, Singapura fell to the Javanese and he went to Malaka, where he was established as Raja for twenty years. And after he had ruled in all for twenty-five years, then in the process of time he died and was succeeded on the throne by his son Raja Kechil Besar with the title of Sultan Megat.

II *The Malay Founder of Medieval Malacca*

The following important reading, which identifies Parameswara, the legendary founder of Malacca, with Iskandar Shah, the first ruler of Malacca, is taken from an article by Sir Richard Winstedt, 'The Malay Founder of Medieval Malacca'. [*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, xii, 3-4, 1948, 726-9.]

THE Portuguese, d'Albuquerque and Tomé Pires,¹ give a Parameswara as the founder of Malacca and make Xaquem Darsa (or Iskandar Shah) his son, and this relationship has hitherto been accepted. Tomé Pires, however, says that the Parameswara ruled Singapore for five years and begot there his son Iskandar Shah, who was "almost a man" at the founding of Malacca (about 1403, according to the Chinese), but, Pires continues, became a Muslim at the age of 72 and died eight years later—or, as the Chinese tell us, in 1424! My reading of the evidence is that Parameswara and Iskandar Shah are *the same man before and after conversion to Islam*. The Chinese record that Parameswara often sent envoys to China and himself visited it in 1411. And they note visits to China by "Mukansautirsha", or Megat Iskandar Shah, in 1414 and in 1419; the annalist, not having met the Malay visitor or understood Malay, naturally took this ruler to be different from Parameswara. But Raffles' MS.² states that Iskandar Shah reigned three years at Singapore and twenty at Malacca, the length of the latter reign coinciding with the Chinese dates 1403 for the accession of the Parameswara and 1424 for the death of Iskandar Shah. This item of Chinese evidence therefore sup-

¹ *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque*, ed. W. de Gray Birch, Hakluyt Society, London, 1875-84, lxii, ch. xvii; *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires*, ed. A. Cortesão, Hakluyt Society, London, 1944, xc (Second series) book six, ii, 229 ff.

² 'The Malay Annals or *Séjarah Melayu*. The earliest recension from MS. No. 18 of the Raffles Collection in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society, London', ed. Sir Richard Winstedt. *JMBRAS*, xvi, 3, 1938.

ports my view. So do the ages given by Tomé Pires. If Iskandar Shah were about 16 in 1403, as Pires suggests, then by 1424 he would have been only 37; but if he is identical with the Parameswara, who was a grown man before he reached Singapore, ruled there from three to five years, and then spent some six years on the Muar and more at Bertam before he founded Malacca (*Suma Orientalis*, vol. ii, pp. 230-8), then the Parameswara *alias* Iskandar Shah, would have been old by 1424 and might well have been described by Pires' Malay informants as a man of eighty. Again, the omission of the name Parameswara from all Malay accounts is incredible if he were a separate individual, but it is quite explicable if it means that Muslim Malays discarded from their history the Hindu pre-Muslim style of the founder of Malacca, preferring to employ only his later Muhammadan title. Such a discard also explains how the last Malay ruler of Hindu Singapore came to be known to Malay history as Iskandar Shah—a curious anachronism, if he were not identical with the Parameswara. And even if this Muslim title could have been borne in Hindu Singapore, the Malacca court would never have chosen for the title of a Malacca ruler the name of a predecessor who had been so ill-starred as to lose the throne of Singapore. On the contrary, it was natural for history to give the loser of Singapore his luckier name as the founder of a new kingdom. All these considerations confirm the identity of the Parameswara with Iskandar Shah.

Who was this Parameswara? d'Albuquerque and Tomé Pires make him a prince from Palembang (that is, Sri Vijaya), who married a Javanese princess, a daughter or (according to Pires) a niece of the Bhatara of Tumapel; worsted in a revolt against his father-in-law, he fled to Singapore where he at once murdered the Sang Aji, its governor, and ruled the island for five years till he was driven out by Siam or one of her tributaries Patani or Pahang. Pires makes the Parameswara son of the Sang Aji of Palembang, then tributary to Majapahit, so that a Javanese princess would be his superior in rank, a fact that would explain his own title ... and the title of Megat given to Iskandar in the Chinese records and to his son in the oldest version of the Malay Annals. As the title Megat was common in Pasai and is found only with the Parameswara's Muslim designation, it must have been given him after his marriage with a daughter of the Muhammadan ruler of Pasai.

de Barros relates how after the death of Pararisa = Bhra Yang Wisesa, king of Tumapel 1389-1428, the splitting of Majapahit into two kingdoms led to a dynastic war that caused many nobles, including a Parameswara, to flee from Java. And the late Dr. Callenfels¹

¹ P. V. van Stein Callenfels, 'The Founder of Malacca', *JMBRAS*, xv, 2, 1957, 160-6.

... ignoring both Malay and Portuguese accounts of the Parameswara's connection with Singapore, suggests that Malacca's founder probably left Java during troubles in 1401 and that no other date fits with Javanese history. But the records of Java's medieval history may well have omitted the story of a minor royal quarrel. And, in fact, the Malay accounts say nothing of any marriage with a Javanese princess or of a flight to Singapore but make Iskandar Shah a Palembang prince, member of a family ruling a Singapore that was a colony of Palembang till Java conquered it about 1365. If Tomé Pires is right in saying that Iskandar died at the age of 80 (in 1424), then the "Malay Annals" may be right in making the Javanese conquest of Singapore the cause of his flight from Singapore to Malacca. Or, as Iskandar Shah would in 1365 have been a youth of nineteen, the Javanese may have maintained him as a harmless puppet, given him a Majapahit princess for bride, and left him on the Singapore throne till Siam drove him out.

Callenfels also inclines to the view of de Barros and Gaspar Correa that the Parameswara was a Javanese. But several facts make this highly improbable. None of the court titles in Malacca were Javanese. All Malay tradition gives the Malacca dynasty a Palembang (Sri Vijaya) origin. So do the earlier Portuguese histories. There was no particular reason for a Javanese nobleman to have thought of Malacca as the site of a kingdom or to have sought a bride from Muslim Pasai. But as a Palembang nobleman the Parameswara may well have chosen Malacca as an outlying post in his ancestors' peninsular possessions that lay as far as possible from Siam. And a Palembang nobleman would have good reason to seek to marry into the Pasai royal family which during the fourteenth century appears to have exercised some sway over Sri Vijaya's old territory in Northern Malaya ... and to have carried Islam as far east as Trengganu.... The Chinese annals record that in 1406 the Parameswara claimed the throne of Palembang.

As for subsequent rulers the title Sultan Megat of the Raffles MS. [of the *Sĕjarah Mĕlayu*] was fortuitous confirmation of the view that Parameswara was a title denoting a consort of rank inferior to that of his wife, the male offspring of such a marriage being termed Megat (magadha). The same MS. says he ruled only two years, which is plausible if his father was 80. The Chinese references to him or his son as Sri Mahala in 1424 and to a Sri Mahala in 1433 reveal a return to the old Palembang title of Sri Maharaja and presumably denote a backsliding from Islam. Omitting the shadowy Sultan Megat, there may have been only one Sri Maharaja, the Raja Tengah, who according to [the] Raffles MS. [of the *Sĕjarah Mĕlayu*] finally became

Sultan Muhammad Shah, or there may have been two, the Raja Tengah and his son Sultan Muhammad Shah of the other two Malay sources.¹ The Chinese record under 1445 the accession of a son and successor to a Sri Mahala, this son being Parmisiwartiupasha (? Parameswara Dewa Shah). Parmisiwartiupasha would either be the Sultan Muhammad Shah of the two later Malay sources or more probably the ill-fated Sultan Abu-Shahid. In that case Muzaffar Shah would appear to have waited for a decade before sending to China to "ask to be invested": but according to d'Albuquerque he assumed the title of Sultan only shortly before his death.

III Chinese Accounts of Malacca

Among the earliest fifteenth century descriptions of Malacca that we possess is a Chinese account of a mission under the command of the Chinese eunuch, Cheng Ho, who visited Malacca in 1409 in pursuance of the new policy of the Ming Emperors to establish tributary relationships with the countries in the Nanyang, or the Southern Seas. Cheng Ho led the second Chinese embassy to Malacca; the first envoy was Yin Ch'ing, who was appointed to command the mission to Malacca in 1403. The following statement (a) is taken from the Chinese history, *Ying-yai Sheng-lan* (1451), and was written by Ma Huan, one of the chief assistants of Cheng Ho. Reading (b) is another fifteenth century Chinese account, *Hsing-ch'a Sheng-lan* (1436) by Fei Hsin. [These translations follow the texts published in Paul Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese*, Kuala Lumpur, 1961, 321-5.]

a. *Ying-yai Sheng-lan*

FORMERLY [Malacca] ... was not styled a kingdom but was known as the Five Isles ... because there were that number of islands off that part of the coast. It had no king, but only a chieftain. The country was under the rule of *Hsien-lo* ... (Siam), to which it paid an annual [tribute] of 40 taels of gold. Default [in this matter] would have provoked an attack. In the seventh year of the ssü-ch'ou [period] of the Yung-lo [Emperor] [A.D. 1409] the eunuch Cheng-Ho, [in his capacity as] an imperial envoy, conveyed [to Malacca] the commands of the Emperor, [in token of which] he bestowed on the chieftain of that country a pair of silver seals, a head-dress, a girdle and a long robe. He raised the place to the status of a city, since when it has been known as the Kingdom of Malacca. Henceforth the Siamese dared not venture to attack it, and the ruler, now by

¹ Shellabear's edition of the later version of *Sijarah Melayu*, and the *Bustan al-Salatin* by Shaikh Nur al-din.

the imperial favour [styled] king, proceeded in company with his consort to the capital [of China], where he expressed his gratitude and offered products of his country as tribute. The Emperor then assigned him a ship in which to return home so that he might [continue to] govern his land. To the south-east [of this country] is the ocean, to the north-west the mainland, which is continued as a chain of mountains. The soil is sandy and saline. Temperatures are hot during the day, but cool at night. The infertile fields yield little rice, so that the people are not greatly concerned with agriculture. A sizeable stream flows by the royal palace before entering the sea. Over this the King has built a bridge, on which he has constructed some twenty booths for the sale of all kinds of commodities. Both the King and his subjects revere the laws of Islam, and observe its fasts and penances. The King wears a white turban of fine local cloth, a long floral robe of fine green calico, and leather shoes. He fares abroad in a palanquin. Among the [common] people the men wear square, cotton kerchiefs round their heads, and the women dress their hair in chignons. The bodies [of the people] are rather dark [in colour]. They wrap a length of white cotton round their loins and wear short bajus of cotton print. Their customs and usages are pure and simple. Their houses are raised on one-storey platforms and lack a layer of planks [against the ground], but a floor of split coconut-palms is erected and lashed with rattan—exactly as if it were a sheep-pen—at a height of about four feet. On this floor [the people] spread their beds and mats, on which they sit cross-legged, and [on this floor] they also eat, sleep and cook. Most of the inhabitants [of Malacca] are occupied in fishing, for which they venture out to sea in boats hollowed from a single tree [-trunk]. Local products include *Coptis teeta*¹ . . . ebony, damar . . . , tin and suchlike. Damar in its original state is the sap of a tree² which flows into the ground and is then dug up. It oozes from the tree in gouts in the same way as the resin of the pine does. When lit, it continues to burn, and the native people use it for lighting purposes. When they have finished building a boat, they smear this substance along the seams to render them waterproof. The people gather a great deal [of damar] for sale to other countries. A superior variety, which is clear, transparent and resembles amber, is called *sun-tu-lu-ssü*³ The local people make it into beads for *těngkolok*. These beads, which they sell, are known as water amber. . . . Tin occurs in two localities in the

¹ *Coptis teeta* is a herb of the family *Ranunculaceae* which is cultivated in South-West China. The genus *Coptis* is found only in the temperate lands of Asia so that, if it was indeed shipped from Malacca, it could only have been a re-export, possibly brought to the Straits from India, which in turn obtained it from the eastern Himalaya.

² The Malay word *damar* is applied to a wide range of vegetable resins, notably those from members of the *dipterocarp* family.

³ This must be the *damar mata kucing* or cat's eye resin of the Malays, who have traditionally classified their damars by colour. This particular type is known to be exuded by several species of *Hopoea*.

mountains, and the King [of Malacca] has appointed officials to control [these districts]. Men wash [the tin] in sieves, smelt it and cast it into ingots of disk-like shape, the standard weight of which is either 1 kati [1½ pounds] 8 taels or 1 kati 4 taels. Ten ingots bound together with rattan constitute a small bundle, forty ingots a large bundle. In all their trade transactions [the people] use [these ingots of] tin. The language, the books and the marriage ceremonies [of Malacca] closely resemble those of *Chao-wa* . . . (Java). In the mountainous wilderness [of the interior] is a palm known as the sago. . . . The country folk pound the bark [of this palm], which resembles the root of the Chinese bean, soak it in water, [allow it] to settle and strain it. The flour obtained in this way is moulded into pellets of the size of green peas, which are dried in the sun and sold as food. On the low ground bordering the sea there grows a palm whose fronds are as long as those of the kajang. . . . When its sword-like leaves first appear they are [as pliable as] young bamboo shoots. The fruits have the appearance of lichees, and are of the size of hen's eggs. The people use them to ferment a liquor, which they call kajang wine¹ and which has the power of intoxication. The local folk interweave the leaves of this plant with bamboo to make fine quality mats which, although only two feet wide, exceed ten feet in length. These they offer for sale. There are sugar-cane, plantains, jack-fruit, wild lichees and suchlike. The vegetables include onions, ginger, leeks, mustard, gourds, water-melons and so forth. Cattle, goats, fowls and ducks are few, and therefore costly, a head of buffalo being priced at a kati of silver. There are neither donkeys nor horses [in the land]. The shores of the sea are inhabited by turtles and by dragons which [are capable of] wounding men. This dragon is three or four feet high, has four legs and a body which is completely encased in scales. It has a ridge of spines along its back, a dragon's head and teeth well adapted to grasping prey. It will devour any man whom it chances to encounter.² In the mountains there is a yellow tiger, which is rather smaller than the yellow tiger of China. There is also a black species and a yellow one with dark spots. Some species of tigers, which can assume human form, frequent the capital and mix with the populace. If anyone recognizes one [of these creatures] he seizes and kills it. They are similar to the corpse-headed barbarians of *Chan-ch'eng* . . . (*Campā*). When this place (Malacca) is visited by Chinese merchant vessels [the inhabitants] erect a barrier [for the collection of duties]. There are four gates in

¹ This is a confused notice but there can be little doubt that the plant referred to is the nipa palm (*Nipa fruticans*), whose pinnate fronds rise from tidal mud flats throughout Malaya. Ma-Huan was mistaken in thinking that the intoxicating liquor or toddy was fermented from the fruits. It was, in fact, prepared by fermenting the sweet sap which flows upwards through the stalk towards an inflorescence.

² The estuarine crocodile or *Crocodilus porosus*, which inhabits tropical Asiatic river mouths and mangrove swamps.

the city wall, each furnished with watch- and drum-towers. At night men with hand-bells patrol [the precincts]. Inside the walls a second small enclosure of palisades has been built where godowns have been constructed for the storage of specie and provisions. When the government ships were returning homewards, they visited this place in order both to repair [their vessels] and to load local products. Here they waited for a favourable wind from the south, and in the middle of the fifth month they put out to sea on their return voyage. The King [of Malacca], accompanied by his consort, his son and some of his headmen, laid in products of his country and followed [our] fleet [to China], where he came to court and presented tribute.

b. Hsing-ch'a Sheng-lan

THIS place did not formerly rank as a kingdom. It can be reached from Palembang . . . on the monsoon in eight days. The coast is rocky and desolate, the population sparse. The country [used to] pay an annual tax of 40 taels of gold to Siam. The soil is infertile and yields low. In the interior there is a mountain from [the slopes of] which a river takes its rise. The [local] folk pan the sands [of this river] to obtain tin, which they smelt into ingots called *tou*. . . These weigh 1 kati 4 taels standard weight. [The inhabitants] also weave banana fibre into mats. Apart from tin, no other product enters into [foreign] trade. The climate is hot during the day but cool at night. [Both] sexes coil their hair into a knot. Their skin resembles black lacquer, but there are [some] white-complexioned folk among them who are of Chinese descent. The people esteem sincerity and honesty. They make a living by panning tin and catching fish. Their houses are raised above the ground. [When constructing them] they refrain from joining planks and restrict the building to the length of a [single] piece of timber. When they wish to retire, they spread their bedding side by side. They squat on their haunches when taking their meals. The kitchen and all its appurtenances is [also] raised [on the stilts]. The goods [used in trading at Malacca] are blue and white porcelain, coloured beads, coloured taffetas, gold and silver. In the seventh year of Yung-lo (1409), the imperial envoy, the eunuch Cheng-Ho, and his lieutenants conferred [on the ruler], by Imperial command, a pair of silver seals, and a head-dress, girdle and robe. They also set up a tablet [stating that] Malacca had been raised to the rank of a kingdom, but at first Siam refused to recognize it. In the thirteenth year [of Yung-lo] (1415), the ruler [of Malacca, desirous of] showing his gratitude for the Imperial bounty, crossed the ocean and, accompanied by his consort and son, came to court with tribute. The Emperor rewarded him [appropriately], whereupon [the ruler of Malacca] returned to his [own] country.

IV *Malacca-Chinese Relations during the Fifteenth and early Sixteenth Centuries*

The following reading is an extract from the *Ming Shih*, or official *History of the Ming Dynasty 1368-1644*, composed in the eighteenth century but based on earlier official and non-official records. The English text is taken from W. P. Groeneveldt's 'Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca: Compiled from Chinese Sources'. [*Verhandeligen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap*, xxxix, Batavia, 1877, 129-33.]

MALACCA is situated at the south of Champa; with a fair wind one may arrive in eight days at the strait of Lingga and then it is two days more to the west. It is supposed to be the old country Tun-sun, and the Kora Fu-sa . . . of the T'ang dynasty.

In the 10th month of the year 1403 the emperor sent the eunuch Yin Ch'ing as envoy to this country, to bring presents of silk woven with golden flowers, curtains adorned with gold, and other things. There was no king in the country and it was not called a kingdom, but it belonged to Siam, to which it paid an annual tribute of forty taels of gold. When Yin Ch'ing arrived there, he spoke of the power and rank of China and of his intention to take the chief with him. The chief, called Pai-li-su-ra, was very glad and sent envoys to go to the court along with the imperial envoy and presented as tribute products of the country.

In the 9th month of the year 1405 these envoys arrived at the capital; the Emperor spoke in praising terms of their master, appointed him king of the country of Malacca and gave him a commission, a seal, a suit of silk clothes and a yellow umbrella, whilst Yin Ch'ing was ordered to go there again and bring all these presents. The envoys said that their king was aware of his duty and wished his country to be a district of the empire, bringing tribute every year, and that he had therefore requested that his mountains might be made guardians of the country. The Emperor gave his assent; he prepared an inscription with a piece of verse at the end and ordered a tablet to be erected on those mountains.

When Yin Ch'ing arrived to carry out all these orders, the king was still more pleased and treated him with even more honours than before. In the 9th month of the year 1407 he sent envoys to bring tribute and in the next year, when Chêng Ho came to his country, he again sent envoys with tribute to go with him to China.

In 1411 the king came with his wife, his son and his ministers, altogether five hundred and forty persons; when he had arrived at the

suburbs of the capital, the emperor ordered two officers to go and receive him; he was lodged in the building of the Board of Rites and received in audience by the emperor, who entertained him in person, whilst his wife and the others were entertained in another place. Every day bullocks, goats and wine were sent to him from the imperial buttery. The Emperor gave the king two suits of clothes embroidered with golden dragons and one suit with *kilin's*; further golden and silver articles, curtains, coverlets, mattresses [*sic*] etc. everything complete, whilst his wife and the rest also got presents.

When they were going away, the king was presented with a girdle adorned with precious stones, insignia of his dignity, horses and saddles, and his wife got a cap and dresses.

On the moment of starting he was entertained by the emperor and got again a girdle with precious stones, horses with saddles, a hundred ounces of gold, five hundred ounces of silver, four hundred thousand *koan*¹ of paper-money and 2600 strings of copper cash; further 300 pieces of silk gauze, a thousand pieces of plain silk and two pieces of silk with golden flowers. His wife, his son, his nephew and his suite were entertained separately and got presents according to their rank. Afterwards the officers of the Board of Rites entertained them twice at two different post-stations on their road.

In the year 1412 his nephew came to present thanks; when he went away the emperor sent a eunuch with him, who came back with new tribute-bearers.

In the year 1414 the king's son, called Mu-kan-sa-u-ti-r-sha, came to court and told that his father had died; he was appointed to succeed him and presented with gold and silks. After this time they brought tribute every year or every two years.

In the year 1419 the king came to court with his wife, his son and his ministers, in order to present thanks for the imperial favours; on going away he stated that Siam seemed inclined to attack his country, and the Emperor accordingly sent an order to Siam, which that country obeyed.

In 1424 Sri Ma-ha-la succeeded after the death of his father and came to court with his wife, his son and his ministers.

In the year 1431 three envoys arrived, who said that Siam was planning an attack on their country, that the king wanted to come himself but was afraid of being detained by them, that he wished to send a report but had nobody who could write it, and that he had ordered them therefore to avail themselves of a tribute-vessel from Sumatra, to go and bring this communication. The Emperor sent them back to their country in the ships of Chêng Ho, to whom a decree was given for the king of Siam, ordering him to live in good

¹ A *koan* of paper-money was equal to a string of a thousand cash. From the liberal amount of paper-money given, we would think that it was at a considerable discount.

harmony with his neighbours and not to act against the orders of the court. When these three envoys arrived they brought nothing as tribute, and the officers of the Board of Rites submitted that, according to the rule, they should not get any presents; but the Emperor replied: "These men have come many thousands of miles to complain of an injustice; it would not do to give them nothing." Accordingly dresses and silks were given to them, just as to other tribute-bearers.

In the year 1433 the king came to court with his wife, his son and his ministers. When he arrived at Nanking, the weather was already cold; the Emperor ordered him to wait till spring before coming up to the capital and moreover sent a letter in praise of the king and his wife. When they came to the capital, the Emperor entertained them and gave them presents as customary, and when they returned an officer was charged to provide a vessel for them.

Afterwards the king again sent his younger brother to bring as tribute camels, horses and products of the country; at that time the emperor Ying-tsung had already ascended the throne (1435), and as the king was still in Canton, he sent him a laudatory letter and ordered the Governor to let him go back to his country. As this officer was just sending back the envoys of Champa, Kalikut and nine other countries, the king returned along with these.

In the year 1445 envoys arrived, who asked that the king Sri Parameswara Dewa Shah, murdered in 1446 might obtain a commission for ruling the country, a dress embroidered with snakes and an umbrella, in order that he might govern the people of his land. They also said that the king intended to come himself, but that his suite was very numerous and therefore he asked for a large vessel, in order to be able to make the sea-voyage. The Emperor granted all their requests.

In the year 1456 Sulthan Wu-ta-fu-na-sha [Muzaffar Shah] sent as tribute horses and products of his country, and asked to be invested as king. The Emperor issued a decree by which an officer was sent there for the purpose, but some time afterwards the same king sent tribute again and reported that the cap and the girdle, which had been bestowed upon him, were burned; the emperor then ordered that a cap of leather, a dress, a daily dress of red silk gauze, a girdle adorned with rhinoceros-horn and a cap of gauze should be given to him.

In the year 1459 this king's son, Su-tan Wang-su-sha, sent envoys to bring tribute, on which the Emperor ordered some officers to go and invest him as king. After two years the officers of the Board of Rites reported that these imperial envoys, on the second day of their voyage, had met with a storm, which disabled the ship; they had been tossed about for six days and were then rescued by people of the coast-guard. The imperial letter was saved, but the goods had all been damaged by water, for which reason they requested that new ones

should be given. The Emperor granted what was asked and ordered the envoys to go again.

In the year 1474 the censor Ch'ên Chün went to Champa with an imperial commission to invest the king there, but on his arrival he found the country occupied by Annamese soldiers, so that he could not enter it; he then went to Malacca, with the goods he had brought, and ordered its king to send tribute; when, subsequently, his envoys arrived at the capital, the Emperor was much pleased and issued a decree in which they were praised.

In the 9th month of the year 1481 envoys arrived with the report that the envoys of their country, who had returned from China in 1469, had been driven by a storm on the coast of Annam, where many of their people were killed; the rest had been made slaves and the younger ones had further undergone castration. They also told that the Annamese now occupied Champa and that they wanted to conquer their country too, but that Malacca, remembering that they all were subjects of the emperor, hitherto had abstained from reciprocating these hostilities.

At the same time the envoys with the tribute of Annam arrived also, and the envoys of Malacca requested permission to argue the question with them before the court, but the Board of War submitted that the affair was already old and that it was of no use to investigate it any more. When therefore the envoys of Annam returned, the Emperor gave them a letter in which their king was reproved, and Malacca received instructions to raise soldiers and resist by force, whenever it was attacked by Annam.

Some time afterwards the Emperor sent two officers with a commission to invest the son of the late king, Ma-ha-mu-sa [Mahmud Shah?], as king of the country. These two officers were lost at sea, on which the Emperor appointed officers to sacrifice to them and took care of their families; for their suite sacrifices were performed by the officials on the sea-coast and their families were also provided for. Two other envoys were then sent in their place, of whom one again died at Canton, on which the Emperor ordered the Governor of Canton to select one of his officers to succeed the deceased, in order to finish this investiture.

In the year 1508 an envoy called Tuan Hadji came to present tribute. His interpreter was a Chinese from the province of Kiang-si, who had run away from China in order to escape punishment for a crime and fled to their country. This man, along with other Chinese, made a plan to kill and rob the envoy and then to run away to the west-coast of Borneo in order to seek for treasures; accordingly he made a quarrel with his people, when they had returned to Canton, and with the assistance of his fellow-conspirators he killed all of them, taking away everything they had. When this event became known,

the guilty parties were soon arrested and brought to the capital, where the interpreter was cut to pieces, others were decapitated, one fined three hundred picols of rice and the rest banished, whilst the officials of the Board of Rites, who had allowed themselves to be bribed, were all punished. The prime ministers at that time, considering that this crime had been committed by a man from Kiang-si, diminished the annual number of graduates for this province with fifty and no man from this province got an appointment in the capital.

Afterwards the Franks (Portuguese) came with soldiers and conquered the country; the king Sultan Mamat ran away and sent envoys to inform the imperial government of this disaster. At that time the Emperor Shih-tsung sat on the throne; he issued a decree upbraiding the Franks, told them to go back to their own country and ordered the kings of Siam and other countries to assist their neighbour in his need; none of these obeyed however and so the kingdom of Malacca was destroyed.

V *Chinese Relations with Brunei and Sarawak*

Chinese contracts with the western coast of Borneo date back many centuries. Old Chinese coins have been found at the mouth of the Sarawak River, and a number of early trading sites have been identified between Tanjong Serabang and Santubong in the First Division of Sarawak. The presence of large quantities of Chinese pottery sherds may well testify to the magnitude of the junk-trade between China and western Borneo even in the pre-Ming period, at which time Chinese pottery and other wares were traded for gold, camphor, canes, beeswax and hornbill casques. References to Borneo in some of the earliest Chinese records are disputed, but the geographical gazetteer, *Tung Hsi Yang K'ao*, which was compiled in Fukien Province in the early years of the seventeenth century on the basis of hearsay and earlier records, and whose preface is dated 1618, refers most probably to Brunei. However some of the internal references in the account, such as the story of the Chinese who is reported to have gone there in the early fifteenth century and reigned as king, cannot now be verified. [Groeneveldt, 'Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca', *V.B.G.* xxxix, 1877, 101-3.]

BRUNEI is the same as Po-lo; it is the last land of the eastern ocean and the beginning of the western sea. In the year 669 the king sent envoys to court, together with those of Huanwang (Siam), but since intercourse has ceased for a long time.

In the year 1406 the king sent his minister to the court, with a tribute of products of the country. The Emperor made presents of embroidered silk to the king and his wife.

It is told that the present king is a man from Fukien, who followed Chêng Ho when he went to this country and who settled there; for this reason there is a stone with a Chinese inscription near the king's palace.

In former years this country has been attacked by the Portuguese; the people retired into the interior and threw poison into the river, which, floating down with the current, killed a large number of their enemies; on this they went away and attacked Manilla [*sic*].

Formerly their city had a stone wall and a wooden wall; the stone wall was demolished in order to fill up the island Ch'ang-yau¹ and shut out the sea; the wooden wall exists until now.

The king shaves his head and wraps around it a cloth embroidered with gold; he has two swords at his side and when he goes out, he walks and is followed by more than 200 men. His relatives are called Pangeran and are only second in rank to the king himself.

The king has a golden seal, weighing 16 taels; on the seal are Chinese seal-characters and on the top is the image of an animal; it is said to be a present from the time of Yung-lo (1403-1424); when the natives marry, they ask for an impression of this seal on their backs. I fear however that it is only represented as a present from the Emperor, in order to impress the people, but that it has not come from China at all.

In their temples they always sacrifice living animals.

The people are not allowed to eat pork; who does so is punished with death.

In this country are the Mau-su² who go to all places as pirates; half of the goods and the men they bring back with them is given to the king.

In this country there is a temple³ in which three men are worshipped as deities, who were superintendents of public works and of the treasury at the time the country was founded; they fell in battle and were buried together on this spot; a temple was erected over their tomb and when a merchant-vessel arrives, it must kill a cow or roast fowls and offer at the same time melati- and other flowers; if any man in the ship does not worship, he becomes ill. When the people of the country go out trading, they make an offering of flowers, and if they come back having made profit, they take two cocks, to whose feet they attach knives, and let them fight before the tomb; if one of these fowls is killed, they thank the deities for it, which is certainly very curious.

¹ Lit. the 'long-loined' island, perhaps Pulau Muara before the Brunei River.

² This was at the time the common name of the Chinese for the Borneo pirates.

³ Called the temple Fow-na-chiau.

The trade is carried on in the following way. When a Chinese ship arrives, presents are sent in to the king. The trade is superintended by a head-writer, a second-writer, a head-assistant, a second assistant, a functionary for the weights and measures, etc. It is very difficult to get out of the river and it is necessary to do so with spring-tides; sometimes, before the trading transactions are finished, the ships have to go out first and wait outside.

VI *The Malacca Sultanate during the Fifteenth Century*

The following reading is extracted from the standard account of the Malacca Sultanate written by one of the great British scholars of Malaya, R. J. Wilkinson. The account is based largely upon Malay sources, especially *Sjjarah Melayu*, or the *Malay Annals*, and describes something of the customs and organization of the Malacca Sultanate at the height of its glory. [‘The Malacca Sultanate’, *Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society (JMBRAS)*, XIII, 2, 1935, 29–33.]

AT the head of the State stood the Ruler. In [Muslim] Pasai he had been known as “Sultan”. . . .¹ Mohammed Shah thought it wise to emphasize a king’s position by sumptuary laws, many of which must have been borrowed from Sri Vijaya. The King never slept, he “reposed”; he was never ill, he “had maladies”; he never ate, he “regaled himself”. He never walked; he was “borne about on high”, preferably on the back of an elephant but in days of eclipse on the shoulders of a slave. Nor could he go unattended. If he went on an elephant the Minister of War sat on its head while an Admiral or General bore the Sword of State behind him. If he went in a hammock-litter his bearers were Ministers and Chiefs of the highest rank and he had a string of chamberlains, insignia-bearers, swordsmen and spearmen in the rear. Before him was borne the metal standard of the State; and before the standard were arranged the bandsmen: gongs, drums, fifes, the royal kettledrum and the silver trumpet with its curious note that Malays liken to the call of a dragon. That was etiquette. In practice, he often went about incognito and rarely for any worthy purpose.

Mohammed Shah was also the first to bring to Malacca the marks

¹ A title not borne, Tomé Pires says, by any Malaccan ruler before Muzaffar Shah. The first ruler of Malacca as a Muslim was called Megat Iskandar Shah. The second ruler took the old regal title of the Sailendras of Sri Vijaya, namely Sri Maharaja, until becoming a Muslim he was styled Muhammad Shah. He also bore the usual Malay title for a ruler.

of distinction known as *larangan*. He made white the colour of the Royal umbrella and allowed no one to be borne in a litter except himself. He also forbade others to build balconies or rest their ridge-poles on pillars based directly on the ground. Without his permission no one could wear ornaments of gold or use the colour yellow either in attire or to fringe cushions and mats. He might confer on one favoured person the right to wear a kris sheathed in gold, on another the right to wear golden anklets, on a third the right to wear a yellow coat. As such distinctions were seen at once by everybody, they were prized highly; and in a small State with an empty treasury it was often easier to pay in honours than in cash. All through Malay history we come across the bestowal of privileges comparable to the right of a grandee of Spain to wear his headdress in his sovereign's presence. One notable case is that of the hero Hang Tuah who was exempted altogether from sumptuary rules and allowed to wear anything he liked. Another was the case of a wise old *bendahara* or prime-minister who was presented with a royal hammock-litter, which he put away at once in a place of honour where the world could see it. "Why not go about in it," said his wondering family. "To go about in it," said the *bendahara*, "is to seem to set myself up as an equal or rival of the King; it is to let my vanity override my prudence."

The King made it also a rule that he should hold his Court, installations, banquets and levees in a hall of audience where the ritual was laid down to the smallest detail. The King was seated at the head of a long raised dais down the sides of which were arranged the highest Officers of State in order of precedence. Nearest royalty were the *bendahara* or Prime Minister and the *tēmenggong* or Minister of War. At lower levels on each side of the dais were young men of princely or noble family who had no official position. Behind royalty were drawn up the insignia-bearers headed by the bearer of the Sword of State, the bearer being either the *laksamana* who commanded at sea or the *dato' Sēri Bija Diraja* who was captain of the guard. The personage to be honoured with an audience—were he an envoy from a foreign State or the captain of a visiting ship or a Malacca Malay about to receive some distinction—was presented formally and moved up the dais with many marks of deference till he crouched humbly at the feet of the king. No one was admitted to the Audience Hall unless dressed suitably, with his kris worn in front, his sarong arranged with a loose hanging end and a scarf flung over both shoulders. All court-attendants were under the orders of the *pēnghulu bendahara* or Chief Treasury Officer, but the magnates were directed to their places by the Minister of War.

On the two great religious festivals, the feast after the great fast and the feast after the pilgrimage, the King was wont to show himself formally to his people. In Java he still does this on a special terrace

overlooking the *alun-alun* or esplanade before the palace; in Malacca (as in modern Perak) he did it in a special pavilion built for the occasion and raised high above the ground so that all could see. But the rite was hedged in with formalities and preceded by various processions: on the 27th night of the Fasting Month the royal praying-mat was borne with all honour to the mosque, the king following later; so also the royal litter would sometimes be taken in procession while the Sultan followed on an elephant. Wherever the king might go in State it was the duty of the *bendahara* or prime minister to await and receive him.

A Sultan who wished to escape some of the cares of office might appoint a King-Coadjutor who enjoyed the same honours less some abatement such as a yellow flag instead of a white or the omission of some instrument from his royal band. Princes of the blood were known as *Raja* and could wear the royal yellow, but they were not all on the same footing: those born of royal mothers ranked above those born of women of lower rank; those who bore princely titles of their own were thought superior to those known only by personal names; and those born after their father's accession to the throne may have enjoyed higher consideration than those born earlier. In times of trouble such rules might easily be broken. Certainly in Malacca it was better for a Sultan's son to be born of a lady of the *bendahara's* family than to be born of a princess. Mansur Shah, Alaedin Riayat Shah, Mahmud Shah, Alaedin II and perhaps Mudzafar Shah were sons of such ladies. The power of the *bendahara* might well override the claim through a mother's royal blood.

The *bendahara* held the position of Prime Minister and Premier Noble of the State; and as the author of the Malay Annals was himself a *bendahara* he dwells with great gusto on the dignity of his high office. He either dined by himself or with princes of the blood-royal and shared no meal with men of lower rank. Among the great Officers of State he alone was excused either waiting on the King or carrying some item of his regalia. On great festival-days he was carried in a litter to be received in audience by the King; and as he approached the Palace all its officers came down the stairs to greet him. Though not of the blood-royal in Malacca he was far the greatest figure in the State, leading the army when he wished to serve in war and sitting as the highest Court of Justice when he wished to try a case. He was Viceroy, King's Deputy, Grand Vizier.

After the Prime Minister came the *Tēmnggong* (or Minister of War and Justice) and the *Pēnghulu Bēndahara*, the Chief Treasury Officer or Chancellor of the Exchequer. The latter controlled all the Revenue and Customs Officers and looked after the Palace buildings and equipment; the former was Master of the Ceremonies at all official receptions. Both were in close attendance on their royal Master.

Next came the four mandarins (*mantëri*) or Heads of Departments; and, as time went on, certain titles became linked with definite duties and were granted to those who carried out the duties in question. Technically, however, office and title were distinct things. Then there were many minor officials: heralds, chamberlains, pages, guardsmen, —call them what we will. In time, whole classes of the population might be given some nominal rank. Nearly half the inhabitants of Negri Sembilan are *biduanda* or honorary pages to the King.

Then there were the titled gentry. A Malay title is either a prefix indicating some form of noble descent and given to all who can claim it by right of birth, or else it is made up of two or more honorifics bestowed by the Sultan upon some individual whom he wishes to honour. It has no suggestion of anything official, territorial or feudal, though particular honorifics came in course of time to be linked with the holders of definite duties or Chiefdoms. Sultan Mohammed divided all distinctions into two classes: those beginning with the higher honorific *sëri* and those beginning with the lower honorific *sang*; and he laid down rules as to the ceremonies accompanying investiture in either class. Below these titles came nobles by birth only; below nobles came the gentry and commoners; below commoners came slaves. But, as we have seen, the Sultan might also confer special marks of distinction unconnected with titles, such as the right to wear a certain dress or gold ornament or to carry some article of the regalia. Any honour of this sort was prized greatly.

A man whom the King wished to honour was led in procession to the Palace-gate. If he was to receive a title of the humbler sort he walked there under an umbrella,—blue or black according to his rank, —and was followed by musicians playing one or two of the humbler instruments of the royal band. If he was to be given an office at Court or a command in the Army he rode on horseback with an umbrella over him of purple, red or green, and two fifes and drums playing some sort of tune behind him. If he was a prince of the blood or was about to have high office conferred upon him he rode on an elephant with a yellow umbrella held over his head and the Sultan's sacred kettledrums thudding dully behind. In exceptional cases—as when a sovereign was to be installed—he might have a white umbrella above him while the sacred trumpet blared its one melancholy note to let the people learn that a King was passing by.

When the dignitary reached the palace-gate he dismounted and was greeted by a chamberlain chosen from the family of the *Muntah Lëmbu*, the hereditary custodians of Ceremony. The chamberlain unrolled a scroll on which were written the words of installation and read them out in a language that no one understood, not even the reader (for it was Sanskrit), but we are told that it was "very sweet to listen to." He then folded up the scroll and put it in the hands of others to be

covered by an embroidered napkin for presentation to the new magnate. Armed with this warrant the new magnate was allowed to pass the gate and enter the palace where a special sitting-mat was spread for him at some spot chosen by the Sultan. Then came the robing. If the man invested was to be a *bendahara* five court-orderlies came forward, each bearing a silver platter with a garment upon it: a headcloth, a coat, a sarong, a sash and a plaid. If he was to be a prince or noble of high rank he was greeted with four silver platters, the sash being omitted; if he was to be a dignitary of the second grade he received vestures on three silver platters: a headcloth, a coat and a sarong. Humbler officials could hardly wear less without discourtesy to the King, so they also received three garments but not on silver platters; their garments were given them by a court-slave who draped the cloth round the shoulders of the recipient. The recipient then kissed the garments and retired to put them on.

When the dignitary has been robed he came forward again and was invested solemnly with a *pontoh*, an armlet or bracelet showing the rank he held, for in those days—not now—all men of title wore these badges of honour. These *pontoh* were of many kinds. Some were of gold, dragon-shaped and talismanic; some were jewelled; some of plain gold; some of silver only; some were worn in pairs; some on one arm only. After receiving his *pontoh* the new magnate was admitted to the royal presence to do homage to his King. The Annals do not describe this part of the ceremony but leave us to picture it from what we see to-day. A Malay Chief begins by pacing with slow steps between the lines of courtiers seated on either side of the raised passageway (*sēri balai*). After each step he halts, bows low, and raises his hands prayerfully to his forehead. As he comes closer he drops to the ground and worms his way forward till he reaches the Sultan whose knees he kisses or whose foot he places on his head. The Sultan then sprinkles him with sacrificial rice-paste (*tīpong tawar*) to keep away all ghostly powers of evil; and the new magnate, having done his loyal duty, moves back as humbly as he came.

There was ritual also at his departure. He was escorted to the gateway by those who had received him and sent off in honour with music and umbrellas as when he came. In Perak he has to cross the Perak River and for seven days may not look on the Ruler or his palace or anything that is his. Violation of this taboo is believed to mean death either to the King or to the Chief.

In connection with all Oriental etiquette it must be put on record that European visitors were expected to observe it, did not observe it, and have often been commended by historians for showing a proper sense of their own dignity. There is something to be said on the other side. Our own expressions "Your obedient servant" can be subscribed to in letter-writing without protest, and the Malay word

sahaya, used by all Europeans as a first person singular means much the same thing. But the great Dutch Governor-General, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, when asked so to write to the Emperor of Java protested violently that he served no man save the ruler of Holland; and . . . Sir Stamford Raffles refused to allow the Sultan of Jogja to take precedence of him even in Jogja itself. Who can presume to criticize great men? But many will feel sympathy with the Malacca *bendahara* who saw his followers flare up angrily at the loud and familiar ways of the Portuguese Thexeira, and then calmed them with the words, "Leave the man alone,—he knows no better."

VII *The Structure of Trade in Malacca at the End of the Fifteenth Century*

The structure and organization of trade in Malacca during the period of the sultanate and in the years following its conquest by the Portuguese in 1511 has been analysed brilliantly by the Dutch scholar, M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs, of the General State Archives, The Hague, in her book *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630*. [The Hague, 1962, 36-41.] The following reading is a brief extract from this book describing the commercial organization of the sultanate in the years immediately prior to its conquest by the Portuguese.

At the end of the 15th century hundreds of merchants from Arabia, Persia, India, Further India, and China, as well as from the Indonesian regions closer at hand, flocked together every year in Malacca, which was then the centre of inter-Asian trade. Like a rich and colourful pageant under the blazing tropical sun, this busy eastern market made an indelible impression on the first Europeans who visited Malacca. . . .

Chinese, Javanese, Klings, Bengali, Arabs, Persians, and Gujarati, to mention only the most important, regularly visited the Malaccan markets. The Gujarati in particular came in large numbers. As the most able seafarers of those days and in that part of the world, they manned the ships of Gujarat, which was the most important trading country on the west coast of India.

Besides the seamen, there were the actual traders, merchants in a large way of business who had undertaken the journey with considerable capital or valuable cargo, factors of prominent foreign merchants who stayed at home themselves and carried on their business by proxy, and, finally, lesser traders who had embarked with small freights only.

As for the merchants established in Malacca, the large-scale traders were to be found chiefly among the Klings and Javanese. They sometimes succeeded in acquiring positions of considerable power if they were authorized to act as the representatives of their countrymen who stood under their own jurisdiction.

The original population and the foreign traders from overseas all lived in separate residential districts, as the Portuguese author Godinho de Eredia relates in his description of Malacca in his own day (early 17th century). But this arrangement clearly goes back to the days of the sultans. To the North of the Malacca river lay Upeh, the big commercial quarter, itself consisting of two separate districts, in one of which lived the people who came from northwestern Asia, and in the other people from the East—Chinese, as well as Javanese from Tuban and Japara and from west Java and Palembang. Javanese from the port of Grise in northern Java lived in the district of Ilir, which was situated to the South of the river. As the principal purveyors of foodstuffs, the Javanese had a bazaar at the mouth of the river for the sale of their commodities. Since most of the merchants also had accommodation for selling their wares in front of their houses, the two districts of Upeh and Ilir, seen from the sea, stretched out along the coast like one long bazaar. As of old, the Malay fisher-folk were housed in the district of Sabak in the marshy lands along the river.

The harbour itself enjoyed a good reputation. Lying in the narrowest part of the Straits of Malacca and accessible in any monsoon, it was free of storms and therefore more sheltered than ports like Samudra-Pasè and Pidië on the east coast of Sumatra, which were exposed to the northeast trade winds. And having no dangerous shallows like those off Singapore, it provided a naturally safe anchorage for foreign shipping in any kind of weather.

The monsoons and trade winds enabled traders from East and West to meet one another in Malacca. Although the Indian ships could leave Cambay from January onwards, the best time for them to sail was in March when they could avail themselves of the northeast monsoon. The later time was probably chosen as a rule so that traders from elsewhere (who also had to depend on favourable winds) could still embark in Gujarati ships. Only a short time could be spent in Malacca because it was necessary to be back on the Indian coast again by the end of May before it was sealed off by the southwest monsoon. From May to the end of October, while this monsoon was blowing in the Indian Ocean, the arrival or departure of ships was impossible.

During the last months of the old year, [and] the first of the new, the Chinese arrived in Malacca with the northeast trade wind. If they were early, they could go on to Java after discharging part of their cargo in Malacca. So the Chinese had a longer respite than the Ind-

ians, but they too had to leave Malacca by the end of June in order to sail back with the southeast monsoon.

Ships from Java, also making use of the southeast monsoon, appeared in Malacca between May and September. They then had to wait until January so as to return with a favourable northwesterly wind, although this was sometimes possible as early as December or even the end of November. During their stay in Malacca the Javanese bartered their wares for goods brought by Indians, Chinese, and people of other nationalities. This explains why Malacca was a stapling port. The merchandise had to be stored for part of the year for resale to customers arriving later. It also explains why trade on a considerable scale came into being among the merchants established permanently in Malacca.

The period of greatest activity on the Malacca market seems to have been between December and March, when ships were arriving from western Asia and the Far East. During the rest of the year, Javanese and other traders from the Indonesian area helped to keep the commercial centre busy.

... [T]he town's economic basis was a narrow one. On top of the fact that there were few domestic products suitable for export, the amount of land given over to agriculture was all in the immediate vicinity of the town and was totally inadequate to meet the needs of the steadily expanding population.

There was no industry worth mentioning in Malacca. Through contact with the mercantile community, some development took place in handicrafts such as woodwork and the forging of arms, but the resulting products were chiefly for the home market and not for export.

Apart from gold and tin, which came as tribute from the subordinate states, Malacca's only domestic product was fish. An extensive trade, particularly in dried and salted varieties, was carried on throughout the whole archipelago, but even then a large proportion of the fish came from the east coast of Sumatra.

From time immemorial, of course, the Malay fisherfolk had been acquainted with shipbuilding, and an abundance of raw materials for this industry could be obtained from the dense forests on the peninsula. The crews for the sultans' navies were provided by the Celates, the seafaring peoples on the coast of Malaya who [are known]... for the important part they played in the foundation and development of the state of Malacca. According to the Annals, their fleets sometimes consisted of forty to a hundred three-masters, but these reports are undoubtedly exaggerated and, for ease in manoeuvring, the ships must have been chiefly small, light, fast-sailing vessels. They were used exclusively for waging war and did not go beyond the Malay Peninsula or the opposite coast of Sumatra. The large cargo vessels or junks with holds came mostly from Pegu, which

also supplied junks to Java. The Malaccan shipbuilding industry was apparently not capable of constructing deep-sea vessels, for when sultan Mansur Shah planned to make a pilgrimage to Mecca he had very large junks, suitable for the long sea voyage, built in Pegu and Java, both lands being renowned for their excellent shipbuilding. This would also seem to explain why when Godinho de Eredia made his survey of Malay shipping at the beginning of the 17th century he only came across small, light ships in Malacca, vessels with two masts and oars, which did not voyage beyond the coasts of the Malay Peninsula and the neighbouring islands. These ships were not strong enough for the ocean-going trade, from which Eredia concluded that the Malays did not sail upon the ocean at all. We know from Pires, however, that in the time of the sultans there was definitely a Malaccan shipping trade and that this extended westwards to Coromandel and perhaps also to Ceylon and from there to Bengal, Pegu and Tenasserim, and eastwards over even greater distances as far as the ports of China. But most of these junks must have been of foreign construction. A century of Portuguese monopoly policy apparently put an end to the Malaccan junk trade. Yet it is odd that in the sources up to, and including, Eredia there is no tradition at all of long distance shipping of a national character. This is yet another indication that the Malaccan junk trade was chiefly in the hands of the foreign merchants established in Malacca and that the Malays did not build these ships themselves, even though they provided the crews and the sultans were sometimes the owners of the ships.

Malacca's prosperity was based entirely on trade. For its convenience there was a regular governing body and a good judicial system which managed to guarantee a fairly large degree of legal security. The requirements of the foreign merchants were met by looking after the port and by building warehouses which, because of the danger of fire, were frequently underground cellars. The streets were wide, but in this town with its predominantly wooden houses and thatched roofs—only the better-class houses had tiled roofs—the danger of fire was ever present. Fixed customs duties, fixed weights and measures, and coinage, all served the same purpose—the furtherance of the economic activity of the port.

The accepted coinage in Malacca was tin. Gold and silver were also used for exchange transactions, not as coinage, however, but as marketable merchandise. These coins bore the name of the reigning sultan while the coins of previous sultans also retained their validity. Moreover, foreign coins from Cambay, Hormuz and Pasè were also current in Malacca. Although money changing is not specifically mentioned in the sources, it is fair to assume that it must have been practised in Malacca since Varthema (who is not entirely reliable, however) counted 500 money-changers in one street in Pidič alone! Pires gives

a very detailed summary of the standard weights and measures in Malacca. For various goods there was a fixed scale of weights....

The bureaucratic organization which created the conditions for economic prosperity must have grown up slowly, although tradition ascribes it to Malacca's second ruler. Because of the importance of various offices connected with trade, and in view of the fact that Pires supplies details which are not mentioned by any other writer, his account of the governing organization may be summarized briefly as follows.

There were various important offices which will be described presently. One which was not permanent but occupied only on special occasions was that of the *Paduca Raja*. Pires compares him to a Portuguese captain-general, a kind of viceroy to whom all the other officials were subordinate, but when there was no *Paduca Raja* the *bendahara* was the highest official in the land. According to Albuquerque, the office of *Paduca Raja* could sometimes be combined with that of *bendahara*. This *bendahara*, a sort of Prime Minister, was in the first place Chancellor and Lord of the Treasury, but also Chief Justice for all civil and criminal affairs. He could condemn people of all ranks to death; not even noblemen or persons of foreign nationality were outside his jurisdiction. But before passing sentence he was obliged to inform the ruler, and together they reached a decision on the case after consultation with the other two high officials, the *laksamana* or Admiral of the Fleet, and the *tumenggung*, a legal official. So supreme jurisdiction was not exclusively in the hands of the ruler of Malacca.

The *bendahara* families were so respected that various sultans married into them and, thanks to the influence and support of these powerful officials, the sons of such marriages usually retained the upper hand in questions of succession even though other sons of the sultan had a better claim to the estate. This in turn served to increase the power of the *bendahara* "kingmaker".

The *laksamana* or Admiral of the Fleet had command of all the naval forces at sea and was of particular importance in wartime. The crews of the various ships were under his jurisdiction. At the same time it was his task to safeguard the king, and all the nobles and court officials owed him obedience. The *tumenggung*, whose authority only extended to the town of Malacca, had charge of the guard and jurisdiction over the town. All criminal cases came before him in the first instance and from there went on to the *bendahara*. The *tumenggung* was a very important personage as far as trade was concerned since he received all the import and export duties. According to Albuquerque, the *tumenggung* also had jurisdiction over foreigners. In the Annals the *tumenggung* appears as a sort of Minister of War and Justice. At court he was in charge of all ceremonies and official receptions, in which capacity the foreign merchants must have come to

know him best because of their audiences at court, while they could also be summoned to appear before him if they infringed the laws of Malacca.

VIII *The Maritime Laws of Malacca*

Among the most remarkable laws of Malacca at this period were the so-called *Maritime Laws* which were probably codified sometime between A.D. 1488–1510. The following 'outline' English translation of the laws has been rendered by Sir Richard Winstedt and Dr. P. E. de Josselin de Jong. 'The Maritime Laws of Malacca', *JMBRAS*, XXIX, 3, 1956, 51–9.]

§ I. THESE are the Laws given by Sultan Mahmud Shah, son of Sang Purba who descended from Mount Si-Guntang (Maha-Meru) and became Ruler of Malacca. Know these laws, in order that all matters be peacefully settled.

§ II. The sea-captains desiring a code of maritime law, the Dato Bēndahara, Paduka Sēri Maharaja Mangkubumi put their request to Sultan Muhammad [*sic*] Shah. The Sultan consented. This code, which was composed in the days when Malacca was still powerful, under the rule of Mahmud Shah, is now set down in writing. . . .

§ 1. The captain [*Nakhoda*] is as a king on board his ship. The steersman [*Jurumudi*] is as the Prime Minister [*Bēndahara*]. The officer in charge of casting anchor and taking soundings [*Jurubatu*] is as the chief of police [*Tēmenggong*]. The petty-officers in charge at starboard and port [*Tukang kanan & kiri*] are as the courtiers [*sida-sida*]. They co-operate with the chief petty officer [*Tukang agong*]. All petty officers, boatswains [*Gantong layar*] and supercargoes [*Sēnawi*] are under the captain's command. The sailors [*Awak pērahu*] are under the chief petty officer's command.

If a sailor resists a command of his chief petty officer, the *Jurubatu* shall punish him with seven lashes; but the flogger may not lift his arm above the shoulder. For a second offence, he is punished with four lashes at the fore-hatch.

The punishment for insubordination towards a boatswain or supercargo is three lashes.

§ 2. The punishment for adultery on board ship is death to both offenders. If the offenders are both unmarried, fornication is punished by 100 lashes, and the offenders are obliged to marry. If the man is unwilling to do so, he is fined 1½ tael of gold.

If a free man commits fornication with a female slave, he pays a fine equal to the slave's price. But if this female slave has been so long

in her master's possession as to be practically his wife, the master may claim either a fine or the death penalty.

If a free man commits adultery with a sailor's wife, he is put to death. As to the wife, her husband may put her to death. If he does not wish to do so, she becomes the unalienable slave [*ulor*] of the captain.

A male and a female slave who commit fornication are whipped at the fore-hatch.

§ 3. If someone goes ashore on the captain's business, and then makes a chance find of gold or silver, etc., the captain may claim the entire treasure trove, and award the finder what he thinks fit.

If the finder was ashore on his own business, he keeps one-third of the treasure trove, and the captain gets two-thirds. If the finder is a slave, or the captain's debtor, the captain gets all.

If the captain himself makes a find, he retains $\frac{3}{4}$, and $\frac{1}{4}$ is shared by the crew.

Var.: If a supercargo goes ashore and there captures a runaway, the latter becomes the captain's property. If the runaway was in possession of valuables, the captain gets $\frac{5}{6}$, the finder $\frac{1}{6}$.

In the case of treasure-trove, if the finder is a supercargo [*Kitwi*], he gets $\frac{2}{3}$, the captain $\frac{1}{3}$. If the finder is supercargo [*turun pēnukun*], he gets $\frac{1}{2}$, the captain $\frac{1}{2}$. If the finder is the captain's debtor, he gets $\frac{1}{3}$, the captain $\frac{2}{3}$. If the finder is the captain's slave, the captain gets all.

§ 4. A captured runaway slave is given to the captain. If the slave's owner is found, he must pay the captain $\frac{1}{2}$ the slave's price. If the owner is not to be found, the slave remains in the captain's service. If the captain decides to sell the slave, he must have the transaction witnessed by the crew and inhabitants of the place where the transaction takes place. If the owner is subsequently found, he gets $\frac{1}{2}$ the slave's price.

§ 5. (a) Who [*ever*] rescues shipwrecked mariners can claim $\frac{1}{2}$ a tael head from the boatswain. (If the rescued men are saved with their goods, the rescuer can claim an award of 10% of the goods' value. The rescued crew should make a true statement of the value of their salvaged goods to their captain. A member of the crew who tries to conceal his salvaged goods, which later come to light, forfeits all these goods to the captain.)

(b) A member of the crew who leaves his ship before the expiry of his contract, pays half a tael of gold if he is a freeman, or 1 *paha* if he is a slave.

§ 6. Who ever uses disrespectful language to the captain shall be punished by being publicly jeered at and insulted. If he answers back, the insults are to be multiplied. If he asks pardon, he should be forgiven, but the punishment be carried out all the same, as a warning.

§ 7. The four crimes punishable by death on board a ship: 1, disloyalty to the captain; 2, conspiracy to kill the captain, supercargoes, or petty officers; 3, wearing a dagger while all the other members of the crew are unarmed; 4, bad conduct.

§ 8. Who ever wants to borrow on board a ship must contract to follow his creditor for three years, three months, and three days. If the debtor wishes to repay the debt before the term is up, the creditor can claim 10% interest, and the debtor is then free to go where he will. If he repays after expiry of the contracted term, he need pay no interest.

§ 9. If a navigator [*ma'lim*] has a share in the trading venture, he has a right to a division of the hold, and 1½ or 3 taels of gold. His midshipmen are appointed navigators [*ma'lim angin*], while he himself is considered a chief navigator [*ma'lim bēsar*]. When about to sail, the navigator [*ma'lim angin*] orders the chief petty officer to supervise the rigging.

A navigator who neglects his duties is to be punished with four lashes, or a fine of four stems¹ of *pitis*.

The navigator should not fail to pray to Allah and His Prophet, for he is as an *imam* [Muslim leader of prayers] on board a ship.

A navigator who wishes to leave his vessel before the expiry of his contract should not be allowed to do so.

Var.: must pay a fee of 10% of his capital. . . .

* * *

§ 11. Before throwing cargo overboard in a storm, the crew has to be consulted, if they also have their share in the cargo. In that case the part of each crew-member's share in the cargo that is to be thrown over-board should be proportionate to the size of that share. This is the captain's responsibility.

§ 12. In case of a collision between two vessels sailing in convoy leading to one vessel being wrecked, [the master of] that vessel should lodge a complaint before a judge. [The master of] the vessel that caused the collision must indemnify two-thirds of the other vessel's loss. (This applies if the collision took place at night or during a storm. If it took place in daytime, the total loss should be refunded.)

§ 13. (a) The penalty for evading a patrol-boat at sea is that all on board the ship, men, women, and children, freemen and slaves, pay a fee in lieu of slavery [?] = *ulor*].

(b) A country at war can levy a toll from merchant vessels. The levying of this toll is comparable to the enforcing of a blockade by patrol-boats at sea, and the penalties are the same.

¹ *Paku* = "nails' weight"? Or 'stem', referring to the tree-shaped moulds for coins?

§ 14. Sailors are not allowed either in the "transverse cabin" or in the "lengthwise cabin". The first is reserved for the ship's council, the second for the midshipmen [*muda-muda*]. . . .

A supercargo is entitled to have a dinghy towed along for fetching water and firewood.

§ 15. The watchmen's duty is to keep guard over the slaves on board the ship, and the midshipmen's to superintend the watches. If, due to a watchman's neglect, a slave escapes or does any harm, the midshipman in charge must pay the slave's price, and the watchman receives sixty lashes.

The changing of the watch should be witnessed by the midshipmen (and announced by one beat on the drum). (The man on watch is issued opium to keep him awake).

When a ship drags its anchor and runs aground owing to the carelessness of the supervising midshipman, the latter is held responsible, but the sailors whose watch it was each receive twenty lashes. . . .

The sailors on watch have four duties: to watch the water in the holds; to observe the winds; to keep a lookout for enemies; to guard against fire.

Whoever loses a baler [*orak-orak*] is fined $1\frac{1}{2}$ tael, and has to do the baling for the rest of the voyage. If a ship makes water due to negligence of the sailor on watch, the latter is punished with fifteen lashes.

If an approaching ship is not hailed, as the watch is asleep and the midshipman negligent, the midshipman is punished as in the case of the runaway slave, and the sailor on watch gets seven lashes.

§ 16. The task of the midshipman, when at sea, is to help in the navigation; when ashore, to accompany the captain wherever he goes.

§ 17. (If a man is hurt when boarding a ship through the galley collapsing, the captain has to pay his medical expenses, for it is customary to board a ship by the galley. Whoever sets fire to a galley is fined $2\frac{1}{2}$ *emas*.) . . .

§ 18. If a man, by fighting on board a ship, damages the ship's rigging, he is fined four stems of Javanese *pitis*.

§ 19. If a man in a fight makes his way with a drawn dagger across the centre of the hold to the stern, he is to be killed. If he is caught alive, he is fined one *emas* and five stems of Javanese *pitis*.

If a man in a fight chases his adversary to the front of the deck-house he is put to death, even if he did not draw a dagger; but if he is caught alive, he is fined 20,007 stems of Javanese *pitis*.

A supercargo aggressively approaching the captain at the stern of the ship is liable to the death penalty. If he is caught alive, and asks pardon, he is fined four stems of Javanese *pitis* and a buffalo.

§ 20. If a trading ship has safely arrived at a foreign port, the captain alone is permitted to trade [on his own account] for the first four

days; after that, (the mate and) the supercargoes, for two days; after that, the crew may trade.

If a captain in buying goods has beaten the seller down to a certain price, no other members of the crew may offer a higher price. If they do so, they forfeit their purchases to the captain.

Supercargoes buying slaves or valuable goods without the captain's knowledge forfeit their purchases to the captain. The same applies to whoever buys a female slave without the captain's knowledge.

If a captain, while at sea, wishes to put in to any port, he should first consult the entire crew....

§ 21. In the holds, one *koyan* should be allotted for cargo of the crew, two *koyan* for that of the supercargoes. This applies to ships with a beam of four (or $3\frac{1}{2}$) fathoms. For ships of ($2\frac{1}{2}$ or) three fathoms in the beam, the allocation is 300 (and 400) *gantang*.¹

§ 22. These rules were drawn up by Patih Harun and Patih Elias, and captains Zainal, Buri (*var.*: Dewa), and Ishak, after consultation with all captains. They then presented them to the Dato Bendahara Seri Maharaja, who offered them to Sultan Mahmud Shah. His Majesty approved, and granted the three captains the titles of Sang Naradiraja, Sang Setiadipati, and Sang Utamadiraja respectively.

§ 23. If a ship is more than seven days late in sailing and then misses the monsoon through the tardiness of the captain, the latter has to refund the price of his division in the hold to the supercargo.

If a ship risks missing the monsoon because the supercargo has not come on board, the captain is entitled to sail off without the supercargo, after waiting seven days. If there is no danger of missing the monsoon, the captain may depart without him after waiting fifteen days.

A ship rigged and ready to sail is like a king about to leave his palace.

If a monsoon has just broken, and the crew is tardy in coming aboard, the captain should wait seven days for sailors, and ten days for the mate; if there is danger of missing the monsoon, three and five days respectively. After that he may sail.

If the latecomers want their possessions back, they should follow the captain and lay bare their fault. After that, they must abide by whatever the captain decides.

§ 24. If a supercargo wishes to go ashore, he forfeits the sum he paid for his division in the hold. If he leaves the ship for a valid reason, i.e. a quarrel with the captain ($\frac{1}{2}$, *var.*: $\frac{3}{4}$ of) the sum is returned to him. The entire sum is returned to him if he is (put ashore by the captain for) quarrelling with the crew, or even the captain's relatives, or for no reason at all.

¹ One *gantang* = $6\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.

(If a sailor falls ill, one should wait five or seven days. If after that period he is not yet better, he should try to find someone whom he can pay wages for taking his place. He may not choose another member of the crew, for a sailor may not do two men's work; only the captain can be paid by him [?]. If he cannot find an understudy, he should sell out his share in the venture to the members of the crew.)

§ 25. This was originally written by Enche' Maulana in the year of the Hijra 1088 [A.D. 1672] in the year Dzal I on the 8th day of the month Rabi' II, on a Friday.

APPENDIX.

§ I. A skipper who takes [a passenger with cargo?] to a different port than was agreed on, is responsible for this action. However, he need not pay more than double compensation, however long the voyage.

§ II. After cooking, fires should always be put out. Who fails to do so, with the result that the galley or anything else on board the ship takes fire, is punished with two lashes. [The culprit's] master is smeared with ash, as a warning.

§ III. A free man who steals gold or silver articles on board a ship is punished according to the laws of his country.

If a slave steals such articles and then brings them to his master, who keeps them while knowing that they are stolen goods, the slave will have his hand chopped off, and the master be fined for being a thief: for thief and receiver are equally guilty.

§ IV. If a merchant ship successfully completes its voyage to Java, participants in the venture are to be presented with 500 *pitis*, two strips of sail-cloth, and a bundle of rattan per share in the cargo....

§ V. Sitting on a cross-beam with dangling legs and facing astern is an insult to the captain and is punished like *lèse-majesté*, with seven lashes and a fine of 1½ tael of gold.

§ VI. Whoever uses a mirror facing towards the bows commits a serious offence, for the captain's wife or concubine might be on board. The punishment is as above.

§ VII. Suppose a man is angling at the bows of a ship, and his line drifts aft. A person at the stern grasps the line as a joke. The angler thinks it is a catch and draws in the line. The hook catches onto the hand or body of the person at the stern, who thus is forced to follow the line to the angler in the bows. Whoever is 'caught' in this way becomes the angler's property, even if it were the captain's wife or concubine.

§ VIII. The mate supervises the baling of a vessel abaft the centre of the hold. If there is no navigator on board, the mate takes over his duties, and supervises [the baling of] the entire vessel.

If, while the crew is baling, something crashes down on the vessel from aloft because the rope was bad, or slipped its knot, the mate has to pay for any damage done. He is also responsible for any loss caused by a defective tow-rope. . . .

Any member of the crew who sets fire to the anchor-rope is punished by lashes equal in number to the burnt strands in the rope.

Chapter Two

THE PORTUGUESE AND SPANIARDS IN MALAYSIA

It was largely the search for spices that led the Portuguese and Spaniards directly into the Malaysian world, for only in the islands of eastern Indonesia, the Moluccas, were nutmegs and cloves grown. During the European Middle Ages these spices were carried to various entrepôt centres of South-East Asia in Indonesian and Malay ships. Here they were collected by Arab and Gujerati traders and shipped via Ormuz and Basra in the Persian Gulf to Baghdad, Damascus and the Syrian ports of the Mediterranean, and thence conveyed by merchants of Venice, Amalfi, Pisa and Genoa to Europe, where they were in great demand for the flavouring of food and for use in drugs. Italians had come to share in the lucrative spice trade by virtue of the special privileges they had won during the Crusades for supplying military and other stores to the Christians. The Crusades themselves, however, and the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate (Baghdad) by the Mongols in 1258, upset the balance of the trade in the Levant and largely diverted its course from the Persian Gulf to the route along the Red Sea via Aden, Ras Elba, Cush in Upper Egypt, Cairo and Alexandria. This diversion of the spice trade resulted in a marked increase in the price of spices in Europe because of the heavy duties imposed on them during transit by the Mameluke Sultans at Cairo. A Muslim stranglehold on Indonesian spices and Indian pepper gave Egypt a golden age of prosperity; it also provided the Portuguese, who hoped to join the legendary Christian Prester John in an anti-Muslim crusade, with an additional reason for finding a direct sea-route to Asia.

Vasco da Gama's ships anchored off Calicut in western India on 21st May 1498 looking for both Christians and spices; the latter proved as difficult to find as the former, for the spice trade at this time was largely controlled by the Muslim traders of Gujerat in north-

western India. The Gujarati merchants had agencies throughout Malaysia and Indonesia, where they exchanged Indian cottons, silks, and other commodities for nutmegs, mace and cloves. The most important of these South-East Asian trading centres was, of course, Malacca, as the Portuguese soon came to realize. The Portuguese chronicler, Duarte Barbosa, brother-in-law and possibly cousin of Magellan, stated that Malacca at this period was 'the richest seaport with the greatest number of wholesale merchants and abundance of shipping and trade that can be found in the whole world', and Tomé Pires, the first Portuguese ambassador to China, who lived in Malacca during the years immediately following the Portuguese conquest of the city, declared in his book *Suma Oriental* that men could not estimate the worth of Malacca 'on account of its greatness and profit'. 'It was,' he wrote, 'a city that was made for merchandise, fitter than any other in the world....'

I *The Portuguese Conquest of Malacca* in 1511

The following reading, which describes the conquest of Malacca by Afonso d'Albuquerque in August 1511, is taken from Tomé Pires' *Suma Oriental*, translated by Armando Cortesão. [Hakluyt Society, London, 1944, II, 278-81.]

AFONSO de Albuquerque, Captain-Major and Governor of the Indies, arrived at Malacca at the beginning of the month of July in the year 1511, with fifteen sail, great and small, in which came about sixteen hundred fighting men.¹ At this time it is said that Malacca had a hundred thousand men-at-arms, from Kuala Lingi (*Coala Penagy*) to the hinterland (?) and Kasang (*Caçam*), which are the limits of the city of Malacca. And the Malays had many strong palisades, and on the sea there were many *lancharas*, and *paraos* in the river, and on the sea many junks and Gujarat ships which were ready to fight; because there was then in Malacca a captain from Gujarat who was working for war, as it seemed to him that he alone could cope with our ships and men, all the more because of the immense number of natives, though the natives did not back the king of Malacca; because in trading-lands, where the people are of different nations, these cannot love their king as do natives without admixture of other nations. This is generally the case; and therefore the king was disliked, though his mandarins fought, and that whenever they could.

¹ Cf. Albuquerque himself writing in 1513: 'We were in all seven hundred white men and three hundred Malabars....'

As soon as the said Captain-Major arrived with his fleet, he spent a few days sending messages of peace, trying as much as he could to avoid war. However, the levity of the Malayans, and the reckless vanity and arrogant advice of the Javanese, and the king's presumption and obstinate, luxurious, tyrannical and haughty disposition—because our Lord had ordained that he should pay for the great treason he had committed against our people—all this together made him refuse the desire for peace. They only attempted to delay matters with Malayan messages, strengthening their position as much as they could, as it seemed to them that there was no people in the world powerful enough to destroy them. So the said Governor managed to get back Rui de Araújo and those who were prisoners with him. The king never wanted peace, against the advice of his *Lasamane* and the *Bem-dara* and his *Cerina De Raja* that he should make peace; but following his own counsel and that of his son, whom he afterwards killed, and of . . . other young nobles who offered to run completely amok for the king, he would hear nothing of peace, the Kashises and their mollahs [those learned in the theology and sacred law of Islam] telling him that he should not make peace; for as India was already in the hands of the Portuguese, Malacca should not pass to the infidels. The king's intention became known, and it was necessary that the said king should not go unpunished for what he did and for the evil counsel he took.

The Governor, having taken counsel, landed with his men and took the city; and the king and his men fled. The Captain-Major returned to the ships that day, and did not allow the said king to be harmed, to see if he would desist from his obstinate intention. The king was unwilling. Finally the said Governor landed again, determined now to take the city and no longer to be friends with the said king. He took the city and occupied it. The king of Malacca fled with his daughters and all his sons-in-law, kings of Kampar and Pahang. They went to *Bretão*, which is the residence of the kings, and the Captain-Major took possession of the city. The city and the sea were cleared up, and authorities were appointed.

The Captain-Major began to make a fortress of wood for want of stone and lime, and in the meantime order was given for the lime; then they began demolishing the wooden one, and they made the famous fortress in the place where it now is, on the site of the great mosque, strong, with two wells of fresh water in the towers, and two or three more in the bulwarks. On one side the sea washes against it, and on the other the river. The walls of the fortress are of great width; as for the keep, where they are usually built, you will find few of five storeys like this. The artillery, both large and small, fires on all sides.

II *A Malay Account of the Conquest of Malacca*

The previous reading was extracted from the best and most accurate of the contemporary Portuguese accounts of Malacca, and it may usefully be compared, therefore, with the following Malay account of the same event in *Stjarah Melayu (Malay Annals)* which was composed much about the same time. [Translated by C. C. Brown, *JMBRAS*, xxv, 2-3, 1952, 167-9.]

HERE now is a story of Fongso d'Albuquerque. At the end of his term of office as viceroy he proceeded to Portugal and presenting himself before the Raja of Portugal asked for an armada. The Raja of Portugal gave him four carracks and five long galleys. He then returned from Portugal and fitted out a fleet at Goa, consisting of three carracks, eight galeasses, four long galleys and fifteen foysts. There were thus forty (*sic*) craft in all. With this fleet he sailed for Malaka. And when he reached Malaka, there was great excitement and word was brought to Sultan Ahmad, "The Franks are come to attack us! They have seven carracks, eight galeasses, ten long galleys, fifteen sloops and five foysts." Thereupon Sultan Ahmad had all his forces assembled and he ordered them to make ready their equipment. And the Franks engaged the men of Malaka in battle, and they fired their cannon from their ships so that the cannon balls came like rain. And the noise of the cannon was as the noise of thunder in the heavens and the flashes of fire of their guns were like flashes of lightning in the sky: and the noise of their matchlocks was like that of ground-nuts popping in the frying-pan. So heavy was the gun-fire that the men of Malaka could no longer maintain their position on the shore. The Franks then bore down upon the bridge with their galleys and foysts. Thereupon Sultan Ahmad came forth, mounted on his elephant Jituji.

The Sri Awadana was on the elephant's head, and to balance him on the packsaddle Sultan Ahmad took [with] him Makhdum Sadar Jahan because he was studying the doctrine of the Unity of God with him. On the elephant's croup was Tun 'Ali Hati.

And the king went forth on to the bridge and stood there amid a hail of bullets. But Makhdum Sadar Jahan clasping the pannier with both hands cried out to Sultan Ahmad Shah "Sultan, this is no place to study the Unity of God, let us go home!" Sultan Ahmad smiled and returned to the palace. And the Franks shouted from their ships, "Take warning, you men of Malaka, to-morrow we land!" And the men of Malaka answered, "Very well!"

Sultan Ahmad Shah then sent out men to assemble all his forces and bid them get ready their arms. That night the war-chiefs and the young nobles were waiting in the hall of audience, and the young nobles said, "Why do we sit here idly? It would be well for us to read a tale of war that we may profit from it." And Tun Muhammad Unta said, "That is very true, sir. Let us ask the Raja to give us the Story of Muhammad Hanafiah." Then the young nobles said to Tun Aria, "Go, sir, and take this message to the Ruler, that all of us crave from him the Story of Muhammad Hanafiah, in the hope that we may obtain profit from it, for the Franks are attacking tomorrow." Tun Aria accordingly went into the palace and presented himself before Sultan Ahmad, to whom he addressed the young nobles' request. And Sultan Ahmad gave him the Story of Hamzah saying, "We would give you the Story of Muhammad Hanafiah did we not fear that the bravery of the gentlemen of our court falls short of the bravery of Muhammad Hanafiah! But it may be that their bravery is such as was the bravery of Hamzah and that is why we give you the Story of Hamzah."

Tun Aria then left the palace bearing the Story of Hamzah and he told the young nobles what Sultan Ahmad had said. At first they were silent, but presently Tun Isak Berakah replied to Tun Aria, "Represent humbly to the Ruler that he has spoken amiss. If he will be as Muhammad Hanafiah, we will be as war-chief Bania' (Beniar): if his bravery is as that of Muhammad Hanafiah, ours will be as that of war-chief Bania'." And when Tun Aria took this message from Tun Isak Berakah to Sultan Ahmad, the king smiled and gave them the Story of Muhammad Hanafiah instead.

When day dawned, the Franks landed and attacked. And Sultan Ahmad mounted his elephant *Juru Demang*. . . . The Franks then fiercely engaged the men of Malaka in battle and so vehement was their onslaught that the Malaka line was broken, leaving the king on his elephant isolated (?). And the king fought with the Franks pike to pike, and he was wounded in the palm of the hand. And he shewed the palm of his hand, saying "See this, Malays!" And when they saw that Sultan Ahmad was wounded in the hand, the war-chiefs returned to the attack and fought the Franks.

And Tun Salehu'd-din called upon Orang Kaya Sogoh to fight with the Franks pike to pike. And Tun Salehu'd-din was struck in the chest and killed, and twenty of the leading war-chiefs were killed. The Sri Awadana was wounded in the groin, so the elephant was made to kneel and he was put on a litter. Sultan Ahmad ordered him to be examined by a doctor, who explored the wound with the pointed end of a *sireh* leaf and said, "All is well, the wound can be treated. But had it been half a rice grain deeper, the Sri Awadana would have died." And Malaka fell. The Franks advanced on the King's audience hall (?) and the men of Malaka fled. Bendahara Lubok Batu was borne off the

field by one Selamat Gagah, closely pursued by the Franks. And the Bendahara said to the man who was bearing him, "Hurl me against the Franks!" But his family would not allow this. Whereupon the Bendahara cried, "What cowards these young men are! If I was still a young man, I would die fighting for Malaka!"

Sultan Ahmad then withdrew to Hulu Muar and thence to Pagoh. Sultan Mahmud Shah had taken up his abode at Batu Hampar. Sultan Ahmad then established a fort at Bentayan. Meanwhile the Franks occupied Malaka where they turned the royal demesne into a fort; which fort is there to this day. Then the Franks advanced to Muar and attacked Pagoh, which fell after several days fighting; and Sang Stia was killed. Sultan Ahmad then withdrew to Hulu Muar. In Muar the Bendahara died. . . . After a while Sultan Ahmad and his father, Sultan Mahmud Shah, left Hulu Muar and went on to Pahang, where they were welcomed by the Raja of Pahang. Sultan Mahmud Shah gave his daughter by his Kelantan consort in marriage to the Raja of Pahang whose name was Sultan Mansur Shah. From Pahang Sultan Ahmad went to Bentan and established a settlement at Kopak.

III *The Spaniards in Brunei*

While the Portuguese were occupied in conquering the sultanate of Malacca, and converting it to their own purposes, the Spaniards were endeavouring to find a way to Asia by sailing across the Atlantic and around the South American continent. Only eight years after the first European cast eyes on its vast expanses, Magellan carried the Spanish flag across the Pacific Ocean to the Philippines and Brunei. The following account of the Brunei sultanate in 1521 is taken from the eye-witness account of the Italian, Antonio Pigafetta, who accompanied Magellan on the voyage around the world. [*The First Voyage Round the World by Magellan*, translated by Lord Stanley of Alderley, Hakluyt Society, London, 1874, 110-17.]

THE . . . king of [Brunei] sent a prahu to the ships; it was very handsome, with its prow and stern ornamented with gold; on the bow fluttered a white and blue flag, with a tuft of peacock's feathers at the top of the staff; there were in the prahu some people playing on pipes and drums, and many other persons. Two almadias followed the prahu; these are fishermen's boats, and a prahu is a kind of fusta. Eight old men of the chiefs of the island came into the ships, and sat down upon a carpet on the poop, and presented a painted wooden vase full of betel and areca (fruits which they constantly

chew), with orange and jessamine flowers, and covered over with a cloth of yellow silk. They also gave two cages full of fowls, two goats, three vessels full of wine, distilled from rice, and some bundles of sugar cane. They did the same to the other ship; and embracing us they departed. Their rice wine is clear like water, but so strong that many of our men were intoxicated. They call it *arak*.

Six days later the king again sent three very ornamented prahus, which came playing pipes and drums and cymbals, and going round the ships, their crews saluted us with their cloth caps, which hardly cover the tops of their heads. We saluted them, firing the bombards without stones. Then they made us a present of various victuals, but all made with rice, either wrapped in leaves in the form of a long cylinder, or in the shape of a sugar loaf, or in the shape of a cake, with eggs and honey. They then said that their king was well pleased that we should make provisions here of wood and water, and that we might traffic at our pleasure with the islanders. Having heard this, seven of us entered one of the prahus, taking with us presents for the king, and for some of his court. The present intended for the king consisted in a Turkish coat of green velvet, a chair of violet coloured velvet, five ells [of 45 inches] of red cloth, a cap, a gilt goblet, and a vase of glass, with its cover, three packets of paper, and a gilt pen and ink case. We took for the queen three ells of yellow cloth, a pair of slippers, ornamented with silver, and a silver case full of pins. For the king's governor or minister three ells of red cloth, a cap, and a gilt goblet; and for the herald who had come in the prahu, a coat of the Turkish fashion, of red and green colours, a cap and a packet of paper. For the other seven chief men who had come with him, we prepared presents; for one cloth, for another a cap, and for each a packet of paper. Having made these preparations, we entered the prahu, and departed.

When we arrived at the city, we were obliged to wait about two hours in the prahu, until there came thither two elephants covered with silk, and twelve men, each of whom carried a porcelain vase covered with silk, for conveying and wrapping up our presents. We mounted the elephants, and those twelve men preceded us, carrying the vases with our presents. We went as far as the house of the governor, who gave us supper with many sorts of viands. There we slept through the night, on mattresses filled with cotton, and covered with silk, with sheets of Cambay stuff.

On the following day . . . we set out for the king's palace. . . . From the governor's house to that of the king, all the streets were full of men armed with swords, spears, and bucklers, the king having so commanded. We entered the palace still mounted upon the elephants; we then dismounted, and ascended a staircase, accompanied by the governor and some of the chief men, and entered a large room full of courtiers, whom we should call the barons of the kingdom; there we

sat upon a carpet, and the vases with the presents were placed near us. . . .

There were placed three hundred men of the king's guard with naked daggers in their hands, which they held on their thighs. At the end of this second hall was a great opening, covered with a curtain of brocade, and on this being raised we saw the king sitting at a table, with a little child of his, chewing betel. Behind him there were only women.

Then one of the chief men informed us that we could not speak to the king, but that if we wished to convey anything to him, we were to say it to him, and he would say it to a chief or courtier of higher rank, who would lay it before a brother of the governor, who was in the smaller room, and they by means of a blow pipe placed in a fissure in the wall would communicate our thoughts to a man who was near the king, and from him the king would understand them. He taught us meanwhile to make three obeisances to the king, with the hands joined above the head, raising first one then the other foot, and then to kiss the hands to him. This is the royal obeisance.

Then by the mode which had been indicated to us, we gave him to understand that we belonged to the King of Spain, who wished to be in peace with him, and wished for nothing else than to be able to trade with his island. The king caused an answer to be given that he was most pleased that the king of Spain was his friend, and that we could take wood and water in his states, and traffic according to our pleasure. That done we offered the presents, and at each thing which they gave to him, he made a slight inclination with his head. To each of us was then given some brocade, with cloth of gold, and some silk, which they placed upon one of our shoulders, and then took away to take care of them. A collation of cloves and cinnamon was then served to us, and after that the curtains were drawn and the windows closed. All the men who were in the palace had their middles covered with cloth of gold and silk, they carried in their hands daggers with gold hilts, adorned with pearls and precious stones, and they had many rings on their fingers.

We again mounted the elephants, and returned to the house of the governor. . . .

Afterwards there came nine men to the governor's house, sent by the king, with as many large wooden trays, in each of which were ten or twelve china dishes, with the flesh of various animals, such as veal, capons, fowls, peacocks, and others, with various sorts of fish, so that only of flesh there were thirty or thirty-two different viands. We supped on the ground on a palm mat; at each mouthful we drank a little china cup of the size of an egg full of the distilled liquor of rice: we then ate some rice and some things made of sugar, using gold spoons made like ours. In the place in which we passed the two nights

there were two candles of white wax always burning, placed on high chandeliers of silver, and two oil lamps with four wicks each. Two men kept watch there to take care of them. The next morning we came upon the same elephants to the sea shore, where there were two prahus ready, in which we were taken back to the ships.

This city is entirely built on foundations in the salt water, except the houses of the king and some of the princes: it contains twenty-five thousand fires or families. The houses are all of wood, placed on great piles to raise them high up. When the tide rises the women go in boats through the city selling provisions and necessities. In front of the king's house there is a wall made of great bricks, with barbicans like forts, upon which were fifty-six bombards of metal, and six of iron. They fired many shots from them during the two days that we passed in the city.

The king to whom we presented ourselves is a Moor, and is named Raja Siripada: he is about forty years of age, and is rather corpulent. No one serves him except ladies who are the daughters of the chiefs.... He has ten scribes, who write down his affairs on thin bark of trees, and are called *chiritoles*. He never goes out of his house except to go hunting.

On Monday, the 29th of July, we saw coming towards us more than a hundred prahus, divided into three squadrons, and as many *tungulis*, which are their smaller kind of boats. At this sight, and fearing treachery, we hurriedly set sail, and left behind an anchor in the sea. Our suspicions increased when we observed that behind us were certain junks which had come the day before. Our first operation was to free ourselves from the junks, against which we fired, capturing four and killing many people: three or four other junks went aground in escaping. In one of those which we captured was a son of the king of the isle of Luzon, who was captain-general of the King of Burné, and who was coming with the junks from the conquest of a great city named Laoe, situated on a headland of this island opposite Java Major. He had made this expedition and sacked that city because its inhabitants wished rather to obey the King of Java than the Moorish King of Burné. The Moorish king having heard of the ill-treatment by us of his junks, hastened to send to say, by means of one of our men who was on shore to traffic, that those vessels had not come to do any harm to us, but were going to make war against the Gentiles, in proof of which they showed us some of the heads of those they had slain.

Hearing this, we sent to tell the king that if it was so, that he should allow two of our men who were still on shore, with a son of our pilot, Juan Carvalho, to come to the ships: this son of Carvalho's had been born during his first residence in the country of Brazil: but the king would not consent. Juan Carvalho was thus specially punished, for

without communicating the matter to us, in order to obtain a large sum of gold, as we learned later, he had given his liberty to the captain of the junks. If he had detained him, the King Siripada would have given anything to get him back, that captain being exceedingly dreaded by the Gentiles who are most hostile to the Moorish king....

As we could not get back our men, we retained on board sixteen of the chiefs, and three ladies whom we had taken on board the junks, to take them to Spain. We had destined the ladies for the Queen; but Juan Carvalho kept them for himself.

The Moors of Burné go naked like the other islanders. They esteem quicksilver very much, and swallow it. They pretend that it preserves the health of those who are well, and that it cures the sick. They venerate Mahomed and follow his law. They do not eat pig's flesh.... With their right hand they wash their face, but do not wash their teeth with their fingers. They are circumcised like the Jews. They never kill goats or fowls without first speaking to the sun. They cut off the ends of the wings of fowls and the skin under their feet, and then split them in two. They do not eat any animal which has not been killed by themselves.

In this island is produced camphor, a kind of balsam which exudes from between the bark and the wood of the tree. These drops are small as grains of bran. If it is left exposed by degrees it is consumed: here it is called capor. Here is found also cinnamon, ginger, mirabolans, oranges, lemons, sugarcanes, melons, gourds, cucumbers, cabbage, onions. There are also many animals, such as elephants, horses, buffaloes, pigs, goats, fowls, geese, crows, and others.

They say that the King of Burné has two pearls as large as a hen's eggs, and so perfectly round that if placed on a smooth table they cannot be made to stand still. When we took him the presents I made signs to him that I desired to see them, and he said that he would show them to me, but he did not do so. On the following day some of the chief men told me that they had indeed seen them.

The money which the Moors use in this country is of metal, and pierced for stringing together. On one side only it has four signs, which are four letters of the great King of China: they call it *Picis*. For one cathil (a weight equal to two of our pounds) of quicksilver they gave us six porcelain dishes, for a cathil of metal they gave one small porcelain vase, and a large vase for three knives. For a hand of paper they gave one hundred picis. A *bahar* of wax (which is two hundred and three cathils) for one hundred and sixty cathils of bronze: for eighty cathils a bahar of salt: for forty cathils a bahar of *anime*, a gum which they use to caulk ships, for in these countries they have no pitch. Twenty tabil make a cathil. The merchandise which is most esteemed here is bronze, quicksilver, cinnabar, glass, woollen stuffs, linens; but above all they esteem iron and spectacles.

IV *Trading Relations between Malacca and Brunei after 1511*

Commercial intercourse between Brunei and Malacca continued during the fifteenth century and this trade was only temporarily disrupted by the Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511. The following reading is taken from pages 5 and 6 of a printed paper by Father Manuel Teixeira, entitled 'Early Portuguese & Spanish Contacts with Borneo', which was read to the Conference of Asian Historians held in Taipei in October, 1962.

In the few years immediately following 1511, traders from some of the neighbouring ports resumed their annual visits to Malacca. Rui de Brito Patalim, the first [Portuguese] captain of Malacca, wrote on 6 January 1514 to Afonso d'Albuquerque:

"...three junks came from Burney [Brunei]...the tomungo [téménggong] of this town [Malacca] is from that country...they brought merchandise and sold it; all courtesy was shown to them and they were treated well...they left fully satisfied; they are a good people and clever merchants: they found us to the point and truthful: they showed clearly that this pleased them: they sailed with the monsoon. They brought camphor and other local products. They habitually traded with Malacca when the Malays were here. They could not manage without this market, for here cloth from Cambay and other similar merchandise is made available to them..."

On the same day [6 January 1514] Rui de Brito Patalim wrote to the king of Portugal:

"Three junks came from Borneo to this town: they brought sea pearls and provisions, in addition to foodstuffs. The king is a pagan, but the merchants are moors...these are a good people, our friends: when trading here they always try to obtain cloth from Cambay and south India."

Tomé Pires, who was in Malacca with Rui de Brito, includes a note on these traders in his *Suma Oriental*...; the people of Borneo... "...seem to be a trading people. The merchants are men of medium stature, not very sharp-witted. They trade direct with Malacca every year. It is a country with plenty of meat, fish, rice and sago. They bring gold, which is of low assay value, lower than any other gold in these parts: they bring every year up to two or three bahars of very valuable camphor. A catty of this varies in value according to the size [of the lumps]: the catty [is worth] from twelve to thirty or forty cruzados according to the kind and quality. They have a great many chebulic myrobalans which they bring to sell.

They bring wax, honey, rice and sago [which] is a foodstuff for

the lower classes—a sort of bread crumbs made up like sweetmeats—and is of value. They bring orracas [arrack]...

They have every year two monsoons to bring them and two others to take them back. They go from Malacca to Borneo in a month and their junks make the return voyage in another. The Borneans seem to be peaceable men."

V *The Portuguese and Spaniards in Brunei*

The Portuguese were not content to allow the Malacca-Brunei trade to remain in the hands of Malays and Indonesians, but attempted themselves to enter directly into commercial transactions with Malaysia and Indonesia. The following readings, which also have been extracted from Father Teixeira's paper, describe (a) early Portuguese and Spanish contacts with Brunei, and (b) later Spanish contacts with Brunei. ['Early Portuguese & Spanish Contacts with Borneo', 26-31, 31-3.]

a. *The Portuguese and Spaniards in Brunei*

MEANWHILE the Portuguese had reached Brunei from the west. On 1 January 1524, Jorge d'Albuquerque, captain of Malacca for the second time (1521-25) wrote to king dom João III:

"I sent António de Pina to Brunei, as I had learnt that the Spaniards who came out here with Fernão de Magalhães reached Brunei and some of them had remained there, as a result of trouble with the sultan of Brunei. When António de Pina reached Borneo, he found there from Magalhães's fleet one Biscayan... and two Greeks who had become Muslims.

I wrote to the sultan of Brunei about this business and he replied saying that he was a true friend of the king of Portugal, and always would be; and he sent the Biscayan called Domingos, to me asking me to let him know whenever I wanted anything and he would do his best for me: I answered stating how he could best serve the interests of your Highness.

What I learnt about Borneo from António de Pina (he is nephew of Rui de Pina, who is in charge of the Tombo) convinced me that he has rendered invaluable service to Your Highness and will continue to do so. The land of Borneo produces nothing but edible camphor, for which there is a ready sale, especially in Bengal, Palcacate, Narsinga, Cochin, Calicut and all other territories in Malabar. The camphor of China is for trade, according to the custom of Christians, and it is not for eating, as is this one of Borneo. Moreover, this camphor

which comes from Brunei, does not belong to the sultan of Brunei, but to another ruler who lives on the island of Borneo, and is a lord by himself: he is a heathen, whereas the sultan of Brunei is a Muslim, and the people of his land are Muslims also: but these caffres, who are called heathens, cultivate this camphor, and exchange it with the people of Brunei for cloth [which] the latter obtain from Malacca: the cloths, which are of various kinds, though always made of cotton, are imported here from Cambay and Bengal. It seems to me that when the navigation of these waters shall be better known, there will be no need of (our going to) Brunei, since the land of Brunei and that of the Caffres (heathens) is all one island and he who goes to one part, may equally go to another. Therefore I say there will be no need of (going to) Brunei, and it is not a country about which we should bother ourselves, except if travelling from Malacca to the Moluccas, when (the ships) can call there. There is nothing else in Borneo which is a matter for trade. This briefly is what I have learnt."

In 1526, dom Jorge de Menezes, who followed dom Garcia Henriques as captain of the Moluccas, passed north of Borneo on his way to Ternate, following the instructions of Pero Mascarenhas, captain of Malacca (1525-26). Barros says that this appears to be the first occasion on which this route was followed successfully (except, of course, by the two vessels of Fernão de Magalhães) and he accordingly gives the itinerary of the voyage: unfortunately he has condensed it so much that it is of little value, and he has introduced one bad error in putting Pulau Gaya before Brunei; it should come after the town if one is travelling towards the east as it lies off Jesselton, and is thus north-east of P.[ulau] Labuan....

Having arrived at Ternate, dom Jorge de Menezes decided to send a kora-kora back to Malacca to follow the route to Brunei from the east. For this he chose Vasco Lourenço a very reliable man, Diogo Cão and João Veloso; with them he sent both a Spanish and a Malay pilot. He gave them letters for the captain of Malacca and the governor of India; he also gave Vasco Lourenço pieces of silk cloth and other materials to provide presents for the sultan and chiefs of Brunei. They reached the port safely and found there a Portuguese, Afonso Pais, who was trading on his own account between Brunei and Malacca. His transactions were proving most profitable for the sultan, and as a result he had become his close friend. Afonso Pais introduced Vasco Lourenço to the sultan, telling him that Lourenço had been sent from the Moluccas to Malacca by way of Brunei to establish friendly relations with him and to trade in his territory; and that any of the sultan's subjects who wished to trade at Malacca or the Moluccas would receive every consideration and courtesy. Then he gave the sultan some lengths of silk cloth and a Portuguese tapestry on which was represented the marriage of Henry VIII of

England and Catherine of Aragon. The king was shown seated on a chair with a crown on his head and surrounded by many men and women.

The tapestry was not appreciated by the Malays, who began by asking the meaning of the picture. Then they expressed strongly the fear that it was intended that the king of England and all the other people shown on it should come alive during the night and kill the sultan in order to seize his kingdom. He referred his fears to the Brunei state council, and insisted that Vasco Lourenço must be killed for plotting against his life. Afonso Pais, with some difficulty, persuaded him that no harm was intended him, or could possibly have come to him, from the picture. But though the sultan agreed to take no action against Lourenço, Pais had to burn the tapestry before his mind was wholly at rest. Afonso Pais then sailed for Malacca, taking Vasco Lourenço with him. . . .

On his arrival at Brunei in September 1530, [Gonçalo Pereira, captain of the Moluccas] . . . sent Luis de Andrade, factor and alcaide-mor of Ternate, with presents of satin and velvet for the sultan and governor. The sultan was told that Pereira had come from the governor of India to say that the king of Portugal, learning of the greatness of the sultan of Brunei, wished to establish friendly relations with him and to inform him that his merchants could trade freely with Malacca and all parts of India, where they would be treated with the respect and favour due to the subjects of so great a ruler; the sultan was in addition asked to grant permission for the Portuguese to trade in his territory, on the assurance that they would pay all reasonable dues and observe the same regulations as his subjects. The sultan agreed to this request and expressed himself pleased at establishing, and anxious to maintain, friendly relations with the Portuguese, especially with his neighbour, the captain of Malacca. . . .

. . . [I]n 1533 Tristão de Ataíde was appointed captain of the Moluccas. He left Goa for Malacca on 20 April and arrived there early in July: in Malacca he found only one pilot (Pedro Anes) who would admit to knowledge of the route from Brunei to Ternate. Taking him, Ataíde sailed from Malacca on 7 August, reaching Brunei at the end of the month. There he sent a present to the sultan on behalf of the king of Portugal. His gift was accepted graciously, the sultan saying that he would always acknowledge the king of Portugal as his superior. After spending only a fortnight at Brunei, Ataíde left for the Moluccas where he arrived in forty days. . . .

In a letter from Malacca dated 19 November 1556, Fr. Baltasar Dias, S.J., superior of the Jesuits at Malacca, says that a Muslim had recently come from India who claimed to be a descendant of the prophet Mohammed. He was proposing to go from Malacca to Borneo, where another Indian Muslim was so venerated that the sultan of

Brunei used to sēmbahyang before him three times a day. Fr. Baltasar Dias preached against the newcomer, and he was sent back to India without being allowed to visit Borneo.

In another letter from Malacca dated 2 December 1561, Fr. Jerónimo Fernandes says that there were no conversions among the inhabitants of Malacca who were Muslims, but many heathens and slaves were converted. In 1565 the Jesuit Fathers Tristão de Araújo and João de Veiga left Malacca in a galliot for the Moluccas, but adverse weather forced them to winter at Brunei, where many Portuguese fell sick and Fr. Veiga died from fever.

In 1568 the captain-mor Gonçalo Pereira Marramaque, on his way from Goa to the Moluccas, called at Brunei in August: there he learned that the Spaniards under Miguel Lopez de Legaspi had landed on Cebu Island, in the Philippines. He took pilots in Brunei and then, instead of sailing direct to the Moluccas, in accordance with his instructions, he tried to proceed to Cebu, but in four months he failed to find the island; thereafter he went on to Ternate.

b. Later Spanish Contacts with Brunei

IN 1578, a self-styled sultan of Brunei called Sēri Lela went to the Philippines to ask the governor, Dr. Francisco Sande, for help. He said that his brother, Saif-ul-Rejal, had usurped his throne; if the governor of Manila would help him to regain it, he would put his kingdom under the sovereignty of the king of Spain. Dr. Sande accepted his request with eagerness and at once sent an expedition to Brunei. He chose the Augustinian friar, Martin de Rada, to accompany this expedition.

The Spaniards attacked Saif-ul-Rejal, who was defeated [and] fled to Suai: then Sēri Lela was installed in his place. However, as many Spaniards fell sick and died, Dr. Sande, at the request of Fr. Martin, recalled the expedition to Manila. The friar died during the voyage, about the middle of June 1578, and was buried at sea. No sooner did the Spaniards leave Brunei than Saif-ul-Rejal attacked his half-brother Sēri Lela, who fled to Belait, where eventually he was killed.

In October 1587, just over nine years later, Franciscan friars Francisco de Santa Maria and Miguel de Talavera were sent by their superior with messages to the king of Spain. They left Manila in a Portuguese ship bound for Goa, but adverse weather forced the captain to seek shelter in Brunei bay, where he anchored off Muara. The sultan was still Saif-ul-Rejal, who was ill-disposed towards the Spaniards, but he advised the orang makau [Portuguese] to winter at Brunei.

The friars built a chapel at the foot of a hill. A few Malays visited them out of curiosity. Full of zeal, the two Franciscans called at the palace and preached to the sultan himself. But when they inveighed

against Mohammed, he became furious, and on the following day Malays went to Muara to kill the priests: Fr. Sta Maria was beheaded, but his companion escaped. The Portuguese rushed to help the priests, drove off their assailants and found the body of Fr. Sta Maria, which they buried. Then they sailed for Goa, preferring the hazards of the open sea to remaining in Brunei.

Sultan Saif-ul-Rejal was succeeded by his eldest son, sultan Shah Brunei, and the latter by his younger brother sultan Hasan, the most arbitrary, powerful and magnificent of the sovereigns of Brunei. The latter is said to have reconquered several countries, and reasserted Brunei's hold on Sulu. Presumably it was under his orders, or with his assistance, that the arsenal at Santaof, on Luzon, was attacked in 1617. On this occasion all the garrison were killed, and property to the value of Sp.\$1,000,000 was stolen or destroyed. The Spaniards are said to have sent an embassy to Brunei a few years afterwards, either in sultan Hasan's time or that of his elder son and successor, sultan Abdul Jalil-ul-Akber (Merhoum Tuah), the tenth of the Mohammedan rulers of Brunei.

VI *The Portuguese in Malaya*

The following reading, which provides a fairly comprehensive account of the Portuguese colonial regime in Malaya during the period 1511-1641, is extracted from an article, 'Notes on the Portuguese in Malaya', by the late I. A. Macgregor. [*JMBRAS*, xxviii, 2, 1955, 5-41.] The author was formerly Lecturer in History in the University of Malaya, Singapore.

DURING the 150 years that the Portuguese held Malacca they also had contact with many other parts of Malaya. In the north, the Perlis river was the scene of a fierce battle with the Achinese in 1547; further south, the Perak river saw a Portuguese attack on Gujerati ships loading tin there in 1613; the Bernam, Sēlangor and Klang rivers are all mentioned in Portuguese reports, and the Muar river appears often in the accounts of their wars and battles. In fact most major Malayan rivers and some minor ones bring back memories of Portuguese activities. So also do the waters round the island of Singapore. In the 1570's there was very active naval warfare in this area, with two and possibly three fights between Portuguese and Achinese fleets. Inevitably, contact with the interior of Malaya was much less extensive, but the Portuguese did ascend the Johore river to a point beyond Kota Tinggi, and they made an expe-

dition to Naning in 1586. We have no evidence of large early Malay Settlements away from the rivers, and in the sixteenth century at least the west side of the Peninsula was probably very sparsely populated. As late as 1848 south Johore was described—correctly in one sense if not in another—as a “vast desert”. On the whole, it seems that the Portuguese had fairly frequent contact with the more important places in Malaya during their occupation of Malacca...

There were never very many Portuguese in Malaya. Only rarely did the number of Portuguese in Malacca exceed 600. Nor did they all stay for any length of time: people were always leaving Malacca to go somewhere else. In addition, the numbers were subject to a seasonal variation. Vessels from India generally reached Malacca in May and June, and in October: these were the two occasions in the year when the winds were favourable to the voyage. The vessels normally brought reinforcements and accordingly the number of Portuguese in Malacca would rise sharply. Then, from November to January, was the season for voyages from Malacca to India and to the Moluccas. Ships would leave and the number of Portuguese would fall again. A complete set of ration orders for the Portuguese serving in Malacca on the first of each month between 1 April, 1519, and 1 May, 1520, is still extant. During this period the numbers never rose above 348 and in one month they fell to 29, though it is likely that other Portuguese were nearby on the second occasion. The average over the fourteen months is under 200.

Unlike their Dutch successors, these few hundred men were not the servants of a trading company. They were the servants of the King and very conscious of their position. Afonso de Albuquerque, a proud man and the writer of some fierce, hectoring letters, always signed himself ‘creature of your Highness’ at the bottom of his letters to the King. Lesser men adopted similar habits. The great majority of the Portuguese who came to Malaya in the sixteenth century came as members of one section or another of the government service. Each was due to receive a fixed rate of pay and a cost of living allowance. The latter was sometimes quite handsome. It began as a ration allowance, issued in kind. In Malacca the issue was made in rice and in the first years of Portuguese rule the Captain of the Fortress, that is, the Governor of the place, the captains of vessels, the Chief Gunner of the Fortress, the Inspector of the Watch, the Supervisor of Works and various craftsmen each received 60 *gantang* a month, paid in advance. A few others received 40 or 50 *gantang*, and the men-at-arms, sailors and the vicar received 30 *gantang* each. Chaplains got a mere 15 *gantang*, unless they chanced to be serving with a ship: then their allowance was doubled. Later, this ration allowance became a fixed money payment which varied from fortress to fortress in accordance

with the cost of living. In Malacca, which was dependent on imported food, the cost of living was relatively high. Consequently the allowance was larger there than in the fortresses in India proper.

Every Portuguese who came to Malaya had (or was supposed to have) his name registered in government books, called *Matricula* books, in Portugal, in India and in Malacca. With his name were supposed to be recorded various other details: his father's name, his birthplace (to facilitate identification), the pay to which he was entitled, together with the year when he came to the East, the details of his service there, and any payments which he had received, or fines which had been imposed on him. If an official's accounts were found to be out of order, a note could be inserted in the register so that the government might retain any amount still due to him. Generally, men had credit balances, for the Portuguese government soon fell behind in its payments to its servants in the East. By 1527 it was in arrears in Malacca in its wages account, and in the payment of the ration allowances. Arrears of pay could press hard on a Portuguese man-at-arms, because the government normally gave him neither free clothes nor free weapons, nor free accommodation. He generally had to buy his own weapons and clothes, but if he bought his weapons from the government the amount could be deducted from the pay that was due to him. Therefore, if his pay was in arrears, he virtually did not pay for his weapons.

When the men were not paid one or more of five things usually happened. A man could sell his right to pay, at a discount, to someone with ready cash. This was illegal, but was always being done. From quite early in the sixteenth century there were people who bought up the arrears of soldiers' pay cheaply and then used their own or a friend's influence to get themselves paid in full by the government. Second, a soldier could try to find a powerful patron to protect him. He could do this because Portuguese soldiers in the East in the sixteenth century were not organised into regular companies and battalions. They were merely attached or attached themselves to individual captains. In time of war an influential captain would often keep fairly open hospitality in order to attract the best men into his service. Third, if he could not find a patron, a soldier could become a beggar. Or, fourth, he could sell his weapons. And, finally, he could desert and become an adventurer. Of these five things, all but the second—attachment to a patron—were either illegal or dangerous to Portuguese power.

The home government was aware of the situation and tried to remedy it in several ways. One of the ways that it adopted, after a little hesitation, was that of encouraging its servants to marry locally. The idea was that these men would settle down and that they and their descendants would form a loyal, resident population, ready to hand and able to live off the food of the country. In the beginning, the

government paid the settlers, just as it paid its other servants, but it soon abandoned this practice and paid the settlers only when they were on active service. Afonso de Albuquerque, the Governor of Portuguese India from 1509 till 1515, supported the idea strongly, but the scheme was by no means completely successful. For one thing, not enough men adopted it. Indeed, not every Portuguese who came to the East could adopt it, for they were not all bachelors. And bachelors or married they were often unwilling to settle down in India during their early years there. They were quite ready to have mistresses—three or four for one man was not uncommon in Malacca, according to the complaints of the missionaries, while some prodigies of virility and resource were said to have had half a dozen. But marriage was a different matter, and before they had grown much older many of the bachelors had died or been killed in war. The death rate among the Portuguese in the East was high. It may have been especially high at Malacca which had a reputation for unhealthiness. In 1525 there seem to have been only 38 married Portuguese settlers there. The number did increase, however, though only slowly, and in 1552, when Malacca was granted city status, the married settlers became the citizens with the right to elect a town council. Even then, as late as 1626 there were only 114 married settlers in Malacca, 62 of whom were living outside the city walls, probably either in Hilir or in small estates up the Malacca river. Clearly this scheme was not a great success in providing soldiers, and at the time of the siege of Malacca in 1629 only 120 settlers are mentioned as fit or willing for military service. However, some settlers served the city well, especially in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Mention has been made of the unhealthiness of Malacca and the high mortality among the Portuguese in the East. The government recognised a responsibility towards its sick soldiers and provided a hospital at each major fortress. These hospitals were not always well run or well supplied and there were even complaints of the buildings falling down. But, on the whole, a considerable effort was made. The Government also provided an official to look after the property of men who died in the fortress. He was not always incorrupt, but the surprising thing is that the system worked at all. If a man left his property to relatives in Portugal, it would take anything from seven to nineteen months to get a message to them from Malacca, and then, if an enquiry were sent back, there would be further delay. And by the time the enquiry reached Malacca, the official who had been dealing with the case might have died or moved somewhere else. Part of the reason why the system did function, however imperfectly, was the existence of the Confraternities of Mercy, private charitable organisations which were established all over Portugal and the East: the one in Malacca was founded by 1532. The Confraternities tried to check

on matters concerning wills; they also attempted to relieve the poor and the sick. In the early days the government itself had ordered the issue of weekly doles of rice to poor local Christians and to the children of its poor servants.

Several factors were responsible for the small number of Portuguese in Malaya. First, it was a matter of size. The area of Portugal is about 35,000 square miles. The Malay Peninsula alone is about twice that size: and the one island of Borneo is eight times the area of Portugal. Nor was Portugal very thickly populated in the sixteenth century, for its people probably numbered between one and one and a half millions at that time—something like the present population of Singapore. Then at the height of the expansion movement the Portuguese central government was still on a very small scale. It was still predominantly the personal business of the king and was run largely on medieval lines. Accordingly the Portuguese king had no administrative system which could extract a high revenue from his country. Royal rights were generally fixed and limited, and an attempt to increase them in the early part of the sixteenth century caused some grumbling. As the sixteenth century went on and the value of money lessened, the Crown's position became worse.

And yet, Portugal in the sixteenth century had vast commitments. During that time the Portuguese were actively engaged in war or colonisation or both in Brazil, Morocco, West Africa, East Africa and Asia. In all these places the Crown had a direct interest and incurred considerable expense. As early as 1515 it was said to have 7,000 men in India or on the way there, and to be preparing to send an expedition of 4 or 5,000 men to Morocco. To this figure must be added the men in fortresses in Africa and Portugal...

[Central government] pivoted on the royal court—a peripatetic body that moved about, mainly between half a dozen places, all within a hundred miles of Lisbon. With it went, for part of the time at least, the more important figures in Portuguese political, social and military life. Since the organisation was small and personal and since it had a pronounced social side, many of the people about the court knew one another and married into one another's families. This situation was reflected in the East, for some Portuguese went there in family groups, together with some of their servants.

Jorge de Albuquerque was twice Captain of Malacca, from 1514 till 1516 and again from 1521 till 1525. He was a gentleman of the king's household, a *fidalgo*, a man, that is, of recognised position at Court. He was a cousin of Afonso de Albuquerque and went to India during his governorship. Another of Jorge de Albuquerque's relatives was Captain of the fortress of Ormuz in 1515 and four more also served with Afonso de Albuquerque. When Jorge de Albuquerque was Captain of Malacca for a second time he had a group of relatives

and followers with him. There was his brother-in-law, Henrique Leme, whose sister had been Jorge de Albuquerque's first wife. Henrique Leme served as a ship's captain in Jorge de Albuquerque's time, went as ambassador to Java in 1522 and was drowned in the Muar river in 1523. Then there was another brother-in-law, dom Sancho Henriques, the brother of Jorge de Albuquerque's second wife. He was commander of the Portuguese naval squadron in Malayan waters from 1521 till his death in the Pahang river late in 1523. Dom Sancho Henriques had brought his brother, dom Garcia Henriques, with him. In 1525 dom Garcia became Captain of the Portuguese fortress in the Moluccas, being granted the post at Jorge de Albuquerque's request. In addition there were various followers who went to Malacca with Albuquerque and left it when he did in 1525. And Duarte Coelho, a prominent figure at Malacca in these early years, seems to have become friendly with Jorge de Albuquerque during his second captaincy, for, after his return to Portugal, he married the ex-Captain's niece. There are a good many similar examples of family groups in other Portuguese fortresses. One of the most interesting at Malacca is that of Pero de Faria, who, during his second Captaincy, made his son by an Asian wife the commander of the Portuguese naval squadron.

There was at all times a conspicuous military element in the Portuguese enterprise in the East, for part of the Portuguese purpose was the aim of making a military attack on their religious, political and commercial enemies. Thus it was that each major Portuguese settlement was also a stronghold—a military base under a military governor, supported by military and naval officials. But since the Portuguese enterprise was so extensive, and Portugal's resources relatively small, trade was also necessary—if not desirable. So we find the Crown taking an active part in trade in the East. Alongside the military and naval officers were the factor, the clerks of the customs house, the judge of the weight and other officials with purely commercial functions. In addition, there was the judge for dealing with crime among the Portuguese and a bailiff and his peons to arrest offenders, or rather, to arrest some of them. For a gentleman (that is, a *fidalgo*), a knight, a judge, a doctor of law, or a doctor of medicine could not be arrested either in Portugal or in the East, unless it were alleged that he had committed a crime for which the penalty was death. In other cases he could only be made to give his bond and have his movements restricted. In the East this generally meant a form of house arrest. This exemption was not quite as extensive as it sounds because more offences were punished with death in the sixteenth century than today. The really sweeping exemption was confined to gentlemen "of great estate and power": they could not be arrested at all: if they were alleged to have committed a crime, the judge could

only send the details of the case to the king and wait for his decision.

In jurisdiction, too, the powers of the fortress judge were limited. He had complete jurisdiction over slaves and ordinary soldiers, but for other people he had to allow appeal to the Governor of Portuguese India. He also had to allow appeal to the Governor in civil suits which concerned large sums of money.

The privileges which gentlemen and knights possessed were occasionally abused. They could be used to obstruct justice and sometimes were. Scandals arose, at Malacca as at other places, and the highest and mightiest were sometimes involved in them. Yet it would be idle to give the Portuguese government nothing but blame. The Crown had to work with the *fidalgos*, not against them, because it needed their military experience and, very often, their private generosity. Their privileges were the outcome rather than the cause of the power which they held. In fact, what prevented them getting out of hand and abusing their power was their own sense of duty and propriety just as much as any fear of government action. The Crown was also helped by two other factors. First, gentlemen were anxious for its favours—offices, pensions and so on—and blackened one another's reputation in trying to obtain them. The *fidalgos* were never a highly organised and united body. Second, the *fidalgos* and knights did not form a rigidly exclusive caste: recruitment was fairly constant and in the early sixteenth century ships' pilots were notable amongst the new knights and gentlemen of the king's household.

In general Portuguese jurisdiction did not cover cases between Portugal's Malayan subjects, though, in the second half of the sixteenth century, the Crown did try to check arrest for petty debts. But, on the whole, it left local government and justice between its non-Christian Asian subjects in local hands and, sometimes, in the hands of local community leaders. This was the normal fifteenth and sixteenth century Malayan way of dealing with settlers of another race.

Relations between the Portuguese and other races in Malaya naturally varied with the personalities of the Portuguese officials and the local leaders: they also varied with the apparent safety or insecurity of Portuguese rule in Malacca. In the early years after their conquest of the town, the Portuguese had great trouble with the Javanese. At that time the Javanese formed two powerful communities in Malacca with a strong grip on the rice trade with their homeland. Relations between them and the Portuguese were always uncertain, but first one then the other disappeared from Malacca. Sixteenth century Portuguese and Spanish accounts are usually hostile to the Javanese, and talk of them as fierce fighters, but false and treacherous. Nevertheless, a Javanese community seems to have re-established itself at Malacca by the end of the sixteenth century.

With the Chinese who came to Malacca Portuguese relations were

fairly friendly from the start. Both Chinese and Portuguese occasionally took to robbing one another on the high seas, but there was no catastrophic breakdown of relations in Malaya. With the Japanese matters were different: the Portuguese admired the soldierly qualities of the Japanese and in the second half of the sixteenth century seem to have brought some to Malacca. In the early years of the seventeenth century Japanese were serving in the bodyguard of the Captain of the fortress. But a fierce brawl in which they took part led the government to ban their employment and this ban seems to have been respected.

In Malaya, the Portuguese had most contact with Malays and with Indians from the Coromandel coast. Sometimes the relationship was quite close and friendly and, not infrequently, the Portuguese used Malay auxiliaries in their wars. Some of the Indian merchants were also useful to the Portuguese. The first to help them was a man called Naina Chetu by the Portuguese. He succoured the Portuguese prisoners who were kept at Malacca between 1509 and 1511. After the conquest of Malacca his services were rewarded by the grant of the office of Bendahara—still a high office, though it no longer had the same significance under Portuguese rule that it had had during the Malay sultanate. In the next three years he helped the Portuguese to open up trade with the surrounding area, though it was insinuated that he took very good care of his own interests at the same time. In theory, he was supposed to hold office for life and to pass it on to his descendants. But by the time royal confirmation of this grant arrived, Naina Chetu had been deposed and had, it is said, committed suicide. The office seems to have been restored to his family at a later date. Other Indian merchants assisted the Portuguese in business matters, and loaned them their slaves in time of war and, sometimes, money as well.

The taxes which the Portuguese imposed in Malacca were mostly customs duties; they were supposed to be quite small and food imports were not taxed. But, as in many other Eastern ports at this time, the gap between the law and practice could be considerable. This applied also to trading by officials, which was banned by a law which was almost universally disregarded. The officials excused themselves by saying that since their salaries were ill-paid and insufficient, they had to trade to maintain themselves and give hospitality to the poor soldiers.

Malacca was an important centre of trade in 1511 and Afonso de Albuquerque seems to have thought of it as a kind of bank on which he could draw to finance his military and naval campaigns in the Arabian Sea area. From the very beginning, therefore, the Captain of Malacca was one of the higher officials among the Portuguese in the East. When salaries were fixed he received the same amount as the

Captains of Ormuz—another great trading centre—and Goa—from 1550 the capital of the Portuguese in the East. Later, other captaincies were added with the same pay. The Captaincy of Malacca was a profitable post. Its disadvantage was its distance from the military glories of India.

There was considerable fighting near Malacca but, since it was to be a bank, its main business was trade and the Portuguese rarely sent very large forces to Malaya. On the other hand, the advantage of Malacca, for an independent man, was the absence of close control by the Portuguese Governor in India. A Captain of Malacca who received an order in May of one year, would usually not answer it until November or December, when the winds were favourable to the return voyage to India. If he wished to put off the execution of the Governor's order, he could send a temporising answer and the Governor would be unable to get a reply back to Malacca before May of the following year. Thus, a good twelve months would have been gained. And since appointments were generally only for three years and there was a fairly constant changing of officials of various ranks through death and through departure of a less drastic kind, the opportunities to frustrate the royal or viceregal orders were considerable.

It would be a mistake to dismiss the Portuguese officials at Malacca as a second-rate collection of corrupt and unprincipled intriguers. Some were; but such men were found in most sixteenth century forms of government. If we look through the lists of officials—when we can make them out—we find that people of high ability, rank and integrity served among the Portuguese in Malacca. This can be shown by a glance at the list of Captains from 1512 to 1560. During those years there were 20 different Captains serving 24 terms of office. Of these 20 men, three died in office, one died shortly after resigning and another was killed a little while after he had handed over to his brother. Only one of these five held the Captaincy for much more than a year—that was Ruy Vaz Pereira, Captain from 1542 till 1544; before coming to Malaya he had served respectably, if without distinction, in India.

The fifteen others are more important because it is possible to follow their careers after they left Malacca. . . . [T]hey include Simão Botelho, one of the Financial Superintendents in Portuguese India—a literal translation of his title would be Controller of the Royal Estate. This post was the next one to the Governorship and Botelho can fairly be described as one of the chief organisers of the administrative reforms the Portuguese carried out in the East in the 1540's. One of his acts was to reform the Malacca customs. With some intervals he retained his post until 1555, when he entered a religious order. It is said that Botelho's advice was considered so important that the Governor used to visit him in the Dominican convent in order to ob-

tain it. Of the others, Jorge de Albuquerque, though he met with much ill-fortune, seems to have been an honest and considerate Captain, though Barros, the chronicler, who must have known him personally, thought he was too trusting and incautious in matters of war. But he earned some high praise and after his retirement to Portugal he appears to have become a royal counsellor. . . .

What can be said about the ability of the Captains can also be said about their social standing: it was generally respectable and sometimes quite high. Four of the Captains in this period were sons of Vasco da Gama, the first Portuguese commander to reach India by sea, the Count of Vidigueira and the Admiral of the Indian Seas. This was high lineage indeed, for there were only about a dozen counts in Portugal in the early sixteenth century. Garcia de Sá was a member—and a prominent one—of the chief official family in Oporto at the time: and his son-in-law dom António de Noronha, Captain in 1554, was himself the son of a Viceroy of Portuguese India who, in his turn, was a nephew of a former Governor. . . .

What applies to the first half of the sixteenth century applies to the rest of the Portuguese period in Malacca. Officials of Malacca continued to become Viceroys and Governors and men of marked ability continued to become officials at Malacca. One of the last men of distinction to hold an official post at Malacca was António Pinto da Fonseca: his gravestone can still be seen on St. Paul's Hill. António Pinto da Fonseca was a knight commander of the Order of Saint James—the second of the three military orders of knighthood in Portugal—and he had served in the wars of Europe before he came to the East in 1611. And then, he did not come as a mere man-at-arms or a petty official, but as a Visitor and Superintendent-General of the fortresses of India, specially recommended by the Crown to the Viceroy of Portuguese India. His duties involved visiting all the fortresses to give orders about how they were to be strengthened. At that time, this was a very important matter: the Dutch were now in the East and the Portuguese government was anxious to improve the defences of its strongholds, so that they could resist Dutch attack. After inspecting several fortresses, Pinto da Fonseca reached Malacca in 1615. A little later he became Financial Superintendent of Malacca and Captain-General on land and sea in the Southern Regions. The Southern Regions meant roughly the Malay Archipelago and Pinto's post was equivalent to that of a Director of Military Operations against the Dutch and Achinese. He also served for a time as Captain of the Fortress. Originally, Pinto was not supposed to stay long at Malacca, and why he did so is not clear. But during his twenty years in Malacca he certainly did valuable service. . . .

There is another point to bear in mind about the Portuguese in Malacca. They came there during what is rightly called the great

Portuguese century—the equivalent of the Age of Gold of Spain. For Portugal, the time of purest gold was the reign of King dom Manuel, who ruled from 1495 till 1521. Dom Manuel himself is not an easy person to assess. Even his appearance was a little odd: the chronicler Goes, who served in his household, describes him as a man with chestnut-coloured hair, a high forehead, eyes of a colour between green and white and arms so long that when he stood up straight he could still touch his knees with the tips of his fingers. Yet, for all his peculiarities of character and appearance, it was during the time of this king, who, even when eating his food in a hurry, is said to have carried on a continual conversation with men of learning and foreigners and Portuguese who had travelled or done service abroad—it was during his reign that Portugal undertook the most ambitious projects at home and overseas. At home, it was the time of the best Portuguese architecture: it is called *Manueline*, and rightly so, because it was made possible by donations from the king. It is the most individual style of architecture or, rather, architectural decoration that the Portuguese have yet produced—in general impression quite different from Spanish *plateresque*. Royal patronage also extended to scholarship and during dom Manuel's reign the interest in classical Latin and Greek studies was spreading fast in Portugal. One of the most distinguished Portuguese scholars of this time was Aires Barbosa: he was nicknamed the Greek because of his deep knowledge of that language, taught at the University of Salamanca, then a great centre of learning, and finally returned to Portugal to help educate two of dom Manuel's sons. In poetry there was considerable experiment and some achievement: among the Portuguese who came to Malacca in the first half of the century was a nephew of one of the better minor poets of the time. Typically enough, the poet was a knight, a courtier and a royal official. In drama there was Gil Vicente, whom Aubrey Bell called "the greatest European dramatist between Euripides and Shakespeare"... Again, during dom Manuel's reign, men who were later to write notable histories were growing up: two of them were doing so at the royal court. To all this must be added the achievements in navigation and overseas enterprise in Africa, America and the East.

In Malacca this period is best reflected by the career of Duarte Coelho, which illustrates the rapid expansion of Portuguese activities all over South-east Asia between 1511 and 1530. Translated, Duarte Coelho's name means Edward Rabbit, and there is, indeed, something rabbit-like in the speed with which he moved from place to place. He was a man of respectable but not of high birth, who came to the East in 1509. He was present at the capture of Malacca in 1511. In the next sixteen to seventeen years he made four voyages to Siam, twice as ambassador. On the way back from one of these visits he was forced

to put in at Pahang: luckily he found the sultan friendly and he took advantage of the occasion to conclude a treaty of alliance with him. In this treaty the sultan promised to pay the Portuguese an annual tribute of a gold vase weighing 4 *kati*. He also, in the same period, made three voyages to China, one to Indochina, one to India and one to Java. . . . The only official post which he ever held seems to have been that of Superintendent of the affairs of the deceased and the Hospital. But he appears to have given it up after a month. Coelho established a hermitage in Malacca, at the top of what is now called Saint Paul's Hill. It was founded in thanksgiving for a safe return from a dangerous voyage to China. In fine, this all constituted an active life when it is considered that vessels were dependent on the winds and that, in general, only one round voyage a year could be made from Malacca to the places we have mentioned. After his return to Portugal in 1529 Coelho married Jorge de Albuquerque's niece. In 1538 he was employed as a Captain of a naval squadron off the West African coast. Finally, in the following year he obtained the captaincy of a large area on the Brazilian coast, on the understanding that he would found a settlement there. Other men obtained similar grants at the same time—including two others who had also served at Malacca—but Coelho was the only one whose work proved a permanent success. We have a picture of him importing seed, distributing land and taking great care of his settlement. And it was there that he died, in 1554, possibly on 7 August. It is perhaps only just that Malaya, which has recently been so much concerned with the Brazilian rubber tree, *Hevea brasiliensis*, should, for over fifteen years, have seen the comings and goings of an early colonist of Brazil.

Technically, the whole Portuguese enterprise in the East was carried out under the flag of the military crusading Order of Christ. It was decreed that every Saturday a mass should be said in all the fortress churches in India for the soul of Prince Henry, 'the Navigator' and the Governor of the Order of Christ who started Portuguese expansion to West Africa and beyond. From the very beginning the state supported religion in the East: it helped to build the churches, provided wine and wafers for the mass and oil for the church lamps; it also paid the stipends of the clergy. In Malacca there was, of course, a church from the time of its conquest. It was called the church of Our Lady of the Annunciation. Active missionary work in Malacca began in 1545 with the arrival of Saint Francis Xavier. But, outside Malacca and its environs, Malaya was not a very suitable area for Christian missionary work. So Malacca became a place of transit or a base for missionaries working some distance away, rather than a centre of active proselytising in Malaya. It was also the seat of a bishopric, founded in 1558. The cathedral clergy were paid, and the missionaries and school subsidised, by the state. Here, Malacca fared badly as the

see had to support the missionaries in Cambodia and the Lesser Sunda Islands and the clergy on the Coromandel coast, in addition to the clergy of the cathedral and four convents at Malacca.

One thing which the missionaries did was to instigate the erection of better buildings in Malacca. This is shown clearly from the various 16th and 17th century sketches of the town. The earliest, made in the first half of the sixteenth century, shows a town of *atap* and wooden houses with the tall stone fortress dominating the scene. Early seventeenth century sketches portray a very different situation. By this time there were the convents of the religious orders, all buildings of a respectable size, the cathedral, the parish churches, the bishop's palace and a small town hall. The general appearance of the town is best described in the words of one of its conquerors in 1641, who wrote that it was a city with big houses of wood or stone, and with very narrow but regular streets, after the Portuguese style.

It is now over three hundred years since the Portuguese lost Malacca, but its loss was not entirely without compensations. Malacca was not always an easy place for the Portuguese: there were times when the men were in arms day and night, sleeping at the foot of the stockades, exposed to the winds and rain, ill-fed and ill-clothed. For every one who survived these things and reached worldly success there were many who died or failed. . . .

Misfortune, or an early death, or both were, only too often, the fate of Portuguese who came to the East in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Chapter Three

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE JOHORE EMPIRE

The capture of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511 disrupted the political and economic relations between the Malaysian and Indonesian states. The extent and volume of the Malaysian-Indonesian trade did not change, but its direction shifted away from Malacca to other ports, particularly to Achin in northern Sumatra. Under the control of the Portuguese, Malacca soon lost its essential function as the main entrepôt of the Malaysian-Indonesian area, and thereby experienced a gradual economic decline. Politically, however, Malacca came to exert an important influence in the area because its new masters, although never numerically very strong, came to play an essential rôle in balancing the rising power of the Malay empire based on the Johore River and Riau-Lingga with that of the sultanate of Achin which was prospering markedly as a result of the diversion of Muslim trade in the Straits away from Malacca. The impact of the Portuguese on Malaysia is therefore not to be measured in terms of direct economic or cultural influence, although the Malay language, to take only one example, includes many words of Portuguese origin; but is to be measured, rather, in terms of the indirect influence which this new and technically superior power was able to exert by controlling a main artery of South-East Asian trade, and by virtue of its willingness to engage its superior military and naval organization in political struggles against Johore and Achin in order to preserve its trading privileges in the region.

I The Origins of the Johore Empire

After the Portuguese had captured Malacca the remnants of the Malay royal house, following a period of wandering, settled at the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula, along the Johore River,

and founded what came to be known as the Johore Empire. This embraced Johore itself, Singapore, the Riau-Lingga archipelago, and Pahang. Except for Malacca, therefore, the actual *territorial* extent of the old Sultanate was not much affected by the Portuguese conquest of 1511. The following reading on the origins of the Johore Empire is extracted from Sir Richard Winstedt's book, *A History of Malaya*. [Revised edition, Singapore, 1962, 135-8.]

IN 1511, their battle for Malacca lost, the Malay chiefs fled, Sultan Mahmud to Batu Hampar up the Malacca river, his son Ahmad south to Pagoh on the Muar, where the grave of his grandfather (with its texts on the vanity of life) was then still white, hardly more than two decades old. But Ahmad's last stand for the ashes of his ancestors failed. . . . [T]he Portuguese forced the hot-head to join his father in flight across the Peninsula through forest depths no enemy dared to penetrate. It was a small party for the Emperor of the Malacca kingdom, only the Sultan and his family and some fifty followers. And a sorry progress it must have been: women and children weak from hardships; sickened by the rolling gait of elephants as they were tilted up and down ravines; missing the sea-fish and luxuries of the cosmopolitan port they had left for ever; lamenting lost silks and trinkets, fugitive slaves and relatives killed in the fighting; afraid of the malignant spirits lurking in that great sea of forest. And their master, Sultan Mahmud with his moody temper and his clever caustic tongue? Was he still confident in the luck of that white blood which his divine ancestors had shared with Siva and his own veins shared with Muslim saints? Was he still hot as he had been against Ahmad, the fire-eating son who had rattled the creese for that disastrous bout with those chain-clad "White Bengalis"? Or was he sulky and despondent, nauseated by jungle food and seeking consolation in the opium-pipe which the Portuguese say he loved? Daily mahouts and paddlers took him further into exile. The war elephants had to be abandoned. Crossing the Jempul watershed the royal fugitives followed the Seriting river into Pahang, a route first travelled by an Englishman in 1827 when the journey from Malacca took a strenuous fortnight and three weeks after his return the forest devils, called by white medicine-men malaria, visited the adventurer with death.

At last Sultan Mahmud reached the court of his cousin of Pahang. To add to the fugitives' depression, the north-east monsoon was soon upon them, those months of incessant rain that driving across the China Sea frays men's nerves in spite of junketings and made the Pekan court for centuries a scene of dark intrigue and bestial tortures. There were long idle days when, if he had the heart, Sultan Mahmud could listen once more, as he had listened at Malacca, to Malay folktales and Muslim romances, to discussions on the doctrines of Ghaz-

zali and to the theological conundrums that had interested him in happier times. He staged a wedding between his daughter Fatimah and his host's son, an alliance and an easy gesture of gratitude for hospitality that was to last a year. A wedding was always gay with feasting and dances and drums and cock-fighting and here certainly with the shadow-play which Majapahit conquerors had left on that coast a hundred and fifty years before; that shadow-play where . . . the old Hindu gods come down and are present in their puppet portraits, and, the play ended, Siva descends to drive his army of evil spirits out of the great door of the palm-leaf theatre. But though Siva as god of death was busy enough with the crews of carracks on their voyage round the Cape, yet he could not spirit the white djinns of Portugal away from the Malayan stage, and an exile's rice is bitter to the taste. With the change of the monsoon, Mahmud despatched "one of his uncles," d'Albuquerque tells us, an Indian trader, Nasim Mudeliar, to China to ask help from the Son of Heaven against Portugal, but having heard of the prowess of the Portuguese and knowing that d'Albuquerque had kindly entreated the Chinese of the five junks while the Sultan had practised tyrannies upon foreign traders at Malacca, His Imperial Majesty made excuses, saying that he was at war with the Tartars.

It was time to found a new kingdom but at first the Malays were too cowed to venture another of those port capitals that alone brought revenue. Overlord though he was of the east coast of the Peninsula from Patani to the southernmost extremity of Asia, that remote monsoon-bound coast could provide Sultan Mahmud no effective base for guerilla warfare against the Portuguese at Malacca. He was overlord of the west coast from Kedah downwards but here the estuaries were too close to Malacca for safety. Overlord of all Malaya except Malacca and Naning, he had yet to seek refuge far up the Johor river, probably at Sayong Pinang, where, as graves attest, Malacca Malays had lived for more than half a century. Sultan Mahmud once remarked that a king's sword attracts gold, and to found a new settlement little else was required beyond palm-thatched houses built in a day or a week or a month according to size and stability, a patch of forest felled for dry rice, and a fleet of dug-outs for transport and trading. But the Sayong retreat was too far from the sea for the wanderer to collect revenue from toll on shipping; so gaining courage he removed to Bintan. There at Riau, Sultan Mahmud preserved the old-world pomp of the Malacca court; astonishing visitors by his gold and silver plate and the hushed dignity of the palace service; still exacting homage from fiefs like Bruas, when they proved careless of a king in exile; still conferring titles and giving his daughters to Sumatran princes, the rulers of Indragiri, Siak and Deli, who under the spell of the old Malacca dynasty were ready to assist its head to assert his divine

right against the European intruder. From 1518 to 1520 he was at Pagoh till the Portuguese drove him back to Bintan. Exile did not improve his temper. On the occasion of one of the many attacks on Malacca, when a storm spoilt the tactics and one of the royal elephants had its right tusk broken in a charge, the testy Sultan rated his commander as a prodigious liar for professing without reason to be braver than 'Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, and cleverer than the Imam Ghazzali. In some black fit after his arrival at Bintan he had his son Ahmad killed; according to Ruy de Brito because the young man did not share his opium-smoking father's desire for peace; according to the *Malay Annals* because he feasted wild young counsellors, neglecting the old, whereupon his father, shadow of Allah upon earth, saw to it the words of the Kuran were fulfilled that no man shall outlive his appointed time. After Mascarenhas destroyed Bintan in 1526, the overlord of so great a part of the Malay world was dragged off the bridge by his ministers and escorted, a fugitive, to wander in the jungle, his aching feet bound with cloth; indebted for his life (according to the same scribe) only to members of the Bendahara house whose wages were cracked porcelain and death. "So long as Your Highness lives," one of them rightly consoled him, "ten kingdoms can be created." And not even then were the Portuguese such masters of the Straits as to prevent the Sultan's deputy in Selangor slinking past Malacca a fortnight later with twenty boats and removing his fugitive liege lord to rule over Kampar in Sumatra, where after two years he entered in 1528 that strait gate of death, which, as the Kuran told him, is the goal of all wanderings.

... Sultan Mahmud left two claimants for his throne, an elder son, Muzaffar by a Kelantan princess, a younger 'Ala'u'd-din whose mother was daughter of Tuan Mutahir, the Bendahara executed by Mahmud in Malacca for treason twenty years ago. When 'Ala'u'd-din was born, his hair was shaved with a golden knife, and baby clothes were brought him on an elephant, escorted by flags and banners and painted standards (which Islam has now banished from Malay ceremony): moreover from his elder brother were taken away his embroidered mat and his carpet, deprivation symbolic as the removal of a mandarin's peacock feather. It is not surprising that the Bendahara family drove away the elder prince (to become first Sultan of Perak) and chose as ruler of Johor the younger prince of their own blood and carried him off still in his 'teens to safety and marriage with a cousin in Pahang. After his wedding in Pahang, the boy Sultan, 'Ala'u'd-din, settled on the upper reaches of the Johor river, guarded by a downstream fort whose earthwork still exists at Sungai Telor a few miles above Kota Tinggi. After one Portuguese attack he had to retreat to remote Sayong Pinang. Some time before 1564 he moved to Johor Lama, a capital sacked by Aceh in that year, when 'Ala'u'd-din was

removed a captive to Sumatra. Before the end of the Johor empire it was to have many other capitals on the Johor river, Seluyut, Batu Sawar, Makam Tauhid, Panchor and two in the Riau Archipelago; for it mattered little where was the palm-thatched court, so long as in it there was the sacred white-blooded person of an emperor.

II *Royal Malay Towns along the Johore River during the Sixteenth Century*

The following reading is taken from the late C. A. Gibson-Hill's article, 'Johore Lama and other ancient sites on the Johore River'. [*JMBRAS*, xxviii, 2, 1955, 138-43]. Gibson-Hill was Director of the Raffles Museum in Singapore.

AL-A'U'D-DIN Ri'ayat Shah was succeeded by his son Muzaffar. There is by no means unanimous agreement on this point, but it seems acceptable: beyond it the picture is for a time tenuous, and several of the relatively few statements available are again conflicting. It does, however, appear that Muzaffar was followed by a young boy (sultan 'Abdu'l-Jalil Shah), who ruled for a comparatively short time; and the child by Muzaffar's brother-in-law, a certain Raja 'Omar of Pahang, who assumed the title of sultan Ali Jalla 'Abdu'l-Jalil Ri'ayat Shah. The latter was the Malay ruler in 1587, and he was thus the last sultan to have his capital on the site adjacent to Johore Lama. Further it is clear that it was only under Ali Jalla, dubious prince of a distant house, that it grew to be a place of great importance.

According to the Shellabear recension [of the *Malay Annals*], sultan Muzaffar moved from Johore Lama and set up his capital at Bukit Séluyut, further up the Johore river. He and his young son, sultan 'Abdu'l-Jalil, are both said to have died and been buried there, and the former is given the posthumous title of *Marhum Séluyut*. Finally we are told that on the death of the boy sultan, 'Abdu'l-Jalil, 'Omar moved the capital to *Tanah Puteh*, which he renamed Batu Sawar, but the locality proved unhealthy and two years later an epidemic drove him across the Sungei Damar to a new locality... which he named Makam Tauhid. This latter site is clearly the 'Batu Sawar' where... sultan Ali Jalla established his capital at the end of 1587, after the destruction of Johore Lama. The Johore capital thereafter remained in this neighbourhood until the hostility of sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh forced raja Bongsu (sultan 'Abdu'llah Ma'ayat Shah) to move down to Lingga, in 1617 or 1618. As we can see, the author of the appendix to the *Malay Annals* makes no mention of raja 'Omar's occupation of the site near Johore Lama. But he also avoids any

reference to the Portuguese attack of 1587, and he could hardly have accounted for the move from Johore Lama if he had once admitted that the capital was taken there. There is, therefore, a good reason for his apparent error, and the latter cannot be taken as grounds for doubting his other statements. Raja 'Omar may easily have moved from Sêluyut to another site further up the river for two years, before re-occupying Johore Lama. He may even have attempted to establish a capital at Gonggong, on the right bank of the river, about two miles below Kuala Sêluyut. . . .

It is clear that the site at Bukit Sêluyut was fortified at one time, and there are three graves (two adult and one of a child) on the foot of the hill, between the fort and the landing place, which were certainly constructed for people of importance. Further no other sultans are said, on comparable authority, to have lived at Sêluyut, and there was after all no strong reason why Muzaffar should have rebuilt Johore Lama after the Achenese attack in 1564. . . . [T]he evidence at present available suggests that settlements were founded at both Sayong Pinang and Kota Tinggi about as early as the initial settlement at Johore Lama. In particular Sayong Pinang's association with the Malacca royal family undoubtedly goes back to the middle of the fifteenth century, but Ala'u'd-din, after establishing his capital in the area about 1530, abandoned it some five to ten years later. There was no long historical tradition to endear Johore Lama to the ruling family in 1564-68. It had been the residence of the previous sultan for a little over twenty years. And there he had terminated a long but undistinguished reign by failing to hold his capital against the Achenese, as he had failed to hold the approaches to Sayong Pinang against an attack by the Portuguese nearly thirty years earlier.

Further we must remember that Johore Lama had only limited advantages as a site for the capital. It was well-suited for the establishment of a small trading post, or a port for the Johore River. It lies below the shoals round Pulau Layang, and within a reasonably short distance of the passage from the Singapore Strait to the South China Sea. There is a good anchorage in front of the area of the present kampong, and an adjacent tributary (the Sungei Johore Lama) behind it, well sited for use by small craft. Tanjong Batu is a natural location for a fort. But at this point we reach the end of Johore Lama's major virtues. Its accessibility was undoubtedly also a disadvantage, as it rendered it singularly open to attack, and, though Tanjong Batu could be considered a good defensive position, it was clearly not possible to fortify the area of the trading settlement adequately, or to defend vessels anchored in the main river. In addition much of the surrounding countryside consists of tidal mangrove swamps, and even by sixteenth century standards the ground could not have provided food for a large population.

Malacca rose to prominence as an entrepôt, owing more to the traders of ma[n]y races resident there than to the guiding hand of her rulers. The city was well-sited, and there were no serious competitors close to her during the fifteenth century. As Malacca grew pro[s]perous, the standard of living, and the material culture, of her inhabitants rose proportionately. Men whose fathers, grandfathers or greatgrandfathers had been *orang laut*, living as coastal scavengers or near pirates, became citizens of no mean city.

When the Malay rulers were driven from Malacca they and their followers lost the means of supporting their enriched economy, but not their appetite for its fruits. For the next two hundred years or more their successive policies were in part dictated by the need to find an alternative source of revenue to replace the one that had formerly fallen, without effort, into their laps. During the sixteenth century, at least, the problem was insoluble. They still thought in terms of a populous capital, and dreamt of a widespread empire. But at that date neither the Johore River nor Bintan could provide a revenue from natural products in any way comparable to the one that they had milked from the entrepôt trade of Malacca. And with Malacca and Goa in Portuguese hands, the Malay rulers could not establish a satisfactory rival emporium within the limits of their territory.

When the Malay leaders vacated Malacca, two courses were open to them. One was to establish a smaller capital, with a lower standard of living, and there subsist as their ancestors had done on sago and tubers, rather than rice; or alternatively turn their subjects into agriculturalists, and set them growing their full requirements of food-stuffs. The other was to find a fresh source of income. Unfortunately . . . they had little to offer then in the way of local commodities, and they could not establish a satisfactory rival emporium. Their income had to come from taxes and tribute, in effect from wars and customs' duties on traffic through the Singapore Strait, from pillage and acts perilously near to piracy.

The troubled conditions that ensued profited neither the Malays nor the Portuguese. On the one hand the latter never obtained the income from Malacca that the Malay court had done, and in time the trade between India and the Indies was diverted to other ports. On the other, the successive Malay capitals became smaller and less prosperous, until finally, in the eighteenth century, their rulers forsook the Peninsula, and established themselves in the islands to the south of it, balancing their economy on tolls from passing shipping, and the profits from the labours of the Chinese whom their Bugis masters induced to settle among them.

In the century following the loss of Malacca, the present and future were equally obscure, except for one point. The Johore River area

was not satisfactory for the production of rice, and the followers of the Malay sultans were not anxious to undertake any unrewarding labour. As a result policy fluctuated. At Sayong Pinang, the capital can have had little income and few imports. At Johore Lama, Ala'u'd-din clearly attempted to build up a revenue by taxing passing vessels, and forcing trade to his port. The same procedure recurred when Ali Jalla (the former Raja 'Omar) moved the capital back to Johore Lama, and ultimately it was this policy which was largely responsible for the sequence of events which led to the Portuguese decision to occupy the city. Sêluyut and Batu Sawar were probably compromise positions: unlike Johore Lama, they could have supported small, independent populations at a reduced standard of living, but it is clear that while at Batu Sawar some at least of the Malay leaders were not content to withdraw into peaceful seclusion. They still tried to extract a revenue from the traffic in the Singapore Strait, and when the Dutch arrived on the scene they hoped that they might recover Malacca with their help, or failing that establish a commercial relationship that would replace the former entrepôt trade. In turn, of course, both parties learnt that fair promises do not make a fine bird.

III *The Portuguese and the Trade and Politics of Malaysia*

The following reading describes the effects which a Portuguese controlled Malacca had on the course of Malaysian-Indonesian trade and politics during the sixteenth century. [Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago* . . ., 136-42.]

PORTUGUESE Malacca was in a much more vulnerable position than it had been in the time of the sultans. Only the town and a small area around it were in Portuguese hands. Surrounded by enemies on nearly every side, here too Portuguese power depended primarily upon the fleet for protection. There was no question at first of the Portuguese dominating the straits, for the sultan who had been driven out of Malacca retained authority over his dependencies on the opposite shore and his fleets continued to render the straits unsafe.

Achin, which was of little importance at the time of the fall of Malacca, rapidly developed into a still more dangerous enemy than Johore. The food situation was extraordinarily precarious too because, just as in the time of the sultans, Malacca was almost entirely dependent upon supplies from outside. Since the Portuguese did not have

enough ships or men to take over the transport of local supplies themselves, they were obliged to take immediate steps to revive the Asian commercial traffic which Malacca had known before 1511. Another consideration was that the tolls which could be levied on native shipping and trade in Malacca represented a considerable source of income to the Portuguese crown. Albuquerque's measures show that he was implementing a policy of attracting Asian traders to Malacca and his efforts in this direction were initially crowned with success. The capture of Malacca and the flight of the sultan gave the Portuguese considerable ascendancy at first in the Malay-Indonesian area. People everywhere were afraid of them, and from all sides Moslem and Hindu princes sent tribute embassies to the new rulers, under whom, moreover, they were hoping to continue the profitable trade which they had carried on under the sultanate. Economic motives certainly weighed heavily in the adoption of this attitude towards the intruder, since most of the Malay-Indonesian countries depended on Malacca not only as a port of supply and loading where they could sell their own goods and buy imports from the West but also as a large-scale purchaser of the foodstuffs they themselves produced.

In the first instance the Portuguese tried to establish closer relations with non-Moslems, and so in Malacca itself they made use of the services of the Hindu merchants, and elsewhere of the help of the Javanese Hindu princes. They also maintained communications with Siam and other countries in Further India and sought contacts even further east as well, yet all the time the Moslems, with their important trading connections, remained indispensable [*sic*] to them. But resistance to the Portuguese was very strong among the Moslems of western Asia, in particular among the Gujarati who had so much to do with the transport of the spices. This was the reason for the anti-Portuguese intrigues carried on by the Gujarati even before the fall of Malacca. Later on Gujarat continued to oppose the Portuguese intruders in close association with the Egyptians and the Turks. Other interested parties in the spice trade were the Javanese who had settled in Malacca. They were responsible for the dangerous riots which took place in the town after its capture and, in cooperation with their compatriots in Java itself, they prepared the great attack that was made upon the port. But the interests of the various mercantile towns of Java were not all the same and only those which handled the intermediary trade in spices felt themselves to be threatened. Moslem or non-Moslem, those towns which depended on Malacca for the sale of their food products tried to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Portuguese, and a large part of their commercial traffic was soon focused once more on Malacca. . . .

Malacca under the sultanate had been able to develop into a com-

mercial centre thanks to good relations with the surrounding countries and to the fact that its possession of the land on either side of the water gave it control over the Malay Straits.

The exiled sultan (from now on usually called the sultan of Johore) still exercised authority over his territory, except for the very small area conquered by the Portuguese and he formed an alliance with those Malay states, such as Pahang and Perak, which were not under his direct authority. On the Malay Peninsula Johore's authority extended over a long strip of land on both the east and the west coast and over a chain of islands scattered along these coasts. The Celates (sea-gypsies) who inhabited these regions remained faithful to their old sultan and made themselves thoroughly troublesome to the Portuguese at sea. On the mainland, only Nanning of all the Minangkabau settlements situated near Malacca had come under Portuguese authority; the rest still recognized their former ruler. People from these settlements raided and plundered the countryside in the immediate vicinity of Malacca, which meant that supplies of foodstuffs brought overland for the daily needs of the town were also threatened. Since the sultan's fleet had survived the fall of Malacca, it could make the straits unsafe and obstruct Portuguese trade. But the Asian traders still established in Malacca also suffered heavy losses through this. Moreover Asian merchants continued to visit the sultan's new capital. . . .

An understanding dangerous to the Portuguese sprang up between the Malays and the disaffected Javanese in Malacca. At a somewhat later date the sultan succeeded in attracting to his port the Javanese junks which carried foodstuffs. Thanks to its overlordship of the Sumatran and Malay countries on the peninsula, Johore at first retained control over supplies of export products such as pepper, tin, and gold. But the presence of the Portuguese in Malacca, meant that regular and direct communications with western Asia were broken, at least as far as the larger ships were concerned, although smuggling must still have taken place of course. Johore was therefore obliged to devote more attention to the East and it succeeded in interesting the Chinese merchants in its exports. Portuguese Malacca suffered just as much from the obstacles which Johore laid in the way of Portuguese trade to and from China as from the sultan's policy of attracting the Javanese junks with provisions to Johore.

Yet the struggle against the Portuguese imposed a heavy burden on Johore. The repeated devastation of the capital, which necessitated its removal to several different sites, the raids made by the Portuguese along the coasts of the Malay Peninsula, the seizure of merchant ships en route to Johore, all were disastrous in their effect. The sultan tried to augment the trade of his country by imposing low duties and offering merchants high prices for the goods they brought

while parting with his own exchange commodities at low prices. But Portuguese Malacca, with its good accommodation and its great tradition of commercial activity, continued to exercise a strong attraction on many Asian merchants in spite of monopoly restrictions and forcible measures. By its very proximity Portuguese Malacca hindered Johore's development as a centre of trade. Chinese and Dutch sources do not think much of the arrangements made for trade in Johore, nor of the landing facilities, since trading had to take place on board the ships lying in the roads. In Malacca, moreover, the native traders could still obtain goods from the West, especially Coromandel cloth.

But to the detriment of both Portuguese Malacca and Johore, a large share of the trade with the West was soon annexed by Achin, the small but rapidly developing pirate state, already known to Pires, which had formerly been subordinate to Pidië but which in a very short space of time had grown into an important harbour for commercial traffic with western Asia. Both Johore and Achin aimed at making their ports the scene of undisturbed contact between traders from East and West and this led to enmity not only with Portuguese Malacca but with each other as well.

As it thrust along the east coast of Sumatra, Achin came up against the dependencies of Johore. In the struggle for the hegemony which had now broken out and was to continue throughout the entire 16th century, weaker Johore was obliged to seek Portuguese support. It was only because of this rivalry between her Asian opponents that Portuguese Malacca managed to hold its own at all, and sometimes it only just managed to do so. Right through the 16th century Malacca lived under the continual threat of war with both neighbours, the situation being alternated only by open attacks and sieges. The progress of the latter is related in detail by the Portuguese historians, but their economic foundation has to be deduced from nothing more than a few random remarks.

The peace concluded in 1536 between Malacca and Johore after the Portuguese had undertaken a destructive expedition against the Malay kingdom was determined to no small extent by Achinese expansion. Trade in Malacca revived once commercial traffic was no longer obstructed by Johore. The Portuguese administration took advantage of the situation to send factors to territories under the authority of Johore. But large numbers of Portuguese private traders also took part in this commercial intercourse. In Patani, which was not subordinate to Johore but which the latter could easily have made it difficult for the Portuguese to visit, some 300 private traders appeared; the same phenomenon could be observed in Achin when peace was temporarily restored and about 80 Portuguese merchants went to try their luck there.

But peace did not last long between the Portuguese and Johore. In the second half of the 16th century, too, there were repeated conflicts arising out of commercial rivalry. The sultan forced Asian ships to visit his ports and pay duty there, which meant that Malacca was deprived of these duties. But from motives of personal gain the governors of Malacca did not scruple to play into the sultan's hands by encouraging this commercial traffic to Johore. They used to buy up in Johore the goods brought there by the Asian merchants, which, because of the low duties imposed by the sultan, were cheaper than in Portuguese Malacca where duties were high. Just how important these conflicts between Portuguese Malacca and Johore were considered to be in Europe can be judged from the reports on the struggle in 1588 sent to the Fuggers, who must have profited from them when buying and selling the East Indian merchandise. This is proof, too, that the commercial significance of Johore was certainly greater than one would suppose from Dutch reports on the situation at a somewhat later date.

Although the state capital of Johore Lama was destroyed by the Portuguese in 1587, at the end of the 16th century Johore appears to have become so much stronger again that the sultan caused defence works to be erected in the immediate vicinity of Malacca. To be sure, the Portuguese succeeded in destroying them, but they had difficulty in preventing Johore from rebuilding. Johore also managed to hold its own against Achin, so that in 1599 Achin sent a delegation to Goa for help. When the Dutch appeared in the waters around Malaya, the actual ruler of Johore at that time, the brother of the reigning sultan, considered it advisable to seek the support of this new power. This resulted in a temporary *renversement des alliances* in the area and brought Achin over to the Portuguese side.

IV *The Dutch Conquest of Malacca 1641*

Merchants from the northern European countries, England and the Netherlands, began to enter the Malaysian trading preserves of the Portuguese during the last decade of the sixteenth century. At first these trading ventures were sustained by private capital but early losses soon led to amalgamation. In 1602 the powerful United Dutch East India Company was formed under the Charter of the States General with a capital of 6½ million guilders. The control of the Company was vested in the hands of seventeen Directors in Holland, who appointed merchants and governors to administer their affairs abroad. It was, of course, obvious that Malacca would soon engage the attention of the Dutch, and in 1605 Cornelis Matelief

appeared before the city and in the following year laid siege to it. A Portuguese relief fleet from Goa forced him to raise the siege, and a second attempt to capture the place was made in 1608 by Pieter Willemsz. Verhoeven. This also was unsuccessful as were further attempts made between 1623 and 1627, and it was not until 1640 that a sufficiently strong force was sent against the Portuguese fortress to effect its capture. Even so, the final siege was a protracted and weary one, and Malacca did not fall into Dutch hands until grave losses had been experienced on both sides, generally from disease. The following reading is the letter which the Dutch commanders wrote to the Governor-General and his Council in Batavia on 16 January 1641, informing them of the capture of the city two days previously. [P. A. Leupe, 'The Siege and Capture of Malacca from the Portuguese in 1640-1641', translated by Mac Hacobian, *JMBRAS*, xiv, 1, 1936, 44-5.]

NOBLE, Valiant, Wise, Honourable Gentlemen,
The Governor-General and Council of India.
Our last letter dated the 6th inst. stated that we had decided to storm the city of Malacca as soon as we received assistance from JAVA or JAPAN. Meanwhile the Commander-in-Chief MINNE WILLEMSZ. CAERTEKOE and his Council thought proper to appoint Wednesday the 9th inst. a day of public prayers and fasting so that God our Lord might be pleased to bless our exploit.

On the 10th inst. the Commander who was lying ill in bed, called another meeting of the Council in which it was unanimously resolved to commission the upper-merchant ANTHONY HURDT and the skipper PIETER BAECK (Commissary HENDRIK SIEVERTSZ. SPANHEM and NICOLAAS JANSZ. HOUTCOPER were to review the army) to urge the enemy once more to surrender but the latter would not take heed and put up a red flag at the entrance.

On the 11th inst. the Commander called another meeting of the Council and suggested that, in view of our complete preparations, it was advisable to storm the city on Sunday night. This was adopted unanimously. Our forces were drawn up as follows:-

The *Avant-garde* under Captain FORSENBURG, two of whose right hand fingers were shot off; and HENDRICK SIEVERTSZ. SPANHEM who led the sailors.

The *Bataille* led by the upper-merchant ANTHONY HURDT.

The *Arrier-garde* led by the upper-merchant NICOLAAS JANSZ. HOUTCOPER.

The Sergeant Major JOHANNES LAMOTIUS was in command of the entire army.

In this formation our army of 650 men marched towards the city on

Sunday night at 2 o'clock and the Almighty was so merciful that by ten o'clock we were masters of the city. Our men fought like lions.

By a placard we declared on Sunday afternoon everything booty except cannons, gunpowder and shells. We lost in all 30 men and had 60 wounded including the skipper of the GOES, the skipper TOBIAS CLOECK of the ZONNETJE and Lieutenant BAEKER.

We will write within 6 or 7 days a detailed account of all that happened and of the present state of affairs. This letter merely serves to give the good news in brief.

The Padres declare that about 7,000 people have died and that they have been eating dogs, cats, rats and hides of beasts. Our shallop EGMOND has come back safely with 28 men.

We send you 30 prisoners. Lieutenant JAN DE MOFF is also coming. He asked the Council for leave stating that you had consented to relieve him as soon as the Malacca campaign was over. We have therefore complied with his request.

We found at the city walls 107 pieces of guns etc. as per inventory and in a street 5 metal and 4 iron pieces. We will state in our next how many more we have found as well as the number of bells. It is such a strong fortification that it would seem impossible to have stormed it. Such a fortress is worth seeing.

Six months' provisions have been distributed among the people on board the yacht the ZONNETJE. We send you the case belonging to the skipper TOBIAS CLOECK. The inventory is inside.

So far no ships have been sighted from anywhere.

We all wish you to-day Noble, Wise and most Honourable Gentlemen, good luck with the city of MALACCA.

Written in the Monastery of ST. PAUL on the 16th of January, 1641.

Signed MINNE WILLEMSZ. CAERTEKOE.
HENDRICK SIEVERTSZ. SPANHEMS.
ANTHONY HURDT.
NICOLAES JANSZ. HOUTCOPER.
JOHANNES LAMOTIUS.
LOURENS FORSENBURG.
PIETER BAECK.

V *The Passing of Malay Rule*

The following reading is an extract from pages 139 to 144 of Sir Richard Winstedt's *A History of Malaya* [Revised edition, 1962]. Sir Richard demonstrates how the advent of the Dutch at first strengthened the Johore empire, only to weaken it later.

IN 1641 the Dutch had seized Malacca and in that same year Iskandar Thani, last of Aceh's imperialist pirates, had died. It must have seemed to Sultan 'Abdu'l-Jalil Shah III (reigned 1623-1677) of Johor that quit of peril from Portugal and Aceh and allied with Holland he might revive the dynastic glory and the prosperous trade of his Malacca ancestors. From now until the nineteenth century, when the empire broke up, Pahang was part of Johor. In 1644 the Sultan's younger brother was accepted in marriage by the Queen of Patani. Fear of the Dutch had made Jambi and Aceh his allies. In Sumatra, two centres of the pepper trade, Bengkalis and Kampar, were his dependencies; the important rivers of Siak and Rakan were placed under his Shahbandars, and after 1669 he became ruler of Indragiri, another source whence pepper from Minangkabau was exported. From Pahang and these Sumatran fiefs as well as the islands of Riau archipelago and even Malacca's hinterland, Klang and Sungai Ujong, there came to his capital on the Johor river tin and pepper and less important commodities such as lignum-aloes, ivory, camphor, copra, pottery, resin, which were sold to the Dutch and, in defiance of Dutch injunctions, to Gujeratis, to Chinese, to Portuguese and even to stray Englishmen. At that same Johor capital the Chinese in want of tin and pepper bartered gold-thread, rough porcelain, iron pans, tea and tobacco, while not only the Dutch but Malacca Chinese, Indians, Portuguese and English imported cloth from Surat and Coromandel. On most of these imports and exports the Sultan enjoyed customs duties and port dues.

Then the first of those Johor Laksamanas, chosen by destiny to be the instruments of their country's ruin, caused war between Johor and her ally Jambi. The daughter of this feudal lord of Bintan married the Johor Sultan's heir, which marriage caused that heir's engagement to a daughter of the Pangeran of Jambi to be deferred until tomorrow and tomorrow and broken promises led to raids and sea-fights between the two countries that lasted thirteen years. In 1673 Jambi surprised Johor's fief, Bengkalis, and then sacked Johor's capital Batu Sawar, taking four tons of gold and 2500 prisoners and driving Sultan 'Abdu'l-Jalil Shah an exile to Pahang, where four years later he died at the age of ninety. This blow cost Johor far more than the loss of a capital, a loss she had often suffered without irreparable harm. This time, by the will of Allah, defeat was to bring her into relations with Minangkabaus and Bugis, vigorous interlopers fated between them to end the empire of Johor. Ibrahim, cousin and successor to the aged Sultan, in order to finish the Jambi war, called to his aid Daing Mangika, a Bugis mercenary. And the Minangkabau population of Siak, like their brothers of Klang and Sungai Ujong contemptuous of an overlord conquered by a Sumatran State as petty as their own, elected for ruler a prince of Minangkabau blood. When in 1685

Sultan Ibrahim died, poisoned according to rumour by three of his wives, he left the Johor stage to his son Mahmud, a minor and a pervert, to that heir's father-in-law the powerful intriguing Laksamana and to Bugis and Minangkabaus quick as vultures to use for their own ends a quarrel beside the death-bed of an empire.

This old Laksamana, Paduka Raja, who had caused and after long years won the Jambi war, had even before Ibrahim's death drawn all authority into his hands and no longer paid respect to his royal master. Now at Riau, which under his influence Ibrahim had made Johor's capital, he became Regent and arrogated to himself such power, that in 1688 he had to flee from the wrath of his fellow-chiefs to Trengganu, where he died. Of this Regency with its ambitions and disturbances that hindered Johor from holding down the contumacious Minangkabaus of Siak, the Dutch Company was not slow to take advantage. In 1685 it contracted with the Regent one abortive treaty, designed to secure a monopoly of Siak's newly discovered tin, but the Regent, a wily diplomat, contrived to repudiate it. In 1688 it exacted another futile treaty from Johor's new Bendahara or prime minister, Tun Habib 'Abdu'l-Majid, who had just brought his princely charge to Kota Tinggi away from the disturbed atmosphere of Riau. The Dutch were to enjoy a monopoly and toll-free trade in the kingdom of Johor. No Hindus or Moors were to be allowed to settle in Johor territory and their goods were to be heavily taxed. The Dutch were to have a monopoly of Siak tin, until Mahmud the young Sultan of Johor should come of age. Mahmud was indeed to come of age and then a few years later to expiate his sadism at the hands of a petty Malay chief, Megat Sri Rama, in revenge for the foul murder of that chief's wife. Never a day passed when this mad prince did not kill some wretch with his own hands. Once the English trader Captain Alexander Hamilton gave him a brace of screw-barrelled pistols, and the next time the madman went abroad "he tried, on a poor Fellow in the Street, how far they could carry a Ball into his Flesh, and shot him through the Shoulder." Malay chroniclers suppose that he had a fairy wife, a genie who made him averse from all mortal women. When his mother introduced a Delilah to his palace, he called the guard and made them break her arms for venturing to touch his person. The chiefs decided to rid the country of the royal lunatic and, accordingly, one morning in August 1699, as Mahmud was being carried in the old style on a follower's shoulders over the muddy approach to the Kota Tinggi mosque, Megat Sri Rama smote "the Beast" with a lance, so that he died. So (except for its Perak branch) perished the last of the Malacca royal line. Dying, Mahmud hurled a creese at his assailant, wounding him, some say, to the death, while according to others he lived four years in agony, grass growing in the wound on his foot. Megat Sri Rama lies buried at Kota Tinggi in the

burial-ground of the Laksamanas and even to this day no member of the Laksamana family dare visit Kota Tinggi for fear of the vengeful ghost of Sultan Mahmud. Were it not for the evidence of English travellers, one might wonder if Mahmud's infamy were not the invention of Malay chroniclers bent on excusing the murder of their ruler at the instigation of his own mother's kinsmen.

Whether or not the Laksamana hoped to fill the vacant throne, choice fell on the prime minister, the Bendahara Sri Maharaja 'Abdu'l-Jalil IV, son of the Bendahara Sri Maharaja Tuan Habib 'Abdu'l-Majid. Habib was a common Malay synonym for Sayid, and it seems likely that only on the distaff side was the new ruler descended from the great Bendaharas of old Malacca, and on the spear side from a Hashimite Sayid who married a daughter of the well-known Bendahara Sekudai. Captain Alexander Hamilton describes him as "a Prince of great Moderation and Justice, and governed well for the eight or nine years that he held the Reins of Government in his own Hands." In 1703 he made Hamilton "a Present of the Island of *Sincapure*, but I told him it could be of no use to a private Person, tho' a proper Place for a Company to settle a Colony on, lying in the Center of Trade." Just before this visit by Hamilton, Mr. Vaughan and four other Englishmen had been brought to Panchor, then the Johor capital, as shipwrecked castaways and were invited by the King to "slarn," that is to accept Islam, but "they all agreed rather to die." However as they pleased the Sultan and his court by singing English songs, dancing and tumbling and doing conjuring tricks, they were given a lodging, rice and gold coins to buy fish and they found it hard to get leave to pass on to Malacca. . . .

Family feuds drove . . . Sultan 'Abdu'l-Jalil IV to religion and he left politics to his younger brother the Raja Muda, whose tyranny and greed caused a revolution. Was the Laksamana, jealous of the new Bendahara royalty, again at the bottom of the rising? Was there a rising at all or was it merely the family quarrels of *parvenu* royalty that brought to Johor the Minangkabau ruler of Siak, Raja Kechil, who was rumoured (against all evidence) to be the posthumous child of the lunatic Sultan Mahmud by a daughter of the Laksamana? The Cellates or sea-tribes, who were subject to the Laksamana, were bribed not to warn the Johor capital of the advent of the Siak fleet which actually surprised the Raja Muda at a game of chess. The guns of the fort were filled with water and would not go off. Seeing that all was lost, the Raja Muda ran amuck killing many of his children and concubines and a wife famous for her beauty and her golden loom. Sultan 'Abdu'l-Jalil fled upriver to Kota Tinggi, tendered submission to the invader and was given his old office of Bendahara or prime minister. Raja Kechil then usurped the Johor throne, adopted the style of Sultan 'Abdu'l-Jalil Rahmat Shah and proceeded in the traditional

Malay fashion to marry a daughter of the ruler he had deposed. Chroniclers aver that betrothed to an elder daughter, Tengku Tengah, he broke off the engagement to marry her younger sister, Tengku Kamariah, whom he had seen at a feast. Tengku Tengah was not the only person disappointed by the headlong warrior. In Sumatra he had promised a Bugis chief, Daing Parani, the office of Yam-tuan Muda of Johor if he would help him take that country, and then while the Bugis had gone to Selangor to collect forces, Raja Kechil had taken it alone. Daing Parani followed to Johor to press his claim, where Tengku Tengah flung an earring into his lap and offered her hand too if he would avenge her. So runs the Bugis romance and that it is no more than romance is attested by the many conflicting versions of this love story. What is certain is that the deposed Bendahara Sultan intrigued with the Bugis in the hope of ousting the Minangkabau usurper: the attempt failed, so that he had to flee to Pahang, where at prayer in his ship at the estuary he was cut down by an emissary of Raja Kechil. That was in 1720.

For four years Raja Kechil ruled Johor from Riau, which henceforth was to be the centre of the old empire until its final disruption. Then in a two days' battle Daing Parani's chain-clad Bugis with muskets and blunderbusses defeated the swords and cannons of Raja Kechil and drove him to the island of Lingga. Once he retook Riau but decoyed to help Linggi against a Bugis feint from Selangor he lost Riau again for ever in spite of the many raids he led for its recovery. In October 1722 the Bugis established as Sultan of Johor and Pahang Sulaiman Badr al-'alam Shah (=Lord of the world), son of Bendahara Sri Maharaja Sultan 'Abdu'l-Jalil who had been killed on his praying-mat at Kuala Pahang. The new Sultan made Daing Marewah (eldest brother of Parani) Yamtuan Muda or Underking of Riau and had to consent to a holocaust of his female relations in political marriage, not one of them being left unwedded by the Bugis for the advances of any other adventurers. From now onwards the Malay Sultan of the Johor empire was a sacred puppet or, as the Bugis frankly described it, in the position of a woman subject to the will of her husband, the Underking, and only getting such an allowance as that husband chose to give her.

VI *The Malay Political System*

In order that the reader may have some understanding of the Malay political system and the function of the rulers in that system, the following selection, referring largely to a later period, has been drawn

from pages 21-2, 44-64, and 25-6 of J. M. Gullick's *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, London, 1958.

THE largest political unit was the State. The Malay word for State is *Negri* (used as a classificatory prefix—e.g. *Negri Perak*, *Negri Selangor*, &c.). Significantly, in view of the derivation of the Malay political system from the Malacca Sultanate, *negri* meant originally a city. By the nineteenth century however *negri* generally denoted an extent of territory under an independent ruler.

The territory comprised in a State was related to the geographical structure of the peninsula and to the use of rivers as the main lines of communication and trade. A State was typically the basin of a large river or (less often) of a group of adjacent rivers, forming a block of land extending from the coast inland to the central watershed. The capital of the State was the point at which the main river ran into the sea. At this point the ruler of the State could control the movement of all persons who entered or left his State, he could defend it from external attack and he could levy taxes on its imports and exports.

The apex of the State as a political unit was its ruler who was drawn from a royal patrilineage and invested with attributes of supernatural power and dignity. He bore the title *Yang di-Pertuan Besar* (He who is made lord). In most cases he bore the Arabic personal honorific prefix *Sultan* (which in Arabic denotes an independent ruler). The functions of the royal ruler were to exercise the limited powers of central government, to conduct external relations, to provide leadership in foreign wars and to embody and symbolize the unity and welfare of the state. He was assisted and supported by his kinsmen in the royal lineage and by a number of executive assistants.

In descending order of size the next political unit was the district (*jajahan* or *daerah*). Like the State the district was a territory shaped by the use of rivers as communications. A district was either an area lying on one or both sides of a reach of the main river of the State or it was a side valley down to the point of junction with the main stream. A fort at the downstream end of the district provided an effective means of control.

The ruler of a district was a chief drawn from a lineage which usually had a long-established connexion with the district. In addition to their local connexion with one district each, the lineages of chiefs also formed a more or less united ruling class of the whole State. As will appear later, there was considerable variation between States in respect of chieftainships. Some chiefs were drawn from the royal lineage, more especially from cadet branches which no longer had any

serious prospect of providing a candidate for succession to the throne. More typically however chiefs came from non-royal but aristocratic lineages.

The existence of a ruling class was one of the most important elements of the political system. The division between ruling class and subject class was a political alignment which was rarely bridged by intermarriage or the advancement of a member of the subject class to the ruling class. The term for the subject class was *ra'ayat* (both for an individual and for the class collectively). There was no comprehensive term for the ruling class. The word *Raja* (a ruler) or *anak raja* (son of a ruler or princeling) could be applied by way of description to those members of either sex of the ruling class who were of royal patrilineal descent. The prefix *Raja* or *Tunku* was used as an honorific prefix to their names. But *Raja* could not be applied to a chief, however exalted, of non-royal descent. Such a non-royal chief bore a special title of office and he was addressed and referred to as *Dato'* (grandfather or chief). There was no all-inclusive term for members of the ruling class who were not chiefs and were not of royal descent. Close relatives of a chief however sometimes bore the personal prefix *Wan* before their names. These niceties are connected with the all-pervasive conception of differential status in the ruling class.

The functions of a chief in his district were local administration, justice, defence, revenue collection and general leadership. The chief had few ritual functions. He was assisted by a number of helpers and deputies who were generally close kinsmen.

The smallest political unit was the village (*kampung*). This was a unit of common residence and, to some extent, of kinship and economic co-operation. Only secondarily was it a unit of political control. The head of the village (except in Negri Sembilan) was the *Penghulu* (headman) who was the bridge and channel of communication between his group of villagers and the district chief. The *Penghulu*, although he enjoyed high status within his village was generally of the subject class....

The Sultan's¹ role was to symbolize and to some extent to preserve the unity of the State. In the Malay States there were many forces tending towards conflict and disintegration. Except in Negri Sembilan there was a lack of cultural homogeneity in the subject class. In all States the existence of district chiefs constituted foci of purely local power and influence. It is true of course that the opposition of the chiefs to each other tended to neutralize their disruptive potentialities in regard to central authority. The chiefs however were often at odds with the Sultan as much as with each other. They certainly

¹ The royal ruler of Negri Sembilan was not called *Sultan* but only *Yang di-Pertuan Besar* (colloquially abbreviated to *Yam Tuan*). This distinction was correlated with his limited powers as a mere paramount and the fact that his title did not derive from Malacca.

resisted the exercise of any royal authority in their districts. Yet the hard facts of trade, national defence and the need for law and order over a wider area than a district dictated the preservation of peace if the State was not to disintegrate completely. (Civil wars were indeed of frequent occurrence.)

Hence there was an acceptance of the Sultanate, if not of the Sultan, as the formal head of the State. Chiefs fought and intrigued to put one claimant on the throne instead of another but never to destroy the Sultanate itself. Government was *kerajaan*, the state of having a ruler, and they visualized no other system.

It commonly happens that symbols of group unity are invested with an aura of sanctity and supernatural power. The Sultan of a State was vested with majesty (*daulat*) at his installation. He then became different from himself as he had been before and from his royal kinsmen. It was believed that any Malay who infringed the majesty of the Sultan would suffer retribution from the impersonal force of outraged royal dignity. . . .

The person of the Sultan was sacred and any touching of it was forbidden. It was said that white blood ran in his veins. There was no evidence that this attribute was seriously believed in. It was part of the conventional make-believe used to express the sense of royal dignity. The use of symbols seems to beget a need for elaboration beyond what common experience of the community knows to be true in order that the attitude to the symbols may find adequate expression. . . .

At ceremonies the Sultan sat impassive; immobility was a sign of divinity. Yellow clothing (and hangings, state umbrellas, etc.) was a royal monopoly. The installation of a Sultan was marked by the most elaborate ritual, including a ceremonial washing to mark the making of a new man.

The sacredness of a Sultan's person was communicated to his regalia (*kebesaran*—symbols of greatness). The details of the royal regalia differed in different States but the general composition was the same. They included:

- 1 Musical instruments such as royal drums (*gendang nobat*), pipes, flutes and trumpets. The royal musicians were commoners but enjoyed high status. The instruments were not much used.
- 2 Various insignia of office such as sceptre (*kayu gamit*), betel box (*puan naga taru*), jewel (*kamala*), a spoken secret formula (*surat chiri*), a seal of state (*chap halilintar*) and umbrella (*ubar-ubar*), pillows, hangings, &c. These were used or displayed on ritual occasions.
- 3 Weapons such as swords, lances and the long dagger of execution (*keris panjang*).

These objects were believed to be self-created and to be so filled with

supernatural power as to blast any unauthorized person who handled them.

The royal drums, played only at the installation of a Sultan, were perhaps the most sacred of all the regalia. The yellow or white umbrella is or was a common royal insignia in many societies of South-East Asia. The inclusion of weapons in the regalia is partly to be explained by the power of life and death theoretically reserved to the Sultan alone and partly by his rarely exercised role as leader of defence forces in foreign wars. There was a considerable Malay preoccupation with weapons as symbols of military power—a symbolism common enough in all societies.

There were many forms of clothing, weapons, domestic and household adornment reserved to the Sultan alone. There was a special vocabulary called the *bahasa dalam* (the language within [the palace]) used in referring to the movements and activities of the Sultan. The house in which he lived had a special title—*Istana* (Palace). It was vacated at his death and, resources permitting, a new one was built for his successor. After his death the Sultan was no longer known by the name he had born in his lifetime. Instead he was referred to as *Marhum* (*Almarhum*—the late Sultan) followed by some descriptive term, usually indicating the place of the Sultan's death or burial, e.g. *Marhum Tambelan* (the Sultan who died at Tambelan). It may be that the personal name was avoided for fear of involuntarily attracting the attention of the still potent spirit of the late ruler. In addressing a living Sultan it was customary to begin with a thousand pardons for thus troubling him.

Certain animals, fruits and even people were reserved to the Sultan. In different States this category included turtles' eggs, elephant tusks, the fruit of the *ketiar* tree, albino buffaloes and illegitimate children. Tame elephants were the mounts of royalty and it was thus appropriate that ivory should be royal property. Albino buffaloes were freaks and illegitimate children were members of society born contrary to its rules. There was thus an aura of abnormality and accursedness. A Sultan vested with supernatural power was the appropriate person to handle such beings...

The elaborate apparatus of belief in the dignity and supernatural power of the Sultan needs to be contrasted with some actual behaviour of chiefs. The approved norm of conduct towards a Sultan was clear-cut; a chief must treat his ruler with deep respect. The tradition of Malay history contained moral tales to reinforce this attitude. For example, a *Bendahara* (Chief Minister) of the Malacca Sultanate submitted to an unjust sentence of death from his master, reproving his son who would have resisted with the remark 'It is the custom of the Malays that they shall never be disloyal to their Raja.'

The formal submission of the chiefs to the Sultan was symbolized

and expressed in the obeisance (*menghadap*) ceremony.... Obeisance had to be made by all chiefs at the installation of a Sultan, by an individual chief on first appointment to office and by the chiefs generally at intervals....

There is evidence from modern times that some chiefs at least brought themselves to... formal and public obeisance only with difficulty. At home in their districts they were magnates to whom their subjects abased themselves with only slightly less ceremony. They did not in fact submit to the government of the Sultan except to a very limited extent. Their obeisance was not therefore the mere acknowledgement of the facts of power but rather a contrast with them. Obeisance ceremonies were evidently occasions of tension. The Sultan of Selangor said in the 1870's of the period before British rule that he was never more in fear of assassination than at the obeisance ceremonies.

Why then did the ceremonies of obeisance, sometimes unwelcome to both sides, take place at all? They had come to be the symbolic expression of the position of the Sultanate as the apex of a political system which the district chiefs wished to preserve. The Sultan was not reckoned to be the acknowledged ruler of the State *vis-à-vis* a particular chief unless the chief had made obeisance to him and continued to do so on appropriate occasions. The chiefs, except in Negri Sembilan, derived the title of their authority from the Sultan under the constitutional theory of the Malay State. They could not claim to hold office unless they had been appointed by the Sultan, which incidentally imported the necessity of obeisance to him. A chief's power was derivative and in controversial or important acts he sought the Sultan's approval. Thus the chiefs who planned the assassination of the first British Resident of Perak in 1875 obtained a letter of authority from the Sultan and also money and munitions—the latter a symbol of approval as well as material aid. In the Selangor civil war both sides appealed to the Sultan from time to time and 'His Highness was always requested to give tangible proof of his approval in the shape of gunpowder and lead'.

There was a contradiction in the relation between Sultans and chiefs. The chiefs, in whom most of the real power was vested, were obliged by the threat of external attack, the need for a larger trade unit than the inland district and by the sheer facts of geography to preserve the State as a unit. The Sultanate was the symbol of State unity. It was also, like medieval kingship, the fount of nobility and the source of all aristocratic titles. There was thus an ambivalence of attitude; the chiefs showed formal respect and sought formal approval from the Sultan as the basis of their own position. Yet they were reluctant to submit to the Sultan by obeisance because they lost dignity thereby. The strict ceremonial of the obeisance can be regarded as a

sort of mechanism of Aristotelian *katharsis*. The chief had to steel himself to make obeisance. Afterwards there was a certain temporary relief to have got it over which eased the friction inherent in the structural relationship of Sultan and chief. . . .

The Sultan was the undisputed agent of the community in the field of external affairs and defence. As the embodiment of the unity of the State he was responsible for its preservation in contacts with external forces. . . . Where a Sultan did act to preserve peace and unity, he could do so only by mobilizing the forces of those chiefs who would accept his leadership.

In foreign affairs the Sultan was more active than in war. In this field also he acted as the leader of a coalition of chiefs. It was recognized that no commitment in the external sphere, such as making a treaty with a foreign power, was valid and binding on the chiefs unless they had joined in it. A treaty required the signature not only of the Sultan but also of a dozen or more leading chiefs. The exigencies of foreign policy brought the chiefs together in conclave with the Sultan more than anything else could do. . . .

In general chiefs who were neither present nor represented at a council were free to repudiate any decisions taken in their absence. If the absentee was unimportant compared with those who were present, the incompleteness of the conclave did not matter. But to stay away was the only mode of expressing disagreement available to a powerful chief. Etiquette did not permit him to differ publicly from his Sultan if the latter chose to express a definite opinion. . . .

Convention required a Sultan to consult certain counsellors on all acts of state. These were (1) male members of the royal family close in the line of succession (the *waris negri*) and (2) chiefs of the first grade, conventionally four in number, and sometimes of the second grade (eight in number). In practice the Sultan saw little of his major chiefs and was often at loggerheads with his close kinsmen. Contacts with chiefs were limited to councils to discuss foreign relations and ceremonial occasions such as installations, Muslim feast days and major domestic occasions such as a marriage. For the rest many chiefs were too powerful and too hostile to be willing to conform frequently to the submission to royalty required by court etiquette. In the opposite and less usual situation of a strong Sultan (such as happened in Pahang) the chiefs were too much afraid of the Sultan to come near him. Moreover in most cases a chief's district was so distant from the capital that to attend at court was to neglect more serious matters of district government. . . .

For the day to day business of government the Sultan consulted an informal group of advisers. The constitution of this group varied in particular cases. A British administrator noted that in 1874 the Sultan

of Perak's intimates were four chiefs, only one of the first grade, and three royal kinsmen, all young men who held no office. He commented that 'at times these chiefs exercise some influence over him but at others none'. The Sultan of Pahang relied entirely on four advisers. One was an upstart promoted to chieftainship by the Sultan; the second was a Tamil Indian who acted as treasurer and tax-collector; a third was a Malay secretary and man of affairs who had been born in another State; the fourth was a Pahang Malay who had spent some time in the Straits Settlements and who posed as an expert on 'European affairs'....

Writing, both as literature and for communication, had been in use for several centuries. It enjoyed great prestige. At the fifteenth century court of the Sultans of Malacca a letter from a foreign ruler was carried through the town by an envoy mounted on an elephant. It was then read aloud to the Sultan in the presence of his court. As another example a district chief in Perak in the 1870's called a meeting of his subjects in order that a letter from the Sultan might be read aloud publicly. A chief who sent a plenipotentiary representative on a mission would give him one or more blank sheets of paper each bearing the chief's seal. The representative could write on these sheets to give an undertaking binding on the chief. The practice was so common that it was a reasonable question to an emissary to ask whether he had such blank sealed papers as a measure of his powers to negotiate.

The impress of a seal was essential to give a document validity. The seal of office of a Sultan or a district chief was thus an important possession. In one case a Sultan gave as his pretext for postponing action the fact that his seal was broken and under repair. Only one craftsman in Perak was allowed to make or repair the royal seal. In another case the use of the Sultan's signet ring instead of his state seal on a document made its genuineness suspect.

The use of written documents was confined to major acts of state. Its use was to provide evidence of an important decision; not of the exchange of opinion leading up to it. Writing was used to record the agreement of chiefs to elect a Sultan, the appointment of a district chief or of a village headman, the grant of a territory and the terms of a treaty. It was also less often used to preserve accounts and for private memoranda.

Sultans and other aristocrats did not write the documents on which their seals were affixed. It is one of the paradoxes of the situation that many members of a ruling class which accorded importance to documents in political affairs were themselves illiterate....

Even if a Sultan was literate, there were reasons why he should not write his own letters. The writing of letters was an exercise in calligraphy and composition. A letter badly written, torn or deficient in

the elaborate courtesies of Malay epistolary style was an insult to the person to whom it was addressed.¹ Writing was thus a task for professionals. Aristocrats therefore employed secretaries who were generally commoners. These secretaries enjoyed some prestige by the standards of their class. The word *Kerani* (Clerk) was used as an honorific prefix to a personal name. But writing was no task for an aristocrat because aristocrats even if literate did not do it.

The secretaries in the households of Sultans and great chiefs were men of varied status and qualifications. The majority were commoners but a few had aristocratic connections. Many were returned pilgrims from Mecca with the prestige and knowledge of the world which attached to them from that fact. . . .

The royal office as the symbol of unity had to be above (i.e. out of the reach of) the major chiefs. On the other hand the Sultan would not be able to preserve unity unless he had some measure of acquiescence and loyalty from the chiefs or from most of them. The possibility of becoming Sultan was therefore confined to a single royal patrilineage distinct from the chiefly lineages. There was no automatic right of succession in favour of a son or younger brother of the late ruler. The choice of a successor from among the royal lineage rested with the chiefs. An aspirant to the throne had to court the support of the chiefs. A Sultan, at the start of his reign at least, had to be acceptable to the majority of the chiefs.

On the other hand a Sultan could usually advance the ablest of his sons to such prominence in his own lifetime that he would have a good chance of succeeding to the throne sooner or later. A Sultan was usually the son of a previous Sultan, but not necessarily of his immediate predecessor. This fact was reflected in the designation of sons, patrilineal grandsons and possibly nephews of any reigning or former Sultan as *waris negri* (heirs of the State). Effectively the choice of the chiefs was limited to the *waris negri*. Moreover, certain lesser royal offices were recognized as stepping stones to the Sultanate.

In these circumstances the personality of a candidate for the succession greatly affected his prospects. It was said of one Raja Yusuf who had several times been passed over by the chiefs of Perak that:

'He is stated to be obstinate, tyrannical and vindictive . . . the real objection to him was that if they gave him power he would have had the will to wield it and that they, therefore, preferred a weaker man.'

The fact that the system produced weak rulers was of course in keeping with the distribution of power between Sultan and chiefs.

A second factor in the choice of a new Sultan was the status of his

¹ Munshi Abdullah who was at one time a secretary in the entourage of Stamford Raffles relates how Raffles was quick to detect the studied insult of a letter sent to him with a corner torn. (*Hikayat Abdullah*.)

mother. A man whose mother was of royal descent, especially if she was the daughter of a Sultan, was preferred to a candidate who lacked this advantage. Sons who were royal by descent on both sides were known as *anak gahara* or (in Perak) as *waris beneh dan tanah* (heirs by the seed and the soil). It was usual for a Sultan to marry a woman of royal descent as his first wife and royal consort (*Tunku Ampuan*). Sons, more especially the eldest, of this union, had the best claim among the Sultan's children to succeed. Sons by other wives were known as *anak gundek* (son of a secondary wife). The basis of distinguishing a wife of inferior status (*gundek*) was that either she was not royal or that she had not been married with the ceremonies appropriate to a consort. There could not be more than one royal consort.

The general principle underlying royal marriage alliances was the tendency of office-holders to concentrate the succession among their own descendants at the expense of collateral lines: e.g. an aspirant to the throne, perhaps himself the son or close kinsman of a previous Sultan, would marry the daughter of a reigning Sultan. He thus improved his chances of succeeding to the throne since his father-in-law (though preferring his own sons) would support him against all other candidates. If he did in fact become Sultan, his own sons would have a better chance of succeeding in their turn because they were sons of a royal mother. Through her the children would be related to another influential branch of the royal dynasty since she might prove to be the sister and aunt as well as the daughter of a Sultan....

The Perak Sultans claimed patrilineal descent from a son of a Sultan of Malacca who had come to Perak in the fifteenth century. During the eighteenth century the pattern (which occurred twice in succession) was that a Sultan was succeeded by each younger brother in turn. In the next generation the sons of the last Sultan in the previous generation succeeded in turn to the throne. The last of the second series was Sultan Ahmadin who died in 1806. Thereafter the pattern changes....

Only one of Sultan Ahmadin's three wives was royal by descent. But the other two were daughters of chiefs and of high enough status to found lines which shared in the succession. It thus became the recognized norm that the royal office should be held in turn by a member of the three lines descended from Sultan Ahmadin and that the Sultan should be 'if possible, the eldest legitimate son of a previous Sultan' of the branch entitled on this occasion to fill the office. In practice there were numerous irregularities....

Affinal ties also played their part. Sultan Abdullah, who became Raja Muda (Heir Apparent) in 1865 was the son-in-law of Sultan Ali who acceded at that time. Idris who became Sultan in 1887 was the son-in-law of his predecessor, Sultan Yusuf. So much was the son-in-law of a Sultan equated with a son that leading authorities on Malay

custom can say incidentally 'son of the reigning Sultan (a term often covering son-in-law)'.

A more sustained example of the use of affinal ties to support claims to succeed to the Sultanate is provided by the Selangor situation. . . . Abdul Samad, son of a younger son, married the daughter of his uncle, Sultan Mohamed, and displaced the Sultan's son, Mahmud, who was a minor, from the succession at Sultan Mohamed's death. Ten years later Abdul Samad, an easy-going man of sixty, decided to withdraw from public affairs and to delegate all his authority. In choosing a 'Viceroy' (Wakil Yam Tuan) he passed over his own sons and also the sons of his predecessor, Sultan Mohamed, and selected his son-in-law, Tunku Kudin, brother of the Sultan of the northern State of Kedah. He hoped that Kudin, a man of parts, would be acceptable as an impartial arbitrator over the quarrels of the Selangor aristocrats (a hope which was disappointed). A generation later . . . Sultan Abdul Samad's grandson and heir repeated the pattern by marrying a daughter of Tunku Kudin.

These episodes in dynastic history are an example of a more general problem which must arise in some form or another in any political system which enjoins the transmission of authority and high office according to rules based on kinship and descent. The significance of descent once admitted leads on to an elaboration of categories of nearer and remoter heirs, and in many cases to an absolute priority for some individual based on the accident of his birth. The odds are very much against the chosen heir being the most suitable candidate on personal grounds of his generation. The problem becomes acute when the system produces an heir who is entirely unsuitable. Malay history is not without examples of Sultans as despotic and insane as the Romans Caligula and Nero. The system may nonetheless be rigid and admit of no solution except enforced abdication or assassination of a bad ruler. But many societies, including the Malay States, consciously imported a measure of flexibility to permit the exclusion of a bad candidate and even the choice of a good one (i.e. good from the point of view of the electors).

The principle of limiting the range of choice to a single descent group was not abandoned. There was some advantage in excluding the greater part of the ruling class from the possibility of succeeding to the throne. Moreover, the tradition of Malay monarchy, upon which so much else of the values of the society depended, required that royalty, or at least the potentiality to become royal, should be based on descent. The conflicting principles of free choice of a suitable candidate and limitation to heirs born to their high estate were balanced in a rule that the heir must come from among members of the royal lineage.

The limited freedom of choice permitted by this rule (which is com-

mon enough in such situations) gave rise to its own problems. A lineage within which office is held branches out in each generation. Admittedly some branches become extinct in course of time. But in the absence of any strict rule such as primogeniture among male heirs there will always be more claimants to office than can ever hold it individually for life. This difficulty is relieved but not solved by instituting a system of rotation of office among branches of the lineage, such as developed in the Perak royal dynasty. There is however, a contrary tendency at work. Members of the lineage who actually attain to office have a natural preference for transmitting their rights to their children in defiance of the principle of rotation. It is usually beyond the ability of an individual office-holder, unless he is exceptionally powerful, to reserve the office to his descendants in exclusion of all other members of the lineage. But he and others who are closely associated with office-holding (as children of previous office-holders or as next in turn to hold office) tend to form an 'inner circle' which intermarries among itself and tries to exclude from office the newly developing collateral branches of each generation. In effect the rotation is confined within a small part of the lineage only.

In human society it is not sufficient to establish a monopoly of privilege. For the satisfaction of the privileged class and the discomfiture of rebels it is also necessary to justify the monopoly by arguments based on assumptions accepted by all. The 'inner circle' of the Malay royal lineage thus rationalized their claim by stressing the importance of near descent from an actual office-holder and of royal descent on both sides. The 'inner circle' intermarried. Granted that fact and the rationalization just stated, their practice of confining the Sultanate to their own children was above criticism. None but their children had so many near ascendants who had held office. This was the qualification for office.

Within the inner circle there was still need to build up one's own influence in superiority to others. Thus intermarriage was further used to cement the political alliances of the moment. . . .

The close kinsmen of Sultans provided the holders of lesser royal offices. In many States the most important of these offices after the Sultanate itself was the office of *Raja Muda*. The title *Raja Muda* means either 'junior ruler' or 'future ruler',—and both meanings were significant. With regard to the sense of 'future ruler' it must be stressed that there was no right of automatic succession to the Sultanate. . . . It was recognized however, that the *Raja Muda* had the right to be considered before any other candidate when the chiefs met in conclave to bury the late Sultan and to choose a new one. Nonetheless, a *Raja Muda* could be passed over. In Perak and Selangor it rested with the chiefs to decide who should be advanced towards the Sultanate by becoming *Raja Muda*. In Perak, with its system of rota-

tion of the Sultanate among three branches of the royal house, the Raja Muda was usually the son of a Sultan but not of the reigning Sultan. In Selangor he was the son of the reigning Sultan.

In Pahang the succession title was *Tengku Besar* (Chief Prince) instead of Raja Muda (this latter title, however, was used and was usually conferred on a younger brother of the reigning Sultan). In Negri Sembilan the royal office of Yam Tuan had been created by inviting over a Sumatran prince as ruler for life without any guarantee that the office would in due course descend to his heirs. . . .

In addition to the offices of Raja Muda or Tengku Besar, which stood next in dignity to the Sultanate, there were a number of minor offices held by members of the royal lineage who have close relatives of the Sultan. There was, for example, an office of *Tengku Panglima Besar* (royal commander-in-chief) in Selangor. In fact the Sultan had no army and the holder of the office was a confidant and executive assistant to the Sultan. In Negri Sembilan there was a corresponding office of *Tengku Panglima* with a corresponding lack of military functions. In Negri Sembilan there was also a *Tengku Laxamana* (royal admiral); in other States the Laxamana was usually a non-royal district chief.

The most important of all these lesser offices was the Raja Bendahara of Perak. In the Malacca Sultanate the Bendahara was the greatest of the Sultan's ministers; not himself of royal descent but often the father-in-law or brother-in-law of the Sultan. In nineteenth-century Perak, however, the office of Bendahara had been appropriated by the royal lineage and bore the prefix *Raja Bendahara*. It had ceased to have any ministerial functions and had become a royal office of dignity second only to the Sultan and the Raja Muda. This situation reflected the arrangement that the Sultan of Perak should be drawn in turn from each of three branches of the royal house. . . .

Relations between the Sultan and his close kinsmen were not usually cordial. There was a great deal of jealousy and recrimination about the right to fill royal offices (and thus enter the succession sequence to the Sultanate) and about the sharing of royal revenues.

The royal consort and lesser wives of the Sultan played no part in the government and had no political influence except in those cases where a woman of strong character or influential connexions intrigued to advance the interests of her sons. The royal wives did not take any great part in the ceremonial and ritual of the royal house. The royal consort was usually herself of royal descent. The lesser wives were not royal but were related to men of position. . . .

It was the Malay custom to provide each wife with her own house. Sultans also had, or were supposed to have, a principal residence or palace (*Astana*). A new *Astana* was to be built for each Sultan. In practice some nineteenth-century Sultans could not command the re-

sources needed to construct a palace of suitable size. Sultan Ali of Perak (1865-71) lodged with a district chief during the whole of his reign. Sultan Abdullah of Perak (1874-6) on his accession lived for a time in the house of Haji Musa, a wealthy headman of the village of Batak Rabit....

When a Sultan died his successor had to find some other abode. The late Sultan's palace could be used for the accommodation of visitors but not as a permanent dwelling place....

The chiefs and royal kinsmen who were in attendance on the Sultan for short or long periods found their own accommodation. If they had arrived by boat for a short visit it was quite common for them to live in their boats during their stay. The Sultan's household consisted of secretaries, armed retainers, domestic servants, boatmen, watchmen and concubines. A Sultan's harem could be relatively large. Sultan Abdullah of Perak once took eleven concubines in his suite on a journey. The Sultan of Pahang was reputed to have a harem of 300-400 women. The size of the royal household was swelled by a number of the destitute and of fugitives from the justice of chiefs seeking sustenance and asylum under the Sultan's protection. The maintenance of these refugees was a heavy burden. It was also a source of prestige and a subject of proverbial wisdom.

As examples of the size of a Sultan's household, there is the case of Sultan Abdullah travelling in four boats—one for himself, one for his wife, one for his concubines and one for his cooks and domestics. On another occasion, as a demonstration of force he travelled with fifty boats and 500 men. At one of his entertainments the number of domestics was apparently insufficient for handing round the food and his secretaries were pressed into service. It is probable that except on warlike occasions a Sultan probably had a residential household of no more than fifty persons. The number of his dependants who 'lived out' was a considerable addition....

The composition of the Malay population [in Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan] was extremely mixed. It appears that the majority were of Menangkabau birth or descent.¹ In Negri Sembilan the whole social system was a modified version of the Menangkabau model. In Perak the local-born Malays accepted Menangkabau immigrants, but no others, as kindred to themselves. There were however many other elements. In Perak in addition to local-born Malays and Menangkabau immigrants there were Bugis (from the Celebes), Korinchi, Rawa, Mandiling and Batak men from Sumatra. In Selangor the peasantry were a mixture of Batak, Rawa and Mandiling groups (especially the latter). Even in predominantly Menangkabau Negri Sembilan there was at least one Bugis colony (at Linggi) and the Rawa traders had

¹ Menangkabau was a kingdom in the Padang Highlands of Sumatra, noted for its matrilineal social system.

been numerous enough in 1848 to give their name to a civil war. The names of the Negri Sembilan clans also indicate that some members of the Malay community were descended from immigrants of Malacca, Javanese and Achehnese origin. The Arabs who intermarried with the Malays were a small but influential group in the spheres of trade and religion. Many of these 'Arabs' were of no more than mixed Arab/Achehnese descent.

The different elements in the Malay population, despite their participation in a general Indonesian culture, were extremely conscious of their differences. The Bugis in Perak spoke their own language and rarely intermarried with other Malaysians. The Korinchi claimed to be stricter Muslims than other Malaysians. They wore all white clothing and held themselves aloof from the rest. In Selangor there was a tradition of hostility between the Bugis aristocracy and the Sumatran miners and peasants of recent immigrant origin. The Selangor chiefs dealt with this element among their subjects by the appointment of 'headmen of foreigners' (*Dato' Dagang*) as intermediaries. In Negri Sembilan the Menangkabau Malays at various times expelled the Bugis and the Rawa traders.

These half-subdued dislikes found expression in many ways besides occasional fighting. In addition to deliberate differences of dress and language there were also occupational lines of cleavage. Indonesian immigrants seem to have kept local trade in their own hands (friction on this score was said to have been the origin of the Rawa War of 1848 in Negri Sembilan). They formed a large part of the retinues of armed men around the chiefs. By contrast local-born Malays of the commoner class were more often peasants. Even where the immigrants were settled as peasants, the cleavage persisted. Each village consisted of members of one cultural group and generally included no others. Even in 1892 it was noted that immigrants (*anak dagang*) would not deal with or settle near the longer established villages of local-born Malays (*anak negri*).

These contrasts and conflicts between groups within the Malay community were of some political significance. It was a situation in which the Malay ruling class could to some extent play the game of 'divide and rule'. A chief with a retinue of foreign-born Malays could count on their loyalty to help him over-awe his local-born subjects in their villages. Equally his followers could not hope to lead a general revolt against him. The consciousness of cultural differences and the hostility arising from it tended to weld the members of each homogeneous village group into a compact and partially endogamous body, loyal to its headman and through him more easily susceptible of control.

Chapter Four

THE BUGIS AND THE DUTCH

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries both the Bugis and the Dutch, each in a different way, exerted a considerable influence on the course of Malaysian history. Although no detailed examination of the subject has been attempted, it appears likely that the commercial restrictions imposed by the Dutch on the trade of Macassar resulted in an exodus of Bugis merchants and adventurers during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries to various parts of Indonesia and Malaysia. In Malaya, where there already were sizeable Bugis settlements in the Klang region as early as 1681, these immigrants were able to play an important part in local politics. Due to their military prowess they were utilized by the Malay rulers in their dynastic disputes, but the price paid for such assistance was often high. For assistance rendered in the early eighteenth century in re-capturing the royal insignia and treasure of Riau from Siak, the Bugis were appointed to the office of Yamtuan Muda, or Under-King of the Johore empire with its new capital at Riau, and from there they were able to exert a considerable influence on the Malay world. By the end of the eighteenth century they were driven into direct conflict with the other important power in the region—the Dutch, who controlled not only the Straits of Malacca, but also the seas of eastern Indonesia.

I *Bugis Ascendancy in the Malay States*

The following reading, an extract from pages 144 to 148 of Sir Richard Winstedt's *A History of Malaya* [Revised edition, 1962], describes the process by which the Bugis gained ascendancy in the western Malay states during the eighteenth century.

MACASSAR came into history in the first half of the sixteenth century as a port of call for Javanese and for Malays from Johor and Patani on their way to the Moluccas for spices; in the latter half of that century these sea-faring traders were joined at Macassar by the Portuguese and by the Chinese, resentful of Portuguese exactions at Malacca. As early as 1603 Moors from Malacca had converted Macassar to Islam. Not yet, however, had the Bugis ventured far afield, though the freedom of their port caused them to flourish, especially after the raids of the Achinese fleet and the policing of the Dutch fleet had made the straits of Malacca unsafe. To Macassar came ships from Borneo, Java, Bali, Solo, Timor, Amboyna and the Moluccas. There too Portuguese vessels wintered safely on their way from China. As Dutch attacks on Portuguese vessels became more frequent, the Portuguese sometimes hired Bugis ships and manned them with Portuguese steersmen. After 1625 English and Danes also frequented Macassar. Armed with weapons bought from the Portuguese, the Bugis now conquered Bima in order to command a rice supply for their foreign clients, and before the end of the seventeenth century Bugis sea-rovers had begun to descend on the coasts of Java, Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. The Dutch *Dagh-Register* [Daily Record] proves that by 1681 there were large Bugis settlements on the Klang and Selangor estuaries, and in 1700 the To' Engku Klang, relative of the Bendahara-Sultan of Johor, gave a seal of authority to a Bugis Yamtuan on the Selangor river. The Bugis famous in Malaya's history for the first half of the eighteenth century were Daing Parani and his four brothers, sons of Upu Tenribong Daing Rilaka, descendant of a Queen of Luwu in south Celebes: Daing Parani is said to have killed a Macassar prince for an intrigue with a concubine of the Raja of Boni, after which Daing Rilaka and his five sons left Celebes to win fame and fortune in Borneo, the Riau Archipelago and the Malay Peninsula.

When in 1722 the five brothers got one of themselves appointed Underking of the Johor empire at its capital Riau, they transferred the centre of Bugis influence away from Selangor to that island, though so important a Bugis settlement was Selangor that already it also had a Yamtuan or king. From Riau the Bugis chiefs established their influence not only over the old kingdom of Johor but in the rich tin countries of Kedah and Perak, leaving to the Malays only the remote and less wealthy states of Pahang and Trengganu. Moreover it was one of the five Bugis brothers who introduced the planting of gambir at Riau and so started a new form of commercial agriculture...

Soon after the Bugis were established at Riau, the eldest son of a deceased Sultan of Kedah invited the five brothers to assist him hold the throne against his younger brother, promising to pay 15 *bahara* (or 6000 lbs.) of dollars for their help. The five brothers accepted

the offer, made sure of the loyalty of Bugis then living in Kedah, installed their client as Sultan and received 3 *bahara* of dollars cash down: Daing Parani married a sister of the new Sultan. Then in 1724 the Minangkabau, Raja Kechil, was invited to Kedah to oust the nominee of his Bugis enemies and instal that nominee's younger brother on the throne: he, too, was given the hand of a Kedah princess. With drums beating the Bugis sailed from Riau in sixty war-boats and started a campaign that lasted two years and ruined Kedah's trade. Daing Parani was shot on the roof of his cabin, but the Bugis won and drove Raja Kechil back to Siak.

The Kedah campaign had repercussions in Perak and Selangor. Minangkabau warriors and Kedah rajas usurped high Perak offices until they were driven out by a Bugis invasion across the Selangor frontier, led by Daing Merewah, the Underking from Riau. Selangor was then raided by Siak fleets under a son of Raja Kechil and under a renegade Bugis, Daing Matekko, relative but enemy of the five famous brothers. In 1740 one of the brothers, Daing Chelak, second Underking of the Johor empire, accompanied by Sultan Sulaiman whose fief Selangor was a part of his "world", led forces against these raiders and two years later headed a second invasion into Perak to combat Minangkabau interference from Kedah and the intrigues of Daing Matekko.

In 1745 Daing Chelak the Underking died, leaving two famous sons, Raja Haji who fell fighting the Dutch in Malacca and Raja Lumu who (probably about 1742) was created first Sultan of Selangor. It was the Selangor chiefs who elected as Daing Chelak's successor Daing Kemboja, who for two years did not condescend to go to Riau for formal installation by his Malay overlord, Sultan Sulaiman Badr al-'alam Shah. Bugis ascendancy now excited not only Malay jealousy but the fears of the Dutch who saw their attempts at a monopoly of the tin of the Johor empire and the northern Malay States frustrated and their commerce with these states invaded by Bugis traders and upset by Bugis fighting. When in 1745 Governor-General Gustaaf Willem Baron van Imhoff ordered the rebuilding of the Dutch fort at the Dindings, it was laid down that in the garrison there were to be no Bugis. And that same eventful year Sultan Sulaiman Badr al-'alam Shah made the gesture of ceding Siak to the Dutch in return for their help against his enemies, further undertaking that, when he could exercise "his former authority over Selangor, Klang and Linggi," he would observe all Johor's old treaties with the Dutch East India Company, or, in other words, give them a monopoly of the tin trade.

This treaty of 1745 was a gesture made by the Malay Sultan of Johor in order to secure Dutch help not only against the Bugis but for Sultan Sulaiman's nephew Raja Muhammad, son of Tengku

Kamariah, the wife Raja Kechil loved so well that years ago he broke troth with her elder sister and now slept a crazy dotard beside her grave. Raja Kechil wanted to leave his throne of Siak to Raja Muhammad but this was opposed by Raja 'Alam, his son by another wife. After helping Sultan Sulaiman to drive Raja 'Alam from Siantan to Borneo, Daing Kemboja gave the exile his own sister in marriage and alienated Raja Muhammad from his uncle Sultan Sulaiman by spreading the report that that wicked man only wanted to win Siak for the Dutch! After this manoeuvre Daing Kemboja, Underking though he was, found it impossible to endure the attitude of the Malay party at Riau, more especially of Sultan Mansur of Trengganu, cousin of Sulaiman Badr al-'alam Shah and tireless opponent of Bugis ambitions. He therefore removed with the leading Bugis and the biggest guns to Linggi. In 1753 Raja 'Alam ousted his brother, seized the throne of Siak and commenced commercial war on the Dutch. In 1755 the Dutch drove Raja 'Alam out of Siak and made a fresh treaty with Sultan Sulaiman. The Company agreed to take any opportunity of recovering for the Sultan of Johor the possessions he had lost to the Bugis. Siak was to be ruled by a Regent who should study the Company's interests. The Company and Sultan Sulaiman were to have a monopoly for the sale of cloth in Siak. The Company was to have a monopoly of the purchase of tin in Selangor, Klang and Linggi, and its ships were to be free of toll everywhere in the kingdom of Johor, while into that kingdom no other Europeans were to be admitted without the Company's pass.

These Siak wars had turned the Bugis into open enemies of the Dutch Company, which had usurped the place of the Bugis "husband" and was promising the Malay "wife," Sultan Sulaiman, alimony to which the Underking took the strongest exception. Daing Kemboja helped Raja 'Alam to return to Sumatra and in April 1756 Bugis were burning houses in Malacca. Dutch and Trengganu fleets attacked Linggi and drove the Bugis to abandon their ships. But by October Malacca territory was being wasted by Daing Kemboja and his Selangor and Rembau allies, and before the end of the year the Dutch were driven out of Klebang, a suburb of Malacca. It was months before the Bugis were worsted. Sultan Sulaiman Badr al-'alam Shah paid his bill and at the same time tried to get the better of his insubordinate Bugis subjects by surrendering Rembau and Linggi to the Dutch. A fortnight later on 1 January 1758 at Fort Filipina, Linggi (a fort named after the daughter of the contemporary Dutch Governor-General Jacob Mosel), the three Bugis leaders, Daing Kemboja of Linggi, Raja Tua of Klang and Raja 'Adil of Rembau, signed a treaty promising that the Company's friends, in particular the Sultan of Johor, should always be their friends and that they would sell their tin only to the Company. The Dutch had got signed agreements for

a tin monopoly from both parties, but otherwise the victory was so hollow that Sultan Sulaiman asked for twenty-five Dutch soldiers to garrison Riau against the Bugis and pointed out that he had not yet regained the thrones of Siak and Selangor.

Sultan Sulaiman was getting now to be an old "wife" and timorous. Aware of this the Bugis "husband," Daing Kemboja, took a bold course to reassert himself in his house of Riau. He sent his vigorous nephew, the afterwards famous Raja Haji, who sailing past the muzzles of the Malay guns dropped anchor opposite the palace of Sultan Sulaiman and demanded that his uncle should be invited back to Riau as the duly elected rightful Underking of the empire of Johor. Sultan Mansur of Trengganu, leader of the Malay party, was away. Sultan Sulaiman yielded. That was in 1759. Next year he died, leaving the empire a thing of shreds and tatters. Selangor and Rembau were gone; the small inland states were held by Minangkabaus and dominated by Bugis; upriver Pahang was under Minangkabau chiefs; Johor was a no-man's land. Siak also was to be lost; for its ruler Sultan Muhammad having before his death in 1759 massacred the Dutch garrison, the Dutch now made friends with his whilom rival Raja 'Alam. Finally Riau itself, the capital of all that was left of the Johor empire, was to be the washpot of the Bugis, until Bugis pride forced the Dutch to capture it. Sultan Sulaiman's successor 'Abdu'l-Jalil Mu'azzam Shah died in Selangor, perhaps from poison, while engaged on the suicidal errand of carrying out his father's promise and inviting Daing Kemboja to return to Riau. Daing Kemboja did return to Riau with forty-five war-boats and the corpse of 'Abdu'l-Jalil Mu'azzam Shah and proclaimed himself guardian of Sultan Ahmad Ri'ayat Shah, the young son of the deceased. This boy soon died, and though the Malays pressed now for an adult brother of Sultan Sulaiman for the throne, the Bugis overawed them and carried the election of Mahmud, Sulaiman's infant grandson, born in 1760. From now till his death in 1777 Daing Kemboja lived as Underking at Riau, *de facto* ruler of the Johor empire, on good terms with the Dutch but grumbling at restrictions on commerce, and trading with the English openly and to his great profit in tin, opium and cloth. The Dutch claim for the cost of the Linggi war of 1756 he is said to have defrayed out of opium. For his assistant he had the redoubtable Raja Haji with the title of To' Klana.

II Dutch Control of Malacca

Malacca declined in economic importance during the eighteenth century, due in part to the deliberate Dutch policy of centralizing trading activities in Batavia [Djakarta], and in part to the heavy

dues which the Dutch imposed on foreign merchants. Nevertheless, the port continued to exercise a not inconsiderable economic and political influence in the region. Some idea of the commercial restrictions placed on trade at Malacca by the Dutch can be gained from the following regulations, which were drawn up by Balthasar Bort, Governor and Director of the Town and Fort of Malacca, for the Shahbandar and revised by the Dutch Governor-General in Batavia in September 1668. [Report of Governor Balthasar Bort on Malacca 1678'; translated by M. J. Bremner, *JMBRAS*, v, 1, 1927, 107-11.]

1 THE shahbandar or one of his subordinates must be in the custom-house every day except Sunday from seven to eleven in the morning, and from two to five in the afternoon.

2. If envoys... arrive from abroad, he or one of his subordinates shall proceed forthwith to them, in order to inform himself of the same and of the cargo and to report to the Governor, so as to await instructions as to what official reception shall be given them;

3. Without defraying the charges of any at the Company's expense or remitting the duties except with the Governor's consent;

4. Letters of state arriving or being dispatched, he must see to having duly translated, and must sew up those for dispatch with white or yellow, according to the dignity of those to whom they are addressed.

5. As soon as any vessel not carrying envoys on board anchors at the Red Island... or in the roads, the shahbandar or one of his subordinates aforesaid shall forthwith go to it to ascertain the cargo, the nachoda's [Malay for captain or chief] name, the number of the crew and the place whence it comes, so as to prevent smuggling.

6. Small vessels, however, which come over the shallows, shall at first lie up inside by the customhouse to be registered as above.

7. The same procedure shall be followed in the case of departing vessels before they have their permits delivered.

8. And the deputies aforesaid shall, when any ship or vessel has arrived, forthwith inform the shahbandar of its arrival and he shall keep an exact record of the goods coming in and going out, each in a special memorandum book, and from this record he must make the assessment of the market price, so as to order and collect the dues, comparing the specification and accounts one with the other, so that he may deposit every month in the Company's chest the moneys in the shahbandar's keeping with an order signed, in the margin, by the shahbandar and his deputy and, at the foot, by the Governor.

9. If any difference in assessment occurs between the shahbandar and the license master, the advice of the chief merchant thereon shall be taken and followed.

10. A note from the memorandum book of all vessels arriving and departing shall be brought to the Governor every evening.

11. Also every week or month a summary of all [arrivals and departures] shall be furnished to the Secretary's office to be inserted in the day-book.

12. No strangers may be in the streets after sunset on pain of a fine of 12 ra. [real] and the loss of their vessels.

13. On the same penalty no one shall carry crises within the jurisdiction of Malacca except the nachodas, who receive a memorandum to this effect and are warned thereof.

14. And according to the old custom the Javanese must take all arms to the shahbandar's house until their departure and only the nachoda may keep his cris.

15. In order that no losses may be suffered by the tolls, the nachodas shall, on their arrival, provide a surety for the same, or else, from their cargo, put the amount in pledge at the custom-house.

16. In the case of trusted inhabitants of Malacca, it is allowed to wait for about 2 or 3 weeks till their departure, but not with persons of insufficient means. . . except under surety.

17. No goods, except the Company's, shall pass the boom until after exhibition of the manifest, payment of the tolls and permission to pass in or out, on pain of forfeiture of the goods concealed and of the vessel as well, and punishment as the occasion demands.

* * *

21. Passes to Johor and to the coast of Java and those to Pera and beyond as far as Trangh must be signed by the shahbandar in the margin and by the Governor at the foot, but those for nearer places by the shahbandar only, both with clauses for the outward and return voyages; those who sail direct or by way of Batavia to Java, also Portuguese or Moors or others going to Bengal and beyond must provide themselves there [at their destinations] with passes for return.

22. To prevent robbing and plundering by the inhabitants and slaves, those who go out to fetch wood and stone, whether by sea or land, must provide themselves with a memorandum from the shahbandar, so that they may be recognized by the inspectors of the jungle and the cruisers at sea.

* * *

24. The following is duty free, viz.

Peper [<i>sic</i>]	{	imported, provided that it is all delivered to the Honourable Company, on pain of confiscation, but the people of Johor may take the tin, free of duty, from the places subject to that state to Johor.
Tin and		
Resin		

Similarly

Rice	{	provided that they are first offered to the Company and that no rice is exported and that no Christian slaves are sold to Moors.
Paddy		
Slaves and		
Buffaloes		

25. So also gold and silver, whether coined or not, diamonds, rubies and other stones, pearls, musk, civet, pedro porco [bezoar] and other valuables, provided that all are delivered to the Honourable Company; but, since that seldom happens, it is permitted freely to trade the same to any one except the Company's servants, simply paying 10% for importation.

The following pays 10% for import and 5% for export, whether bought by the Company or by others.

26. All kinds of Surat, Cormandel, Bengal and other cloths and piece goods, but four-footed cattle, peas, beans and wheat 5% on import.

27. Fruit from the Company's gardens north and south of the town, which are let, is to be sold by auction in the bazaar and half of the proceeds given to the Company, but on fruit from gardens belonging to private owners only 10%.

28. Slaves taken away to places belonging to the Company 5 riks-dollars each, but to other regions, 10 re^s; children half price.

29. Iron and lead not bought by the Company 20% on export, otherwise 5%.

30. Reals and other hard coinage exported 10%, but copper and lead coins no duty.

* * *

32. Moors and Portuguese from Cormandel and Bengal must have a tenth of their merchandise unloaded by the shahbandar and commissioners in their presence to be then turned into money by public sale, but the duty for wheat and butter must be paid in cash.

33. But, if any of the Moors remain at Malacca and export any of their aforesaid goods to Johor, no duty is to be levied at the time, but on their return 10% *pro rata* . . . of the goods exported, because they bring back gold for them in secret.

34. All subjects of Johor, nobles and common people have to pay export and import duties, but the nobles are mostly, with the consent of the Governor, excused by courtesy.

35. The shahbandar gets 10% of betel coming down the river from Nanningh for the entertainment of envoys, nachodas, etc. on departure and arrival.

* * *

37. Over and above the aforesaid duty all strangers pay as poll tax 1/8 of a re^s, and those who depart to Pera, Queda, Jonghsalangk,

Aatchin, Jambij, Palimbangh, Batavia, Java and places beyond Johor and Calangh pay one re^s for a pass and, for anchorage dues, from one to four re^s according to the tonnage of the vessel.

* * *

41. Goods having paid duty to the Company once at Batavia or elsewhere are free of import dues but not otherwise, unless they do not discharge cargo.

42. All foreigners who are not Christians and not resident in Malacca pay only export duty and pass money.

43. But, if they return, they must pay, in addition to the duty, 1/8 of a re^s poll tax and anchorage dues as aforesaid like the Christians who live here, but do not pay poll tax.

44. Portuguese [vessels] on their passage from Goa or Maccauw and other regions, whether king's ships or belonging to private persons, pay as follows: small yachts 300 re^s medium sized 400 and large ships 500 for the outward and the same for the return passage, but, if they discharge their cargo, they pay 10% customs and no passage dues; if they trade only part of their cargo and take the rest on, they must pay the passage dues as well as the customs dues for the goods sold, but without paying dues for the resin they export, because they buy it from the Company.

45. All ships belonging to the king of Siam are free from all dues, wherever they are going or returning to.

46. The farmers of the fish and vegetable markets must always keep them clean and must put the benches, blocks etc. under cover every night.

47. Wine-sellers pay, besides 2 re^s per month to the farmer, 75 re^s for each wine cask, 50 for the community . . . and 25 for the town, on pain of forfeiture of the wine and punishment at discretion . . .

Batavia in the Castle, 21st September, 1668. On the order of their Honours, signed Jan van Riebeeck, Secretary.

III *Eighteenth Century Dutch Reports on Malacca*

The following extracts from the reports of two Dutch Governors of Malacca give some idea of Dutch involvement in local Malay politics during the eighteenth century. The first report (a) is that of Governor W. B. Albinus in 1750; the second (b) that of Thomas Schippers in 1773. [*'Malacca in the Eighteenth Century: Two Dutch Governors' Reports*; translated by Brian Harrison, *JMBRAS*, xxvii, 1, 1954, 24-34.]

a. *Memorandum handed by*

Governor Wilhem Bernhard Albinus, on the occasion of his departure to Batavia, to Senior Merchant and Governor-elect Pieter van Heemskerk, for provisional reference.

WHEREAS it has pleased the Honourable High Government of the Indies to release me from the Government of Malacca and allow me to return to Batavia (upon repeated request, and after a full six years' administration) without prejudice to my status and salary, with instructions to hand the Government over to Your Excellency on the day of my departure until further orders; so a transfer of all the Company's effects, etc., has already been made for that purpose, and the necessary arrangement have been made in the Council¹ for the work of administration. . . . Now I also place at Your Excellency's disposal this memorandum of information for your provisional reference. It is concerned with the situation of this government, the real importance of which lies in maintaining by every possible means the supply of tin from the tin areas, especially Perak, as well as in the Company's cloth and other commodities (this being a major centre of the gold trade), so that a well regulated establishment may be maintained here with as little expense as possible.

In order to deal with the first point, namely the procural of tin, one must first consider the situation of those areas where tin is found. In the first place, the kingdom of Johore is at present cut off from those areas as a result of the former rebellion of various princes (especially the old Raja Ketchil) who annexed lands to themselves by craft and violence, and finally murdered the lawful ruler. Afterwards the Buginese were called in to help, and they reinstated the present ruling king, Raja Suleiman, who at that time was still a minor. In return, however, the Buginese have held in control all the tin areas formerly under Johore, and also, by means of continued piracy, the whole of the trade in that mineral, despite agreements concluded with the Company.

From time to time I exhorted the ruler of Johore and finally persuaded him to visit me, which he did, under the protection of many ships and soldiers, in the year 1746. On that occasion he informed me that he wished to deliver over the river of Siak to the Company by force of arms (the proprietorship of Siak having been already vested in the Company), and at the same time to order a massacre, according to Malay law, for the murder of his father, the forementioned Raja

¹ 'Raade van Politie'; literally, 'Council of Police', but the functions of that body were much wider than such a translation of the term would suggest; it had, in fact, general charge of the administration of the fortress of Malacca.

Ketchil. Since a kind of friendship existed between Siak and Malacca, I advised the king (though I was not authorized to do so) to wait a while before carrying out his intention. I also asked him why he did not first drive out the Buginese (by whose permission he appeared to rule) from the Straits, and then bring the various peoples under his own authority. Upon this he declared that if he knew that the Company would really come to his assistance on the basis of a mutual alliance, then it would be possible to drive the Buginese out, and thereafter delivery could be made to the Company of all the tin which was brought in or fetched from Perak, Selangor, Klang, etc., to Riouw for the Chinese junks, or which was brought to Kedah for foreign nations, together with that which came from Tenasserim, Mergui, Ujong Salang, etc., for the same purpose, at a slightly higher price than the Company had agreed upon. . . .

When I took over the administration of this government in 1745, after the departure of the Commissioners, it was absolutely impossible to satisfy the requirements of the home government and those of the Indies, especially as most of the tin from the hinterlands of Malacca—Sungei Ujong, Sri Menanti, etc.—as well as that which is found along the rivers Panagie and Linggi, came on to the market in Kedah, Selangor or Riouw, or else went eastwards to Pahang, Trengganu, etc. I therefore began to give serious thought to the recovery of this trade. I gradually prepared the ground with Perak, and just at the time when the Buginese had worked out a division of the tin interests among the members of the court of that kingdom, I obtained an exclusive contract through a special envoy in the year 1746. By this contract all tin was to be delivered to the Company at 26 new ducatoons, with 2 Spanish [reals] as duty, for each *bahar* of 375 lbs.; and by a further agreement the price was fixed at 34 new round Spanish reals in all. A suitable place on the river was to be allocated for the construction of a fort. Since then this has been such a success that a good quantity of tin has been brought hither. I also supplied various Malays with regular funds in order to buy up the tin in the hinterlands of Malacca, paying at first slightly more than the market price in order to keep foreign merchants out.

As a result of these arrangements I had the satisfaction last year of not only completely fulfilling the requirements of the home country and the Indies to the amount of 420,250 lb. [*sic*] (that is, 200,250 lb. for the Netherlands, 200,000 lb. for China, and 200,000 lb. for Surat), but also of being able to send 100,125 lb. in the ship 'Ida' to Batavia, thus making a total of 520,375 lb. Furthermore, out of the residue at present available in the godowns here and in Perak, together with that which has been contracted for in the hinterlands, it will be easy to find the required amount for China, which has been fixed at an amount equal to the annual shipment to Batavia.

It is thus quite clear that this tin trade depends mainly upon Perak, and upon regular consignments from the hinterlands. Therefore Your Excellency will have to compel the junks from Siam, Cambodia and Amoy, which pass by Malacca without a licence and buy tin at Kedah and elsewhere, to surrender that mineral in the most suitable manner and at the most reasonable price according to circumstances.

But special care must be taken to remove by appropriate measures any difficulties that may arise in the kingdom of Perak. For our position there does not appear to be acceptable to the Malays, or in particular to the ruler of Kedah, who is only waiting for a suitable occasion to start a serious attack on our position, and has already promised to divide up the tin with the mercenary and fickle people of Perak, promising them a better price.

We have seen examples [of the Perak people] in the person of Raja Alim, who is descended on his father's side from the royal house of Kedah, and whose mother is a sister of the ruler of Perak; and in the person of the Orang Kaya Muda, a Buginese, whose daughter is the concubine of the said Raja Alim. The Orang Kaya Muda had the secret assistance of the Laxamana towards making it possible for Raja Alim (who was formerly married to a daughter of the king of Perak's brother) to do as much harm as possible to the Company, with the help of Kedah and the Buginese. But now the Orang Kaya Muda intends before long not only to give his niece or adopted daughter in marriage to his other cousin, the Raja Muda, but also to declare the latter the legal successor to the throne.

Meanwhile, Raja Alim and the Orang Kaya Muda have been brought over here under strong guard upon the request of the king and the Raja Muda, who allege that those two would in due course attempt to direct the tin to Kedah against the interests of the Company. That, at least, is the pretext; but it is quite clear that the real reason is the fear with which the eighty-year-old King appears to be obsessed lest Raja Alim, with the support of his many adherents and with his wealth, should contest the Raja Muda's succession. Because of that fear, the Raja Muda will no doubt secure the royal princess as his wife.¹

Considering therefore the advanced age of the King, and our uncertainty with regard to the Raja Muda's methods as a ruler, it would be advisable to retain Raja Alim under house arrest within this fortress and to keep the Buginese Orang Kaya Muda in prison. The purpose of this would be to keep the Raja Muda in a state of fear lest, if he broke contract or attempted other deceitful evasions, the Company should place Raja Alim on the throne. For they both have equal rights, apart from the fact that the Raja Muda enjoys the [f]avour of the present King and appears to be solemnly betrothed to the

¹ For a Malay account of these events, see the following reading.

King's favourite daughter. By this means, at any rate, it would be possible to keep the Raja Muda under better control and in greater respect for the Company after the King dies....

It also seems to me important that the sloop 'Jaffanapatam', which has already received instructions from me, should be sent by Your Excellency, as soon as it has been repaired, to patrol before Larut, some miles to the north of Perak. For the Perak people transport tin along the river and overland to Kedah, where the exchange market for cloth, opium and other cheaper commodities is much better than it is with the Company. Otherwise Larut will become for Kedah what Perak would now surely be for the Company if it had been sealed off in that manner.

It is equally necessary that Your Excellency should gradually try to build up near the fort [in Perak] a colony of Christians, Chinese, Moors, etc., and in due course appoint a suitable person, under the supervision of the Commandant, to be the Company's Shahbandar and Merchant there—a person who should be, above all, well versed in the customs of the country, and of a commanding yet accommodating nature—so that the trade may be set going, and that the Company may have the benefit of import and export duties by agreement with the King, if only under a concession, in order to pay the expenses of the garrison.... In this way the tin trade will be secured, and Perak will continue to be in every way a satisfactory means of fulfilling the requirements of the home country and the Indies....

In so far as the sale of the Company's cloth and other commodities forms the basis of the gold trade, that depends completely upon untiring effort in the face of numerous competitors if we are regularly to outdo them, especially in the Siak and Indragiri rivers. But conditions are not now so favourable as they were. The Arab priests of Mahomed's descent, called Sayyids, have spread everywhere throughout the Malay countries and have revealed too much to the natives.... The Kings of Achin and Kedah now equip ships of their own in which they send the products of their countries to India... bringing back material which is most sought after in the Straits and which is hawked about in small vessels and bartered along both coasts. Hence it is clear that the chances of outdoing them in the precious cloth trade, even with the greatest attentiveness, are steadily diminishing. In spite of this, however, a quantity of gold dust to the value of 53,640.7 guilders was obtained last year from 'Patapahan' and Indragiri, and for that reason the Honourable High Government of the Indies has strongly recommended that the trade in that article should be maintained without interruption....

Malacca can thus be a source of profit to the Company if one concentrates on maintaining it as a well regulated establishment with as little expense as possible. This I have always tried to do, and have so

far succeeded that the actual accounts show credit balances of 90.8 guilders for the fiscal year 1746-7; 2,149.18 guilders for 1747-8; and 9,188.12 guilders for 1748-9, from our own sales and from the Company's imposts (especially the farm of the import and export duties, which has been again rented as from the last day of December). The above figures have been arrived at after deducting incidental expenses connected with passing ships which were no concern of this place, and without considering the cinnamon trade, or those profits which goods shipped from here must certainly have yielded at other posts...

Batavia will be informed of the result of the expedition to the Nicobars, the Sombreros, and the islands lying to the north or north-west of Achin, with the return of the frigate 'Double Eagle' and the bark 'Cheese Merchant'. Having been supplied with provisions and everything else for five months, those vessels departed thither from this roadstead on 10th January last under the flag of the oldest captain, Jacob Hen, with the purpose of discovering whether wood for masts was to be found there, particularly on the island of Sombrero, as described in the travel account of the English General James Lancaster; and, if so, how far they were suitable for use, at what cost they could [be] obtained, and how they could be transported hither.¹ They were also to discover whether any European nations had established, or tried to establish, a settlement there; what those islands produced; and whether or not they had any communication or trade with neighbouring peoples. At the same time those in charge were given written instructions that when their work was completed they were to make close enquiries at Achin... as to whether silk is to be found there, since fine large silkworms were obtained from nearby Pedir in the year 1747. They were then to return by way of Perak and to load the tin lying ready there for Malacca...

Signed W. B. Albinus, Malacca, in the fortress, 15th February, 1750.

- b. *Memorandum handed by the under-signed, on the occasion of his departure, to Jan Crans, Governor and Director-elect of Malacca, for His Excellency's provisional reference.*

FOLLOWING the esteemed command of their Honours to place at Your Excellency's disposal for provisional reference a short concise memorandum on the present situation of this possession and

¹ Modern maps show the Sombrero Channel between the main Nicobar group and the Little and Great Nicobar Islands to the south. Lancaster's 'Sombrero Island' may have been the present Nancawry Island, in the south of the main Nicobar group. It was 148 years before the present memorandum was written that Sir James Lancaster visited the island.... See Sir William Foster, *The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster*, London (The Hakluyt Society), 1940, 88-9.

the company's interests here, I shall first of all explain what is the basis of its welfare and subsistence in the present circumstances. I shall then show how, in addition to being a good, well-conducted establishment, its expenses may be met, and the Company may draw its principal profits from it; and next, how both its welfare and its profits may remain, with Heaven's blessing, permanent and constant.

With regard to the first point, although there is little or no trade to be done here for the Company itself, it is certain that the welfare and subsistence of this colony at present lie purely and simply in trade. This seems at first to be a paradox, but the apparent contradiction disappears and the statement becomes intelligible when one considers that the sale of goods is at present reduced to nothing, with no indication that any improvement may fairly be anticipated in this respect, whereas trade in these Straits is very busy and will surely continue to be so. Moreover the Company has long abandoned its sales, on which it never made any profit, and only persists with the collection of duties.

It therefore remains a matter of supreme importance, both for the Company and for the inhabitants, that the trade should be fostered and encouraged by every possible means, for from that all else—the reduction of charges and the increase of profits—must follow; since it is obvious that as trade here flourishes the amount of customs-duties must rise, and so the Company's charges diminish and its revenues increase....

In view of the fact that most of the people in this region are very prone to plunder, one must always be careful for the safety and security of these Straits, and on the least report of pirates being on the move anywhere one must immediately take precautions lest they establish a headquarters or get the chance to combine with one another. Daily experience teaches that the mere display of the Netherlands flag is often enough to strike terror into that gang, and for that purpose there are at present very suitable means to hand here in a good number of ships. These should therefore be always kept in good condition and well provided, so that immediate use may be made of them at need.

Also a strict and vigilant eye must be kept generally on the behaviour of the rulers and regents of the surrounding parts with whom the Company is joined in alliance, and on the least evasion or breach of contracts the necessary steps should be decided upon as promptly as possible.

Especially must the Prince Regent of Riouw, Dain Cambodia, and the King of Trengganu, with his son-in-law Raja Ismail, be watched very closely in the present circumstances. What the aims of those princes may be certainly remains obscure, but there is no doubt that all three seem to be dissembling and to be full of dangerous designs.

Consequently it is advisable that great care be taken lest the Company become involved in their quarrels; a strict neutrality should be observed.

With the rulers of Perak and Siak good relations should be maintained, and the contracts will be faithfully performed, for those two kingdoms are of very great profit both to the Company and to this place, for which reason it is desirable that the contracts with those princes should be constant and lasting. The first should now once again be earnestly exhorted to lower the price of the tin that he delivers to the Company. It seems to me that the young king and the nobles are at present very well disposed and that therefore the opportunity should not be lost but should be seized as quickly as possible. The other prince must be constantly kept to a proper respect and awe for the Company, and above all must not be allowed to admit to his rivers merchants or ships other than those which go there in accordance with our treaty with him or by their Honours' permission....

The inhabitants of Naning, though vassals and subjects of the Company, are in general very disloyal and inconstant. They sometimes work closely with the people of Rombouw; the similarity of their natures and the proximity of their lands give them great opportunity for doing so. They are moreover fickle and much inclined to change. They must therefore be kept carefully and constantly within the bounds of their duty, and for this purpose they have been urged and held to their due annual homage to the Company; for experience has taught that if this is neglected they become somewhat forgetful of their dependence on the Company and of their due loyalty and obedience to it; they insensibly turn aside from it, and sometimes pass on to disobedience and even intrigue....

These, I think, are the main matters which are necessary for a provisional reference; and for the rest I shall refer Your Excellency to the substantial observations of his late Excellency [Jacob] Mossel concerning the good administration of this government, and to the decisions taken thereon by their Honours, as well as to the successive instructions both of the Honourable Directors and the Honourable High Government of the Indies....

Thom. Schippers, Malacca, in the fortress, 9th January, 1773.

IV *A Malay Account of the Dutch in Perak*

The references in the Dutch Governor's report of 1750 to certain of the events in Perak are confirmed in the Malay Chronicle, *Misa Mlayu*, translated by W. E. Maxwell in 'The Dutch in Perak', *JSBRAS*, x, 1882, 258-9.

THUS Sultan MOZAFAR SHAH was again firmly established on the throne of his kingdom and carried on the government with the help of the Raja Muda. It is said that the Dutch then came to live at Tanjong Putus. By the orders of their Raja they went from Batavia to Malacca and thence came to Perak. They asked the Raja of Perak for a place to live in and selected Pangkalan Halban. Their object was to buy tin with *reals*; for a *bhara* [about 375 pounds] of tin they could pay thirty-two *reals*. . . . And all the wishes of the Hollanders were approved by Sultan MOZAFAR SHAH and they accordingly came to live at Pankalan Halban. They built a *gedong* (a brick house) and surrounded it with fortifications and, after this, people could no longer take tin out of the river for export, but all was given to the Hollanders, traders thenceforth having to take dollars with them on their voyages. Regarding the Hollanders themselves, their Captain was relieved every three years. For a long time they continued to live at Pangkalan Halban and to watch the mouth of the Perak river, and in that time quantities of reals were paid by them to the Sultan towards the revenue of the State, and all the people in the country put by plenty of money. It is related that a certain Raja KHALIM was ordered by the Sultan to be sent to the Dutch at Malacca. This Raja KHALIM was the son of Raja PUTEH and nephew of the Sultan himself, but his father was a son of the Raja of Kedah; the Sultan had formerly been very fond of him and when the Sultan had been obliged (by civil war) to remove to Kuala Kangsa, Raja KHALIM had lived with him and had followed his fortunes, receiving the title of Raja Kechik Besar. But when the Sultan was restored to Brahman Indra by the Yang di per Tuan Muda, Sultan MOHAMED SHAH, and the Raja Muda, Raja KHALIM remained behind at Kuala Kangsa and did not remove with the Sultan; and when Sultan BAKABAT attacked Bukit Gantang, Raja KHALIM took no part in the measures taken for resisting him, but remained perfectly passive. When the Sultan heard this report, he was extremely angry with Raja KHALIM and he ordered the Raja Muda to turn him out of Kuala Kangsa. The latter brought him down the river to the Sultan's presence and afterwards to Pulo Tiga before the Yang di per Tuan Muda. He was allowed to live at Pulo Tiga and afterwards went to Tanjong Putus, where he planted hill-padi, but he still refused to mix with the other princes of the royal family who were in attendance on the Raja Muda (all young Rajas in Perak being under the Raja Muda's orders) and he plotted with a certain Inche KHASIL, a Harua, (whose daughter he asked in marriage), and associated with all sorts of bad characters—Bugis, Harua, and others. When Sultan MOZAFAR SHAH heard the character of Raja KHALIM'S companions, he was more than ever incensed against him. Raja KHALIM went up the river on one occasion from Tanjong

Putus with the object of fetching his wife and children from Pulo Tiga and taking them back to Tanjong Putus. When he reached Pulo Tiga with all his followers, information was given to the Sultan, who ordered the Raja Muda and the Chiefs to prevent their removal, for his wife (whom he wanted to take away down the river) was the daughter of Raja DAHA (who was called Raja Kechik Muda) and niece of the Sultan and of Sultan MOHAMED SHAH. The Raja Muda and the Chiefs opposed Raja KHALIM accordingly and the latter resisted them and there was fighting for seven days. Raja KHALIM then retreated and went from Bukit Lada to Sungei Dedap and thence back again to Tanjong Putus. There he lived quietly in Inche KHASIL'S house and married his daughter. Still bent on opposition, he assembled men at Tanjong Putus, whom he bound by oaths of fidelity, and planned an attack upon the Raja Muda at Pulo Tiga. The men of Tanjong Putus were divided, half joining Raja KHALIM, and the other half being unwilling to be disloyal to Sultan MOZAFAR SHAH and the Raja Muda. While these proceedings were going on, information was carried to the Sultan, who wrote a letter which he desired might be conveyed to the Dutch Captain, but not a man knew the contents of it. After it had reached the Dutch Captain, Raja KHALIM happened to come to him one day to get some dollars in exchange (for tin?). The Captain took him into the brick factory, and the will of God was accomplished upon his servant, who was not permitted to sin any longer. Raja KHALIM was received by the Hollanders and taken on board their sloop, in which he was immediately conveyed to Malacca. Inche KHASIL too was subsequently seized by the Hollanders and taken to Malacca, and by order of the Raja of Malacca was thrown into a dungeon (*gedong gēlap*). All that were left submitted to the Sultan.

V *The Chinese in Dutch Malacca*

There is no way of estimating the size of the Chinese population of Malacca during the period of the Sultanate, although it could not have been very large. Figures for the Chinese in Malacca during the period of Portuguese occupation are also lacking and it is only in the Dutch period that we are given any reliable information about these people who today number nearly fifty per cent. of the total population of Malacca (121,000: 291,000). [Kernal Singh Sandhu, 'Chinese Colonization of Malacca: A Study in Population Change, 1500 to 1957 A.D.', *The Journal of Tropical Geography*, xv, 1961, 6-7.]

AT the time of the Dutch capture of Malacca in 1641, there were 300 to 400 Chinese in the State. There is reason to believe that the number of Chinese settlers sometime prior to the Dutch occupation had been higher than this. It appears that the monopolistic trade policy of the Portuguese coupled with the corruptness of their officials had obliged many merchants, including Chinese, to leave Malacca during the latter part of Portuguese rule. In addition, this policy of the Portuguese brought them into conflict with other nations, and Malacca was constantly besieged first by neighbouring South-east Asian states and later by the Dutch. These wars took a heavy toll of those who remained behind, and by the time of the Dutch capture Malacca was a ruined city of only 2,706 inhabitants compared with an estimated figure of 20,000 for the pre-Dutch period. In fact, so drastic had been the decimation of certain sections of the Chinese population that the Dutch had to import Chinese from Batavia to work the fields and gardens of Malacca. [Justus] Schouten, the Dutch emissary, visiting Malacca in 1641, enumerated thirty-three such Chinese immigrants among the estimated 300 to 400 Chinese merchants, craftsmen and fishermen living in the Upe and Sabac (modern Bunga Raya) suburbs of the city...

The return to peaceful conditions after the cessation of Portuguese-Dutch conflict witnessed an increase in the number of Chinese in the State. In 1678 Balthasar Bort, the Dutch Governor of Malacca, enumerated 426 Chinese among the total population of 4884. According to Bort the Chinese community comprised 127 men, 140 women and 159 children. The females among the Chinese were probably Batak and Balinese slaves, whom the Chinese males married in the absence of Chinese women. Chinese female immigrants did not start arriving in the Straits Settlements until about the middle of the nineteenth century. Seventy-eight of the Chinese lived around Bukit China, the rest were in the northern suburb ('Upe' of the Portuguese). These Chinese, principally merchants, artisans and carpenters, were comparatively wealthy, owning 81 brick and 51 *atap* out of a total of 185 brick and 583 *atap* structures in the whole territory. In addition, they owned 290 slaves.

The Dutch were anxious to persuade 'the industrious Chinese' to settle in Malacca for the cultivation of the soil and other traffic. In response to Dutch encouragement the Chinese population increased to 2,161 by 1750, a five-fold increase over the 1641 estimates. It is possible that some of this was the result of natural increase in the Sino-Batak or Sino-Balinese homes. This situation which was conducive to population growth was short-lived. In the first place the monopolistic trade policy of the Dutch, like that of their predecessors, led to a gradual strangulation of Malacca's trade, whilst restrictions on movement and a poll tax of a quarter guilder per person per month

imposed on the Chinese, to boost the revenue of the State, discouraged the new immigrants. Secondly, the comparative decline of Dutch influence in the eighteenth century, and the rise of British power [in the Straits of Malacca] led to the establishment of Penang as a trading station in 1786.

VI *Bugis-Dutch Conflicts*

The British began to show a decided interest in the Straits of Malacca during the early 1770's when missions were despatched to Achin and Kedah to obtain territorial concessions from the local rulers. These missions were unsuccessful, but that sent to Kedah in charge of the Hon. Edward Monckton tended to focus attention on the activities of a British private trader, Francis Light, who exerted some influence upon the British authorities to obtain the cession of the island of Penang off the Kedah coast in 1786. At the very time that the British were becoming a serious threat to the long established Dutch power in the Malacca Straits, the Dutch themselves, caught in a weakened position by the outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, faced a serious and final challenge from their old rivals, the Bugis, for hegemony in the western Malay states. The Bugis of Riau were led by the most famous of all Bugis warriors of the eighteenth century—Raja Haji. [Winstedt, *A History of Malaya*, revised edition, 1962, 148-53.]

THIS Raja Haji was a renowned Bugis fighter whom every ruler wanted on his side. He fought for the rulers of Jambi and Indragiri and in the fashion of the time was given their daughters in marriage. . . . Raja Haji turned north of the Johor empire to extend the influence of his sword. . . . He took the Selangor Sultan, Salahu'd-din, his brother, up the Perak river, to the dismay of the Dutch anchoring a flotilla of twenty war-boats above their fort: according to local chronicles, the august presence of Sultan Mahmud of Perak drove evil thoughts out of the head of Raja Haji, but Raja Haji demanded the hand of the Perak ruler's niece for Salahu'd-din and proposed that the marriage should take place before his flotilla left the river! Then he sailed on to Kedah to demand the payment of the 12 *bahara* of silver still owing for Bugis help rendered by Daing Parani in 1724! The Kedah Sultan refused and was driven out of Alor Star. The Malays were poor fighters, compared with the Bugis. In 1772, the Honourable Edward Monckton, envoy of the East India Company, wrote to India, that "the King of Quedah and all the Malay kings have got guns enough to drive all the Europeans out of India

if they knew how to make use of them." Today it has been forgotten how in the first negotiations between Kedah and the British for a settlement, it was not the Siamese but the Bugis from Selangor whom the Kedah ruler feared and hated. Writing from Kedah in 1771, Francis Light informed his Madras firm that "the King of Queda has granted to you the seaport of Queda with a fort lying near it to be kept by you, in consideration that you will promise to assist him against the people of Salengore." When the Sultan discovered that the Company's support did not include aid against Selangor, he dismissed Monckton as "a stuttering boy" and declared that "the King of Siam had strictly forbidden him to let any Europeans settle in his kingdom." The decay of the Dutch Company's power enabled the Bugis to fight for a share of the revenue Kedah derived from duty on opium, goods from Bengal and Surat, pepper from Sumatra, and tin, wax, timber and rattans.

After his victorious campaign in Kedah, Raja Haji sailed off to Borneo to enlist under the Sultan of Pontianak. There he heard of the death of Daing Kemboja and immediately left for Pahang where he got the Malay Bendahara of the Johor empire to create him, in accordance with custom, its Underking. Then he passed on to Riau, the traditional seat of the Bugis Underking, and forced the resignation of Raja 'Ali, son of Daing Kemboja, whom the Dutch had already recognized as his father's successor. However, with the Dutch Raja Haji lived on good terms until 1782, when they refused to give him any share of the money got from the capture at Riau of an East Indiaman carrying 1154 chests of opium. Thereupon Raja Haji invoked the aid of Selangor and Rembau and started raids in the Malacca Straits. The Dutch sent thirteen ships and 1504 men to capture Riau. Raja Haji took command of the defence and was paddled from vessel to vessel directing operations: if any of his crew ducked at passing shots, he hit him with a rattan. But the Dutch blockade was becoming effective when Batavia despatched a further force and gave supreme command to a Malacca civilian, Arnoldus Lemker. This commander's ship blew up and the siege was raised. Various excuses were made for the retirement: the civil command, the merchant fleet, bad shells and poor equipment, lack of fresh food and dysentery.

Raja Haji did not delay. Dropping his nominal overlord, Sultan Mahmud, at Muar, he landed at Teluk Ketapang five miles south of Malacca, where until the end he amused his thousand warriors and their three hundred women with feasts and plays and dancing. Already Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor had sailed up the Linggi river, captured some Malacca Tamils resident at Rembau, collected Minangkabau fighters from Rembau and Pemas, and sailed along the Malacca coast reducing the whole country down to Tanjong Kling, seven miles north of Malacca. Nightly the Bugis attacked the outer batteries of

Bunga Raya, Bandar Hilir and Bukit China, so that everyone in Malacca stood to arms. But on 4 March 1784 a fleet of six ships, 326 guns and 2130 men reached Batavia from Holland under Jacob Pieter van Braam, and on June 1st this fleet dropped anchor at Teluk Ketapang. Secretly on the night of June 18th van Braam landed 734 bayonets. At daybreak he opened fire with his big guns on the Bugis fleet and batteries. "At about 8 o'clock," the contemporary Malacca journal tells us, "it was seen from St. Paul's Hill that the ships with the landing party moved into Teluk Ketapang bay, and soon afterwards the heavy firing from the ships ceased. Then for more than half an hour were heard continual volleys of musketry, an unbroken running fire, and a little after 9 o'clock one could see a thick smoke rising which lasted off and on the whole day. About 10 a.m. the flag-ship signalled that the landing had been successful." A Malay historian records "two or three men carrying yokes could not have borne away the shoes and hats of the dead Dutch soldiers," but discipline won the day. Their stockade surrounded, the Bugis charged, one of their chiefs sick and mounted on a pony which like his master was shot down. Raja Haji stood, a dagger in one hand, and a Muslim treatise *The Guide to Grace* in the other, an unpainted Delacroix. He was hit by a musket-ball or round shot while his followers were embracing his knees. Followed by some women, his body was carried away in a mat slung from a pole and was hidden in a thicket until, identified from its shaven head and short teeth, it was brought under Dutch escort to Malacca and buried at the foot of St. Paul's Hill.

On 2 August 1784 van Braam's fleet conquered Selangor and drove its Sultan, Ibrahim, a fugitive to Bernam and thence to Pahang. On October 10th the Dutch fleet was before Riau. van Braam attempted to induce Sultan Mahmud and the Malays to break with the Bugis but the Sultan was under duress and unable. The Dutchman then issued an ultimatum that all the Bugis must leave Riau and that in future there must be no Bugis Underking of the Johor empire. On October 29th the Bugis started a naval engagement but by dawn on October 31st they had fled. Sultan Mahmud thanked the Dutch for having expelled them. The Sultan, the Bendahara and the Temenggong now signed a treaty, acknowledging that the kingdom and port had become by right of war the property of the Dutch, which the Malays would hold as a fief under conditions. Riau was to have a Dutch garrison. The Company was to enjoy free trade everywhere in the empire of Johor, and no other Europeans were to be admitted. Vessels from Johor and Pahang that passed Malacca had to call there for Dutch permits. Chinese and native craft might trade at Riau, provided they did not come from Celebes or Borneo or carry cloves or mace and provided they did not carry tin from Palembang or Bangka. All tin was to be sold to the Company at a fixed price. On the death of the Sultan,

his successor had to be one of the Johor royal family approved by the Governor of Malacca. A garrison of 254 men, including thirty-eight European officers and gunners, was left to protect Riau against the Bugis and the English. The booty taken was sold at Batavia for \$60,670 and distributed among the crews. On 19 June 1785 David Ruhdé took up his abode in a palm-mat house at Riau as its first Resident, but administration still remained in the hands of Sultan Mahmud and his Malay chiefs.

In that same year 1785 the Bugis Sultan Ibrahim, aided by the Malay Bendahara at Pahang, drove the Dutch out of his state, Selangor, and asked Captain Light, of Pinang, for authority to hoist the British flag, even addressing a request to the Governor-General of Bengal to found a British settlement in his country. "In July last," Light wrote to the Governor-General, "the King of Salengore having collected about 2,000 Pahangs, crossed over to Salengore, and in the night sent a few desperadoes to massacre the Dutch. They got into the Fort,¹ and wounded one of the Sentinels and the Chief, but the garrison taking alarm killed eight of the Buggese, dispersed the rest, and in the morning the Dutch, being afraid of another attack, embarked in their vessels and fled to Malacca, leaving all their Stores, Provisions and Ammunition undestroyed; the King took possession and still keeps it. The King of Salengore cannot remain in his present situation, his people are kept together by hopes of assistance from the English, which he expects from the preference our Merchants always received from him and his Father above any other nation. I had scarcely arrived when I received intelligence that the Dutch Fleet consisting of three large Ships and fourteen sail of Prows and Sloops, were before Salengore. The King, unable to procure provision or to support himself longer without assistance, entered into a Treaty with the Dutch. It is said, they obliged him to swear on the Koran he would send all the tin to Malacca and be a friend of the Dutch. They took away all the guns which they had lost there and have now sent for him to Malacca." The Dutch blockade of Selangor lasted over a year. Meanwhile, his title unrecognized by Dutch and Malays, Raja Haji's successor, Raja 'Ali the Bugis-made Underking, was seeking, though in vain, unmolested passage through Rembau in order to attack Malacca. Only in Riau were the Bugis and the Malays parted.

Summoned to Malacca, Sultan Mahmud had to look for help to the east and turned to Borneo, entreating the ruler of Tempasok to send Ilanuns to rid Riau of the Dutch. On 7 February 1786 he was browbeaten into signing a convention. He had to hand over the administration of Riau to the Dutch East India Company, receiving for the first three years and perhaps longer one-third of the revenue for himself and his chiefs. Except in case of great urgency or of his own house-

¹ At Kuala Selangor.


hold affairs, all was to be done in consultation with the Dutch Resident. Foreigners, convicted on a capital charge, were to be sent to Malacca; important Chinese cases and disputes between strangers and the inhabitants of Riau were reserved for the Resident; death sentences even on Malays and Bugis required his sanction. Pahang was to admit no Chinese or other junks to its ports but to direct them to the Dutch customs-station at Riau. Sultan Mahmud was allowed no private monopoly.

On 2 May 1787 a fleet was despatched heading for Riau. Sultan Mahmud affecting surprise reported that it was a fleet under some Bornean prince, a Solok fleet blown off its course in a storm and in need of provisions. The Malays supplied it with water, rice and two pilots. On the night of the tenth the Riau garrison heard the noise of many voices on the water. On May 13th owing to the remissness of the Sultan's men the *Ilanuns* entered the inner bay and plundered and burnt houses outside the fort. The Chinese rallied to the Dutch but the garrison was small. A dark night and the *Ilanuns'* want of small vessels enabled the Resident, the Dutch officers and part of the garrison to escape to Malacca with nothing saved but the Company's cash. It was good fun to drive the Dutch from Riau, but after their prank the Malay chiefs had to skedaddle, Sultan Mahmud to Lingga, the Bendahara to Pahang, others to Bulang. The life of a hunted wanderer was neither pleasant nor profitable for Mahmud. What was the next move? Three courses were open to him and he tried them all. He got his grand-uncle, Sultan Mansur of Trengganu, and Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor to endeavour to make peace between him and the Dutch, who would not listen to them. He wrote to Captain Light at Pinang, telling him of the *Ilanun* capture of Riau and inviting English help, which was not forthcoming. He formed a coalition of Trengganu, Kedah, Rembau, Siak, Solok, Lingga, Johor, Indragiri and Siantan to drive both English and Dutch off Malayan seas, but the coalition effected nothing beyond a short and futile siege of the Dindings and an ineffectual landing on the coast of Pinang.

Meanwhile the Dutch had soon re-established themselves at Riau: to have abandoned it would have meant the ruin of Malacca, more particularly after the opening of Pinang as a free port by the British. But though the Dutch now declared Riau a free port, all the Malays had scattered, most of them becoming pirates. . . . Batavia accepted Malacca's view that that sacred lodestone of empire, Sultan Mahmud, must be brought back. The Underking, Raja 'Ali, had been permitted to live at Muar on condition that he supported the Dutch commercial treaty with his brother-in-law the Sultan of Selangor, and finally he was allowed to go to Riau on condition that he would effect the return of Sultan Mahmud. But the big Malay chiefs, resentful of past Bugis domination, made Sultan Mahmud offer the Company \$60,000 if it

would put him in full possession of Riau. Pirates under Mahmud's protection infested the seas. It was of the utmost importance to Dutch commerce that the wanderer should settle down. In 1795 Batavia accepted the royal offer. As it happened, the English had now occupied Malacca and it was they who removed the Dutch Resident and garrison from Riau and handed the island back to Sultan Mahmud. Was it only the island? The question was hotly debated after [Thomas Stamford] Raffles had grabbed Singapore. When Governor [Abraham] Couperus handed Malacca to the English, he declared it was not only Riau but Johor and Pahang that Batavia had restored to the Malays, but when in 1818 the Dutch reoccupied Malacca, they declared that only Riau had been restored and that Johor and Pahang had since 1784 remained dependencies of Malacca. Couperus was trying to keep as much of the Johor empire as he could out of English hands; with the same object the Dutch Government in 1818 contended that Couperus had spoken without authority and refused to recognize his admission.

Indonesian Archipelago A sketch map showing the area covered by the readings, in relation to the mainland of South-East Asia, indicating the location of some of the less well known places.



Chapter Five

THE BRITISH IN MALAYSIA

Malacca fell to British arms in August 1795 when the Dutch governor, Abraham Couperus, after a token resistance, surrendered to a British expeditionary force sent from Madras. Malacca remained in British hands until 1818 when it was returned briefly to the Dutch, who finally surrendered sovereignty to the British in 1824 under the terms of the Treaty of London which demarcated spheres of influence in Malaysia between the two powers. In August 1786, Great Britain had taken possession of Penang after obtaining occupancy rights from the Sultan of Kedah, so that during the whole period of the Napoleonic Wars the British dominated the Straits of Malacca. This control was made even more effective when Sir Stamford Raffles acquired Singapore from a claimant to the Johore Empire in 1819. By the early years of the nineteenth century Great Britain had succeeded to the position of hegemony in the western Malay states which the Dutch had exercised during the eighteenth century. Gradually, as the century progressed, she was drawn more and more into the local politics of the region until finally in 1874 British Residents were appointed to the States of Selangor, Perak and Sungei Ujong to advise the Malay Rulers on matters of internal administration.

I *The British in Northern Borneo*

During the early 1770's, when the British were taking a more decided interest in the Straits of Malacca, they also were attempting to extend their commercial interests to the small island of Balambangan off the northern coast of Borneo. The reasons for this venture, and its ultimate failure, are described in the following reading extracted from the late Vincent T. Harlow's article, 'Early British Pioneers in Borneo'. [*The Sarawak Museum Journal*, vi, 1955, 445-50.]

By the 1760's the chief trading interests of the British were shifting from India to China. Tea was becoming increasingly popular in England, in certain European countries, and in the North American colonies. As the English made their way to Canton they took with them in payment for the tea a certain amount of English woollen goods, Cornish tin, cotton goods from Madras, raw cotton from Bombay, and opium from Bengal. However, that was only a small portion. The major commodity was silver—the average annual value of silver exported in the 1780's was £700,000—nearly 3 million in modern currency....

Now to export silver to that extent was disliked. It was disliked because silver—coming mainly from the mines of Spanish America—was very short in the 18th century, and because the economy of exporting treasure was believed to be unsound. So a new plan began to take shape in the minds of the English, and that new plan was conditioned by two factors. First: the English were becoming foremost in sea-power—in the Seven Years War (1756–63) they had fought and won a duel with the two major sea powers, France and Spain. The English thereafter held a predominant position in the Oceans. Secondly they were beginning to industrialise—to produce woollen goods which, of course, during the next 70/80 years were going to be one of the outstanding sources of British industrial wealth. They had the ships to convey the goods, and the sea power to protect the ships. All this, naturally, extended the horizons of English merchants; and as they looked at the India/China trade they began to formulate plans. It struck them that if they could create a great emporium in the Malay Archipelago, away from Dutch and Spanish control, this emporium could create a very profitable triangular trade. Manufactures brought out to this part of the world would be British woollens and hardware, Indian cotton goods, opium, and saltpetre. In exchange pepper, spices, and other goods would be conveyed from South East Asia to China where they would fetch high prices. Having sold these goods in Canton they could then buy tea to ship back to Europe. So that in the end there would be a threefold profit: there would be the profit made on selling British manufactures in the Malay Archipelago, the profit on selling Malay goods in China, and a third profit when they brought tea back to Europe....

This scheme was essentially commercial; it was not a plan of conquest. I have read many contemporary despatches on the scheme, and [what] they stress all the time is that "we do not want territory, we do not wish to become involved in the internal affairs of these countries; what we want is a chain of trading depots linking Europe, South East Asia, and China in a multilateral exchange of goods". In other words recreating the ancient system which had been in operation for many centuries. The plan was officially assisted in a number of ways.

It produced for example a very exceptional enterprise, namely Lord Macartney's embassy to the Imperial Court of Peking in 1792, in the hope of establishing a commercial alliance between Britain and China. During the same period, in 1786, Francis Light established a depot in Penang which flourished reasonably well. Then there was Raffles, whose efforts . . . eventually led to the establishment of Singapore in 1819.

Where does Borneo come into this very ambitious plan? In this way—and now I come to one of the great names of British Pioneer-ing, Alexander Dalrymple. . . . He entered the East India Company's Service at the age of 16; he worked his way up rapidly and was offered the position of Secretary at Madras, which he refused. At Madras he became intensely interested in some of the old records, and he realized through these records that a substantial trade had been carried on between South East Asia and China. He became so immersed in the plan that he pressed the Madras Government to give him a small ship to explore the Eastern Seas to find out what could be done to revive it. He set out in 1759. He . . . had an interview with the Sultan of Sulu, who at that time was overlord of North Borneo. The Sultan of Sulu welcomed this Englishman very warmly. . . . for two reasons: firstly, the English might be useful in fending off the Dutch and Spanish and, secondly, they might help to reopen the channel of the trade route to China which had been cut off; the Sultan saw the chance of prosperity.

The Sultan in 1761 entered into an agreement with Dalrymple. The British were to have a site for a factory, and there was to be free trade for the British, Chinese, and other merchants throughout Sulu territories. The Chinese were to be allowed to settle under British jurisdiction. Any disputes between Britain and Sulu were to be settled between the Sultan and the British Chief. Not only was the Sultan enthusiastic but the merchants were also; in fact they were too optimistic[.] They told Dalrymple that they would buy any goods that he might care to supply through Madras, and guaranteed 100% profit on sales of Sulu products in Canton. Thus encouraged, Dalrymple set sail from Sulu to Canton, but the pepper cargo he took with him brought very disappointing prices. Nevertheless he was convinced that it was a sound plan. After selling his cargo in Canton he set out for Madras, and it was characteristic of him that he turned this journey into a voyage of exploration of the Eastern Seas. Having arrived at Madras he convinced the Madras Government that the scheme was worth while, and then he set off again for Sulu, taking with him the Madras Government's ratification of the Treaty. The Sultan welcomed him back and formally ceded Balembangan to Britain, and the British flag was hoisted there in 1763.

In the meantime, the East India Company in London had also become interested in these regions, and in the middle of the war with

Spain worked out a plan for capturing Manila and the island of Mindanao. Their intention, as stated in the Minutes of the East India Company, was at the end of the war to retain them as sources of supply (in other words Dalrymple's idea)—not as a monopoly but to reinforce the Sulu market with cassia, cloves, etc. The plan succeeded, but in the end Manila and Mindanao were not retained because news of their capture reached Europe too late for inclusion in the peace treaty.

Dalrymple, during the temporary occupation of Manila, went there to have a look round, and it was there that he encountered the real Sultan of Sulu. He discovered that the ruler of Sulu itself was a nephew of the real Sultan and a usurper. Dalrymple with true Scottish perspicacity saw his chance. He took the real Sultan back to Sulu and said "Here is your true ruler". The old man was reinstated as titular Sultan, but the nephew's rule continued. By way of sealing the bond, the north of Borneo from the Kimanis river on the west coast right round to the Kinabatangan delta on the East side was ceded to the English East India Company together with Labuan, Palawan, Balembangan, and other islands north of Borneo. The old Sultan's son Serafudin was to rule these territories, as vassal of the Company. All this was signed and sealed in 1764. In other words, the Sulus thought it worth while to give generous terms to the English in the hope that they would provide support against the Dutch and Spanish, and that the English trading schemes would bring in handsome commercial profits.

Dalrymple then went home and put his great scheme to the Company, who were at that time experiencing internal troubles. But in 1768 Dalrymple's enterprise and pertinacity won through and the Company decided to embark upon the enterprise. Following Dalrymple's advice, they determined to settle in Balembangan as a beginning, despite Spanish and Dutch hostility. However Dalrymple quarrelled with the Company over the terms of the Borneo enterprise and now fades from the picture. And then Captain Trotter, a forgotten British pioneer in North Borneo, left Bombay in 1769 with formal instructions from London that he was to occupy Balembangan and then go to Sulu to get confirmation of the treaty of 1764 with the Sultan of Sulu. He was also told to conduct a detailed survey of the North Borneo coast and to land frequently at various points so as to get to know the different types of people, the nature of local products and so forth. Trotter's report was very detailed and very useful. He reported after his voyage that he had secured the ratification of the treaty, and he gave a very interesting report on the northern coast of Borneo. He stated that on the west side of North Borneo there were small supplies of wax, pepper, sago, and rice, on the East side small quantities of camphor. He considered there were great oppor-

tunities here and stated that wherever he went he found people prepared to co-operate. Great development was possible; however there was the hatred of the Dutch to bear in mind. The report reached London in June 1770.

On the strength of this report... the ship *Britannia* was fitted out for the first great trading venture to North Borneo. The cost, with cargo, was approximately £20,000... The ship arrived in Balembangan in December 1773, under the leadership of John Herbert with the title of Chief Resident. John Herbert... built houses for his staff, wharves and warehouses, and set up a chain of trading depots. Edward Coles was established in Sulu, William Cornhill at Palawan, and John Jesse at Brunei.

In 1774 an Embassy arrived at Balembangan from the Sultan of Mindanao. He invited the English to come over to Mindanao and establish more trading depots there.

That led to the voyage of Captain Thomas Forrest (1774-6). Again, in Captain Forrest we have an unknown name, but he was a pioneer of the first class—a man of tremendous integrity and courage. He took with him a Malay called Tuan [Haji] and sailed off in a 10 ton prau to explore countries to the East where they hoped to find spices. It was a great feat of daring and skilful navigation. They reached the North coast of New Guinea. The Sultan of Mindanao granted them a small island, and offered an alliance with the British on the same sort of terms as the Sultan of Sulu... Forrest... came back full of hope, and full of ideas for a great network of trade. But when he reached Balembangan in 1776 he found the place deserted. There was no John Herbert to welcome him—just a curious silence and a scene of devastation... John Herbert's regime had been a riot of fraud and peculation: he had swindled the Company to the tune of £35,000. Worse still, he had quarrelled with the Sulus. He had been a little unwise in selling his goods to the Sulu merchants on credit on the understanding that they would pay in pepper and other local products. The Sulus took the British goods, but when John Herbert began to press for payment, the products were not forthcoming—in fact they had not got the crops growing to the extent the English believed. This was the cause of the quarrel, and the Sulus attacked the fort on Balembangan and looted the English godowns. Herbert and his compatriots fled on board ship. That was the end of the first English settlement. Within a few hours the result of 15 years' planning had been destroyed.

II *Early Progress of Penang*

The British settled on the island of Penang in August, 1786. The

vicissitudes of its early development under its founder, Francis Light, are described in the following reading from H. P. Clodd's book, *Malaya's First British Pioneer: The Life of Francis Light*. [London, 1948, 55-65, 67, 70.]

THE foundation of the Settlement quickly became noised abroad. Asiatics and Europeans alike flocked to the island, eager to seize the opportunity of trading under that emblem of security, the British flag. Captains of ships made use of the new harbour; some of the more commercially minded among them applied for free grants of land, which Light... offered in order to attract settlers....

The ubiquitous Chinese were... among the first to take advantage of the new outlet for trade. Captain Kyd, whom the Bengal Government sent in January, 1787, to report on the Settlement, wrote that "The shops in the bazaar, which is now pretty extensive, are principally kept by Chinese; at present there are sixty families and many more are expected to settle on the island soon. These very industrious and quiet people are spread all over the Malay Countries and exercise almost all the handicraft professions and carry on most of the retail trade." Light himself at a later date... singled out the Chinese for their sterling qualities. "They are," he said, "the only people in the East from whom revenue can be raised without expense and extraordinary effort." Of the Arabs he said, they are "good friends and dangerous enemies"; the Chulias are "neither worthy of confidence nor fear"; the Bugis are "better governed by mild exhortations than by force. They may be persuaded, but yield reluctantly to stern authority."... Tact, with which [Light] was endowed in full measure, was essential in maintaining accord among so diversified a community....

...[T]he free port of Penang had made an auspicious beginning; traders from the Malay Archipelago, eager to avoid sale to the Dutch under the compulsion of monopoly, undertook the long voyage through the Straits of Malacca to Penang; merchants from India, from Burma, from Siam, from Acheen; all came to trade....

It was with justifiable pride that Light recorded "the united opinions of all persons who have been here, Europeans and Indians, as to the excellency of this situation for a commercial exchange and from the heartburnings of the Dutch and from the jealousy of the people of Kedah who already foresee they must be dependent on this place for any foreign trade." But, he added significantly, "in order to protect the place from any sudden attack" it will be necessary "to have a Battalion of Sepoys and 50 European Artillery, with a cruiser of 18 or 20 guns."

To Andrew Ross¹ Light could write so much more freely than in his official communications, and to him he wrote on the 1st February, 1787, "Did not the Dutch keep a strict watch over the Malays, most of them would leave Malacca. Not a man is allowed to leave without giving security he will not go to Penang.... The contempt and derision with which they treat this place and the mean dirty art they use to prevent people coming here would dishonour any but a Dutchman."

Light had in fact barely settled down in Penang when intrigues commenced with the object of ousting the British from the island; his situation was not rendered less easy by the East India Company's indifference to the welfare of their new possession. In February, 1787, he complained to Ross that he had "received nothing from the Bengal Government" since his departure from Calcutta in May of the previous year....

Light's series of reports reached Calcutta when a change in the Governor-Generalship of the East India Company was occurring with the arrival of Lord Cornwallis to succeed Sir John Macpherson. The position of the Company in India at this juncture was critical; Macpherson's administration had been responsible for many abuses and the machinery of government was badly out of gear. The energies of Cornwallis had first to be directed to remedy the mistakes of his predecessor and to introduce reforms. Before, however, this work had proceeded far, [an] old feud broke out again between the Company and the powerful Tippoo Sultan. Preoccupied as he was with these big issues, Cornwallis was now called upon to review the Penang venture....

On the 22nd January, 1787, the Bengal Government broke the ten months' silence it had maintained so far as any communication with their Superintendent was concerned by inditing an important despatch containing in the first instance instructions "to make the Port free to all nations," a far-seeing decision in that it undoubtedly tended to encourage that entrepôt trade so necessary to the full development of the Settlement.

Subsequently... Cornwallis, finding the expenses of administration were exceeding the revenue, exerted strong pressure on Light to institute certain duties and taxes. These, however, were abandoned after a few years' trial.

The declaration of policy in the despatch from Calcutta was, however, largely stultified by what followed. "We do desire," added Lord Cornwallis, "to be informed with as much accuracy as possible how far the Settlement will answer the ends proposed, that having this information before us, *we may be enabled to judge whether it will be*

¹ One of His Majesty's Justices of the Peace for Madras, and a friend of Light. He died in 1797, aged 79 years.

prudent to continue or to withdraw altogether." To Light this was a bolt from the blue. With all his energies bent to the difficult task of bringing into order a rapidly growing population on an island which only six months beforehand was practically virgin soil, and with every prospect of a steady expansion in its commerce, the founder now was confronted with this timorous attitude. In a vigorous reply, he reminded Cornwallis of the numerous proposals, beginning with that in 1771, to persuade the Company to a step which would not only prove of advantage to their China trade, but would frustrate "the endeavours of the Dutch to exclude the British from any part of the Eastern commerce."...

Fortunately the Bengal Government was effectually silenced for the time being by Light's strong remonstrance, and he was left in peace to develop the new colony without interference from that quarter.

There were sites to be cleared to provide for the rapid influx of settlers. The area from the point where the expedition had landed up to the foothills, being flat and swampy, was liable to inundation, consequently much drainage work became necessary. Roads had to be made; the fact that the network of roads as planned by Light exists almost unchanged to the present day is a tribute to the methodical system then adopted. Buildings had necessarily to be lightly constructed of timber, with roofs of palm thatch. The Malay method of raising the bungalows on posts was adopted to ensure protection from risk of floods. Bricks were used in but a few instances; Light wrote on the 20th June, 1788, that the Company's supercargoes in China had sent him ten brick-layers, presumably Chinese, under an agreement that they should be kept in constant pay by the Company, and that they should be employed to build a military store-room, a customs house and a warehouse. But up to the year 1793 there were only twenty brick houses in the town....

In January, 1790, Light submitted to the Bengal Government an exhaustive report, which stated *inter alia* that there were then 200 houses built, planted lands estimated at 2,500 acres, producing 10,000 maunds [a Bengal maund at this time was 75 pounds] of rice—expected to be doubled the following year—besides "great quantities of fruit trees, coconuts, pepper, gambier and sugar-cane."

Every encouragement was given for the cultivation of rice so as to render the Settlement self-supporting in this staple of the Asiatic races. In an effort to recover for the Company a part at least of the lost trade in spices, Light advanced money to Che Kay, a Chinese merchant, for the purpose of cultivating pepper with vines procured from Acheen, and an area of four hundred acres was planted experimentally. Nutmegs and cloves were also introduced; the initial attempts failed owing to lack of experience on the part of the growers,

but in due time success rewarded their efforts. A survey register made in September, 1796, showed an area of over 2,000 acres under cultivation, in addition to that under spices. All nationalities contributed to this development—Chinese, Malays, Siamese, Burmese, immigrants from Southern India, Bengal and Bombay, as well as the British settlers.

The Settlement in its early days attracted some rather unruly characters, as Light had complained in the letter, already quoted, to Andrew Ross. In October, 1787, he had to report that European seamen who had "run" from their ships had been caught. "The riots these people committed in striking and abusing and plundering the inhabitants made it necessary to establish a Police. Also great disorder is occasioned by a number of people retailing a very cheap and destructive spirit." Following an affray among natives in which two Siamese were murdered, Light represented to Calcutta the need for creating a Judiciary in the Colony, but the instructions received served only to put on himself the whole onus of preserving order. The decision of the Council was recorded thus in the Minutes of their meeting held on 21st June, 1787: "The Governor-General does not consider himself at liberty to make any permanent regulations for the Prince of Wales' Island without express authority from Europe. Agreed therefore that it be left to Mr. Light to preserve good order in the Settlement as well as he can by confinement or other punishment, so far as the inhabitants not British subjects are concerned and excepting in cases of murder. Murderers other than British Subjects, are to be tried by Court Martial."

That phrase to "preserve good order as well as he can" was indeed typical of the whole attitude of the Company from the day Light occupied the island on their behalf until the day of his death. Nor did a word come from Calcutta concerning the thorny questions of compensation to be paid to the Sultan of Kedah and military assistance to him. Naturally, Light was becoming uneasy at this prolonged silence and in a letter dated the 7th May, 1787, he impressed upon Lord Cornwallis the need for coming to a final decision on these matters. Regarding the compensation, for which the Sultan had asked the sum of \$30,000 a year, Light suggested that \$10,000 should be paid annually "as the value of the Sultan's friendship, but," he added, "there is a necessity for coming to some terms with the King of Kedah while the Siamese and Burmans are upon him; and I have reason to believe that nothing will be acceptable without Government promising the King protection. . . . Should the Siamese be permitted to take possession of his country, we shall not only find an insolent and troublesome neighbour, but be under the necessity of assisting them in their wars or go to war with them ourselves. I humbly conceive that it will be easier, and attendant with less expense to the Honourable Company

to declare the King of Kedah at once under our protection; little else than the name of the Company will be wanted; the longer it is delayed, the greater will appear the consequence of the island, and the more difficulty there will be in fixing a settlement. The Danes, the Dutch, and the French have solicited permission to have only a house in Kedah; either of them will promise much, and should the King consider himself aggrieved or disappointed by the English, he may in despair seek for [an] other alliance."

Lord Cornwallis could not of course ignore the Sultan's claim for monetary compensation, for it had been already accepted in principle. The adjustment of this matter was now left to Light, subject to a maximum payment of 10,000 dollars a year for a period not exceeding seven, or at the most ten, years. But Cornwallis had no warrant to authorise any action that might mean active participation in the political affairs of Kedah. . . .

From the commencement of negotiations with Kedah as far back as 1771 the Company had wisely vetoed any proposals for an *offensive* alliance, because the history of the Malay states of the Peninsula had been for years past one long series of internecine strife. Then . . . after the loss of the American Colonies . . . , England had a fit of penitence and passed Pitt's Act which for the protection of the Asiatic brought the Company's policy under the control of the government and so deprived Bengal of the power to make any treaty that might lead to war, since "schemes of conquest and extension of dominion are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and policy of the nation." The leasing of an island seemed innocent but to become involved in a war with Siam dishonourable.

But the position of the states contiguous to or within a comparatively short distance of Siam was in a somewhat different category from those at the southern end of the Peninsula. Kedah . . . had been for many years the goal of Siamese territorial aggression; Siam was only awaiting a favourable opportunity to subjugate that country. Success in this effort might probably encourage them to press southward in an attempt to seize Perak and Selangor as well as Trengganu, all of which kingdoms Siam affected to consider as its vassals. Thus in the course of time, Siam might obtain the suzerainty of the larger, and commercially more valuable, area of the Malay Peninsula.

That Light had good reasons for appreciating the situation is shown by his letters to Calcutta stating that the Sultans of Trengganu and Selangor had each asked the Company to enter into an alliance to enable them to resist the pretensions of Siam.

The position forced upon Light by these latest Calcutta instructions was humiliating in the extreme. If the Malays realized finally that it was useless to rely upon the English for succour, then the future

of Penang would be imperilled, because the Sultan could use it as a bribe to secure from some other nation the military help he needed. . . .

Pin-pricks were to be the order of the day for the harassed Superintendent. The expenses of administration were exceeding the earnings of the Colony, and though no other result could have been expected after barely two years' occupation, the Company evidently thought otherwise. Accordingly, Captain Kyd . . . was deputed to visit Penang and to report upon its affairs. The result of Kyd's investigation was but to confirm previously expressed opinions of the prospects of the Settlement. Lord Cornwallis insisted, however, that efforts should be made to obtain more revenue, so Light was instructed to suggest measures to this end. He protested that undue impatience was being displayed. "Barely two years have elapsed since the first inhabitants arrived and I would not have scrupled to give my word to them that they would not be taxed for three years," but as the Government now desired "a commercial plan to be pursued," Light, obviously against his own inclinations, submitted proposals involving taxation, and comprising . . . import duties. . . .

The import duties . . . were . . . approved by Calcutta and were collected for some years, until it was found that they became a serious hindrance to trade. With the establishment of Singapore as a free port in 1819 it became imperative for Penang to revert to that policy from which there should never have been any departure.

During the next year or so affairs in the Settlement proceeded quietly. In the year 1789 an official statement of the trade passing through the port showed imports valued at 421,000 rupees and exports at 432,000—no mean figures to have been reached within less than three years after its foundation. A big fire in the bazaar in April of that year caused damage to the extent of 15,000 rupees. . . .

According to Sir George Leith, who became the first Lieutenant-Governor, a "count" in 1797 revealed a population of 6,937, which had increased in 1801 to 10,310, the total in each case being exclusive of Europeans and the Garrison. Leith observed that these numbers were probably underrated and that the population in 1801 had reached probably 12,000, "a larger population than has perhaps been known in any Settlement in so short a period from its foundation."

Although small numerically, Europeans were the main-spring of this development. But by the year 1788, Chinese formed over two-fifths of the total population; the part played by this remarkable race in the earlier days of Penang was indeed symbolic of the enterprise and persistence in seeking out fresh avenues of trade which have characterised their industrial penetration of the Malay Peninsula following upon the spread of British influence in that hitherto disturbed region.

III *The End of the Johore Empire and the Founding of Singapore*

The founding of the British settlement on the island of Singapore on 6th February 1819 consolidated British power in the Straits of Malacca and effectively destroyed any continuing value which Malacca might have had in Dutch hands. The events leading up to the founding of Singapore and its effect on power relationships in the western Malaysian region are discussed in the following reading from pages 159 to 162 of the revised edition of *A History of Malaya* by Sir Richard Winstedt.

WHEN in 1795 Sultan Mahmud was restored to the throne of his ancestors, fate destined him to be the last Emperor of Johor, Pahang, the Riau Archipelago, the Carimons and Singapore. Dying in 1812 on Lingga, the small island whither he had retreated from Bugis Riau, he left the succession to his throne unsettled, an omission that was to provide the shadow of a legal excuse for the partition of his empire. He had married four wives, one the Engku Puan his second cousin and childless, two women of no birth but lawfully wedded, the last a Bugis lady Tengku Hamidah, daughter of the famous Raja Haji and sister of Raja Ja'far the Underking, who bore him only a daughter that lived an hour. The two commoner wives each bore him a son, one of them Tengku Husain, the other Tengku 'Abdu'r-Rahman, both lawful. Which had Mahmud intended for his heir? Tengku Husain, the elder, claimed that he alone had been adopted both by the Engku Puan and by Tengku Hamidah, his two royal step-mothers. When his father had sailed to Riau to settle the quarrel with Engku Muda, he as elder son and heir had been given a royal flag to fly, but his younger brother only a red flag, and his father had pointed out to the chiefs the significance of those symbols. He claimed that his father had destined him for emperor and his brother only for the petty throne of Lingga. Tengku Hamidah supported Husain and refused to deliver the regalia to his brother. Moreover Husain was married to a sister of the Temenggong and to a daughter of the Bendahara, so that clearly Mahmud had planned to enable him as emperor to maintain the balance of power against the Bugis, marrying him to relatives of the two greatest Malay chiefs in the empire. But while Husain was away in Pahang marrying the Bendahara's daughter, Sultan Mahmud died suddenly not without a rumour of poison, and Raja Ja'far the Bugis Underking got the younger brother, Tengku 'Abdu'r-Rahman, his *protégé* and creature, elevated to the throne of the empire. The Bendahara came with a fleet to

Bulang to support Husain but both Bendahara and Temenggong were young men and shunned war with the able and energetic Underking. 'Abdu'r-Rahman remained Sultan, while his brother lived in penury.

Then in 1818, the British having meanwhile lost not only Malacca but Java by the Convention of London on 13 August 1814 (a treaty designed to strengthen Holland against France), Thomas Stamford Raffles returned from his house and his man-servants and his "splendid equipage" in Berners Street to administer "dreary derelict Bencoolen." It was the only spot in the Malay Archipelago that was not now recognized as being within the Dutch sphere of influence, and it was useless and inconsiderate to try to persuade Malay rulers again within that sphere to be faithful to engagements made with the English between 1795 and 1814. But Raffles tried and in the unscrupulous fashion of his time. On 5 July 1818 he wrote to Raja Ja'far the Underking at Riau saying how he had just returned from Europe and had got news that Batavia, contrary to treaty, was going to take Riau! His letter advised the Underking "not to receive any Dutch envoy, for as he was disposed to remain under the protection of the British flag, they could remain friends as before, rendering each other mutual help." On August 19th, a month before the retrocession of Malacca to the Dutch, Major William Farquhar, its English Resident, visited Riau and adjured the Bugis Underking to resist any Dutch attack and send at once for English aid. The Underking must have recalled how it was the English who in 1795 had restored the Bugis to home and office at Riau; so gratefully accepting a rich present of guns and velvet, he consented to sign a treaty of commercial alliance in virtue of powers granted him by Sultan 'Abdu'r-Rahman, the *roi fainéant* of "Johor, Pahang and dependencies." British vessels and merchandise were to enjoy in the ports of Johor, Pahang, Lingga, Riau and elsewhere the privileges granted to the most favoured nations. The Sultan was not to grant a monopoly to anyone or to renew any treaty obstructing British trade!

After that the Malays started to build forts in order to resist the threatened Dutch attack. The Dutch did not attack, but in November Rear-Admiral C. J. Wolterbeek arrived from Malacca and got a treaty signed on behalf of the same *roi fainéant* by the Underking and by the Temenggong of Johor. A Dutch Resident and a Dutch garrison were to be stationed at Riau—and in November arrived. Riau and Lingga were to be free ports, but *all other harbours in the Sultan's kingdom were to be free only to Dutch and local vessels*. There was to be mutual rendition of runaway slaves. The Underking explained that he had been tricked into the English treaty with indecent haste, because the English had deceived him into thinking the Dutch would take his country; and though this had surprised him as being contrary

to the treaty between England and Holland, he had assumed that, although Malacca was being restored to the Dutch, there might be some other clause prohibiting any engagement between Johor and Holland her ancient ally. To Farquhar the Underking explained that he had not applied for English aid, as the Dutch had used no force. Whatever the validity of the respective treaties, the Dutch were in possession of Riau. On 15 October 1818 Farquhar had written to the Underking suggesting the Carimon Islands as a suitable place to give the British for a port, and been given permission to survey them.

Raffles now received instructions from Bengal that he might establish a British port at Riau if the Dutch had not forestalled him, or, if they had, he might negotiate for a port in Johor, after he had made enquiries with regard to "the actual political conditions and relations of the State, the degree of independent authority exercised by the chief, his power of maintaining any engagements he may contract, his relations with other States, specially the Dutch settlements at Malacca and the Government of Siam." "There is some reason to think," the Instructions continued, "that the Dutch will claim authority over the State of Johor by virtue of some old engagements, and though it is possible the pretension might be successfully combated, it will not be consistent with the policy or present views of the Governor-General in Council to raise a question of this sort with the Netherlandish authorities."

The Carimons (Kerimun Islands) rejected on the report of a marine surveyor, Raffles and Major Farquhar on 28 January 1819 anchored off St. John's Island in Singapore waters. The next morning, accompanied by a Sepoy with a musket, they landed at Singapore and went to the house of Temenggong 'Abdu'r-Rahman, who entertained them with Malay fruit the more refreshing as he told them there were no Dutch on the island. Singapore was part of Johor. Did the visitors remember with satisfaction that when handing over Malacca in 1795, its Governor, Couperus, had declared that Riau, Lingga, Johor and Pahang were not dependencies of that ancient settlement?

Though in August 1818 Major Farquhar had signed a treaty with the Underking of Riau by virtue of powers granted him by 'Abdu'r-Rahman Sultan of Johor, Pahang and dependencies, and though in his letter suggesting the Carimons for a port he had again referred to 'Abdu'r-Rahman as emperor, he now conveniently remembered that that potentate had deprecated being called ruler of the Johor empire and had declared that he was Sultan of Lingga only. So aware that under Dutch surveillance neither Sultan 'Abdu'r-Rahman of Lingga nor the Underking at Riau would be able to convey any rights at Singapore to the British, Raffles determined to go back on the British recognition of the younger brother, Sultan 'Abdu'r-Rahman of Lingga,

whom in 1819 he himself had addressed as "seated on the throne of Johor, Pahang and all their dependencies," and to instal Tengku Husain as the rightful Sultan of the old empire of Johor. Evidently the Temenggong abetted him and apparently the Bugis Underking at Riau gave his tacit consent, glad to satisfy so easily Husain and his friend the Temenggong and to trim so conveniently between the Scylla of Holland and the Charybdis of Great Britain. That Raffles had any shadow of right so to interfere in the domestic politics of a Malay empire bound for two centuries by intimate ties to the Dutch, no one can for a moment contend. However the Eastern seas had never been a school for fine sentiment and Raffles was not only sore at the loss of Java and Britain's place in the Malayan sun but felt honest indignation at the wretchedness Dutch monopoly of trade had brought to the Malays.

On 30 January 1819 the Dato' Temenggong Sri Maharaja, who two months before had signed a treaty with the Dutch, now "in his own name and in the name of Sri Sultan Husain Mu'azzam Shah, Raja of Johor" and in return for an annual grant of \$3,000 and for British protection, agreed to let the English Company land, hoist the Union Jack and select land "at Singapore or other place in the government of Singapore-Johor" for the establishment of a factory. Raffles paid two Malay gentlemen \$500 each to fetch the "rightful" heir from Riau. Tengku Husain pretended he was going fishing and sailed on to Singapore, where in the name of the Governor-General of Bengal he was installed in the open with the aid of a plumed and aiguilleted A.D.C. as Sultan of Johor. Raffles gave him a thousand dollars and rolls of black and yellow cloth and on the same day, being 6 February 1819, Their Highnesses the Sultan and Temenggong signed a treaty confirming the preliminary agreement of January 30th, in return for annual allowances of \$5,000 to the Sultan and \$3,000 to the Temenggong and substituting "factories" for "factory"; they also engaged to exclude any other power, European or American, from settlement in any part of their territories. So began the division of the historic Sultanate of Johor, Pahang and the Riau Archipelago. Husain reigned in Singapore, his brother at Lingga, the one in the English the other in the Dutch zone.

The Dutch indignation at Raffles' ruse and the final legal partition of the old empire belong to the history of the new British settlement.

IV Settlement of Anglo-Dutch Differences, 1824

The largely unauthorized settlement of Singapore by Raffles caused

alarm and consternation in The Hague and London where discussions were about to be opened between the two powers with a view to settling their differences in the Indonesian-Malaysian region. At first there was talk of a British withdrawal; once British commercial interests began to realize the importance of Singapore as an entrepôt, however, opinion hardened in favour of its retention. In 1824 the Dutch recognized British occupancy rights to the island and Great Britain accepted Malacca in exchange for her Benkulen settlements in west Sumatra, and agreed to recognize generally the Straits of Singapore as the line demarcating respective spheres of influence. These decisions were incorporated in the Treaty of London of that year, the most important articles of which follow.

* * *

ARTICLE II

THE Subjects and Vessels of one Nation shall not pay, upon importation or exportation, at the Ports of the other in the Eastern Seas, any Duty at a rate beyond the double of that at which the Subjects and Vessels of the Nation to which the Port belongs are charged.

The Duties paid on exports or imports at a British Port on the Continent of India, or in Ceylon, on Dutch bottoms, shall be arranged so as, in no case, to be charged at more than double the amount of the Duties paid by British Subjects and on British bottoms.

In regard to any article upon which no Duty is imposed, when imported or exported by the Subjects, or on the Vessels, of the Nation to which the Port belongs, the Duty charged upon the Subjects or Vessels of the other shall in no case, exceed six per cent.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties engage, that no Treaty hereafter made by Either, with any Native Power in the Eastern Seas, shall contain any Article tending, either expressly, or by the imposition of unequal Duties to exclude the Trade of the other Party from the Ports of such Native Power: and that if in any Treaty now existing on either Part any Article to that effect has been admitted, such Article shall be abrogated upon the conclusion of the present Treaty.

It is understood that, before the conclusion of the present Treaty, communication has been made by each of the Contracting Parties to the other, of all Treaties or Engagements subsisting between each of Them, respectively, and any Native Power in the Eastern Seas; and that the like communication shall be made of all such Treaties concluded by Them, respectively, hereafter.

* * *

ARTICLE VI

It is agreed that Orders shall be given by the Two Governments to Their Officers and Agents in the East, not to form any new Settlement on any of the Islands in the Eastern Seas, without previous Authority from their respective Governments in Europe.

ARTICLE VII

The Molucca Islands, and especially Amboyna, Banda, Ternate, and their immediate Dependencies, are excepted from the operation of the I, II, III, and IV Articles, until the Netherland Government shall think fit to abandon the monopoly of Spices; but if the said Government shall, at any time previous to such abandonment of the monopoly, allow the Subjects of any Power, other than a Native Asiatic Power, to carry on any Commercial Intercourse with the said Islands, the Subjects of His Britannick Majesty shall be admitted to such Intercourse, upon a footing precisely similar.

ARTICLE VIII

His Netherland Majesty cedes to His Britannick Majesty all his establishments on the Continent of India; and renounces all privileges and exemptions enjoyed or claimed in virtue of those Establishments.

ARTICLE IX

The Factory of Fort Marlborough and all the English Possessions on the Island of Sumatra, are hereby ceded to His Netherland Majesty and His Britannick Majesty further engages that no British Settlement shall be formed on that Island, nor any Treaty concluded by British Authority, with any Native Prince, Chief, or State therein.

ARTICLE X

The Town and Fort of Malacca, and its Dependencies, are hereby ceded to His Britannick Majesty; and His Netherland Majesty engages, for Himself and his Subjects, never to form any Establishment on any part of the Peninsula of Malacca, or to conclude any Treaty with any Native Prince, Chief, or State therein.

ARTICLE XI

His Britannick Majesty withdraws the objections which have been made to the occupation of the Island of Billiton and its Dependencies, by the Agents of the Netherland Government.

ARTICLE XII

His Netherland Majesty withdraws the objections which have been

made to the occupation of the Island of Singapore, by the Subjects of His Britannick Majesty.

His Britannick Majesty, however, engages, that no British Establishment shall be made on the Carimon Isles, or on the Islands of Battam, Bintang, Lingin, or on any of the other Islands South of the Straits of Singapore, nor any Treaty concluded by British Authority with the Chiefs of those Islands.

ARTICLE XIII

All the Colonies, Possessions and Establishments which are ceded by the preceding Articles shall be delivered up to the Officers of the respective Sovereigns on the 1st of March, 1825. The Fortifications shall remain in the state in which they shall be at the period of the notification of this Treaty in India; but no claim shall be made, on either side, for ordnance, or stores of any description, either left or removed by the ceding power, nor for any arrears of revenue, or any charge of administration whatever.

* * *

ARTICLE XV

The High Contracting Parties agree that none of the Territories or Establishments mentioned in Articles VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII shall be, at any time, transferred to any other Power. In case of any of the said Possessions being abandoned by one of the present Contracting Parties, the right of occupation thereof shall immediately pass to the other.

V The British Policy of 'Non-Intervention' in the Malay States, 1786-1867

The following reading is taken from L.A. Mills, 'British Malaya 1824-67'. [*JMBRAS*, xxxiii, 3, 1960, 203-10. This was edited for reprinting, from the original 1925 edition, by Constance M. Turnbull.]

DURING the eighty-one years that the Straits Settlements were under the control of India, the Government wherever possible followed a policy of strict non-intervention in the affairs of the Malay States. Not only was the increase of British territory forbidden, but all attempts to form political treaties were regarded with strong disapproval. It was feared that alliances might finally compel the Company to intervene in the affairs of the native states, and that it would become involved in the constant wars which by 1874 had brought nearly every state of the Peninsula to a condition of anarchy. India

was also afraid that alliances with the Malay Sultans might lead to war with Siam. British relations with the Peninsula were almost entirely commercial. On the few occasions in which intervention occurred it was due either to treaty obligations, or to attacks on British interests so flagrant that they could not be permitted.

The reason for the Company's policy was that its interests in Malaya were purely commercial. The Straits Settlements were regarded, not as the nucleus of a Malayan Empire, but solely as trading centres; and the Directors were more than content that their territorial responsibilities were practically limited to the land upon which the towns were built. This attitude was much strengthened by the Company's loss of its monopoly of the China trade in 1833. Hitherto the Straits Settlements had been valuable to it as depots where the products of the Archipelago were collected for transmission to the Company's factories in Canton. Henceforth they ceased to be a source of direct profit, and were maintained by the Company at considerable annual loss, for the benefit of British trade. The Indian Government derived no benefit from them except indirectly, through the increase of Indian trade with the Straits Settlements.

During the whole period between 1786 and 1867 the Malay States of the Peninsula were hard at work committing political "hara-kiri." The process had begun at a much earlier date; but during the nineteenth century it became greatly accelerated. There were constant wars between the different Sultans, and the states were also weakened by frequent civil wars between rival claimants to the throne. The power of the Sultans decayed, till even petty rajas were able to set themselves up as independent local rulers, free to plunder and fight pretty much at will. Piracy flourished, and trade declined. In many ways the condition of the Peninsula was very much like that of England during the reign of Stephen. In the Malay States, as in mediaeval England, the organization of society was feudal, the relation of the Malay rajas towards their Sultan strongly resembling that of the Norman barons towards the king. With the breakdown of the central government, the vassals seized the opportunity to establish themselves in a position of local independence at the expense of their weaker neighbours and the peasantry. No man's life and property were safe unless he were strong enough to defend them. . . . Throughout the Peninsula, from Siam on the north to the Straits Settlements on the south, there was only one state where anarchy was not the order of the day. In Johore peace was maintained owing to the scantiness of the population and the British control over the Sultan and Temenggong. The other states were torn asunder by the convulsions of a dying feudalism.

From 1844 onwards the Singapore newspapers frequently referred to the decay of the Malay States, and gave vivid pictures of the state

of anarchy and semi-barbarism into which they were sinking. Their testimony perhaps may be somewhat suspect, since they advocated the development of British trade with the Peninsula, either by annexing the Malay states, or else by governing them by means of advice tendered to the Sultans—an interesting forecast of the Residential System which developed after 1874. The despatches of the Straits Government frequently contained similar descriptions. In 1841 for example Governor [S. G.] Bonham reported to the Government of Bengal that "the Malay States on the Peninsula . . . from some cause or other appear to be crumbling away into entire insignificance." . . . In 1849 Governor [W. J.] Butterworth submitted a long report to Bengal which showed how completely the Negri Sembilan was given over to anarchy and misrule as the result of constant wars.

The Company's policy of non-intervention dated from the earliest years of British rule in the Straits. It will be remembered that Captain Light was strictly forbidden to involve the Company in the affairs of the native states, and was for this reason forbidden to assist Kedah against Siam. The appeals of Perak and Trengganu for defensive alliances were likewise rejected. Although the aggressive designs of Siam finally compelled the Company to intervene in order to safeguard British trade, it did so with extreme reluctance, and took great care to safeguard itself from any obligation to defend the Malay states against Siam. The severe censures passed upon Captain [J.] Low for his treaty with Perak in 1826, and indeed the whole history of Anglo-Siamese relations in the Malay Peninsula are convincing proofs that the policy of non-intervention was followed wherever possible.

During the 30 years which followed the Burney Treaty the same principle was adhered to. In 1832 for example a treaty was made with Rembau by which the Company voluntarily renounced all the rights inherited from the Dutch to a monopoly of the tin and to suzerainty. The same year the Government of Bengal sent the following instructions to Governor [R.] Ibbetson regarding the Naning War which was then in progress:—"It cannot be too strongly impressed on your mind that extension of territory at Malacca is no point of our policy, and that such an extension as might tend to involve us in further contests is greatly to be deprecated." A still more striking instance occurred in 1833 when the boundary between Malacca Territory and the tiny state of Johol (in the Negri Sembilan) was being delimited. Between the two lay a debatable land which had formerly been claimed by both. It contained rich mines of tin and gold, including Mount Ophir, famous for its veins of gold. Governor Ibbetson regarded the frontier delimitation as an excellent opportunity for showing "that accessions of territory and encroachments upon their rights is the furthest from our views and intentions." Although the chief of Johol had made no

demand for this territory—indeed he appears to have offered to resign it to the Company—the Governor with the approval of the Bengal Government resigned any claims the British might have to it, and included it within the area of Johol. During the same year the Linggi War broke out. Saiyid Shaaban, Yamtuan Muda of Rembau, wished to conquer Inche Katas the petty chief of Linggi, near Malacca territory, who controlled important tin-mines. Some of the Chinese merchants of Malacca were interested in these mines, and their trade suffered greatly because of the war, and because Shaaban levied a heavy duty on tin coming down the Linggi River. Ibbetson refused to interfere, in spite of the loud outcry of the Chinese, whose complaints were echoed by the Singapore press. He reported the case to Calcutta, and the Government entirely agreed with him that it was quite impossible to intervene in a quarrel between two independent chiefs, even though British merchants suffered severely from its effects. Saiyid Shaaban was defeated, and he and his father-in-law Raja Ali, the ruler of Rembau, were in 1835 forced to seek refuge in Malacca. They were given shelter, but when they asked for British aid to reinstate them it was refused, although their alliance had been of great assistance in the Naning War. There was no breach of faith, because the British treaty made with them in 1832 did not require the Company to assist them. Since treaty obligations were not involved, Governor Ibbetson felt himself bound by the Bengal Government's orders not to interfere unless to do so meant a breach of treaty engagements. The Supreme Government approved of his action, and directed that no assistance whatever was to be given the exiles, since if granted it was almost certain to involve the Company in future entanglements. For many years Saiyid Shaaban lived in Malacca on a pension from the Company, until 1847 when a faction in Rembau invited him to resume his former position. Governor Butterworth allowed Shaaban to accept, but told him that by so doing he would forfeit his pension, and compel the Straits Government to inform all the adjacent states that his attempt was not made with British support. The Company could not permit the neighbouring Sultans to think that it was trying to interfere in the affairs of a native state, even in the interests of a man who had rendered such great services as Syed Shaaban. The Governor's attitude received the approval of the Supreme Government.

Two years later, in 1849, Governor Butterworth submitted a long report on the anarchy and misrule which were rampant in the Negri Sembilan. The country was ravaged by constant wars, the ruling chieftains were penniless and powerless, and the states were given over to the struggles of "a number of needy, desperate, petty chieftains," who claimed complete independence. They were imposing many illegal exactions on British trade, and the Governor's ire was especially roused by the impudence of a freebooting raja who had

built a stockade at Sempang, on the Linggi river, bordering on Malacca territory. He was a mere robber and pirate, and was able to maintain himself at Sempang solely because his nominal suzerain was too weak to expel him. Like a mediaeval robber baron, he had established himself on a river which was the sole water route to Sungei Ujong, from which Malacca drew much of its supply of tin; and he levied toll on all traders who passed. The British merchants were loud in their complaints. The Governor had seen the stockade, and pronounced it to be a ramshackle affair of palm-logs which a few round shot would knock into a heap of ruins. Yet his hands were tied by the policy of non-intervention. Since the Sultan was powerless [E. A.] Blundell, the Resident Councillor at Malacca, urged that the Straits Government should try to end the ceaseless wars by offering to mediate between the Malacca chieftains. Butterworth asked the Bengal Government to sanction this suggestion, but frankly admitted that he was very sceptical of its utility. When the Straits administration was forbidden to use the threat of force, how would it be expected, he plaintively asked, that "we can exert effectually over the barbarous rule of a number of needy, desperate, petty chieftains an influence unbounded, but altogether dissociated with fear or dread?" Personally, he was a believer in the efficacy of action rather than moral suasion, and he asked that if Lebai Kulup, the robber baron of Sempang, declined to mend his ways, the Straits Government might be authorized to expel him by force. The Supreme Government refused to sanction Butterworth's request, and declared that it was opposed to any attempts to gain wide influence in the Negri Sembilan. British interference was to be confined "within very narrow limits," and no proceedings likely to lead to war with a Malay state were to be undertaken without the previous consent of India.

In 1853 the Sultan of Perak was dethroned by a rival. Both invoked British aid, and the request was referred to India. The Supreme Government forbade intervention since the Sultan's fall was the result of his vices and his incapacity to govern, and Low's Treaty of 1826 contained no provision binding the Company to interfere in such a case. The Straits Government was empowered to offer its mediation, but it was warned to be most careful not to commit the Company to support either faction. Butterworth accordingly proffered his services as mediator. They were refused, and in 1854 Perak was still in a state of anarchy as a result of the war. The Governor decided not to renew his offer, but to wait until the Malays asked him to settle the quarrel, because he was "perfectly convinced" of the inexpediency of taking an active part in the internal affairs of the Malay states except when it was absolutely unavoidable. The Supreme Government in its reply commended the soundness of his views on Malay policy.

Although as a rule, the East India Company adhered strictly to a

policy of non-intervention, cases occasionally arose when interference was unavoidable. The reasons which were held to justify this course were the invasion of British territory, the ill-treatment of British subjects, and treaty obligations. In 1826 for example the Temenggong or chief of Muar (a small dependency of Johore on the border of Malacca) occupied some ninety square miles of Malacca Territory on the River Kesang, adjoining Muar. He claimed it as rightfully part of his own state; but the Government after careful inquiry decided that it belonged to the Company. Lengthy negotiations followed, but every attempt to persuade the chieftain to evacuate the territory failed. A company of sepoy was accordingly moved against him, and the raja was given the alternatives of voluntary retirement or expulsion. He chose the former and the incident was closed.

Interference to obtain redress for injuries inflicted on British subjects generally occurred when pirates were given shelter by native rulers. The imposition of illegal exactions upon British merchants (usually it would seem, Chinese), occasionally brought about the Government's interference. In 1860 for instance Governor [Orfeur] Cavenagh made successful representations to the states of Rembau and Sungei Ujong to secure the removal of illegal exactions which were inflicting losses upon Malacca's trade. In 1862 a somewhat similar incident occurred in the Larut district of Perak. This proved to be the beginning of the disturbances which twelve years later brought about permanent British intervention in that state. On this occasion, to collect the sums awarded to Chinese merchants who were British subjects as redress for their losses, Cavenagh was compelled to blockade the Larut River until the amounts were paid. In the same year occurred the bombardment of Trengganu. The motives were partly to protect British trade, but in the main to checkmate Siamese aggression. About the same time Governor Cavenagh found it necessary to take the Temenggong of Johore and his son Abubakar to task for punishing natives who were British subjects according to Malayan law. He told them that he "could not permit British subjects to be at the mercy of the caprice of any native chief," since "there was no regularity or certainty about judicial proceedings in Johore." Abubakar showed a strong desire to comply with the Governor's orders: he released his prisoners and promised to draw up a code of laws which he would submit to Cavenagh's inspection. Colonel Cavenagh's Malayan policy however cannot be regarded as typical of that pursued before 1867. He was much more inclined than any of his predecessors except [Robert] Fullerton to take strong measures for the protection of British trade or checking Siamese aggression. In many ways the Colonel's vigorous policy was more nearly allied to that adopted after 1873 under Sir Andrew Clarke than to the traditional policy of non-intervention.

VI *Conditions in the East Coast States of Malaya in 1838*

The following readings (a) (b) and (c) give a vivid account of conditions in the east coast states of Pahang, Trengganu and Kelantan during the late 1830's as seen through the eyes of a Malay, Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, who was born in Malacca in 1797 and lived throughout his life in the British settlements in the Straits of Malacca. His *Autobiography* (*Hikayat Abdullah*), written between 1840 and 1846, is one of the classics of modern Malay literature.¹ The readings are taken from *The Story of the Voyage of Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir*, Munshi, (*Kisah Pelayaran Abdullah*). [Translated by A. E. Coope, Singapore, 1949, 7-10, 15-21, 26-7, 44-5, 67-8.]

a. *Pahang*

WE sailed up-stream for about an hour and a half and reached Kampong China, where I saw hundreds of Malays and Chinese waiting on the shore with spears and other weapons.

We . . . went ashore and they asked us where we came from, and I told them that we came from Singapore and were taking letters to Kelantan. Then Raja Siak and Raja Tanjong came with hundreds of people and asked what was the news from Singapore and what was the price of merchandise. I gave them what news I had and then inquired where the Bendahara was.

They replied that the Bendahara had gone up-river to the Jelai gold-mines with the head of the Chinese community. That is a fifteen days journey by river. He added that all the way up there were houses on the river front and told me that there were man-eating crocodiles in the river.

I saw that the country of Pahang looked like an orchard; there were no market-places or shopping centres; nor were there any regular paths, except in Kampong China where there was a practicable path about 100 yards long. I was sorry to see how neglected and overgrown the country was owing to the laziness and slackness of the people. But anything you sow or plant will grow, and all the trees looked fruitful.

As for the people, as far as I could see, not one in ten did any work; the majority of them loafed about all day in poverty and vice. And each man carried four or five kinds of weapons and never parted from them.

There were some who liked to make themselves smart and wore

¹ 'The Hikayat Abdullah': An Annotated Translation by A. H. Hill. *JMBRAS*, xxviii, 3, 1955, whole number.

fine jackets and trousers, but they didn't earn their living by work.

When the people saw our party, they came flocking to look at us as if we were some marvel never seen before.

Many of them were thin and pale—obvious opium-smokers.

The people's houses were all made of thatch; some were large, some small, all of them on dry land. The surroundings of the houses were thick with undergrowth, and they were sited higgledy-piggledy, some in the jungle, some on the shore. Some of the compounds were fenced, some not; each man followed his own fancy. There were clusters of houses at intervals all along the river-front.

Under the houses was a lot of filth; each house had under it a puddle and piles of rubbish; when one entered a house, the stink seemed to fill one's nose. Some people just let the undergrowth grow. Some lit smudges every day under the house to smoke out mosquitoes; if one went into these houses, one at once had a choking feeling and one's eyes watered and smarted.

As for people's clothes, they were so black that the pattern on them was invisible.

As regards cultivation, I observed that it consisted chiefly of coconut and betelnut trees. But when I was there, eight coconuts cost a dollar.

They planted a few vegetables too e.g. aroids, tubers, sweet potatoes, sugar-cane and bananas; but all these came from up-river.

Their chief source of livelihood consisted of buffaloes and goats, but they kept a certain amount of cattle and poultry too.

All along the river and among the homesteads, the commonest bird was the crow; the reason for their numbers lies in the fact that they are scavengers and ate the fish-refuse and dead things.

The principal exports of Pahang are gold and tin. There is also a little silk-weaving, and some kemuning wood, resin and rattans are exported.

The principal imports are opium, silk, salt and rice, and there is some traffic in cloth from Europe, but not much.

I inquired where they got the gold, and was told that it was at a place called Jelai, fifteen days journey upstream; they said that there were numerous cuttings. They also said that the place was very populous, there being tens of thousands of Chinese and Malays there, and that that was the place for trade.

I was also told that there were many Jakun aborigines in the upper waters of the River Pahang; they gathered and sold forest produce such as eagle-wood, benzoin, resin and rattans; and many of them worked with the Malays in the gold-mines. Most of these aborigines, I was told, had plantations of their own and brought in all kinds of fruit which they exchanged with the merchants for tobacco and salt.

The upper reaches of the River Pahang extend as far as the territory of Malacca.

Food in Pahang presents a great difficulty; a foreigner finds it hard to buy any at all, and what there is is very expensive owing to the lack of markets and shops. But the people of the country say that they feel no hardship on this account, being accustomed to it.

There is one custom in Pahang which is productive of great hardship in my opinion. The currency consists of tin tokens, called "tampang", sixteen of which are valued at \$1. But there is no small change, so that, if a man wants to buy a small article, he has to give a tampang just the same.

I asked Raja Sulaiman, son of the Bendahara, whether the currency system could not be altered and he laughed: "My father has often tried to change it", he said, "but each time the tigers and crocodiles turned to man-eating! So it was decided to make no change, as this system of currency has existed ever since Pahang began".

I smiled and said no more. But I did not believe this story.

As regards the Chinese community, I found that all the Chinese in Kampong China were Khehs. Their houses were all thatched, and each man kept some goods, such as foodstuffs, cloth etc. in his house, and buyers inquired for what they wanted. All of them had married Balinese or Malay women. I noticed that their children preferred to speak Chinese rather than Malay. The Chinese had a small house, also thatched in which they kept their idols.

There are many Arab "Said" and "Shaikhs" there. Now Said is descended from the Prophets of God, and all their descendants are called Said too.

And Shaikhs are descended from the companions of the Prophet of God, and their descendants similarly are called Shaikh.

All of them are revered by the Malays, who observe the same etiquette in dealing with them as with Rajas. When they speak to them, they first crouch down and salute them addressing them as "Highness" and referring to themselves as "Your Highness' servant".

These Arabs are all merchants. Most of them are rich and their houses are much finer than those of the Malays, and their demeanour is that of Rajas. But their houses are thatched like those of the Malays. Their quarter is separate from that of the Malays; it is on the shore opposite Kampong China. In the Arab quarter is a mosque, hard by the dwelling of the Bendahara; it is thatched, but its walls are partly plank. It is in that mosque that the Bendahara and Malays worship on Friday.

There are no real Schools, though among ten or twelve households there will be one or two boys studying the Koran, not Malay. That is the way in Malay countries everywhere—they don't study their own language, they start when small to study the Koran and they

don't understand it; not one in a thousand really understands the Koran. . . .

As we sailed I pondered again on the condition of Pahang. Why, I asked myself had a State once famous among the nations sunk to such a level of poverty and desolation? There was no obvious reason why it should have degenerated, seeing that it had not been plundered by enemies or conquered by another country.

In my opinion, this fall was not due to pirates, for I have never heard of any great country losing its trade and wealth on account of pirates. And it was not due to poverty of soil, for the soil of Pahang is very fertile.

Nor was it due merely to the laziness of the inhabitants, for there has never yet been a country anywhere in the world in which all the inhabitants were lazy; if any man who is willing to exert himself to seek fortune, knows that his enjoyment of such fortune will be undisturbed, then even if only half the population do work for their living with energy and loyalty, their country cannot fail to become great and prosperous.

No, in my opinion, the reason for the poverty of Pahang is to be found in the fact that its inhabitants live in continual fear of the oppression and cruelty of the Rajas and other notables. Naturally they feel that it is useless to be energetic when it is certain that any profits they make will be grabbed by those higher up. And so they remain poor and miserable all their lives.

Thus I made up my mind, that the reason why the people of that country could not attain peace and comfort was the badness of its government. And all the evils from which they suffered were due to the wickedness and stupidity of the Rajas. I can think of no other reason.

I reflected on the difference between the condition of the people of Pahang and of us who live in serenity under English rule. We are as good as Rajas; no one fears another and no one can oppress another. And the reason is that the administration in all its actions has one essential aim—the happiness of the people.

b. *Trengganu*

WE entered the River Trengganu at 7 o'clock and all went ashore to see the Customs officials.

The estuary of the River Trengganu is of impressive appearance; the river is large and its water fresh. From the sea one can see nothing but coconut trees and white sandy beaches.

We went ashore and I saw a small hut, made entirely of thatch, walls and all. In it was a sort of little office made of bamboo. This is where the Customs officers wait to inspect incoming boats.

When we reached the hut, hundreds of people crowded round; all were armed and their javelins bristled like the stakes of a fish-trap.

The Customs officers asked us where we came from and what was our destination.

I told them that we came from Singapore and were going to Kelantan with letters from Mr. Bonham.

"It's very difficult," they said, "to enter Kelantan at present as there is a big war going on; some people who came from Kelantan yesterday told us that two or three hundred people had been killed."

I questioned the Head of the Customs. "Sir, what are the regulations and prohibitions in force here? We are new-comers and want to go to the market to get provisions and we don't know the local code."

"There is no market at this time of day", he said. "The market is held only in the evening. As regards the laws of the country, you must not keep an umbrella up when passing the house of a Raja. And you must not wear shoes or yellow clothes or fine muslin. All these are absolutely forbidden." When I heard this, I smiled inwardly.

What stupid and pointless regulations! What piffling things were forbidden as criminal! Why didn't they forbid birds to fly over the palace? Why didn't they forbid mosquitoes to bite the Raja and bugs to hide in his pillow? Why didn't they forbid elephants to trumpet in front of the palace and people to have cock-fights in front of it? All such things are on a par with the things which are prohibited—mole-hills made into mountains! . . .

After seeing the Customs officers, I went along a path leading to the market. The path was less than six feet wide and zig-zagged; in some places one had to walk through swampy ground, in others there was something that served as a bridge; in some places there was filth, in others undergrowth and trees. The windings of the path reminded one of the wriggling of a wounded snake.

The houses were scattered about without order or arrangement; each man had built as he pleased, and the fences of the compounds were not aligned. The houses were high and thatched, the surroundings were filthy, and under the houses was rubbish and also stagnant water. Most of the houses had piles of coconut husk under them; they used to light it at night to smoke out mosquitoes. All round the houses were coconuts. In each cluster of houses was a chapel, also thatched.

The houses had no regular frontage; some had their backs to the path, some their fronts, some were built on a line with it; in some places the path between the houses was so narrow that one could only just squeeze through.

As I walked I passed stalls at which were sold foodstuffs and cakes and pastry and banana-fry and boiled aroids and flat cakes and sugar-dumplings and potato-cakes and flour cakes; all the sellers were women.

I saw five elephants chained by the feet; they belonged to the Raja....

I walked until I reached the dwelling of the Ruler. It was a stone house of about 30 feet frontage, and was built in Chinese style. The walls of the house were covered with dirt, spittle, betel-juice and moss.

I saw another stone house in which merchandise was stored.

And there was another stone house belonging to a Chinese called Ah Cheng Koh, who had become a Mohammedan under the name of Inche Saleh; he was the richest man in Trengganu and was believed to be worth \$200,000 or \$300,000.

The Ruler of Trengganu had recently died, and was succeeded by his son, a boy of 15, called Sultan Muhammad ibni Sultan Mansur Shah. The behaviour of the present Ruler was worse than that of his predecessor, as he was uneducated and had not yet reached years of discretion.

I was told that the most common act of oppression by the previous Rajas was taking people's wives and daughters, especially those of the Chinese.

Then I reached the market, but found it deserted; there were huts and stands made of thatch on both sides of the path, but all were empty.

I asked someone where the market was, and he replied: "This is the market. Come when the sun is declining and you can get whatever you want".

As stated, the market is held only in the evening. And the sellers and hawkers of various kinds of food and clothing are all women. When the sun begins to decline, the women in the town and in the orchards and up-country come with baskets of food and clothing on their heads. They come to the market, sit and sell. And from then until sunset is the time for buying things in the market. And at sunset all go home, and the market is deserted until next evening.

The market is called Kampong Laut Market.

Vegetables and fish and all kinds of foodstuffs are cheap. Limes in their season are 200 for a dollar. And I noticed a great number of orange trees; there are five or six kinds of orange, each with its own price. Cattle, goats, sheep and poultry are all cheap; a goat costs \$1. Nevertheless, the people do not care for meat or suet, preferring fish and vegetables and evil-smelling things, such as pickled durians and fish-preserve and the beans of the petai and jering trees and such-like. And in the market I saw more vegetable-condiments than anything else.

The currency in Trengganu is a tin coin called "pitis", stamped "Lord of Justice"; 3840 pitis go to the dollar. In size the pitis is about the same as our cent.

Exports from Trengganu are gold and tin and coffee. About 1000 pikuls of coffee are exported yearly. And one or two thousand pikuls of black pepper are exported yearly and two or three thousand pikuls of dried betelnuts. There is also some export of silk and fine sarongs and cloth of silk mixed with cotton and silk trousers; also jackets, sashes and handkerchiefs of silk. Also exported are various types of weapons, such as krises, swords and spears. Also sugar, coconuts, suet, rattans, resin and so on.

Imports are opium, a kind of coarse linen, undyed cloth in 80 foot lengths, a little pink cloth and European chintz, European cotton cloth in red, white, blue and black, and undried betelnuts in small quantities.

There are few serfs or slaves in the country. But I think that the mass of the population live like serfs, because they stick to evil and foolish customs. And even if they wished to abandon such customs, they would not dare.

I walked on into the Chinese quarter. There I came to a plank bridge, six feet wide and ten or twelve yards long; there was a fenced embankment on the approach to the bridge. I came to a gate about six feet in width and entered. And I saw a number of little stone shops on both sides of the way, all of them Chinese. Grandpré and I went into the house of the Captain, as the aged head of the Chinese community was called. His house had a wall round it. We entered and I saw that the house was of stone and like a Chinese temple in style; there were a number of rooms opening out on both sides, and behind was a coconut grove.

The wife of the Captain came out. She was very old, probably 70 or 80; and she was blind. I sat down and gave them the news of Singapore.

The Captain had very fine manners and a charming voice. He did not lisp at all, as Chinese usually do, but spoke Malay like a Malay. After we had sat for a short time, he had tea and oranges brought out and invited us to take refreshment. All the ladies of the household came out to have a look at us.

In manners and clothing and speech and behaviour they seemed like a Malay family. All were extremely courteous.

The Captain urged us to sit for a while, promising to get us a young coconut, but I asked to be excused, explaining that we were about to sail and could not wait.

I respectfully made my farewells and before I left the Captain introduced two of his grandsons; he said that they often went to Singapore and that he hoped that I would keep an eye on them there.

The Chinese in Trengganu appeared to be all Hokkiens and Khehs, mixed together. And most of them speak Malay in preference to Chinese. But their children mostly prefer Chinese.

There are far more Chinese up-country than in the town of Kuala Trengganu.

I walked on along another path and found a mosque. It had a thatched roof and a stone floor and stone walls.

There are not many Arabs in the country—only two or three! I don't know why that is.

In Kuala Trengganu there is no place for anyone to study in Malay, though there are occasional places where six or seven youngsters can study the Koran.

Though the people speak Malay, their Malay differs from that of other Malays and sounds strange to the ear; their accent is like that of Kedah Malays. . . .

The people of the country appeared to be all poor and to spend their time in idleness. Everywhere were young Rajas and Rajas' Slaves.

The people's clothes were poor and dirty, and their persons were unclean. But every one carried four or five javelins and a kris and a cutlass. Their work consists of carrying weapons hither and thither! It is the women who sell in the market and act as hawkers and do all the work necessary for the earning of a living. But the men are drones; they eat and sleep and repair their weapons—that is all they do.

Yet I could see that their country was exceptionally well-suited for agriculture and cattle-raising; a splendid country in which to earn your living. If there were as good a soil in another country, everyone would become rich and there would be no more poverty.

Now, all the evils which I have mentioned are due to the oppression of the Rajas and the badness of their rule.

The common people are in a dilemma. Their point of view is that it is better to stay poor and avoid trouble, living from hand to mouth; for if a man does acquire property or a fine house or a plantation or estate of any size, a Raja is sure to find some way or other to get hold of it; or he may demand a loan or a gift. And, if the man refuses, the Raja confiscates his property; if he resists, he and his whole family are killed; fines are also levied. So Trengganu remains thinly populated, and foreigners are afraid to live there, and there are no merchants; for news of the state of affairs in Trengganu gets noised abroad in other countries.

c. Kelantan

I observed that the River Kelantan was extremely wide—two or three times as wide as the River Pahang and River Trengganu. Its water remains fresh until it reaches the sea. Shallows alternate with deep channels. . . .

The shore was thick with thousands of people, all armed; every man had six or seven javelins, a chopper or cutlass or sword, and a kris at his waist; some had guns—they bristled like the branches of a dead tree.

I noticed that among all those thousands of men there were none really fair-skinned; one or two were fairly light-brown, the rest quite black.

Adjoining the landing-place was a stretch of white sand about 100 yards wide, extending for 10 or 12 miles.

From the landing-place to the residence of Raja Bendahara is a distance of about a mile. Raja Temena sent some people to notify the Raja that the cutter with the letters had reached the landing-place; it was about three hours before they returned.

Meanwhile Said Abu, who lived on the other side of the river, came on board the cutter. He was a native of Pontianak who had settled in Trengganu. Then in view of the reverence in which he was held, the Raja of Kelantan invited him to Kelantan and appointed him as a religious teacher. He counted as a Raja.

When he came on board he greeted me in Arab fashion and I responded accordingly; he thought I was a Said.

"What is the news of Singapore, Lord Said?" he inquired. "And did you meet any pirates on the way? You were very daring, my Lord, to come in so small a boat; anyone here would rather be killed than make a voyage in so small a boat". . . .

The contrast between the ways of women and of men in Kelantan was most surprising.

All the people were of one type, neither fair nor very dark. Neither men nor women wore shoes; not even the Rajas did so.

There are no other races in Kelantan except Malays and never have been. The Rajas are of pure Malay descent too; they have no Arab blood in them.

They speak Malay, but their pronunciation is very ugly; they lisp as Tamils do when speaking Malay. Often they leave out a final 't' and add final 'g' and change 'a' to 'o'. But they do not make these changes when writing.

Exports from Kelantan are gold and coffee and rice in small quantities and silk sarongs and trousers; the silk is woven in the country after being imported in a raw state in English ships and Chinese junks. Goods are imported from Europe and from Madras and from China, but they come in slowly and in small quantities, because there are no big merchants in the country; for it is well-known in the outside world that a man with money and property is not safe in Malay territory, because he will be liable to oppression and false accusations. And that is why the country is poor and neglected. . . .

I observed in Kelantan an exceedingly large number of loose wo-

men. In the evening they came in droves to any place where foreign crafts were lying. They had their sarongs tied high above their breasts and wore no jackets; their hair was knotted up so as to stand out on each side of the head. They wore garlands of jasmine flowers hanging to their knees; many wore posies of jasmine, made up in various ways, some in patterns with acute angles, some with an open-work design; these posies were beautifully made, better than any that I had seen in Malacca or Singapore. There are pimps and ponces who come to all the boats and offer their services; in Kelantan that sort of business is not looked down on. And there are many cock-fighters, and gamblers, and opium-smokers too. But people who attend to their religious duty and observe the laws of God do not amount to two in a hundred. . . .

Well, I had never in all my life before visited the Malay States and seen their customs. And now I have seen them, and seen how they are governed.

And, even if it had meant my death, I would have been glad to see what I did with my own eyes, not merely listening bewildered like a duck in a thunderstorm.

And now I can compare the government of those countries with that of the English in Malacca where I was born; and the difference is as the distance between earth and sky.

VII *Economic Development in the British Straits Settlements during the early Nineteenth Century*

Abdullah was a noted Anglophil and a stern critic of the backwardness and arbitrary rule in the Malay states as compared with the position in the British Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. The following reading describes the economic development in these British possessions during the early decades of the nineteenth century. It affords some basis for assessing Abdullah's criticism. [Mills, 'British Malaya 1824-67,' *JMBRAS*, xxxiii, 3, 1960, 219-30.]

THE Straits Settlements throughout their history were the most important centre of British trade with Further Asia. No local manufactures of importance existed, with the exception of the sago and (for some time after 1867) the tapioca factories; and agriculture was always a minor, though not unimportant industry.

The Straits Settlements were essentially centres of exchange, and grew wealthy by their transit trade. Their prosperity was the result of two causes, their situation on the great trade route through the Straits of Malacca, and their system of free trade. The manufactures of Europe and India were brought to the Straits Settlements, and above all to Singapore, for transshipment to China, or for distribution throughout Indo-China and the East Indian islands. Conversely, they were the great depot where the products of Siam, the Malay Peninsula, and the Archipelago were collected, to be sent to Great Britain, India and China. The history of the Straits Settlements is in its essence the expansion of their commerce from Burma to Australia and from Java to China.

Agriculture before 1867 was of much less importance than it has since become through the formation of rubber plantations in the Peninsula. During the earlier period it was largely confined to the cultivation of spices and gambier, although there was a large amount of rice-farming in Province Wellesley [opposite Penang] and Malacca. There were also some sugar and coconut plantations. About 1803 the Directors hoped to make of Penang a second Moluccas, and so render themselves independent of the Spice Islands. For a few years the prospects were most encouraging. Pepper was the staple product, the average annual output until about 1810 being some 4,000,000 pounds while in quality it was superior to that of any other part of the East Indies. The price obtainable decreased however, and the industry was gradually abandoned. By 1835 the amount produced had sunk to about 266,600 pounds, and by 1847 the growth of pepper had become unimportant. The same lack of success attended the early attempts to grow cloves and nutmegs—principally, it would appear, because the planters were ignorant of the proper methods of cultivation. By 1818 the industry had in great measure been abandoned, and until about 1833 only a single planter, [David] Brown of Glugor, made any serious attempts to continue the cultivation. The refusal of the Company until 1841–45 to sell lands in perpetuity, or grant them on long leases, also hampered cultivation greatly. Spice cultivation required a heavy initial outlay, and since it was many years before the plants began to bear, capitalists were unwilling to spend large sums of money on lands which they could only obtain on short leases. By 1833 Brown's efforts were at last successful, and there was an immediate and marked increase in the number of plantations. By 1847 nutmegs and cloves had become the staple product of Penang. This continued until 1860 when a blight fell upon the spice plants. At this time half the island was covered with spice plantations: but in a few years the greater part of the trees were [*sic*] killed by disease.

The growth of sugar... in Province Wellesley... did not become important until 1846. The change was due to the reduction of the duty

on Penang sugar imported into England to the same amount as that levied on sugar grown in Bengal. The granting of land in perpetuity instead of on lease, referred to above, also fostered the growth of the industry. From this time the area under sugar cultivation steadily increased.

The history of spice cultivation at Malacca can be dismissed in a few words: there was none. The Malacca land question...strangled every attempt to foster agriculture. In spite of the excellence of the soil, Malacca did not even produce sufficient rice to feed its own population. It exported only a few coconuts and a little fruit.

In Singapore the cultivation of cloves, nutmegs and sugar was a complete failure, although for many years pepper and gambier yielded large returns. As early as 1824 Governor John Crawfurd, the encyclopaedic oracle on all matters Malayan, had predicted that this would be the case, since the soil, while well suited to the pepper plant, was unsuitable for the more valuable spices. His warnings were unheeded, and for over a generation much labour and money were wasted in the growth of cloves, nutmegs and sugar. Spice cultivation had been introduced by Raffles in 1819, and for about twenty-five years the prospects of success appeared hopeful. Until 1841-45 the Company's land laws hindered cultivation as at Penang; but even after they were amended the natural unsuitability of the soil was an obstacle which no legislation could overcome. By 1847 the growth of cloves and nutmegs had failed. The sugar plantations also were never of much importance.

Gambier and pepper however were for many years cultivated with much success. There were many large plantations which, as at Penang, were entirely owned and worked by Chinese. It may be questioned however whether they were not in the long run an evil. Their sole object being to make money as rapidly as possible, they made no attempt to manure the soil, and in a few years exhausted its richness. As soon as their plantations became unproductive they abandoned them, moved further into the jungle, and recommenced the same process. Large areas on the island thus relapsed into wilderness, and could never again be used without a heavy expenditure to restore the soil. By 1840 the natural richness of the island had already begun to wane, and the Chinese planters in growing numbers abandoned it for the neighbouring mainland of Johore, where they commenced the same method of agriculture. By 1860 only some 40 square miles out of an available area of about 225 were under cultivation, and the amount of pepper and gambier produced had greatly decreased.

The trade of Penang between 1786 and 1819 in the end proved as great a disappointment to the Directors as the cultivation of spices. After the British conquest of Malacca and other Dutch possessions in 1795, and above all when with the capture of Java in 1811 the empire

of Holland was annihilated, Penang had the most favourable of opportunities to show whether it could become as its panegyrists averred the trading centre of the Archipelago. In this it failed signally. From 1786 to 1810 indeed commerce increased rapidly; but from 1810 to 1821 it remained practically stationary. In 1821 the value of its trade was \$6,000,000, about one seventh of that of Singapore in 1854, thirty-five years after its foundation.

The reason for the Directors' disappointment was not far to seek. Penang lay on the western edge of the Eastern Archipelago, hundreds of miles from its centre. Moreover the Straits of Malacca swarmed with pirates, who did immense damage to the small and ill-armed praus (native craft). Furthermore Penang had two rivals whose position was much superior, Malacca... and Rhio, the great Bugis port near Singapore. The disadvantages more than counterbalanced the points in Penang's favour. These were the Malays' strong dislike of the Dutch and preference for the British, and the great attraction of the low customs duties at Penang as compared with the heavy dues levied at Dutch ports. The majority of the praus from the eastern part of the Archipelago stopped at Rhio or Malacca, and only a comparatively small number made the long and dangerous journey to Penang. Apart from them, and a small but flourishing trade with Siam and China, the bulk of Penang's commerce was with the countries in its immediate neighbourhood. These were Burma, the western coast of the Malay Peninsula, and above all Achin and the petty states of Northern Sumatra. In 1867 Northern Sumatra was still the most important market, British and Indian manufactures being exchanged for pepper. Northern Sumatra was in 1824 the most important pepper-producing country in the world, its output being about 58% of the total amount. Raffles saw the position clearly, and pointed out again and again that the position of Penang was an insuperable obstacle; the only way to obtain an important share of the trade of the East Indian Islands was to establish a post near the southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca.

The occupation of Singapore marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of British trade with the Archipelago. Although fluctuations inevitably occurred, from the date of its foundation there was on the whole a steady and phenomenal increase in the volume of commerce. The hostility of Holland, the partial closing of many markets, as for example in Indo-China owing to the French conquests, these and many other obstacles were powerless to impede its progress. The growth of Singapore's trade has few parallels in the history of commerce.

The secret of its prosperity lies primarily in its position. At the Southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca, the island was designed by nature to be the centre of trade for the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra,

and the islands to the eastwards. Within easy sail of Siam, Indo-China, and China, and lying on the shortest trade-route from Europe and India to the Far East, Singapore inevitably became the centre where the merchants of Europe and the Orient came to exchange their manufactures for the products of the Archipelago. Singapore's position by itself, however, would not have sufficed. Its trade would have been far smaller had it been burdened with the heavy dues and vexatious regulations which in 1819 were in force in every Dutch port. The Bugis of Celebes, the principal traders of the East Indian islands, would scarcely have sailed hundreds of miles out of their course for the privilege of paying heavy duties when so many Dutch ports lay at their very doors. Sir Stamford Raffles foresaw that a town where commerce was untaxed and harbour regulations were almost non-existent would prove an irresistible attraction. His policy was soon justified: merchants flocked to Singapore from every part of the Archipelago and the Far East, and every effort of the Dutch to prevent them proved unavailing. By 1824-25 the total value of the exports and imports had already risen to \$13,519,137, more than twice the trade of Penang, and eight times that of Malacca. The merchants of Singapore, Chinese as well as European, always regarded free trade as the palladium of their city, and firmly, and on the whole successfully, resisted the periodical attempts of the Company to tamper with it. To its continuance, and to their spirit of daring enterprise, they owed their continued prosperity.

Almost an immediate result of the foundation of Singapore was that the trade of Penang and Malacca began rapidly to decline. Writing in 1830 Governor Fullerton reported that Singapore had "annihilated" the declining trade of Malacca, and "bade fair to annihilate that of Penang also." While the Governor was unduly pessimistic, the annual trade-returns show that he had good cause for uneasiness.

* * *

The decline of Penang's commerce was the inevitable result of the superior situation of Singapore. An analysis of the trade returns shows that after 1822 Singapore had captured almost all of the older settlement's trade except with Northern Sumatra and the West coast of the Malay Peninsula—in short, the territory which lay much nearer to Penang than to Singapore. Even here the competition of Singapore was very keen. Penang also retained an important trade with China, apparently because the island served as a depot for the collection of pepper, tin, birds' nests, etc. from the adjacent countries, and it was found more convenient to ship the produce directly to China than to forward it to Singapore for transmission from there. But with these

exceptions the trade of Penang had almost ceased to exist. Over three-quarters of its commerce with Siam had passed into the hands of Singapore, and apart from an insignificant amount of trade with Java, Penang had lost almost the whole of its former commerce with the islands east of the Straits of Malacca....

The remedy proposed by the Penang Council to restore the trade of Penang was to destroy the freedom of trade at Singapore, by extending to it the customs duties levied at Penang. The Council also urged that the same course should be followed at Malacca, which had also been a free port since its transfer to the Company. The Directors consented, but the friends of Singapore in England brought up the matter in Parliament. The Cabinet not only forbade the imposition of customs duties, but also ordered the abolition of those at Penang. With much chagrin the Directors obeyed, and in 1827 Penang became a free port. Thus the unexpected result of the attempt to fetter the trade of Singapore was to establish free trade throughout the Straits Settlements.

If the effect of Singapore's competition on Penang was serious, upon Malacca it was disastrous. The town had already suffered severely from the occupation of Penang, which had deprived it of its trade to the westward. A second blow had been struck during the first British occupation, when a partially successful attempt was made to destroy the town and divert its trade to Penang. Furthermore the harbour of Malacca was rapidly silting up. The foundation of Singapore however was a far more serious blow than any of the foregoing. By its position 120 miles to the south east of Malacca the new settlement had exactly the same advantage over Malacca which that port had formerly held over Penang. Within a few years Malacca lost forever the whole of its commerce with the Archipelago and China. With rival ports on both sides, the trade of the ancient city became almost entirely confined to the neighbouring states of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra. Malacca also retained a small direct trade with India and China; but on the whole it became a mere depot where the produce of the adjacent countries was collected for transmission to Penang and above all Singapore.

Most of the trade returns for the early nineteenth century seem to have perished, but enough remain to show how complete was Malacca's downfall. In 1779 it was still very prosperous; but in 1826 its commerce had fallen to \$1,037,649, or about £200,000. In 1829 its trade reached its lowest point, with a total value of £133,067.... The city sank rapidly into a state of stagnation, a picturesque backwater to which the wealthy Chinese merchants of Singapore retired to spend their declining years.

The remarkable growth of trade in the Straits Settlements during the period 1825 to 1864 is shown by the following table.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Penang</i>	<i>Singapore</i>	<i>Malacca</i>	<i>Total</i>
1825	£1,114,614	£ 2,610,440	£318,426	£ 4,043,480
1830	£ 708,559	£ 3,948,784	£141,205	£ 4,798,548
1840	£1,475,759	£ 5,851,924	[No data]	£ 7,327,683
1850	£1,644,931	£ 5,637,287	£439,175	£ 7,721,393
1859	£3,530,000	£10,371,300	£920,000	£14,821,300
1864	£4,496,205	£13,252,175	£821,698	£18,570,080

* * *

Penang continued to be what it had already become by 1830, a local trading-centre where the produce of the adjacent countries was exchanged for the manufactures of Great Britain and India. Commerce with China recovered and became an important branch of the island's trade. The centre of the opium traffic had shifted to Singapore; but large quantities of silks and other goods from China were imported and exchanged for Straits produce. Straits produce was the trade term for the typical products of the East Indian islands and the Malay Peninsula, such as pepper and other spices, gambier, tin, camphor, beeswax, coffee, ebony, antimony from Borneo, tortoise-shell, beche-de-mer, birds' nests, rattans, gold-dust, pearls, sandal-wood. It is an interesting fact that an important part of the island's trade with China was composed of sea slugs, birds' nests, and similar delicacies. To some extent Penang was a commercial dependency of Singapore; a great part of its trade was not carried on directly, but through the medium of Singapore. Much of the Straits produce which it collected was not sent directly to Great Britain, India, and China, but was shipped to Singapore and forwarded from there. Similarly a great deal of the British and Indian manufactures which it required did not come to it by direct shipment, but was sent first to Singapore, and then transmitted to Penang.

* * *

From 1825 to 1867 Singapore was the centre of the British commerce with the East Indies, and, with Canton and Hongkong, the headquarters of the trade with China. The bulk of its import and export trade was with Great Britain and India, while the commerce with China was a good second. The principal imports from Britain were cotton and woollen cloths, "piece goods" as they were called, iron, and manufactured articles. From India came opium (one of the most important items of trade), Indian cloths, etc. Part of the imports from India and Great Britain were intended for the China trade. From Singapore they were either carried to their destination by European

vessels from India, "country ships" as they were called, or were sold to the Chinese junks which every year came to the port in large numbers. The goods from Great Britain and India which were intended for the trade with the Archipelago were sold at Singapore to the native merchants who carried them far and wide over the East Indian islands, and in return brought back Straits produce. Few European vessels engaged in trade in the Archipelago itself. The exports of Singapore consisted of imports from China, such as tea, silks and cassia, and Straits produce, collected from every part of the East Indian islands. Half to two-thirds were sent to Great Britain and India. The amount of trade with Continental Europe and the United States was small but increasing. The exports were the same as to Great Britain and India, while the imports were principally wines, piece goods, steel and iron.

Next to the commerce with Great Britain and India, and rivalling it in importance, came the trade with China. For a thousand years or more Chinese junks had made regular voyages to the East Indies, and they very quickly appreciated the importance of Singapore. The island rapidly became the greatest trading centre in the Archipelago, and by 1860 its commerce amounted to £10,371,300, while that of the whole Dutch East Indian Empire was only £14,300,000. . . .

In addition to the trade with China, the basis of Singapore's prosperity was its trade with the East Indian islands and the Malay Peninsula. . . . The Dutch hampered this trade so far as they were able, especially in Sumatra. . . . Even when Holland finally brought herself to sacrifice revenue and created free ports she was unable to do more than capture part of the trade of the islands near them. Rhio, the old Bugis trading-centre near Singapore, was made a free port in 1834, but the move was a complete failure. The harbour remained almost deserted, and what little trade the island possessed was mainly with Singapore. Macassar in Celebes, which was created a free port in 1847, diverted to itself a considerable amount of trade from the south-eastern part of the Archipelago, but this was more than atoned for by gains elsewhere. It may be observed in passing that the returns of trade with Borneo show a sudden and remarkably large increase after 1840, and thus bear eloquent testimony to the results of Rajah Brooke's work in Sarawak and against the Borneo pirates.

Chapter Six

BRITISH INTERVENTION IN SARAWAK AND WESTERN MALAYA

The process by which Great Britain acquired territorial responsibilities in many parts of the globe during the nineteenth century was complex and varied. This complexity and variety is well illustrated by the manner in which the territories of Malaysia gradually came under British rule. Strategic and commercial considerations dictated the settlement of Penang in 1786, the ensuring of adequate food supplies determined the cession of Province Wellesley in 1800, the long-felt desire to have an entrepôt and port-of-call in South-East Asia resulted in the founding of Singapore in 1819, and the fear of foreign intervention, made real by disorders in Perak and Selangor, led to the appointment of British Residents in some of the western states of Malaya in 1874.

The rôle of an individual who pressed a somewhat reluctant superior authority forward is evident in all these instances. Francis Light provided the inspiration for the Penang settlement and Stamford Raffles founded Singapore despite strong official opposition. In 1874 the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Andrew Clarke, somewhat exceeded his instructions in appointing British Residents to Sungei Ujong, Selangor and Perak. But in all of these cases, individual action was only the logical outcome of trends of policy which had made initiative possible. In Borneo there was a difference. There Great Britain owed her position to the work not of an official of the East India Company or of the Colonial Office but to a private individual—Sir James Brooke.

It is, of course, true that Great Britain had shown interest in northern Borneo in the 1760's and 1770's (see reading I in Chapter Five, pages 119–23), but after the failure of the Balambangan venture in 1775, and its attempted revival in 1803, official concern for the island

was limited, despite Raffles' efforts during the period 1811-16, when he was Lieutenant-Governor of Java and its dependencies, to establish trading stations in Brunei, Pontianak and Sambas through agreements with the local rulers. When, in December 1838, James Brooke left England in his ship to engage in trading ventures in Marudu Bay in northern Borneo, he sailed as a private individual without official backing. Within four years he had been created Rajah of Sarawak by the Sultan of Brunei, Omar Ali Saifuddin.

I *The Chinese Revolt in Sarawak in 1857*

During the 1840's Brooke was consolidating his rule in Sarawak. The opposition of Brunei Malays, Dayaks, and Chinese was quickly and effectively suppressed and by the 1850's Sarawak began to prosper. And then, on the night of 18th February 1857, the Chinese gold miners of Upper Sarawak, who had long opposed the taxes and regulation of their societies by the new regime, attacked Kuching and the Raja's *Astana*. Brooke just managed to escape, but the town was destroyed. The following reading is taken from Sir Spenser St. John's book, *Rajah Brooke*. [London, 1899, 148-57, 159-60, 163.]

SHORTLY after midnight the squadron of Chinese barges pulled silently through the capital, and dividing into two bodies, the smaller entered a creek, called Sungei Bedil, just above the Rajah's house, while the larger party continued its course to the landing-place of the fort, and sent out strong detachments to surprise the houses of Mr. [A.] Crookshank, the magistrate, and Mr. [P.] Middleton, the head constable, and a large force was told off to attack the stockades. Unaccountable as it may appear, none of these parties were noticed, so profound was the security felt; and everyone slept.

The Government House was situated on a little grassy hill, surrounded by small, neat cottages, in which visitors from the out-stations were lodged. The Chinese, landing on the banks of the Bedil stream, marched to the attack in a body of about a hundred, and passing by an upper cottage, made an assault on the front and back of the long Government House, the sole inhabitants of which were the Rajah and an English servant. . . .

Roused from his slumbers by the unusual sounds of shouts and yells at midnight, the Rajah looked out through the Venetian blinds, and immediately conjectured what had occurred. Several times he raised his revolver to fire at them, but convinced that he could not defend the house alone he determined to effect his escape. He supposed that men engaged in so desperate an enterprise would naturally take every pre-

caution to ensure its success, and concluded that bodies of insurgents were silently watching the ends of the house; so, summoning his English servant, he led the way down to a bath-room on the ground floor which communicated with the lawn, and telling him to open the door quickly and follow close, the Rajah sprang forth, with sword drawn and revolver cocked, but found the coast clear. Had there been twenty Chinese there, he would have passed through them, as his quickness and practical skill in the use of weapons were unsurpassed. Reaching the banks of the stream above his house he paused, observing that it was full of Chinese boats; but presently, hearing his alarmed servant, who had lost him in the darkness, calling to him, he knew that the attention of the Chinese would be attracted that way, and dived under the bows of one of the barges and swam to the opposite shore unperceived. As he was then suffering from an attack of fever and ague, he fell utterly exhausted, and lay for some time on the muddy bank till, slightly recovering, he was able to reach the Government writer's house.

An amiable and promising young officer, Mr. [H.] Nicoletts, who had but just arrived from an out-station on a visit to the Rajah, was lodged in a cottage near; startled by the sound of the attack, he rushed forth to reach the chief's house, but was intercepted and killed by the Chinese, who severed his head from his body, and bore it on a pike in triumph as that of the Rajah. Mr. [H.] Steel, the Resident on the Rejang, and an experienced officer, quietly looked through the window of his cottage, and seeing what was passing, slipped out of the house, and soon found himself sheltered by the jungle...

The other attacks took place simultaneously. Mr. and Mrs. Crookshank, rushing forth on hearing this midnight alarm, were cut down, the latter left for dead, the former seriously wounded. The constable's house was attacked; he and his wife escaped, but their two children and an English lodger were killed by the insurgents.

Here occurred a scene which showed how cruel were these Chinese. When the rebels burst into Mr. Middleton's house he fled, and his wife, following, found herself in the bath-room, and by the shouts was soon convinced that her retreat had been cut off. In the meantime the Chinese had seized her two children, and brought the eldest down into the bath-room to show them the way by which the father had escaped. Mrs. Middleton's sole refuge was a large water jar, which happened to be full, and she only raised her mouth above water to draw breath; there she heard the poor little boy questioned, pleading for his life, and heard his shriek, when the fatal sword was raised which severed his head from his body. With loud laughter these fiends kicked the little head from one to the other, and then rushed out in pursuit of Mr. Middleton. Fortunately the bath-room was in darkness, so the mother escaped unseen. The Chinese then set fire to the house, and

she distinctly heard the shrieks of her second child as they tossed him into the flames. Mrs. Middleton remained in the jar till the falling embers forced her to leave it. She ran to a neighbouring pond and, fortunately, was thus sheltered from the savages who were rushing round the burning dwelling. Her escape was indeed extraordinary.

The stockades, however, were not surprised. The Chinese, waiting for the signal which was to be the attack on the houses, were at length perceived by a sentinel, and he immediately roused the Treasurer, Mr. [Charles] Crymble, who resided in the stockade which contained the arsenal and the prison. He endeavoured to make some preparation for defence, although he had but four Malays with him. He had scarcely time, however, to load a six-pounder field-piece, and get his own rifle ready, before the Chinese, with loud shouts, rushed to the assault. They were led by a man who bore in either hand a flaming torch. Mr. Crymble waited until they were within forty yards; he then fired and killed the man who, by the lights he bore, made himself conspicuous, and before the crowd recovered from the confusion in which they were thrown by the fall of their leader, discharged among them the six-pounder loaded with grape, which made the assailants retire behind the neighbouring houses or hide in the outer ditches. But with four men little could be done; and some of the rebels, having crossed the inner ditch, began to remove the planks which constituted the sole defence. To add to the garrison's difficulties, they threw over into the inner court little iron tripods, with flaming torches attached, which rendered it as light as day, whilst they remained shrouded in darkness.

To increase the number of defenders Mr. Crymble released the sole occupants of the prison—a fraudulent debtor and a Malay madman who had killed his wife in a fit of fury. The former quickly disappeared, whilst the latter, regardless of the shot flying around, stood to the post assigned him, opposite a plank the Chinese were trying to remove. He had orders to fire as soon as the first assailant appeared, and when the plank gave way and a man attempted to force his body through, he pulled the trigger of his carbine, without lowering the muzzle, and sent the ball through his own brains. Mr. Crymble now found it useless to prolong the struggle. One of his four men was killed, and another, a brave Malay corporal, was shot down at his side. The wounded man begged Mr. Crymble to fly and leave him to his fate, but asked him to shake hands with him first and tell him whether he had not done his duty. The brave Irishman seized him by the arm and endeavoured to drag him up the stairs leading to the dwelling over the gate; but the Chinese had already gained the courtyard, and pursuing them, drove their spears through the wounded man. Mr. Crymble was forced to let go his hold, and with a brave follower, Daud, swung himself down into the ditch below. Some of the rebels outside the fort, seeing their attempted escape, tried to stop

the Treasurer, and a man stabbed at him, but the spear only glanced on his thick frieze coat, and the Chinese received in return a cut across the face from the Irishman's cutlass which was a remembrance to carry to the grave.

The other stockade, though it had but a corporal's watch of three Malays, did not surrender; but finding that every other place was in the hands of the Chinese, the brave defenders opened the gate, and, charging the crowd of rebels, sword in hand, made good their escape, though all were severely wounded.

The confusion which reigned throughout the rest of the town may be imagined, as, startled by the shouts and yells of the Chinese, the inhabitants rushed to the doors and windows and beheld night turned into day by the bright flames which rose in three directions—where the Rajah's, Crookshank's and Middleton's large houses were all burning at the same time.

It was at first very naturally thought that the Chinese contemplated a massacre of the Europeans, but messengers were soon despatched to them by the Kungsi to say that nothing was further from their intention than to interfere with those who were unconnected with the Government. . . .

The Rajah had, as soon as possible, proceeded to the Datu Bandhar's house, and being quickly joined by his English officers, endeavoured to organise a force with which to surprise the victorious Chinese; but it was impossible. No sooner did he collect a few men than their wives and children surrounded them and refused to be left behind; and being without proper arms and ammunition, it was but a panic-stricken mob. So he instantly took his determination, with that decision which had been the foundation of his success, and, giving up the idea of an immediate attack, advised the removal of the women to the left-hand bank of the river, where they would be safe from a land attack of the Chinese, who could make their way along the right-hand bank of the river by a road which ran at the back of the town.

This removal was accomplished by the morning. . . . At the mouth of the Siol the Rajah found the war boat of Abang Buyong, with sixty men, waiting for him, which was soon joined by six others and many canoes, for no sooner did the Malays of the neighbouring villages hear where the Rajah was than they began flocking to him. . . .

When morning broke in Kuching, there was a scene of the wildest confusion. The six hundred rebels, joined by the Chinese vagabonds of the town, half-stupefied by opium, were wandering about in every direction, discharging their muskets loaded with ball cartridges. But at eight o'clock the chiefs of the Gold Company sent a message to the Bishop of Sarawak, requesting him to come down and attend the wounded. He did so, and found thirty-two stretched out, most of them from shot wounds; but among them he noticed a man with a gash

across his face from the last blow Mr. Crymble had struck at the rebels; and before the Bishop's arrival they had buried five of their companions.

Poor Mrs. Crookshank had lain on the ground all night, desperately wounded, and with extraordinary coolness and courage had shammed death whilst the rebels tore the rings from her fingers, or cut at her head with their swords. Her life was saved by her mass of braided hair. Early in the morning her servant found her still living, and went and informed the Bishop, who had great difficulty in persuading the Kungsi to allow him to send for her. She arrived in the mission house in a dreadful state.

It was soon evident that, in the intoxication of victory, the Chinese aimed now, if not before, at the complete domination of the country, and summoned the Bishop, Mr. [Ludwig V.] Helms, agent for the Borneo Company, Mr. Ruppell, an English resident, and the Datu Bandhar to appear at the Court House. The Europeans were obliged to attend the summons. The Malay chief also came, but with great reluctance, and contrary to the advice of the Datu Imaun, his more energetic brother; but he thought it expedient to gain time.

The Chinese chiefs, even in their most extravagant moments of exultation, were in great fear that on their return up the river the Malays might attack them in their crowded boats and destroy them, as on the water they felt their inferiority to their maritime enemies....

Next day the rebels retired up-country unmolested by the Malays, and a meeting was at once held at the Datu Bandhar's house to discuss future proceedings.... Abang Patah, son of the Datu Tumangong, addressed his countrymen.... 'Are we going to submit to be governed by Chinese chiefs, or are we to remain faithful to our Rajah? I am a man of few words, and I say I will never be governed by anyone but by him, and to-night I commence war to the knife against his enemies.'

The unanimous determination of the assembly was to remain faithful to the Rajah, but they were divided as to the course to be pursued. Patah, however, unfortunately, cut the knot of the difficulty by manning a light war boat with a dozen Malays, and proceeding at once up the river, attacked and captured a Chinese boat, killing five of its crew. In the meantime all the women and children had been removed from the town, and some trading prahus were manned and armed but imperfectly, as the Chinese had taken away the contents of the arsenal....

Patah's bold act was no doubt well meaning, but was decidedly premature, as the Malays, being scattered, could not organise any resistance, and urgent entreaties were made to the Rajah to return and head this movement. He complied... but he knew it was useless, and arrived at Kuching to find the rest of the English flying, the town

in the hands of the Chinese, and smoke rising in every direction from the burning Malay houses....

...[T]he rebels were dragging up heavy guns, and it was evident the Malays could not hold out for many days, particularly as there was now little to defend; the flames which reddened the horizon, and the increasing volumes of smoke, told the tale too well that the Malay town was being completely destroyed.

With feelings of the most acute distress the Rajah gave the order for departure, and the small flotilla fell down the river Samarahan, and arriving at its mouth put out to sea, when a cry arose among the men, 'Smoke! smoke! It is a steamer!' And sure enough there was a dark column rising in the air from a three-masted vessel. For a moment it was uncertain which course she was steering, but presently they distinguished her flag—she was the *Sir James Brooke*, the Borneo Company's steamer, standing in for the Muaratabas entrance of the Sarawak river. The crew of the Rajah's prahu, with shouts, gave way, and the boat was urged along with all the power of their oars, to find the vessel anchored just within the mouth.

'The great God be praised!' as the Rajah said. Here, indeed, was a base of operations.

II Sarawak 'Recognized' by Great Britain

The arrival of the steamer *Sir James Brooke* turned the tide of rebellion and the Malays and Dayaks, pursuing the Chinese inland, are said to have killed over one thousand of them. The following reading, extracted from *Outlines of Sarawak History under the Brooke Rajahs 1839-1946*, by A. B. Ward and D. C. White, gives an outline summary of the history of Sarawak from the time of the Chinese Rebellion until 1863, when Great Britain formally 'recognized' Sarawak as an independent state.¹ [Kuching, 1957, 9-11.]

THE Chinese insurrection having been quelled, the Tuan Muda decided to attack Rentap [a Dayak chief] at Sadok. After considerable opposition the force gained the summit of the mountain on 8th June. Seven days were spent in consolidating their

¹ Cf., however, G. Irwin, 'Nineteenth-Century Borneo: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry,' *Verh. Kon. Inst. T.L.F.*, The Hague, 1955, xv, 188-9: 'In August 1863... Cabinet approval was given for the appointment of a British consul specifically to Kuching. ... Historians of Sarawak have always claimed that this... marked the "full and complete" recognition of the country's independence.... But, whether by accident or design, the commission furnished to... the first British consul to Kuching, was drawn up in such a manner as to leave the British Foreign Office a loop-hole through which they could escape whenever the demands of the Sarawak Government for "full and complete" recognition were strongly pressed.'

position, and then Rentap's stockade was stormed. After four hours' hard fighting Abang Aing, the Government Chief, was wounded and the Tuan Muda obliged to retire.

Mukah now claimed the Rajah's attention. Kuching was largely dependent on this coast district for its sago trade, but since 1854 rival factions in the town had caused anarchy and Brunei's intervention by sending the notorious Pangiran Mahkota there, had made matters worse. The Rajah put the situation before the Sultan, and in September, 1857, was given power to deal with the situation and managed to pacify the parties. The Rajah then returned to England broken in health with the intention of settling there in peace.

Dayaks troubles still worried the Tuan Muda. The fort, lately built at Betong in the Saribas, was attacked by Saji on 14th July, 1858, and a punitive expedition, under the Tuan Besar and the Tuan Muda, sent up the Saribas.... Rentap still held out and the Government force had to retire.

In June, 1859, news was received that on the 2nd... the officers stationed at Kanowit, had been murdered in the fort. The Tuan Muda left immediately for the Rejang and the leaders of the outrage were caught and executed. The Dayaks implicated were next attacked in the Kabah, a stream above Kanowit, and a severe lesson administered. The conspiracy which occasioned the deaths of two English officers was, however, wider spread than the Rejang.

Sherip Masahor, the chief at Sarikei, together with Haji Abdul Gapar, known as the Datu Patinggi, thought the moment propitious to overthrow the Sarawak Government. The plot was dealt with promptly by the Tuan Muda, and the Datu Haji was imprisoned in Batavia for endeavouring to cause a rising among the natives on the border.

In April, 1860, Sherip Masahor was waylaid as he was moving on Kuching with an armed force. His boats were broken up by gunfire at the mouth of the Sadong, but the Sherip escaped to Sarikei. The Tuan Muda followed and the Sherip fled to Igan and from thence to Mukah. Igan was burned and looted and many of the Sherip's brass *bedils* [guns] were brought to the Court House in Kuching, where they remain to this day. Sherip Masahor retired to Mukah and was instrumental in hindering all trade between that place and Kuching....

In February, 1861, the Rajah returned to Sarawak.... Amicable relations were restored with Brunei, and, as the result, the Sultan in August granted the Rajah a concession of the country from the Rejang to Kidurong Point. Sherip Masahor, the prime instigator of many troubles, was exiled to Singapore, where he died in 1890.

The coast affairs having been settled, the Rajah returned to England, but it was very necessary to deal again with Rentap. The Tuan Muda therefore started for Sadok in September with a large force

backed up with a 12-pounder and 6-pounder gun. With great difficulty the large gun was carried up the mountain and, on the night of the 28th October, 1861, Rentap's stronghold was finally destroyed. Rentap's power was broken and he retired to Kanowit to end his days in peace.

The Tuan Besar, now known as the Rajah Muda, was left in charge of the Government of Sarawak, and one of his first acts was to defend the coast against Illanun pirates who had lately become bold and dangerous. On 25th May, 1862, the Sarawak gunboat *Rainbow* with the Rajah Muda on board and the pinnace *Jolly Bachelor* had a successful encounter with the pirates off Bintulu, sinking three of their boats and accounting for 220 of their crews. The lesson was sufficient and Sarawak was little troubled again by these pests.

The Rajah again returned to Sarawak in 1863 and it was decided to proceed against the Kayans in the headwaters of the Rejang, who had been harassing loyal Dayaks. . . . The Tuan Muda led the expedition which, after nearly a month negotiating the rapids, reached the Kayan country in the middle of May, 1863. Little fighting occurred, but the expedition achieved its purpose when a great Kayan-Dayak peace was concluded at Kanowit in October of the same year.

The Rajah meanwhile returned to England in September, having appointed the Tuan Muda, who had already assumed the surname of Brooke, as his heir and representative.

In 1863 Great Britain recognized Sarawak as an Independent State, and five years later, on 11th June, 1868, the great Rajah died at Bur-rator in Devonshire, leaving a name that will never die so long as nobility, courage, and benevolence are honoured in this world.

III *Colonial Society in Singapore in the 1860's*

The following reading, describing the day-to-day life of the British in Singapore during the 1860's, is taken from John Cameron's rare book, *Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India*. [London, 1865, 289-303.]

To give a correct idea of the everyday life of the European it is necessary rather to distinguish between the unmarried and the married, than between the man of narrow and the man of extended means. Most of the bungalows . . . are about two miles from town; nearly all, at least, are within hearing range of the 68-pounder gun on Fort Canning, the discharge of which each morning at five o'clock ushers in the day. This is the accepted signal of all old residents to start from bed, the younger however, usually indulge in an extra half-hour's slumber. Still, six o'clock generally sees all dressed

and out of doors, to enjoy a couple of miles walk or ride through the lovely country roads, in the delicious coolness of morning, before the sun's rays become disagreeably powerful.

The air at this hour is of that temperature which may be described as a little colder than cool, and it has a sharpness which I have experienced only in the early mornings of tropical countries, or on a frosty day at home. A slight mist, too, rises from the ground, that, whether it does in reality lend any measure of coolness, certainly by association gives a frosty aspect to nature. Indeed I have often, when setting out on my walk at sunrise, been positively startled by the resemblance of sharp frost.... I may remark that, throughout the year there is barely thirty minutes difference in the hour of the sun's rising. In June and December it dawns about quarter past five, in March and September at a quarter to six....

Most people limit their walks to two miles, or about half an hour; but this is by no means a rule. Some go as far as four, five, or six miles in a morning; these are the early birds who start at gun-fire sharp, and they are in the minority. I know one gentleman, now nearer seventy than sixty years old, who is out of doors at five each morning, goes a round of six miles, and comes back to his tea at about half-past six. He has kept up this practice during forty years of residence, and has reaped his reward in still robust health, strong nerve, clear head, and a yet lively enjoyment of the good things of life.

During the training season for the races, it is at this hour that the horses are taken their rounds, and the course then forms to a great many the limit of their walk. As early as half-past four the syces or native grooms are up preparing their horses, and start a little after gun-fire for the course, a distance of about two miles. At sunrise the horses commence to go their rounds, and as they wait their turns, it is generally half-past six before all have been exercised. As the distance is to most a tolerably long one, the stewards provide tea on the course, so that it is altogether a very favourite resort for about six weeks before both the spring and autumn meetings....

On coming home from these morning rounds, the custom is to get into loose, free and easy attire, generally baju and pajamas. A cup of coffee or tea, with biscuit or bread-and-butter and fruit, is then consumed, and the next two hours spent in reading, writing, or lolling about in the verandahs which front each apartment of a house. I have said reading, writing, or lolling about; but, more correctly speaking, the time is devoted to a combination of the first and the last. In the daily avocation of most, the pen is pretty actively handled; and unless at mail times, or by those of a literary turn of mind, it is seldom taken up out of office. Reading is generally accomplished in the extremely reclining posture for which the verandah chairs of Singapore are so admirably adapted....

At half-past eight the breakfast dressing gong or bell is sounded. A gentleman's toilette in this part of the east is not an elaborate one, and half an hour is ample time for its completion. The bath is its chief feature. Attached to the dressing-room of each bedroom in almost all houses is a bath-room, with brick-tiled floor, containing a large bathing jar holding about sixty or seventy gallons of water. The orthodox manner of bathing is to stand on a small wooden grating close to the jar, and with a hand bucket to dash the water over the body. This is by no means such an unsatisfactory method as to the uninitiated it may appear. The successive shocks to the system which are obtained by the discharge of each bucketful of water, seems to have a much more bracing effect than that of one sudden and continued immersion. Every gentleman has his native boy¹ or body servant, whose sole duty it is to attend upon him personally. While bathing, these boys lay out their master's apparel for the day; so that on coming from the bath a gentleman has little trouble to get himself attired. As to shaving the process is generally performed by itinerant Hindoo barbers, who for the small charge of a dollar or a dollar and a half per month come every morning round to the residences of their customers. The charge is so small, and the saving in trouble so great, that almost all avail themselves of the convenience.

The universal breakfast hour is nine o'clock, and when the bell then rings the whole household assemble, and should there be ladies of the number this is the first time of their appearance. Singapore breakfasts, though tolerably substantial and provided with a goodly array of dishes, are rarely dwelt over long, half an hour being about the time devoted to them. A little fish, some curry and rice, and perhaps a couple of eggs, washed down with a tumbler or so of good claret, does not take long to get through and yet forms a very fair foundation on which to begin the labours of the day. After breakfast the conveyances drive round to the porch or portico and having received their owners hasten in to town. No matter how many may reside together, each bachelor has generally his own "turn-out;" and for half an hour every morning the two bridges leading across the river into town present an endless string of these rather motley vehicles. . . . A large number of horses are brought up from Australia, not less I should say than 100 each year, and all find a sale at what must be remunerative prices. . . .

Arrived in town, ten minutes or a quarter of an hour are usually spent in going the rounds of the square to learn the news of the morning. These commercial square gatherings are quite a characteristic of the place and of the community, and whatever channels they may open

¹ The term 'boy' is applied to all servants of this class, whatever their age. Some of these 'boys' are grey-haired men of over sixty.

to the flow of local gossip, or it might even be scandal, yet they are so far useful that they serve the purpose of an open air and non-commercial exchange. Differences of position are in most cases left behind in office, and all meet here on a footing of equality, or if there is any ascendancy at all it is that which is obtained by the readiest wit or perhaps by the greatest measure of self-assurance. As scarcely a day passes without the arrival of a steamer with news from England, China, India, or from some interesting point in the neighbourhood, there is always ample material for an animated exchange of ideas and information on leading topics, whether they be European politics, the [civil] war in America, the position of affairs in China, the combined action at Japan, the affairs of India, Java, Borneo, the administration of the local Government, or the condition and prospects of the adjacent markets.

This sort of congress takes place between the first arrival in town and ten or half-past ten o'clock. At that hour business has commenced and continues in full force till tiffin time, or one o'clock; and certainly it is gone through in quite as smart and active a manner as at home. The climate, though it may produce a greater languor in the evening, has apparently no such effect during the day. There is not much out-of-door bustle; but still when occasion requires the folks post about the square under the midday sun at a lively pace and with apparent impunity.

Tiffin time does not bring the luxurious abandonment to the table which it does in Java; people in Singapore are more moderate in their indulgence, yet some show of a meal is in most cases made; a plate of curry and rice and some fruit or it may be a simple biscuit with a glass of beer or claret. Half an hour's relaxation too is generally indulged in, and as the daily newspaper comes out about this hour, there is a goodly flocking either to the exchange or the public godowns in the square for a perusal of it.

Two o'clock is the exchange hour, and though I do not think there is really much intercommunication on commercial subjects, yet as a rendezvous and a place where the leading men of the mercantile world can have an interchange of ideas even on irrelevant matters, it has the good effect of promoting and maintaining a more general intimacy than might otherwise prevail. . . .

Business hours are not particularly severe, and by half-past four or five o'clock most of the mercantile houses have got through their work. But only a few proceed direct home at this hour; the greater number, at least of the younger members of the community, resort to the fives-court or the cricket-ground on the esplanade. The former is an institution of long standing in Singapore; as far back as thirty years ago it was erected, and at no time since then has the interest taken in the game subsided. On the contrary, about two years ago it

was found necessary to build another court out at Tanglin about two miles from town in the vicinity of the residences, so greatly had the number of members increased. The game is well-known at home, and I need not describe it further than to say that it is a kind of rackets, but that the hands instead of bats are used to play up the ball and that consequently the exercise is much more severe.... Cricket is of course precisely the same game in Singapore as it is at home.

But there are two evenings in the week when the whole European community may generally be seen upon the esplanade, whether or not they be fives or cricket-players, and these are band evenings, generally Tuesdays and Fridays. The band, which is that of the regiment on the station at the time, or from one of the men-of-war which occasionally visit the port, plays on a raised mound on the centre of the esplanade green. The chains which protect the green on ordinary occasions are on these evenings let down, and carriages, horsemen, and pedestrians are alike admitted to the greensward. Gathered round the band in a tolerably broad circle are the beauty and fashion of the place. The ladies, to whom almost all the other outdoor amusements are denied, partake at least in this, and though the ruddy glow of the colder latitudes has fled from most cheeks, still there supervenes a languid softness which is more interesting and perhaps more beautiful. The pretty pale-faced European children too may on these occasions be seen tripping about in playfulness a little less boisterous, but quite as cheerful as is witnessed at home. The band plays from half-past five till half-past six, at which hour it is all but dark, when the carriages make for home in a long string, gradually falling off one by one as the various residences are reached.

Except on band nights however, most of the commercial and all of the official world retire home a little before six o'clock. Arrived there, probably a glass of sherry and bitters will anticipate the refreshing process of dressing for dinner. A slight difference as to dinner-hour prevails; some dine at half-past six, some at seven; the former however is the time most commonly adopted. There is one advantage here which is too seldom to be found in other parts of the world. Whatever may be the hour, a clock-work regularity and punctuality is observed, and this not with respect to dinner only, but with respect to all other meals. No doubt this regularity also has its share in the maintenance of the good health of the European community.

Dinner in Singapore is not the light airy meal which might reasonably be imagined from the nature of the climate; on the contrary, it is quite as substantial a matter of fact as in the very coldest latitudes. The difference is not that the substantials are fewer, but that the luxuries are more numerous. Indeed the every-day dinner of Singapore, were it not for the waving punkahs, the white jackets of the gentlemen, and the gauzy dresses of the ladies, the motley array of native

servants, each standing behind his master's or mistress's chair, and the goodly display of argand lamps, might not unreasonably be mistaken for some more special occasion at home. Soup and fish generally both precede the substantials, which are of a solid nature, consisting of roast beef or mutton, turkey or capon, supplemented by side-dishes of tongue, fowl, cutlets, or such like, together with an abundant supply of vegetables, including potatoes nearly equal to English ones grown in China or India, and also cabbages from Java. The substantials are invariably followed by curry and rice which forms a characteristic feature of the tables of Singapore, and though Madras and Calcutta have been long famed for the quality of their curries, I nevertheless think that those of the Straits exceed any of them in excellence. There are usually two or more different kinds placed on the table, and accompanying them are all manner of sambals or native pickles and spices, which add materially to the piquancy of the dish.

During the progress of the substantials and of the curry and rice, the usual beverage is beer, accompanied by a glass or two of pale sherry. The good folks of Singapore are by no means inclined to place too narrow restrictions on their libations, and it has been found in the experience of older residents that a liberality in this respect conduces to good health and long life. Besides this the American Tudor Company keeps up a tolerably regular supply of ice, and as it is sold at three cents, or less than 1½d. per lb., it is within the reach of all, and is an invariable adjunct to all beverages.

To curry and rice succeeds generally some sort of pudding or preserve, but sweets have not the same temptation here as at home. Very good cheese however is obtained in fortnightly supplies by the overland steamers, and, as good fresh butter is always to be had, this part of dinner is well enjoyed, accompanied as it is by no illiberal allowance of excellent pale ale. But it is in the luxuriance of the dessert perhaps more than anything else that the tables of Singapore are to be distinguished, and it is little wonder that it should be so; for there is no season of the year at which an abundance of fruit cannot be obtained. Pineapple may be considered the stock fruit of the island, and one or two splendid specimens of these generally adorn the table. There are plantains, ducoos, mangoes, rambutans, pomeloes, and mangosteens; the latter fruit is peculiar to the Straits of Malacca and to Java, and so great is its fame that to India or China no present or gift from Singapore is more acceptable than a basket of them. It is of a somewhat singular genus; it is round, of the size of a small orange, is covered with a thick woody purple bark in place of rind, which has to be cut or broken off, and inside are the snowy-white cloves of the pulp, sweet and with a very delicate but delicious flavour, unlike anything else I know of. But though dessert generally makes a finer display than any other part of dinner, it is not that to which most

attention is directed. A cigar and a glass or two of sherry after the ladies are gone, and dinner is over.

Many of the residences have billiard-rooms attached, in which case the usual custom is to retire there after dinner. Where no billiard-room is within reach, a chat in the verandah, a little meditation, or perhaps a book passes the hours pleasantly enough until bed-time. And as dinner is seldom over before eight o'clock, and the usual hour for rest is ten, it is not a very long interval between them that has to be disposed of.

... I think it is to be regretted that the people of Singapore so determinedly set their faces against every sort of entertainment which does not include a dinner. I am quite sure that much of the after-dinner time, that is under the present system in a manner thrown away, might be more agreeably, and at the same time more profitably spent, if the custom were to set in that people should meet occasionally after dinner, and pass their evenings in the same sort of social intercourse as is usual at home, and in most other parts of the world.

Such is the everyday life at Singapore.

IV *Chinese in Malaya under the British,* 1786-1874

The following reading is taken from a work by the late authority on the Chinese in Malaya, Victor Purcell, formerly Lecturer in Far Eastern History in the University of Cambridge. [*The Chinese in Modern Malaya*, Singapore, 1956, 3-8.]

AFTER the foundation of Penang the immigration of Chinese into Malaya greatly increased. In a letter dated 1st October 1786, Captain Light said, 'Our inhabitants increase very fast. Chooliahs (Tamils), Chinese, and Christians; they are already disputing about the ground, everyone building as fast as he can', and in another letter he adds, 'Did not the Dutch keep a strict watch over the Chinese, most of them would leave Malacca.' In the year of his death (1794) he wrote an official report to his superiors in which he said, 'The Chinese constitute the most valuable part of our inhabitants: they are men, women, and children, about 3,000; they possess the different trades of carpenters, masons, and smiths, are traders, shopkeepers, and planters: they employ small vessels and prows and send adventurers to the surrounding countries. They are the only people from whom a revenue may be raised without expense and extraordinary effort of government. They are a valuable acquisition, but speaking a language which no other people understand, they are able to

form parties and combinations in a most secret manner against any regulations of Government they disapprove, and were they brave as intelligent they would be dangerous subjects, but want of courage will make them bear many impositions before they rebel.' (Like many other Europeans before and after him, Light mistook Chinese amenity to control as a sign of a lack of courage instead of what it was, namely a long-established social tradition.)

In addition to trading, the Chinese immigrants cultivated in Penang and Province Wellesley pepper, gambier, coconuts, tobacco (in small quantities) and *sireh* (a leaf for chewing with betel-nut). But their principal crop was sugar of which between 1800 and 1840 they had the monopoly.

Penang, however, proved to be only a limited success as a settlement and it was not until after the foundation of Singapore by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819 that the Chinese became really well established in Malaya. On 11 June, 1819, Raffles wrote to the Duchess of Somerset, 'My new colony thrives most rapidly. We have not been established four months, and it has received an accession of population exceeding 5,000—principally Chinese, and this number is daily increasing.'¹ Raffles directed that all Chinese should leave the northern side of the river where they had located themselves and form a new village from a bridge down to the river on the site of the present Boat Quay. By 1821, there were 3,374 yards of road, 15 yards wide in Chinatown. Raffles considered that the first in importance among the immigrant peoples was 'beyond doubt the Chinese'. 'From the number of Chinese already settled, and the peculiar attraction of the place for that industrious race,' he added, 'it may be presumed that they will always form the largest part of the community.' (Raffles was certainly right, for in 1955, of a total population of about 1,200,000, the Chinese accounted for 85 per cent.) . . .

The Chinese who migrated to Singapore and Penang were of different tribes—Hokkiens, Cantonese, Hakkas etc.—and they did not form a social unit as they did in China where they lived side by side in settled districts. There was thus room for friction between the several unamalgamated tribes. Nor were they exclusively composed of enterprising merchants and industrious artisans and workmen: they had brought with them some of the worst characters for whom China itself had no room. There were frequent robberies, even in broad daylight, and for the first years of Singapore's history most of these went unpunished. Moreover, there was only a handful of police (Indians from Bengal and Madras) and as yet no code of laws under which criminals could be punished.

In the early days, both in Penang and Malacca as well as in Singa-

¹ T[Thomas] Braddell, however, in his more careful examination shows that in 1823 the total population of Singapore was 10,683 of which the Chinese were only 3,317.

pore, the British left the Chinese very much to themselves. They governed them through headmen appointed by themselves. Only when robbery increased did the Chinese realize the necessity of contributing towards their own protection and of subscribing to the Night Watch Fund.

The Chinese Secret Societies had undoubtedly been imported with the first immigrants, but it was not until 1831 that there is any mention of their existence in Singapore. In that year a riot broke out and rumours placed the responsibility for it at their door. Even so, it was twenty years before another such riot occurred. Then from 1851 to 1854 a series of incidents took place which culminated in the great riot of the latter year when some 400 Chinese were killed. . . . Chinese Secret Societies were generally believed to be all offshoots of the *Thian Ti Hui* (Heaven and Earth League), known as the *Hung* (Food) *League* or *Triad Society*.¹ Originally religious or self-help associations, they had assumed an anti-dynastic character at the time of the Manchu conquest of China and later on they degenerated into criminal associations. Europeans have made a distinction between the benevolent *kongsis*, or district and clan associations, and the malevolent *huis*, but this is not historically justifiable. In their early days in Malaya the *huis* (which at that time included the *kongsis*) did indisputably useful work among the Chinese community in the matter of welfare, but when the 'reformed' *kongsis* were recognized by the Government while the *huis* became illegal as 'unregistered societies' (in 1889), this came to be a distinction with a difference.

Effective action to suppress the Chinese Secret Societies called for a knowledge of their organization and *modus operandi*, but for nearly a century after Light landed at Penang the British administration was completely in the dark not only as regards the Secret Societies but as regards the social organization of the Chinese community in general. In 1857 (says N. Oliphant) there were 70,000 Chinese in Singapore but not a single European who understood their language. It was not until the publication of the epoch-making work, *Thian Ti Hui*, the *Hung League* or *Heaven-Earth League*, by the Dutchman, Gustav Schlegel, in 1866, that anything definite was known about the Secret Societies.

In 1877, the Chinese Protectorate was established under the direction of Mr. W. [A.] Pickering, a member of the Civil Service who had qualified in the Chinese language. This new department was intended to deal not only with the problem of the Secret Societies but also with those of Chinese labour and immigration and with the traffic in women and girls for the purpose of prostitution which had

¹ But the late Mr. Mervyn Wynne of the Malayan Police, in an important work on the subject, *Triad and Tabut*, advanced a theory of the independent origin of rival societies from the *Thian Ti Hui* and the *Hung League* respectively.

grown into a very profitable business owing to the preponderance of males over females among the immigrants from China.

* * *

The immigrant Chinese had not confined their attention to the Straits Settlements but many of them had penetrated to the Malay States in search of a fortune. In 1827, an Englishman named Gray who visited Pahang mentions a tin-mine about to be opened at Lepar for 800 Malays, as well as a number of Chinese, to work on. In 1838, Raffles' *munshi* (teacher), Abdullah, on his way to Kelantan sailed up the Pahang River to Kampong China (Pekan Baharu). There he found hundreds of Malays and Chinese, armed to the teeth, awaiting him on the bank.¹... The Chinese at Kampong China were Hakkas and they intermarried with Malay women or with Balinese slaves...

It was the demand for pepper and gambier that brought the Chinese squatter to Johore. Those who could satisfy the Malay authorities as to the sufficiency of their means were allowed to form settlements up some named river and the titles they received from the Sultan were called *Surat Sungei*, or 'river documents'. The system was called the *Kangchu* system (literally 'master, or owner, of a river').

In Sungei Ujong... Captain [T. J.] Newbold in 1832 found four hundred Chinese employed on the tin-mines. (It is worth noting that at this time the wages of Chinese miners were 5-8 dollars a month as compared with the 3-5 dollars earned by Malay miners.) Already at Lukut in 1824, [John] Anderson speaks of two hundred Chinese tin-miners. By 1874, there were about 10,000 Chinese miners working there. Into Selangor there was an influx of Chinese miners after the 'fifties, and in 1871 there were 12,000 altogether in Selangor (Lukut at that time being part of Selangor).

* * *

...[W]herever the Chinese went they took their Secret Societies with them. These, indeed, were practically the only social organization they had. In Perak, Chinese miners appeared in Larut from Penang whence they also had brought their Secret Societies, namely the rival *Ghee Hin* and *Hai San*.

Then it happened that about 1850 Che Long Ja'afar discovered a patch of rich mining land at Klian Pauh, the site of the present Taiping gaol, and soon Chinese miners from Penang were flocking to Larut. Further discoveries of tin land in the area followed soon after this. Before long the influx of Chinese into Larut and its neighbourhood was so great that it was beyond the capacity of the Malays to keep

¹ See reading VIa, Chapter Five, page 142.

order, and the Chinese, free from any control from above, began faction fights among themselves.

These disorders continued for years. The rival Chinese Secret Societies repeatedly petitioned the Governor of the Straits Settlements to help one or the other against its rival, but he declined to interfere. Chinese merchants having trade dealings with the Malay States, who also sought British help, were told that they must accept the risks as well as the profits of their enterprise. Later on these Chinese faction fights became mixed up with the question of the succession to the throne of Perak. Rival candidates for the throne, which had become vacant by the death of Sultan Ali in 1871, appealed for the support of one or other of the Chinese Societies (the members of the *Ghee Hin* were mostly Cantonese and of the *Hai San* mostly Hakkas, but this was not the invariable rule).

It was at this juncture that British policy towards the Malay States changed. These States had been falling more and more into decay for several decades, but hitherto the British had declined to interfere in their affairs. But the new Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Andrew Clarke, was instructed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to 'bring about limited interference in the affairs of the Malay States . . . to rescue, if possible, those fruitful and productive countries from the ruin which must befall them if the present disorders continue unchecked.'

The result of this intervention was that the Malay Sultans, one by one, accepted treaties with the British whereby they agreed 'to ask for, and to act upon, British advice in all matters except those touching the Mohammedan religion and Malay custom.' This formula proved to be the foundation of the 'Protectorate system'...

V British Intervention in Malaya: Background

In the history of Malaysia nothing has aroused more controversy than the reasons why the British 'intervened' in Malaya in 1874. The following reading provides background for understanding the problem of intervention, in so far as it related to the highly complicated succession controversies in the Malay states. [Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, 11-18.]

Perak

PERAK had existed as a Malay State for several centuries. A process of disintegration, associated with mining development, began about 1850.

During the 1850's there was a civil war between the Sultan and certain of his chiefs. In this fighting the Sultan's son, Raja Yusuf, and a member of the Laxamana lineage, Mat Amin, particularly distinguished themselves. In 1857 the Sultan died. The Perak political system provided that in normal circumstances the Sultan should be succeeded by the Raja Muda; the Raja Bendahara became Raja Muda; the late Sultan's son became Raja Bendahara. Each Sultan's son, if he lived long enough, would become Sultan after members of the two other branches of the royal lineage had had their turn. This system was only two generations old in 1850 and it was by no means fixed and unalterable. On the death of a Sultan it rested with the chiefs to decide how to fill the three royal offices.

In 1857 the Raja Muda, an opponent of the late Sultan, acceded as Sultan Ja'afar. The former Raja Bendahara became Raja Muda Ali. Thus far according to norm. But the chiefs refused to appoint the late Sultan's son, Raja Yusuf, to the vacant office of Raja Bendahara. He was personally unpopular, he had fought against many of them in the recent civil war, and he was likely to be an autocratic Sultan later on. The chiefs therefore appointed one Raja Ismail to be Bendahara. Ismail was a member of the royal lineage only through his mother. It is probable that there was no intention at that time of promoting Ismail from Bendahara to Raja Muda and then to Sultan. He was merely a stop-gap to keep out Yusuf.

Sultan Ja'afar appointed Mat Amin to the office of Laxamana. In this capacity Mat Amin was the most powerful chief in lower Perak for the next twenty years. Another new family was rising to prominence. One Long Ja'afar had been appointed about 1840 to collect taxes for his kinsman, the Dato' Panglima Bukit Gantang, in the sparsely settled and remote areas of Krian and Larut. Tin was found at Larut and Long Ja'afar imported Chinese tin miners to work these deposits. The mines were a great success and Long Ja'afar became immensely wealthy. He died in 1857 and was succeeded by his son, Ngah Ibrahim (incidentally the prefix *Ngah* indicates that he was not the eldest son). In 1862 Ngah Ibrahim was given the title of Mentri, previously held by another lineage then in decline. As Mentri, Ngah Ibrahim ranked as one of the four chiefs of the first rank in Perak. He is always referred to as 'Mentri of Larut'; more correctly he was Mentri (Secretary of State) of Perak and incidentally chief of Larut. His case illustrates how the titles of office of the State Government had become associated with local chieftainships. The Mentri was related to the chiefs of upstream Perak, around Kuala Kangsar, and he became the leading member of that local group.

In 1865 Sultan Ja'afar died. Raja Muda Ali, a nonentity, was duly promoted to be Sultan. Raja Bendahara Ismail, not being truly royal,

was left as Bendahara. Raja Abdullah, son of the late Sultan Ja'afar, was appointed direct to the vacant office of Raja Muda.

In the late 1860's the weakness of the Sultan left the chiefs without any focus of central control. They divided into two opposing local groups. Raja Bendahara Ismail, who had a substantial interest in the tin mines of Kinta, and the Mentri of Larut, which was an important mining district, were the leaders of the upstream group. Laxamana Mat Amin and Raja Muda Abdullah led the downstream group. Mat Amin, in partnership with the late Sultan Ja'afar, Abdullah's father, had opened up the mining district of Batang Padang. The division between these two groups was still spanned by kinship ties. The Mentri was a son-in-law of the Laxamana. Raja Muda Abdullah was a son-in-law of Sultan Ali, himself of the upstream group.

Sultan Ali died in 1871 in his village in upstream Perak. There was the usual meeting of chiefs to conduct the funeral and to elect a new Sultan. Custom required that the new Sultan should be present to preside over the funeral of his predecessor. Raja Muda Abdullah did not dare to go up-river among the hostile upstream chiefs; moreover he had lost face among them by his acquiescence in the abduction of his wife by one of their number. In his absence the Mentri persuaded the chiefs to appoint Raja Bendahara Ismail as Sultan. The immediate purpose was to install an ally as Sultan. It was also believed that the Mentri was intriguing for his own ultimate succession to the Sultanate. Ismail was elderly and not of royal descent on his father's side. When he died there would be a useful precedent in the Mentri's favour.

Thereafter there were two contenders for recognition as Sultan. Ismail, though not of true royal descent, had been constitutionally elected by a majority of the chiefs of Perak. Abdullah, with a better title by descent and by having been the Raja Muda of the previous reign, laid claim to be Sultan with the support of Laxamana Mat Amin and the downstream chiefs.

In 1872 serious fighting broke out among two factions of Chinese miners at Larut. The Mentri, originally committed to the Hai San men, gave his support to whichever side seemed to be winning at the time. This policy was an indication of the essential weakness of his position; he had failed to use his resources to build up an adequate police to enforce his authority. Fortunes fluctuated in the fighting at Larut and the Mentri soon lost by his turncoat policy whatever influence he had had with either Chinese faction. At the beginning of 1873 he was driven out of the Chinese mining area of Larut and took refuge in the northern Malay area of Larut around Kurau and Krian. Abdullah, who recognized that the Mentri was the mainstay of the upstream coalition of his enemies, tried to dislodge him from Larut altogether.

Early in 1874 Sir Andrew Clarke, Governor of the Straits Settlements, intervened in Perak. Clarke and his advisers had only an imperfect understanding of the complicated succession dispute and the factors underlying it. Abdullah agreed to accept a British protectorate in Perak if the British would make him Sultan. The Mentri was forced to accept Abdullah as Sultan as a condition of being allowed to hold his district of Larut. The position of Sultan Ismail was left undetermined. The British were at this time unaware of the claims of Raja Yusuf, who had been appointed Raja Muda by Abdullah when he himself claimed to be Sultan.

The first British Resident of Perak, J. W. W. Birch, encountered much passive opposition in his attempts to introduce central collection of revenues in Perak and to abolish debt-bondage. Adversity reunited the factions among the Perak chiefs in opposition to Birch. In November 1875 Birch was murdered at Pasir Salak, village of the Maharaja Lela. After a punitive expedition ('the Perak War') had encountered little opposition, there was an enquiry into the origins of the attack on Birch. Sultan Abdullah, ex-Sultan Ismail, the Mentri and the Laxamana were all found to be implicated to a greater or less degree and they were exiled to the Seychelles. The only notability who was not in the plot was the ever-unpopular Raja Yusuf. Raja Bendahara Osman, son of the late Sultan Ali, was mentally unstable and he died in 1876. The only other Malay chief of consequence was Raja Idris, cousin of Sultan Abdullah; his complicity in the events of 1875 was slight and he was not exiled.

In 1877 Raja Yusuf was appointed 'Regent' of Perak, *faute de mieux*, because the Anglo-Malay Treaty of 1874 postulated the existence of a Malay ruler of Perak whom the British would advise. Yusuf remained 'substantively' Raja Muda until 1886 when he was recognized as Sultan. He died in 1887. Raja Idris (or Dris) became Raja Bendahara in 1876 and Raja Muda in 1886. He succeeded Yusuf as Sultan Idris (1887-1916). From 1877 to 1889 Hugh Low was British Resident of Perak.

Selangor

The ruling dynasty of Selangor were a branch of a Bugis family established at Rhio, south of Singapore. Sultan Ibrahim, second Sultan of Selangor, died in 1826 leaving no son by his royal consort. He was eventually succeeded by Sultan Mohamed, a son by a secondary wife.

Sultan Mohamed was an ineffectual ruler. He tried to develop tin-mining in Selangor and in the course of these ventures he lost large sums of money borrowed from merchants in Malacca. In 1839, while on a journey between Selangor and Rhio, he was unwise enough to

stop at Malacca. His creditors threatened him with arrest for debt. Raja Juma'at, a nephew of the Sultan's wife, rescued him from this predicament by taking over responsibility for the Sultan's debts (some £35,000). Raja Juma'at and his father, Raja Ja'afar, were members of the Rhio branch of the family. They had however begun to open tin-mines at Lukut, the southernmost of the five valleys of Selangor. In return for his assistance Raja Juma'at obtained from the Sultan a grant of the district of Lukut. He thus became a district chief with a title to Lukut instead of being merely a tin-miner in no man's land. Raja Juma'at consolidated his position by marrying a daughter of Sultan Mohamed. His brother Raja Abdullah married another daughter of the Sultan or (according to other sources) a niece of the Sultan. But the two brothers, Juma'at and Abdullah, were still regarded as outsiders from Rhio by the Selangor-born aristocracy.

In 1853 a son of Sultan Mohamed, Raja Sulaiman, died. He had been chief of the Klang district but had failed to develop it satisfactorily. Sultan Mohamed passed over the claims of Raja Mahdi, son of Raja Sulaiman, to inherit his father's district and assigned Klang to Raja Abdullah, brother of Raja Juma'at. By this time Raja Juma'at had become wealthy from the rapidly increasing revenues of tin-mining at Lukut and, being wealthy, he was powerful. Raja Mahdi had perforce to accept the position.

Another prominent figure of this period was Raja Abdul Samad, a nephew and also a son-in-law of Sultan Mohamed. Abdul Samad had financed tin-mining in the valley of the Selangor River with fair success.

Sultan Mohamed died in 1857. His eight-year old son, Raja Mahmud, had been appointed Raja Muda (at the insistence of the boy's mother) and was thus designated to succeed to the throne. Raja Juma'at however secured the succession for Raja Abdul Samad. The explanation was that Raja Juma'at, although the patrilineal grandson of a Sultan of Rhio, had no line of descent from the Selangor royal dynasty. Raja Abdul Samad, patrilineal grandson of Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor, was at least eligible to succeed. He and Raja Juma'at were brothers-in-law, both having married daughters of Sultan Mohamed; Raja Abdullah of Klang made a third of the trio of brothers-in-law. Sultan Abdul Samad, Raja Juma'at and Raja Abdullah between them controlled the greater part of Selangor.

The predominance of this coalition was much resented by the kinsmen of the late Sultan. In 1864 Raja Juma'at died and the coalition lost its most forceful member. In 1866 Raja Mahdi succeeded in driving Raja Abdullah out of Klang. Sultan Abdul Samad tried to remain neutral in this quarrel since so many of the Selangor aristocrats sympathized with Raja Mahdi. The Sultan had recently married his daughter to Tunku Kudin, the able and ambitious brother of the Sultan of

Kedah. Tunku Kudin was appointed 'Viceroy' (*Wakil Yam Tuan*), possibly at his own request, with the task of settling the quarrel over Klang. By this manoeuvre Sultan Abdul Samad avoided committing his shaky personal authority to the support of either side and he provided a newcomer to the scene, linked with neither faction, as an arbitrator. The scheme failed because the Selangor aristocrats who backed Raja Mahdi were set on getting rid of outsiders. They had driven a Rhio chief out of Klang; they did not want to exchange him for a Viceroy from Kedah. The Mahdi faction denied the authority of Tunku Kudin who was forced into alliance with the sons of Raja Abdullah (Abdullah himself had died). Kudin had friends and backers among the business men of Singapore and Malacca; with their aid he was able to raise mercenary forces. He also found a powerful ally in Yap Ah Loy, the leader of the Chinese miners of Kuala Lumpur, and in the last stages of the civil war (1866-1873) he obtained help from the ruler of Pahang. Raja Mahdi was the acknowledged leader of the other side but there were two other leaders of almost equal prestige, Raja Mahmud and Syed Mashhor. Mashhor, an Arab half-caste, was by far the ablest general of the three. Mahdi, Mahmud and Mashhor were all nephews of Sultan Abdul Samad.

Lukut, under a son of Raja Juma'at, had sunk into a decline and played no part in the war.

In 1874 Selangor came under British protection. The British recognized Tunku Kudin as Viceroy. Sultan Abdul Samad reigned until 1898.

Negri Sembilan

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Malay immigrants from Menangkabau who had settled in Negri Sembilan gave some help to the Sumatran side in the intermittent wars between Sumatran chiefs, the Bugis of Rhio and the Dutch at Malacca. About 1760 the Bugis overran Sungei Ujong, a district of Negri Sembilan. They were soon driven out. But this reverse may have contributed to the decision of the Negri Sembilan chiefs to obtain a war-leader for the State. Up to that time they had had no higher political leadership other than unsuccessful pretenders and they merely acknowledged a vague tradition of suzerainty by the Sultans of Johore as successors to the Sultans of Malacca. The name 'Negri Sembilan' means 'Nine States' and indicates a group of small, independent districts.

The new leader was Raja Melewar, a member of the royal house of the Sumatran kingdom of Menangkabau. He was given only limited authority and revenues. The first three holders of the office (Yam Tuan of Negri Sembilan) were appointed for life; when each died a successor was invited over from Menangkabau. The second and

third of these foreign princes married the daughter of his predecessor. A royal dynasty, patrilineal by sentiment, was thus built up by foreigners marrying into the matrilineal family of the district chief of Ulu Muar, in whose territory the royal ruler had his capital.

The sons of these unions naturally aspired to succeed to the throne. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century it was settled by the arbitrament of a civil war that sons of former rulers should succeed their fathers. Between about 1830 and 1860 the office of Yam Tuan was held by a forceful ruler, Yam Tuan Radin. He was unable, however, to make the authority of his office effective outside the limits of the royal domain. The threat of foreign attack receded and the development of tin-mining provided new bones of contention. The chiefs of Negri Sembilan and the Yam Tuan lived in an intermittent state of warfare with each other. Princes of the royal family penetrated into outlying districts of the State and tried to carve out districts for themselves by fighting or by marrying the daughters of chiefs. The complications of marriages between patrilineal royal princes of the paramount dynasty and women of the matrilineal clans from which the chiefs were drawn became obvious. Before the middle of the nineteenth century the matrilineal clans of Negri Sembilan had ceased to permit royal princes to marry their women. Thereafter the royal house was more or less endogamous.

The four major chiefs of Negri Sembilan were the *Undangs* (Law-givers) of the districts of Sungei Ujong, Rembau, Jelebu and Johol. A branch of the royal house was established in the district of Tampin. There were two minor districts of Inas and Gemencheh attached to Johol; there was a district of Linggi colonized by Bugis who owed a vague allegiance to Sungei Ujong. Sungei Ujong itself was virtually divided in two because the Dato' Shahbandar held half the district in open defiance of the Undang of the whole of Sungei Ujong. The Yam Tuan's authority was limited to the four small districts of Terachi, Ulu Muar, Gunong Pasir and Jempol around the royal capital at Sri Menanti.

In 1860 Yam Tuan Radin died and was succeeded by his brother, Yam Tuan Imam. In 1869 Yam Tuan Imam died. There was then a long-drawn dispute between a son of Radin, Tunku Antah, and a son of Imam, Tunku Ahmad Tunggal. Tunku Antah had the support of most of the chiefs but his rival, Tunku Ahmad Tunggal, was backed by the Dato' Klana of Sungei Ujong, senior member of the college of the four chiefs of the first rank (the Undang). The Dato' Klana himself was not strongly established in Sungei Ujong and had difficulty in holding his own against the Dato' Shahbandar. In 1874 the Dato' Klana accepted British protection. The Dato' Shahbandar rose in revolt and was defeated by a British force. In 1875 Tunku Antah, now generally recognized as Yam Tuan, invaded Sungei Ujong. He

was defeated and went into exile. He was restored in 1877 but only as overlord of the group of small districts around the royal capital. The major chiefs no longer acknowledged him as paramount.

Until 1886 only Sungei Ujong was under British protection though British administrators frequently visited other districts of Negri Sembilan and sometimes mediated in the many quarrels between the chiefs. The whole state came under British protection about 1887. In 1898 the position of the Yam Tuan as paramount ruler of the entire state was again acknowledged by all the chiefs.

Pahang

Originally Pahang had been an outlying province of the Johore Sultanate ruled by a more or less independent but non-royal chief, with the title of Bendahara of Pahang. As the Johore Sultanate lapsed into impotence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the independence and the pretensions of the rulers of Pahang increased.

In 1857 the Bendahara of Pahang died and was succeeded by his eldest son. Another son, Ahmad, rose in revolt against the legitimate ruler. The civil war ended in 1863 with the victory of Ahmad. He was a forceful leader and in the course of the war he had built up a strong following and had weakened his opponents among the chiefs. He came to the throne with much greater power than his contemporaries among the rulers of the other States. Moreover there was much less tin-mining in Pahang than in the other three States already described. The ruling class as a group was poorer in consequence but the Bendahara was relatively richer and therefore more powerful.

There was nonetheless a good deal of tension between the Bendahara and the chiefs. In 1882 the Bendahara assumed the title of Sultan. The discontents of the chiefs had been focused in support of the Raja Muda, a brother of the Sultan and at one time a trusted supporter. Raja Muda Mansor resented the Sultan's unwillingness to give him a large share of the royal revenues and his evident intention to arrange for the succession after his death of his son rather than his brother, the Raja Muda. There was a certain amount of British mediation. Swettenham visited Pahang in 1885. In 1887 Hugh Clifford was appointed 'British Agent'. In 1888 the Sultan was prevailed upon to accept British protection.

VI The Problem of British Intervention in Malaya

The following readings (a) (b) (c) and (d) offer different explana-

tions as to why the British adopted a more active policy in the Malay states during the early 1870's.

a. *An official's view*

[Sir Frank Swettenham, *British Malaya*, London, revised edition, 1948, 173-7. The first edition of this book was published in 1906.]

MAJOR-GENERAL Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., K.C.M.G., the new Governor, Commander-in-Chief, and Vice-Admiral of the Straits Settlements, arrived in Singapore on 4 November, 1873. The very lamentable state of Malay affairs had, from time to time, been reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and [the Governor] Sir Harry Ord, while he made no suggestion for dealing with the situation, had expressed his regret that, as he was precluded from interference, he could do nothing to improve matters beyond offering advice that the various disputants should meet and settle their differences. . . . Where all classes and nationalities are in arms fighting for different causes or different leaders; where neither life nor property have any safeguard, except the owner's strength and will to defend them; where robbery, or murder, or any other crime meets with neither inquiry nor punishment, peace and order will not be restored by any voice from inside the disturbed regions, and the wisest counsels, unsupported by power to enforce them, will be given in vain.

Lord Kimberley had, however, furnished Sir Andrew Clarke with instructions of the first importance, showing a disposition to make an entirely new departure, and to recognize the duty forced upon England, as the dominant Power, to interfere in the Malay States and put a stop to a disgraceful state of affairs. The duty was imperative from motives of humanity alone; but it was equally certain that to undertake it would be highly beneficial to British interests and British trade, though these pleas had hitherto been dismissed as of no importance. The most timid British taxpayer will probably admit that it is not wholly unjustifiable to define more clearly an existing responsibility, in order to create and to keep a trade which is wholly, or almost wholly, British, and worth £12,000,000 annually.

. . . [I]t is safe to say that, while the Colonial Secretary desired to use British influence to save the Malays from themselves and give them the blessings of peace and justice, the Governor found it intolerable that the colony, for which he was responsible, should be harassed by the misgovernment of its neighbours.

In Sir Andrew Clarke's instructions, dated 20 September, 1873, were the following passages:—

"Her Majesty's Government have, it need hardly be said, no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the Malay States. But looking to the long and intimate connexion between them and the British Government, and to the well-being of the British Settlements themselves, Her Majesty's Government find it incumbent upon them to employ such influence as they possess with the Native Princes to rescue, if possible, those fertile and productive countries from the ruin which must befall them if the present disorders continue unchecked.

"I have to request that you will carefully ascertain, as far as you are able, the actual condition of affairs in each State, and that you will report to me whether there are, in your opinion, any steps which can properly be taken by the Colonial Government to promote the restoration of peace and order, and to secure protection to trade and commerce with the native territories. I should wish you especially to consider whether it would be advisable to appoint a British Officer to reside in any of the States. Such an appointment could, of course, only be made with the full consent of the Native Government, and the expenses connected with it would have to be defrayed by the Government of the Straits Settlements."

Here, then, for the first time, was the germ of the residential idea, though Abdullah, writing to Sir Harry Ord not long before, had gilded his plea for acknowledgment as Sultan of Pĕrak, by requesting that a British officer might be sent to him to teach him how to rule the country. That request he repeated to Sir Andrew Clarke shortly after his arrival, and the Governor, having made all the inquiries necessary for his purpose, at once decided on the line of action.

Lord Kimberley's instructions were as wide as could be wished, and they contained a valuable and definite suggestion; but they invited the Governor to report his proposals, and Sir Andrew Clarke, a man of energy and decision, ready to take any responsibility, decided that this was no time for talking; the situation demanded immediate action, and he would take it, reporting what he had done, not what he proposed to do. Naturally the Governor did not come to this conclusion until he had gone thoroughly into the case, taken the advice of all those who had any knowledge of Malay and Chinese affairs, and felt confident that he could carry his plan to a successful issue.

At that time there was, in Singapore, a very remarkable and able officer in charge of Chinese affairs, Mr. W. A. Pickering (afterwards created C. M. G. for his many public services), and he was sent to Pinang to endeavour to persuade the heads of the Chinese factions, then warring in Lĕrut, to agree to accept the Governor's settlement of their differences. In this duty Mr. Pickering was entirely successful, and, as soon as he had telegraphed the result of his negotiations, the Governor started from Singapore in the colonial yacht for the island of Pangkor lying off the coast of the Dindings, near the mouth of the

Pêrak River. The Governor sent ahead, or took with him, Mr. [T.] Bradell [*sic*], the Attorney-General; Major [J. F.] McNair, R.A., the Colonial Engineer; Colonel Dunlop, R.A., the Inspector General of Police; and Mr. A. M. Skinner of the Secretariat, the party reaching Pangkor on 13 January. Meanwhile, by the Governor's instructions, I went from Pinang to Lârut on board H.M.S. *Aton* to tell the Chinese that their friends in Pinang had agreed to suspend hostilities, and to invite the Mantri, and any other chiefs who could be got at, to meet Sir Andrew at the rendezvous on 15 January. By that date it had been possible to collect at Pangkor, Raja Abdullah, his relative Raja Idris (the present Sultan of Pêrak), and the chiefs who were his adherents, also the Raja Bëndahâra, the Mantri, the Tēmenggong, and the Dato Sâgor; but Raja Ismail and Raja Yusuf were too far away, and made no effort to attend. Mr. Pickering and the heads of the Chinese factions were also present.

After some days of discussion an instrument was drawn up in English and Malay, and was signed and sealed on 20 January, 1874. It is known as the Pangkor Engagement, or Treaty, and provides, amongst other things, for the recognition of Raja Abdullah as Sultan of Pêrak, and the grant of the title of Ex-Sultan to Ismail, who is to hand over the regalia to Sultan Abdullah.

The two most important clauses are as follows: —

Clause VI. "That the Sultan receive and provide a suitable residence for a British Officer, to be called Resident, who shall be accredited to his Court, and whose advice must be asked and acted upon in all questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom."

Clause X. "That the collection and control of all revenues and the general administration of the Country be regulated under the advice of these Residents."

The Mantri was confirmed as the chief in charge of Lârut, with an Assistant Resident, and Captain T. C. S. Speedy was immediately appointed to this latter office.

As soon as the document had been signed and sealed the Sultan was saluted, and he and his chiefs returned to their homes in Lower Pêrak. The heads of the Chinese factions then signed a bond, undertaking, under a penalty of \$50,000, to disarm, to destroy their stockades, give up their row-boats, and not again to break the peace. At the same time a commission, consisting of Colonel Dunlop, Mr. Pickering, and myself, with the leaders of the Go Kuan and Si Kuan factions, was appointed to at once see that these promises as to the destruction of forts and the rendering up of all arms were faithfully observed, to arrange for a settlement of the dispute concerning the ownership of the mines, and to effect if possible, the rescue of a number of Chinese women and children said to be detained in captivity by one side or the other.

The Governor and his party then returned to Singapore, and from there Sir Andrew sent a report of his proceedings to Lord Carnarvon, then Secretary of State for the Colonies. As soon as the facts were known the Chambers of Commerce of both Singapore and Pinang wrote letters of congratulation, and the Governor's action was received with high approval by all classes and nationalities in the colony.

b. *An historian's view*

[C. D. Cowan, *Nineteenth-Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control*, London, 1961, 169-75. The author is Professor of the History of South-East Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies in the University of London.]

REASONING from the Colonial Office papers we... reach the conclusion that the decision to take some action in Malaya, and if necessary to intervene in the affairs of the states, was provoked not by conditions in the Peninsula, nor by any consideration of British economic interests there, but by fear of foreign intervention. This is confirmed by the terms in which Kimberley justified his instructions to Sir Andrew Clarke to [W. E.] Gladstone:

The condition of the Malay Peninsula [he wrote] is becoming very serious. It is the old story of misgovernment of Asiatic States. This might go on without any very serious consequences except the stoppage of trade, were it not that European and Chinese capitalists, stimulated by the great riches in tin mines which exist in some of the Malay States are suggesting to the native Princes that they should seek the aid of Europeans to enable them to put down the disorders which prevail. We are the paramount power on the Peninsula up to the limit of the States, tributary to Siam, and looking to the vicinity of India and our whole position in the East I apprehend that it would be a serious matter if any other European Power were to obtain a footing in the Peninsula.

This attitude was... in line with the idea that the promotion of British economic interests in the area, however desirable in itself, has in fact always been secondary to the defence of India, the protection of the sea route to China, and the denial of bases along that route to potentially dangerous powers.

Many interesting questions arise from this conclusion, but we can only find space to discuss two of them here. First, what led Kimberley to conclude that the threat of foreign intervention in Malaya was real enough to justify action? Of the other Colonial Powers Holland was precluded by the Treaty of 1824 from interfering, and a general

colonial settlement had been reached with her only two years before with the Sumatra and Gold Coast Treaties of 1871. France was prostrate after her war with Prussia, and her colonial activities were to remain at a stand-still until after the Congress of Berlin in 1878. In the East after the Franco-Siamese Settlement of 1867 secured the recognition of the French protectorate over Cambodia successive French Consuls at Bangkok contented themselves with the administration of their extra-territorial rights in Siam. So little were any other states regarded as potential rivals in London that a large concession in North Borneo granted to the American Consul in Brunei in 1865 passed almost unnoticed in the Foreign Office and Colonial Office records. Even a Prussian attempt to survey Blair Harbour, on the east coast of Johore, and the off-lying islands, for use as a coaling station during the Franco-Prussian War was not taken very seriously in London.

By the middle of 1873 however conditions had changed. A Dutch invasion of Atjeh at the beginning of the year created a focus of unsettlement in the Straits. The Atjehnese leaders, seeking a counter-balance against the Dutch, attempted to obtain the support of some other Power by offering island bases and trading monopolies. Rumours of secret treaties negotiated with the United States and the Italian consuls in Singapore were denied by the countries concerned, but they were taken seriously enough in London to engage the attention of the British Cabinet. Italy and the United States were not the only 'new nations' which had to be considered. Seymour Clarke's letter specifically mentioned Germany, and though a junior Colonial Office official remarked that the prospect of a German protectorate was small the Liberal ministers were not so certain that they might not meet with trouble from this quarter.

There had been a marked change in the British attitude towards Germany during the course of the Franco-Prussian War, which transferred from France to Germany political predominance in Europe. One feature of the uncertainty which followed this disruption of the balance of power was an invasion scare in England, prompted by the publication in 1871 of an anonymous pamphlet, *The Battle of Dorking*. Another was a series of alarming rumours started by the King of the Belgians, who sent warnings to his English friends of an understanding between Russia, Germany, France and the United States to act together in support of Russia against England in Asia. The Liberal ministers were not much impressed by the invasion scare, and Gladstone commented acidly on the warnings from Belgium—'This intelligence rather tends to lower my estimate of the *acumen* of the King of the Belgians.' But they had some basis in fact; the years after 1870 saw a drawing together of Germany and Russia as part of the

Bismarckian alliance system, which was consolidated in June 1873 by the creation of the *Dreikaiserbund* between Germany, Russia and Austria. Bismarck's support had already enabled Russia in 1870 to denounce with impunity those clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856) which forbade her to maintain military or naval establishments on the Black Sea. Russia was Britain's most feared rival in Asia, and in the years between 1866 and 1872 her conquest of the Khanates of Central Asia brought her to the boundaries of Afghanistan and enabled her to intensify her pressure on Persia. Both Britain's traditional opposition to any power which aspired to the domination of Europe, and her suspicion of Russia therefore urged her to view with suspicion any hint of the acquisition of territory by Germany.

There is no indication in any of the official papers that in 1873 any minister or official servant of the Crown had knowledge that any other Power actually contemplated the acquisition of territory or influence in Malaya. The consolidation of the British position there seems to have served rather to remove temptation than to forestall a projected movement in that direction. The background to Kimberley's decision is by no means clear, and it remains for some future student of this period to uncover definite evidence of the circumstances which prompted him to take the view he did. It is just possible, in view of events in Fiji and the Gold Coast at this time, that he justified intervention in Malaya in these terms because he thought that no other argument would secure the acquiescence of Gladstone. But until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming the only course is to accept at its face value Kimberley's own declaration that:

Her Majesty's Government could not see with indifference the interference of a foreign Power in the affairs of the Peninsula, and it would be difficult to justify an objection to the Native States applying for aid to other Powers if the British Government refuses to lend its aid.

We come now to the second question for discussion. Granted that some move must be made in Malaya, what should it be, annexation or the proclamation of Protectorates? Again there is little evidence that bears directly on the question. One course of action seems to have been ruled out from the beginning. There was never any prospect of the Liberal Government sanctioning annexation. Two similar problems with which the Liberals were faced in 1873, in the Gold Coast and Fiji, did end in annexation. But the deed was done not by the Liberals but their Conservative successors. In the Gold Coast the Ashanti War was still in progress when the Liberals quitted office early in 1874, and it was left to their successors to annex the old 'Protectorate'. In Fiji, where the activities of 'black-birders', traders and adventurers kept the islands in turmoil, the Gladstone Government was again faced with the need for action. Both the settlers and

the natives pressed for annexation. Kimberley continually urged the reluctant Gladstone to a decision, but in June 1873 the Cabinet fell back on the expedient of a Commission of Enquiry, which staved off responsibility long enough to get the tottering Liberal ministry out of office.

It is tempting to see Kimberley's instructions to Sir Andrew Clarke to 'enquire and report' as an application of Fijian tactics to Malaya. But several circumstances combine to suggest that they were not intended to shelve or delay action, and were not the result of a politically inspired compromise. In the first place the original suggestion came from the Permanent Secretary at the Colonial Office, [Sir Robert] Herbert, who wrote:

As Sir A. Clarke is believed to be able and cautious in administrative matters it might be well to desire him confidentially to consider after his arrival whether it would be safe & advantageous to extend our influence to some parts of the Malay territories beyond our own Settlements.

In the second place Clarke's instructions were never submitted in draft to any other department of state. Kimberley recorded in his original minute of 22 July his intention of speaking to Granville at the Foreign Office and Argyll at the India Office on the subject, and may have done so. But when detailed memoranda on the situation in Malaya prepared by his officials were presented to him, he realized that under the arrangement reached in 1868 he was entitled to conduct relations with the states not under Siamese influence without reference to the Foreign Office, and insisted on doing so. Lastly, neither Clarke's instructions nor the general situation in Malaya appear ever to have formed the subject of discussion in Cabinet. There is no reference to Malaya in Gladstone's Cabinet minutes. The Liberal Cabinet during 1873 were distracted by continual domestic crises, and what time they had for colonial affairs was occupied by Fiji and Ashanti. Clarke's instructions were therefore entirely the work of Kimberley and his officials, and it was not until 10 September that the draft despatch embodying these instructions was submitted to Gladstone. He returned it without comment.

The instructions in their final and now widely known form were somewhat weaker than the draft. But this seems to have been the result of purely accidental circumstances. From the beginning, as a result of Herbert's suggestion and the departmental memoranda on existing treaties with the Malay States, Kimberley had had in mind an extension of these treaties so as to allow of increased British influence in the affairs of the states, and to exclude the possibility that any other Power might establish itself there. This followed naturally from the nature of the existing treaties. When these were subjected to detailed scrutiny in the Colonial Office it was realized for the first

time that Perak, for instance, was almost a British Protectorate already, as result of the 1826 treaties. Thus the draft instructions called on Clarke to report 'what mode of proceeding should in his opinion be adopted', making it quite clear that some form of action was in any case going to be taken, since 'the interests of the British Settlements require that we shall exert our influence to put an end to the state of anarchy and disorder which prevails.' These instructions were originally drawn up in the form of a confidential letter to be given to Clarke before he sailed for Malaya. But probably owing to the time the papers were kept by Gladstone the letter was not ready when Clarke sailed, and it had to be turned into a despatch. It seems to have been this that resulted in the instructions being toned down, and in the passage which dealt with 'the interference of a foreign Power in the affairs of the Peninsula' being cut out. The operative part of the instructions then read:

I have to request you will carefully ascertain as far as you are able the actual condition of affairs in each state, and that you will report to me whether there are, in your opinion, any steps which can properly be taken by the Colonial Government to promote the restoration of peace and order, and to secure protection to trade and commerce with the Native Territories.

I would wish you especially to consider whether it would be advisable to appoint a British officer to reside in any of the States. Such an appointment could of course only be made with the full consent of the Native Government and the expenses connected with it would have to be defrayed by the Government of the Straits Settlements.

To sum up, the decision to depart from the policy of rigid non-interference in Malaya was prompted by fear that if the disordered conditions in some of the states were not ended some other Power might be invited to intervene. This decision was taken by the Secretary of State on his own initiative. He and his officials had in mind an extension of the existing treaties with Perak and Selangor which would eliminate the possibility of foreign interference. They also envisaged the possibility that British Agents might be stationed in these states, but they did not elaborate this suggestion. Instead they decided that as a first step the new Governor of the Straits Settlements should be asked to report on the practicability of these proposals.

c. Another historian's view

[David McIntyre, 'Britain's Intervention in Malaya: The Origin of Lord Kimberley's Instructions to Sir Andrew Clarke in 1873', *Journal*

of *Southeast Asian History*, II, 3, 1961, 47-69. McIntyre is Professor of History in the University of Canterbury, New Zealand.]

It is well known that British political control in the Malay States began with the Pangkor agreement of January 1874, which was soon followed by the appointment of the first Resident in Perak. The Earl of Kimberley's famous instructions of 20 September 1873 have generally been accepted as providing the basis for this new phase in the history of Malaya and of the British empire. Sir Andrew Clarke was told that the conduct of Britain's relations with the Malay States which were not subject to Siamese influence, would be an important part of his duties as governor. Since growing anarchy was injuring trade and British interests generally, the government had to consider whether it could do anything to improve matters in the States. Although the British government had no desire to interfere in the affairs of the Peninsula, said Kimberley, Clarke should inquire into the condition of each state and report any steps which the Straits government could take to restore peace and to protect trade. Kimberley also added the often-quoted words:

"I would wish you especially to consider whether it would be advisable to appoint a British Officer to reside in any of the Malay States. Such an appointment would only be made with the full consent of the native government...."

Six years before this, when Sir Harry Ord became the first governor of the Straits Settlements under the Colonial Office, he arrived with no instructions about the Malay States. What happened in six years to alter Britain's policy?

C. N. Parkinson, in his recent detailed study,¹ while carefully describing many of the incidents of those years, has failed, I think, to account satisfactorily for the new policy. The Colonial Office in his view, adopted a consistent policy of non-intervention in the Malay States. Although Ord was persuaded by many factors to intervene, and being unpopular in Singapore might have been tempted to make a bid for acclaim by a dramatic external policy, he was restrained by successive Colonial Secretaries. Yet Parkinson shows that intervention did take place. In 1871 Colonel [A. E. H.] Anson intervened in the Selangor Incident and in 1873 Ord intervened, on Anson's advice, in Perak, with the approval of the Colonial Office. Because of the effects of the Perak and Selangor wars, and because of skilful pressure by the Straits interests in London, Kimberley instructed Clarke to report on the possibility of intervention. Clarke worked fast; realising in the autumn of 1873 that the Liberal government was about to fall, and being a man to act first and report afterwards, he deter-

¹ *British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877*, Singapore, 1960.

mined on a bold policy which he anticipated would appeal to a Conservative ministry. This in bald outline would appear to be the core of Parkinson's thesis.

But a number of further questions need to be asked. Was the policy of non-intervention as consistent as Parkinson says? What attitude did the Secretaries of State for the Colonies take in the privacy of their office minutes, which were not published, and which Parkinson has not studied? If there were many factors compelling Britain to intervene, which was decisive in persuading Kimberley to contemplate action in the summer of 1873? Why, once some form of intervention was decided on, did it take the form of Kimberley's suggestion of the Residents? Where did Kimberley get this idea from?

My aim here is to attempt some answer to these questions by examining the rather narrow theme of the development of Colonial Office policy, as recorded in the manuscript files in the Public Record Office. No attempt will be made to narrate the details of events in Malaya, which have often been recounted. It must be emphasised, moreover, that the Colonial Office, in forming its policies had a very imperfect knowledge of these events. . . . The Secretary of State as he planned his future moves was rather like a general going into battle with poor maps and a weak intelligence service.

There were three phases in the development of British policy from the Transfer in 1867 to Clarke's instructions in 1873.

- (1) Ord's first tour of duty as governor (1867-71), when the question of the Malay States was first raised for the Colonial Office, which decided generally on a policy of non-intervention.
- (2) The interregnum when Col. Anson administered the government (1871-72), when new proposals for intervention were rejected, but when his actual intervention in the Selangor Incident of 1871 was approved.
- (3) Ord's second tour (1872-73), when he faced the spread of war in Perak, Selangor and the Linggi region, when he was restrained by the policy of non-intervention. In this period he did his best to intervene in all these areas, and so doing he caused, if nothing else, the Colonial Office to become concerned about the west coast of Malaya.

I

The Colonial Secretary who first had to deal with the Malay States was the Duke of Buckingham, and the policy of non-intervention was formulated under his direction. It was inherited from the India Office, but at the time of the Transfer in 1867 no discussion appears to have taken place about the Peninsula. When crown colony administration was established in the Straits by Sir Harry Ord the chief interest in

the Colonial Office was the revenue since fear of a new drain on the exchequer had been the main factor which held up the Transfer for so long. On 8 June 1867, however, among a bundle of papers which the India Office handed over, Charles Cox, the head of the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office found a few which were "interesting & instructive as regards our relations & difficulties with Native Princes". These documents referred to the Johore-Pahang boundary dispute, to minor restrictions on trade by the rulers of Larut, Kedah and Kelantan, and to the problem of trade with the east coast of Sumatra.

None of these matters were regarded as urgent. "Nothing further to be done at present" was the usual comment. . . . In 1867, in fact, the Colonial Office did not give any serious thought to the Malay States.

Early in 1868 Ord's relations with Kedah and Kelantan forced the Colonial Office to remedy this deficiency. Ord was not accustomed to the routine of crown colonies where all details were referred to London, and at the age of forty-eight he was an experienced negotiator, who had received the Singapore appointment because of the reputation he made for himself on important matters of policy in West Africa. Confident in his abilities he began to teach the Sultan of Kelantan the virtues of free trade and to try to tidy the boundary of Province Wellesley and Kedah.

It was these negotiations which introduced the Colonial Office to the question of relations with the Malay States. The whole matter had to be considered in February 1868, and . . . it was evident at once that Ord's action opened an important question of principle for the Colonial Office: "namely our mode of dealing with the Native Chiefs—a point on which Sir H. O. has had no instructions". Buckingham was quite clear in his own mind: "Col. Ord himself is to govern the settlements not to diplomatise, which may be left to the F.[oreign] O.[ffice]." But [Sir Frederic] Rogers [the Permanent Under-Secretary,] realised a rather wider question was raised concerning the whole sphere of the responsibility of the Governor of the Straits Settlements in South-East Asia. . . .

Pleased to have a concrete case and not an abstract question Rogers considered relations with the Malay States in the broadest context by surveying the division of responsibility on the entire imperial frontier. . . . Rogers' minute was the first step after the Transfer in the direction of closer interest in the Malay States. He wrote:

"in some places the FO has no machinery thro' which it can act, no channels thro' wh it can desire information—& no interest in the questions wh arise—while on the contrary the CO has all these advantages for the transaction of business. Such is the case in the countries adjoining Natal & the Cape. Consequently the CO deals

absolutely without any intervention on the part of the FO, with Kaffirs and Zulus.

In China the contrary state of things exists & the contrary mode of proceeding is inferred. We are continually impressing on Sir R. Macdonell [Governor of Hong Kong] that he is only to communicate with the Chinese Govt. thro' the diplomatic authorities.

On the West Coast of Africa I shd think the CO wd be left to take its own way absolutely, but for the fact that the FO has an interest in the Slave Trade question & consequent Treaties with Native "Kings"—Here I believe it is not unusual to invest a consular authority in the Govr or administrator who in that capacity takes orders from the FO. [e.g. at Lagos]... I am inclined to say that this double responsibility of the Govr to authorities whose bias is not always the same is not, except in very easy times, a very safe or satisfactory method, if it can be avoided[.]. . .

Now as to the Straits. . . ."

Here Rogers defined three spheres, suggesting (1) that the governor should deal, under the Colonial Office, with the Malay States "not subject to any influence than our own", (2) that he should be able to deal directly with the Siamese tributaries, under Foreign Office approval, and (3) that relations with the Dutch would as elsewhere be handled by the Foreign Office with Colonial Office advice. In March 1868 the two departments worked out a policy along these lines. The Colonial Office agreed that Ord was the man best placed for gaining information on the Peninsula and that his prestige was important, but his activities might conflict (as they soon did) with British policy towards Siam or the Netherlands and that a local colonial interest might embarrass the home government. The Foreign Office had no objection to the governor having direct relations with the Siamese tributaries, provided treaties were negotiated through the consul in Bangkok. On the whole Lord Stanley, the Foreign Secretary, found it all "rather an irritating and troublesome matter" and the Permanent Under Secretary, Edmund Hammond, said "let the Colonial Office adopt their own rules".

With his ideas generally accepted in this rather casual fashion by Whitehall, Ord was now furnished with some belated instructions as to his Malayan policy. Relations with the Dutch would be as in similar regions like British Guiana and the Gold Coast. The important part of the instructions concerned the Malay States not subject to Siam. Here Ord was told:

"you will possess a larger authority. But you will remember that the relations of the settlements with those powers are matters which may at any time become of serious importance. . . . Although therefore circumstances may not unfrequently arise in which you may be called to act absolutely on your own judgement, yet it is

generally undesirable that you should enter into formal negotiations with native princes... except in pursuance of an object or a policy approved by HM's government".

Thus the policy on non-intervention was slightly qualified by an authority for the governor to act on his own judgement if absolutely necessary. The instruction was dated 22 April 1868. Yet after only two months Buckingham was forced to modify his policy slightly, and to admit that intervention might be necessary.

This modification was caused in the first place by requests for intervention in the Malay States from Straits companies with economic interest in the Peninsula. Within two days, 9th-11th May 1868, requests reached the Colonial Office from two quarters. The most comprehensive was from W. H. M. Read, at home on leave with an introduction from Ord. In London he was making arrangements for certain commercial ventures and his London collaborator was his brother-in-law, Seymour Clarke, the highly successful General Manager of the Great Northern Railway... While Clarke pestered the Foreign Office about a telegraph concession in Siam, Read sent both the Colonial and Foreign Offices a forthright indictment of the policy of non-intervention, in which he threw out the suggestion that new treaties might be made with the Malay rulers...

...Rogers decided to scotch Read's notions. To follow them was to "involve oneself in quarters of which we cannot see the end". He said the government should not approve a policy "which has for its object either territorial extension wh. they look upon as an [a]bsolute disadvantage, or political influence, which as they believe will follow as a matter of course". When Read's letter went to Singapore Ord was reminded of the policy of non-intervention.

At the same time the Colonial Office was considering the other request. This was from the London agents of Paterson, Simons, and Company who had worked tin mines briefly at Kuantan, Pahang. Some property had been confiscated by followers of Wan Ahmad in 1863, and as neither the governor nor the Government of India would assist, the company turned to the Colonial Office. By now Rogers was evidently beginning to realise the significance of the question of intervention in the Malay States... He said the Colonial Office should completely disassociate itself from commercial ventures in the Malay States. Thus the answer to Paterson, Simons closely followed that given to Read, and to similar promoters at this time in such places as New Guinea and West Africa. Merchants venturing into 'un-civilised' lands did so at their own risk; the government would not intervene to enforce their contracts—"when the disturbed state of the country, and the disputes of rival claimants to power cause embarrassment and loss". The phrase quoted is significant, as it represents a slight qualification of Rogers's view. It was added to the draft of the

despatch by Buckingham on 4 June 1868 because he thought "there may be cases in which it might be right & proper to take strong measures." He did not specify here in which cases, but his admission represents a significant qualification of the policy of non-intervention. And on the same day, 4 June, at least one possible case for intervention was cited in a reply to Ord over his Kelantan reports.

... This despatch, which arrived exactly a week after Reed's letter, was couched in such similar terms that Rogers, noting that all these letters were about "extensions of our influence", suspected some concerted move. Ord offered now a comprehensive policy for the Malay States. Firstly, in the case of the Siamese tributaries, he did not know what Siam's precise relationship was, but in the Kelantan and Kedah negotiations he had seen Siamese commissioners complete the business without so much as a reference to the rulers concerned. Ord thought "the subjection of these native States of the Peninsular [*sic*] to Powers greater and more civilized than themselves is an advantage to themselves and to all who have relations with them". Secondly, in the southern part of the Peninsula he said that outside Johore there was "neither order, peace, nor regular government". "I feel", he concluded, "that it would be greatly to the advantage of the settlements if our influence could be thus extended over the Peninsular [*sic*], and I shall not fail to avail myself of any opening that may present itself for doing so".

Ord, then, had decided what his duty was in the Malay States, and Rogers did not like it. "Settlers and merchants are always ready to call for operations of which they are to reap the profit and Govt. to bear the [cost]... And Governors are only too apt to fall in with a policy wh. gives interest and importance to their proceedings"... Ord was reminded, therefore, a third time of the policy of non-intervention and he was told to keep clear of any disorders in the neighbouring Malay States "which do not directly affect or threaten the peace of the settlements themselves". Here, then, was Buckingham's ground for local discretion. Having admitted, privately to the department, that intervention might become necessary, he permitted Ord to do this if the security of the colony was involved.

Buckingham's regime at the Colonial Office ended in December 1868. In summarising his Malayan policy, it can be said that the Colonial Office had evolved its own policy of non-intervention, and since Ord seemed rather anxious to be off the mark, this was reiterated several times. At the same time the governor was given a local discretion where the security of the colony was involved, and it had been admitted in London that intervention might become necessary. The germ of a revolution in policy lay in this, for when in 1872 Penang became involved in the Larut war this provided the condition for the use of Buckingham's discretion.

Gladstone's ministry of 1868-74, which would be responsible for Clarke's instructions in 1873, began with a short tenure at the Colonial Office by the second Earl Granville, but he did not modify his predecessor's Malayan policy. He approved Ord's successful mediation in the Johore-Pahang dispute, but when Ord tried to revive the British claim to the Dindings, Perak, Granville restrained him. Granville was a politician rather than an administrator, and since Lord Stanley of Alderley (who had lived in the Straits and could be a nuisance in the House of Lords) demanded an explanation of the Dindings move, Granville reminded Ord of the policy of non-intervention.

Having been cautioned now on four occasions Ord ceased trying to do what he believed was needed in the Peninsula. He told his Legislative Council at the end of 1869 "my hands are tied". He refused to intervene in the Selangor civil war when requested by the Sultan in 1870; in fact at this time Ord did not realise what the war was really about. As he was going on sick leave to England in March 1871 he waited until he saw the Secretary of State in person before raising the question of intervention in the Peninsula again.

II

It was Colonel Anson, who administered the government of the Straits in Ord's absence, who first forced the Earl of Kimberley to think seriously about the Malay States. When he became Colonial Secretary in July 1870 Kimberley obviously had little knowledge of, or interest in, the Peninsula. For instance... when a rumour was circulated by the Dutch that the Maharaja of Johore was about to lease Tioman Island to the North German Confederation as a naval station, Kimberley wrote "the first step is to ascertain distinctly *where* the Maharaja & his islands are". What Kimberley was interested in, as a former diplomatist under Palmerston, was imperial strategy. As Under-secretary in the Foreign Office ten years before he had favoured supporting the Dutch in the Archipelago to prevent France stepping in and threatening India and Australia. But after the Franco-Prussian war he believed France could be discounted as a colonial power for a number of years; now, it seems, his fears were of Germany. Thus... rumour of a possible German interest in Selangor in 1873 would find him alive immediately to strategic implications. As against Kimberley's rather narrow interest and his somewhat cynical aloofness from Malay affairs, Robert Herbert, the new Permanent Under-secretary who succeeded Rogers in 1871, was a man with first hand experience of the colonies. He had been both Colonial Secretary and then Premier of Queensland and he had also visited the Straits Settlements. How,

then, did these men react to Anson's attempts at intervention in the Peninsula?

It is somewhat ironical that while Ord failed to move Kimberley while he was on leave in England, Anson not only intervened with force in Selangor and gained Kimberley's approval, but without knowing it he forced Kimberley to admit, like Buckingham, that intervention might become necessary.

Anson, however, did not achieve this by the merits of his advocacy, since it is quite clear that the Colonial Office took great exception to him from the start. They felt Anson was too eager to reverse Ord's policies behind his back. . . . Kimberley was very irritated when Anson displayed "the foolish tendencies of acting governors to fussy meddling with the policy of their superiors" Therefore, when in June 1871 Anson announced the findings of the committee which reviewed Malayan policy, a hostile reception, partly on personal grounds, was to be expected. . . .

Anson appointed the Malay States committee largely because relations with the States lying between Johore and the Siamese tributaries were unsatisfactory and trade was affected. In the spring of 1871 the Selangor civil war (called locally the 'Klang war') was reaching a critical phase. Anson probably knew that when Ord visited the Sultan in May 1870 he confined himself to advice. He knew also that there was tension in Perak, and by the time the committee's report went to London Anson knew of the death of Sultan Ali—the event which brought matters to a head. Anson also found papers from Malacca referring to a case of robbery in Rembau which were endorsed by Ord 'left for Col. Anson'. So there were good grounds for attempting some improvement in relations with the states of the west coast lying between Malacca and Province Wellesley.

The Committee was probably pre-disposed towards intervention. Major McNair, the Colonial Engineer, had served in India for a time but had been at the Straits and Labuan since 1853. Commander Robinson, the Senior Naval Officer, commanded the tool by which any intervention would have to take place, and Arthur Birch, who was acting for Anson in Penang, had been lent by the West Indies department of the Colonial Office and evidently had closer relations with the Peninsula than his superiors at home either knew about or desired. . . . The committee proposed that carefully selected and qualified Europeans should be appointed, on the application of the Sultans to reside in the Malay States. They would advise on government and economic development and would form a channel of communication with the Straits government. Johore, they said, had virtually adopted this system. The suggestion was very like that of the later Residents, but Anson did not support it and made a more modest proposal. He wanted a "political agent" to visit the Malay States frequently—by

no means an outrageous idea in view of Ord's visits to Siam, Trengganu, Pahang, Johore, Selangor and Batavia. But the Colonial Office was now impatient with Anson. "I do not find the slightest pressing need for moving", wrote Cox, the head of the Eastern department. . . .

It was, in fact, the Selangor Incident of July 1871 which caused a modification of Kimberley's views. . . . For the intervention, which began in the pursuit of pirates, ended with the coercing of the Sultan of Selangor, with the Straits government taking sides in the Selangor civil war, and with publicity for the whole affair in England. . . .

...[I]here were a number of questionable things about the Selangor Incident. After the pirates and the stolen junk had been found in the Selangor River Anson could have turned the matter over to the Sultan under the terms of the 1825 treaty, or, since the police officers had been resisted and shots had been fired on the steamer *Pluto*, Anson could have telegraphed home for instructions. Instead he ordered a search for the escaped pirates in Selangor territory, and the... *Rinaldo* bombardment followed.

Although no doubt Anson believed he was acting in a case of piracy and self-defence (and this was accepted by the Colonial Office) he found himself interfering in the Selangor civil war. He later claimed that he did not know the political situation in the Selangor River when he ordered the search. Therefore the expedition stumbled unwittingly into the complexities of Selangor politics. It was left for Charles Irving (the Auditor-General), who was one of the few Straits officials who had studied the Malayan political system and who had visited Klang in April 1870, to paint the background. Since Irving believed that the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din was the most promising candidate for power in Selangor, Anson decided to support him. . . .

On the basis of this advice the... Langat settlement was forced on the reluctant Sultan Abdul-Samad. Although he knew that his son-in-law, the Tengku, was unpopular, and that it was by no means certain that he would prevail in the civil war, the Sultan was forced by J. W. W. Birch, the Colonial Secretary, to renew the old authority of 1868. This was possibly designed originally to enable the Tengku, after marrying the Sultan's daughter, to derive an income from the revenue of the Langat region, but it included that well-known, ambiguous, phrase that he would "give up the country with its districts to Our son... to govern and develop for US and for Our Sons". Henceforth, the Straits government were convinced that the Tengku was "viceroy" of Selangor, and Raja Mahdi, his most troublesome opponent, was outlawed. Whether Birch promised support officially is not recorded. . . . Certainly the impression was gained locally, as the Tengku toured the Selangor river mouths in the company of R.N. vessels, [that] Britain was committed to his support. Irving compared Birch's action at Langat with what had been done previously with Johore:

the most promising ruler had been picked and supported with advice and influence.

How did the Colonial Office react to this? When the news of the *Rinaldo* shelling arrived on 21 August 1871, Anson's proposal of the "political agent" was still unanswered. Kimberley saw the report on the Selangor affair on 26 August. He took no exception to it, although he considered that Anson had handled it badly by exposing the police to danger in the first place. . . . On the same day, replying to Anson's plan for the agents, he said there would be no question of political intervention except in case of emergency. In view of Kimberley's reaction, we may assume that the Selangor action was such an emergency. The report of the Langat settlement arrived on 4 September 1871; Kimberley saw it on the 10th and found it "thoroughly satisfactory". He hoped Birch had not pledged support to the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din, yet for the benefit of the office he added this significant qualification: "I use the word 'pledge' because it might become advisable to give him [the Tengku] support but this is very different from *promising* it".

Thus, the Selangor intervention did not meet disapproval; the Colonial Office regarded the matter as one of piracy and obviously they did not realise its political implications. However, the affair caused flutterings elsewhere. On 13 September 1871 Sir Benson Maxwell, the former Chief Justice in Singapore, in a letter to *The Times* castigated the incident as "an act of war". What right, he asked, had a governor to arrest people in a foreign country or to punish subjects of that country who obstructed him? The Sultan of Selangor was at peace with Britain, yet because some of his people resisted British officers who were carrying out an unlawful order

"his town and forts were . . . destroyed, a number of his subjects were killed, and he was himself compelled, by threats of further hostilities, to appoint to the administration of some province an officer nominated by the English Governor. . . ."

It was inglorious and unnecessary, said Maxwell, and should "raise a blush of shame and indignation on every English face".

This tirade reached the right quarters. Gladstone remembered . . . trouble over Raja Brooke and the Dyak pirates and he asked Kimberley what had happened. . . . "The Malay pirates are desperate men, and the murders committed on this occasion were most atrocious", wrote Kimberley melodramatically and not very accurately. Gladstone was prepared to accept Kimberley's judgement, but he wondered, with quick perception, whether "on principle as well as for want of sufficient force" the governor should not have applied first to the Sultan of Selangor. Kimberley therefore agreed to alter his despatch to Anson. While approving of his action he said that in future incidents with the Malay States the governor of the Straits

should ensure that "all means of obtaining redress by peaceful means are exhausted before measures of coercion are employed".

* * *

III

Ord's second tour at Singapore was the period of the worst disorders in Perak and Selangor. Although his actions were circumscribed by the policy of non-intervention he did his best to understand what was happening...

... Ord had a new subordinate at Penang. Colonel Anson had applied for leave, and the Colonial Office thought it wise that he should be out of the way when Ord returned. J. W. W. Birch, who offered to go to Penang, was needed at Singapore, so the Colonial Office had to find another substitute. The choice fell on G. W. R. Campbell (later Sir George) who was Inspector of the Police in Ceylon and who had ten years previous experience in India... [H]e was not afraid to make bold suggestions for a new policy in Malaya, and he seems to have impressed Lord Kimberley when he was on leave in England in 1873. In fact Kimberley's first admission that intervention might be necessary was made after reading one of Campbell's reports.

Ord faced five serious problems in the Peninsula in 1872-3. (1) the controversy over Raja Mahdi, and, after the latter's return to Selangor, the consequent adverse turn in Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din's fortunes (2) the possibility of the Selangor war spreading to Sungei Ujong. (3) the disputed succession in Perak. (4) the Chinese miners war in Larut, which became entangled with the Perak dispute, and, through the secret societies, directly involved the colony. (5) the effect which the Malay problems had on Straits trade, which caused further demands for intervention both from European and Chinese merchants....

[Ord]... was extremely late in forwarding some of his reports, and those which reached home in 1872 created a very unfavourable impression. By December 1872—January 1873 the Colonial Office was quite furious with Governor Ord.

The trouble began over his relations with the Maharaja of Johore. Abu-Bakar wished to purchase some rifles from England for his police, but as Kimberley had read from a Straits newspaper that the Maharaja was harbouring Raja Mahdi (who they knew as the villain of the Selangor Incident) with Ord's collusion, Kimberley demanded an explanation before he would sanction the arms purchase. Ord showed this despatch to Abu-Bakar, who was pained to think that Kimberley was suspicious about his relations with Raja Mahdi. Ord also pointed out to the Colonial Office that the Straits officials were divided over the rivalry between Raja Mahdi and Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din, and that there were good reasons why the Selangor outlaw had not been arrested... Obviously he was by now very frustrated by

the policy of non-intervention and resented the suspicions which had been entertained in the case of Raja Mahdi where he had followed it. Of the general situation in the Peninsula he wrote: "murder, plundering and burning are the order of the day, and the *bad ones* are beginning to believe the popular cry that 'nothing will induce the Government to interfere'".

The Colonial Office reaction to this was very vehement. On the question of intervention generally Herbert wrote: "most certainly the present Governor cannot be trusted to interfere wisely". On the specific issue of the Johore rifles, by showing Abu-Bakar the despatch Ord was "guilty of great indiscretion". "This shows that Sir H. Ord hardly understands the rudiments of his duty as a Governor", wrote Herbert, and Kimberley agreed that Ord should be censured, although in a manner which would not undermine his influence with the Maharaja. Kimberley drafted the censure himself on 12 December 1872.

* * *

[On 31 December 1872] they received information on the war in Larut. It came in the shape of a report describing Lieut-Governor Campbell's expedition to the Larut River on 16-18 October 1872. Although the Colonial Office found this "unfortunate and undignified" . . . it had important consequences. For as it was becoming obvious that the Chinese societies at war in Larut were based upon Penang, whence their arms were obtained, Campbell made his expedition to warn those engaged in this traffic of "the grave offence of which they had been guilty" and to "prevent turbulence by the presence of a British man-of-war at Larut". He did not achieve anything, and he was censured for allowing the societies to use Penang as their supply base, but his report indicated to Ord, and to Whitehall, the seriousness of the Larut war. What is more significant, from the point of view of Colonial Office policy, was the new course which Campbell urged. . . . [namely] "the appointment of a Resident or Political Officer for certain of the Malay States. . . ."

The suggestion met with no response from Ord, who no doubt agreed with it but knew it was impossible at the moment. But in London Edward Knatchbull-Hugessen, the Parliamentary Under-secretary in the Colonial Office, said the fact that Penang was getting mixed up in the Larut war was

"only one of the many instances in which the neglect of proper precautions in the *first instance* has increased difficulties. . . if my memory is correct, the annexation to British Rule of the country in which the disturbances took place, and which its inhabitants are said to desire, would be most beneficial to Penang and contribute to the tranquility & prosperity of the Settlements in no slight degree—

this idea however, is not to be encouraged, I suppose, just now. . . .” . . . Kimberley could not agree “that further extension of British territory is the proper remedy for these evils. If we are to annex all the territory in Asia where there is misgovernment we must end in dividing Asia with Russia. . . .” Yet after only eight months Kimberley changed his mind and gave Ord’s successor the scope which enabled him to fulfill Campbell’s hopes. What caused Kimberley’s crucial *volte face* in the summer of 1873?

There appear to have been three reasons. Firstly, he realised the growing seriousness of the Larut war. Secondly, he was subjected to skilful pressure from those with economic interests in Selangor. Thirdly, there seemed to be a possibility of foreign intervention.

During the early months of 1873 various hints were received of the growing dangers in Larut. Ord applied a blockade, the Admiralty reported that R.N. vessels were patrolling off the coast, and Ord admitted that the situation was getting worse and was leading to piracy too. As a result, on 7 July 1873, Kimberley admitted that something would have to be done. . . .

Kimberley . . . had a conversation with Campbell, who was home on leave. Evidently Campbell impressed the Secretary of State and possibly it was he who convinced him that something would have to be done. For Kimberley wrote on the same day that Sir Andrew Clarke, the next governor, would have to look into the Larut problem. . . . As yet he was undecided what action to take. But at the end of July the second factor came into play and helped him to make up his mind.

Attracted inevitably by the success of Chinese tin mining, a few Englishmen were attempting to enter the Malay States for the same purpose. The group which was destined to influence Lord Kimberley in an unexpected manner was the Selangor Tin Company with which James Guthrie Davidson and W. H. M. Read were connected. . . . Read had attempted to collect the Klang revenue on a commission basis for the Sultan in 1866, but the civil war upset this. He was one of those who believed the Straits Government was not doing enough to support Tengku ‘Zia’u’d-din in 1872. Davidson was the financial backer of both the Tengku and Yap Ah Loy, and therefore he had invested in the success of one side in the Selangor war. In March 1873 he secured a concession from the Tengku of tin mining rights in Selangor for ten years and the Selangor Tin Company hoped to exploit this.

But the company had first to convince prospective investors in Singapore and the City that operations in Selangor would be secure. Thus on 25 June 1873 Davidson’s London solicitors asked the Colonial Office if it would allow the company to employ its own soldiers in Selangor. This was immediately refused, therefore the company tried a different approach. They turned to their chief ally in London,

Mr. Seymour Clarke, who was married to Read's sister. He was a very successful railwayman, who probably became concerned with Malaya, through Read, as a telegraph expert. . . . He became General Manager of the newly built Great Northern Railway in 1860 and ruled at Kings Cross Station (Read's London address) until he retired through ill-health in July 1870. He is said to have been influential with Gladstone when the latter arbitrated in railway pooling arrangements. . . . As leading London director of the Selangor Tin Company he was given the task of getting the Colonial Office to ensure that Selangor was safe for the company's efforts.

Thus on 18 July 1873 Clarke passed on a letter from the Tengku 'Zia'ud-din dated 3 June 1873 in which he asked a member of the Selangor Tin Company "to ascertain if the English, or any other Government, would interfere in any disturbance that might arise in the territory of Salangore". On the face of it this was a vague, and, for this period, not an unusual request from the ruler of a small state on the fringes of British influence. But Clarke also added that a Singapore resident (Read?) had recently expressed the view that "the independent sovereigns of the smaller States of the Malayan Peninsular [*sic*], would put themselves under the Protectorate of some European Power, and Germany was mentioned as most likely to be approached failing England". . . . Clarke's letter brought the third factor into play in influencing Kimberley.

As has been suggested, Kimberley was likely to be sensitive to the dangers Clarke revealed. He supported the Dutch war in Aceh because he realised an unsettled independent Aceh might provide an excuse for foreign intervention. After the incident of the American colony in North Borneo in 1865 and the Italian plans for a penal colony in 1870, the possibility of intervention by some power could not be ruled out. Thus when in February 1873 the Foreign Office passed on a Dutch rumour that Italy or the U.S.A. contemplated treaties with Aceh, although Herbert was at first inclined to dismiss the idea, careful inquiries were made in Singapore, Rome and Washington before the matter was left. . . . [Now] Herbert suggested that Sir Andrew Clarke might consider confidentially if it might "be safe and advantageous to extend our influence to some parts of the Malay territories beyond our settlements". . . .

Early in 1873 [Knatchbull-Hugessen] said annexation was the ideal solution for the Malay States. . . .

Certainly Kimberley saw Seymour Clarke's letter in entirely new light. "It would be impossible for us to consent to any European Power assuming the Protectorate of any state in the Malay Peninsula". . . . On 31 July 1873 he made an interim decision.

Seymour Clarke was to be told that all correspondence about the Selangor Tin Company would have to go through the governor.

With this breathing space gained Kimberley ordered a thorough study of the Malayan treaties. . . . Before deciding on the Malayan matter Kimberley gave the department a fortnight to prepare a comprehensive memorandum on relations with the Malay States under the Indian regime and after "so complete as to be intelligible without books or papers." Even after MacDonald had done this Kimberley still called for some of the original documents. He studied the memorandum most carefully and it is adorned with his pencilled comments. . . . Kimberley told his department that the whole question of the Malayan policy would be dealt with in connection with Sir Andrew Clarke's instructions. . . .

. . . [T]he final step came at the end of August when Kimberley wrote the new governor's instructions. Before he did this the . . . petition from the 248 Chinese traders reached London with the comment by Ord that the whole of the west coast from Province Wellesley to Malacca was in a state of anarchy. . . . Kimberley wrote his famous draft for Sir Andrew Clarke on 31 August. . . . The Chinese traders petition only underlined a situation which Kimberley had already appreciated. . . . Kimberley sent Clarke's instructions to the Prime Minister with this rather apt summary of the situation:

"The condition of the Malay Peninsula is becoming very serious. It is the old story of misgovernment of Asiatic States. This might go on without any serious consequences except the stoppage of trade were it not that European and Chinese capitalists stimulated by the great riches in tin mines in some of the Malay States are suggesting to the Native Princes that they should seek the aid of Europeans. . . . We are the paramount power on the Peninsula up to the limit of the States tributary to Siam, and looking to the vicinity of India & our whole position in the East I apprehend that it would be a serious matter if any other European Power were to obtain a footing on the Peninsula".

He assured Gladstone that the instructions "do not actually pledge us to anything but they imply that some attempt is to be made to produce a better state of things".

Thus in the autumn of 1873. . . Captain Speedy joined the Mantri of Larut; Ord recognised the latter as an independent ruler thus committing the Straits government; HMS *Thalia* shelled the stockades of the Chinese faction who opposed the government's new protegee; and in Selangor the alliance with Pahang, which was arranged by Ord, enabled Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din to prevail in the civil war. But the Colonial Office was not unduly worried now that the Straits government had compromised its neutrality in the Peninsula. "I do not see that we can avoid interference", wrote Herbert, and he even suggested that the Malay rulers should police their rivers with gun-boats commanded by Englishmen. Kimberley said "Englishmen command-

ing Malay Gunboats would soon acquire a preponderating power in Malay States''. The Colonial Office, in fact, approved of all Ord's last minute efforts and they settled down to await Clarke's report.

... Clarke worked on the principle that it was necessary to act first and report afterwards. By a remarkable coincidence the telegram announcing the Pangkor agreement reached London on 24 January 1874, the very day that the dissolution of parliament was announced and Gladstone's Greenwich manifesto was published. Parkinson makes a good deal of the point that Clarke had highly placed friends in both political camps, that he therefore went to Singapore in the knowledge that the Liberals were about to fall, so that he had reason to presume that a bold policy in Malaya would meet with Conservative approval. But it is just as likely that Clarke... wished to shine in Malaya and prove that his methods of limited intervention would work. It is unlikely that Kimberley would have been any less favourable to Clarke's solution than Carnarvon, since it was strictly a limited intervention, and anyway it had been suggested by Kimberley in the instructions. Clarke himself was opposed to [Sir William] Jervois's later attempt at annexation in Malaya, which Carnarvon stopped. Disraeli, in spite of the popular conception, had severe misgivings about permitting forward moves in South Africa and Afghanistan and in his great imperial venture in the Eastern Question he stood for neutrality and non-intervention as compared with the policy of Russia, and he refused to annex Egypt.

Although Carnarvon was a very conscientious Colonial Secretary there appears to be no evidence that he gave to Malay affairs the same close attention he gave to certain other matters. It would be fair to say that Kimberley studied the Malay problem more carefully than Carnarvon. What is important is the fact that both ministers were searching for a way of achieving order on the frontier of the empire in the Straits by some method which fell short of the extension of British sovereignty. This was the real origin of the Resident system. People like W. H. M. Read had long hinted, hopefully, that the Malay States were ripe for some new relationship with Britain. The Anson committee and George Campbell suggested explicitly the appointment of Residents. By coincidence Campbell spoke to Kimberley in London at the time when the situation on the west coast was causing him to change his mind, and Seymour Clarke's production of the unlikely threat of a German protectorate was a sort of political blackmail to a sensitive diplomatist like Kimberley, who immediately felt a challenge to Britain's position as the paramount power in Malaya. In later years he remembered the 'German scare' of 1873.

This, I think, is a more satisfactory description of the background to the famous instructions of 1873. Since Buckingham's time Britain's policy had really been 'non-intervention—unless...'. There was

always the reservation that intervention might be necessary if British interests were affected or if the security of the colony was endangered. These were vague, infinitely flexible, conditions. The various requests, incidents, qualifications, attempted interventions, private admissions, and actual interventions between 1868 and 1873 all led gradually to the moment in 1873 when Kimberley said 'the time has come'. He decided then that something more comprehensive should be done to solve the problem, so he hoped, once for all.

d. *An historian's re-evaluation*

[Nicholas Tarling, 'Intervention and Non-Intervention in Malaya', *Journal of Asian Studies*, xxi, 4, 1962, 523-7. Tarling is Associate-Professor of History in the University of Auckland.]

MOST recent historians of Malaya have concentrated on the nineteenth rather than on the twentieth century. The peculiar political and social pattern of twentieth-century Malaya did, indeed, derive in a degree from the pattern of the 1800's. Some recent books, such as those by Professors C. D. Cowan and C. N. Parkinson, have focussed on the 1870's as the period of the "origins of British political control" and of "British intervention in Malaya";¹ but there is danger of finding in that decade too great a watershed in the history of European impact on Malaya.² It should not be forgotten that even before the 1870's, the Peninsula possessed a pattern of Malay states and rulers and of British advice and influence.

The 1820's might be considered a more significant watershed in Malayan history, both for what was then done and for what was not done. According to the Anglo-Dutch treaty of March 17, 1824, the Dutch were to be allowed to predominate in the Archipelago but were excluded from political relations with the Peninsula, and the British Government and the East India Company were to retain Penang and Singapore and acquire Malacca. Their object was primarily strategic: to defend the routes to China and the east coast of the Bay of Bengal. They feared a conflict with Thailand's claims over several Peninsular states, and hence did not wish to intervene on the Peninsula.

The settlements in the Straits were intended to be entrepôts for trade with the Archipelago, but the local authorities, believing that

¹ C. D. Cowan, *Nineteenth-century Malaya: the Origins of British Political Control* (London, 1961). C. Northcote Parkinson, *British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877* (Singapore, 1960).

² Recent research by Dr. Emily Sadka, Dr. Eunice Thio, and Dr. Wong Lin Ken ... set the last quarter of the century in perspective. Each has a paper in K. G. Tregonning, ed., *Papers on Malayan History* (Singapore, 1962).

the Dutch would impede such trade, sought to build up a compensating influence on the Peninsula—hence the attempts to limit the Thai advance beyond Kedah after 1821 and the Anderson treaties with Perak and Selangor of 1824, settling the disputed boundary and arranging for the protection of Penang traders. The Burney treaty with Thailand of 1826 left Thai claims over Trengganu and Kelantan ambiguous, but local authorities clarified the position on Perak. Governor Fullerton sent Captain Low to make a new treaty with the Sultan, ensuring that he did not send tribute to Thailand, and Low additionally refurbished the state administration and secured the cession of Pangkor. The Sultan was further assisted when Low was sent to punish pirates in the Kurau river, for the chief who encouraged them was pro-Thai and an opponent of the new Perak régime. In spite of disapproval from Calcutta in 1826 and 1827, the local authorities had helped to shape the political future of Malaya. The Thai advance had been limited, and it was clear that the Malay states would still exist and that the British might still hope to influence them.

In the following decade, the governors of the Straits Settlements made contacts with the princes, especially the Temenggong, ruler of Johore, whom they sought to use in carrying on their policies elsewhere. In the early 1830's, Temenggong Ibrahim was supposedly associating with pirates from the Riau-Lingga islands. But when the anti-piracy commission of 1836 found that the Bendahara of Pahang, another officer of the old Johore empire, bought some of the pirates' captives for work in his mines, Ibrahim offered his mediation, which was accepted.

These proceedings have several interesting features. First they somewhat qualify Cowan's statement... that "the British authorities in Singapore were drawn into the affairs of the Peninsula," and suggest that the governors were consciously pursuing a policy rather than simply reacting to changed circumstances. Though they could not undertake intervention or occupation, they still had to attempt to put down piracy, and this brought them into contact with princes whose coasts the pirates frequented or who encouraged them. Naval actions, as the Kurau episode showed, had broad political effects, and especially was this so after the arrival of a steamer in 1837.

The vigorous operations of 1836 helped to convince the Temenggong of the error of his ways, and here again was another source of influence for the governors, a prince resident in Singapore, open to advice and education, and anxious to build up his prestige. The second feature of these proceedings, therefore, is that the growth of British influence resulted not only from a desire for it but from the availability of means to satisfy that desire.

When the Temenggong began to develop Johore, British merchants in Singapore became interested, and parties formed either for or

against Ibrahim. Again the Temenggong early secured a special position in the politics of Malaya. That position endured, and Ibrahim's son, Abu-bakar, became in 1866 the first Malay prince to visit the English court. In 1885, he was recognized as Sultan of Johore, though the right to appoint an agent at his court which the British secured then was not exercised, and no adviser was appointed for another thirty years.

While the Temenggong was useful to the British, their alliance also supported his influence, and this provoked jealousy among other rulers. 'Ali, a claimant to the sultanate of Johore, had to be bought off in the treaty of 1855. Sultan Omar of Trengganu was also apprehensive of Ibrahim's growing influence, and E. A. Blundell (Governor, 1855-59) thus sought to cultivate friendship with him independently of the Temenggong. The connection with the Temenggong had helped the governors to increase their influence on the Peninsula despite lack of authority from their superiors. Blundell now had to suggest that the governor's regular authority should be increased. At the same time, he suggested that Omar should send down some of his sons to be educated at Singapore.

The Pahang civil war, in which the rival princes of Trengganu and Johore intervened on opposing sides, was the severest test of the Blundell policy. The Governor tried to prevent open intervention by Ibrahim on the ground that he was a resident of Singapore. Omar, on the other hand, had to be persuaded. Blundell visited him and occasionally sent a steamer up to Trengganu, ostensibly to search for pirates. Governor Cavenagh, however, reverted to a policy of close connection with the Temenggong and in 1861 sanctioned his treaty with the client Bendahara. Faced with this new threat, Omar associated himself more closely with the Thais, who were anxious to assert their supremacy over Trengganu. Previous governors had always opposed this, and in order to deal with the Thais, as well as with Omar, Cavenagh bombarded Trengganu in 1862. His lack of regular authority thus led to a violent irregularity.

This violence naturally caused a reaction among the superior authorities, particularly because the Thais protested and because the matter was connected with party strife in Singapore. The reaction affected the situation which the first Colonial Office governor, Colonel Harry Ord, encountered on his arrival in 1867. The Sultan of Trengganu, more confident after the defeat of the Temenggong's party in Pahang, attempted to assert himself by dispatching an envoy direct to London. The Foreign Office received Omar's ambassador, but then regretted doing so, for Ord reported that the Sultan was generally considered a Thai tributary....

The violence of 1862, followed by the shift to Colonial Office authority and the Foreign Office's acceptance of Ord's report, led there-

fore to a break in the attitude built up by the "Indian" governors to the north-eastern states over which Thailand claimed supremacy, and indeed to a misinterpretation of the events that had created conditions in those states. However, these states had been preserved from Thai occupation and their rulers had a place in the pattern of Anglo-Thai relations. Though further challenges to Thai supremacy were deferred for fear that similar challenges might come from the French, now established in Cochin-China,¹ the ultimate transfer of Thai rights to the British was well prepared in the days of the East India Company and India Office governors.

This is also true of Kedah. Here Henry Burney, Military Secretary at Penang in the 1820's, had been unable to undo the effect of the Thai invasion of 1821, and Thai rights had actually been recognized in his treaty of 1826. The local government assisted the Thais during the revolts and invasions of 1831 and 1838, working with the established authority, since it could not be overthrown. But Governor Bonham aided in the negotiations that led to the restoration of the exiled Raja of Kedah as a Thai vassal in 1842, and this restored a somewhat more normal situation. Because the rulers of Kedah continued to receive a stipend on account of the cession of Penang, this gave them a specially close association with the government.

Thanks to the efforts of Fullerton and Low, Perak was free of Thai supremacy. But the development of British influence proved impossible after 1827, since the local authorities did not dispose of the power that would enable them to continue Low's work and make up the deficiencies in the organization and leadership of Perak. The opening up of the state's tin resources from the 1840's produced an initial period of relative tranquility, but the strife among the Chinese miners ultimately intertwined with aristocratic rivalries and succession disputes and placed the situation beyond control by the governors. They did, however, attempt a positive policy. Blundell visited Perak in 1854 in an effort to mediate among the chiefs. Cavenagh intervened against the Hai San miners at Larut, invoking the Anderson treaty and gaining his superiors' approval. He then suggested that the government might afford the Sultan regular assistance or hold the subordinate chiefs responsible for outrages against British subjects. The authorities saw objections to both courses, but favoured the latter rather than the former. Ord believed that the British should interpose here as the Thais did in the north-east, but the Colonial Office would not agree, nor even approve a negotiation to define the acquisition of Pangkor under the "treaty" of 1826. Ord thus followed the indirect methods of Blundell and Cavenagh, which provided precedents for his and Lt. Governor Anson's attempts to mediate, and for Ord's

¹ V. G. Kiernan, 'Britain, Siam, and Malaya: 1875-1885,' *The Journal of Modern History*, xxviii, No. 1 (March, 1956), 1-20.

recognition of the Mantri of Larut's independence on their failure... Even the revival of the Pangkor proposal had been suggested in Cavenagh's time by the Resident Councillor at Penang.

In Selangor also, the rivalry of the chiefs had produced a touchy situation. The Indian Governors' attempts to cope with it again provided their successors with precedents. Anson used the piracy of the "Selangor incident" of 1871 and its punishment as the basis for procedures aimed at strengthening the vice-regal position of Tengku Zia u'd-din in Selangor.... The Tengku was the younger brother of the Sultan of Kedah, a prince in close connection with the British authorities, and there was, in addition, a general precedent for pursuing objects of policy simultaneously with the suppression of piracy. The ruler of Johore was persuaded to try to keep Mahdi, centre of opposition to the Tengku, in Johore.... Ord also clinched the arrangement for Ahmad of Pahang to intervene on the Tengku's side....

The break in political development came after Ord's governorship with the appointment of Residents in the west coast states by Ord's successor, Sir Andrew Clarke, and the occupation of Pangkor in 1874. Cowan has brilliantly analyzed the motives for the change of policy in London. Parkinson has attempted to associate it with the change from Liberal to Tory government.... However, Cowan's argument that the main consideration was apprehension lest other major powers should intervene in the Singapore neighborhood is supported both by his references to the correspondence of the then Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley... and by reference to the history of British policy in the area after 1824.

At that time, it was thought that the Dutch might exclude other powers from strategically important parts of the Archipelago, and this had helped make rather ambiguous the clauses of the treaty of 1824 protecting British trade there. The many complaints by British traders in the 1830's and 1840's, a time of depression when markets were highly coveted, seem to have had a much greater share in the support given to James Brooke against the Borneo pirates and in the establishment of Labuan than Cowan suggests.... But the London authorities were certainly still anxious to prevent other major maritime powers from settling anywhere along the route to China.

The motive behind the Kimberley policy was not, therefore, a revolutionary one. The appointment of Residents seemed, furthermore, a logical outcome of the existing situation. According to Cowan... the re-introduction of the idea in the 1870's dates from the report of the Anson Committee of Native States of 1871. Dr. W. D. McIntyre has recently pointed to the probable influence on Kimberley of Anson's successor, Campbell, and suggested that the idea derived from his Indian experience.¹ The contacts that the Lt. Governor presumably

¹ See previous reading.

had with Kedah also may have played a part, but the important point is that the plan assumed that it was all a matter of *advice*. In the 1820's, John Anderson, then Malay Translator at Penang, had proposed appointing a Resident in Kedah, as part of a scheme to drive out the Thais, but this would have required force. Experience with Kedah in the interim, and, more certainly, with Johore, whose example the Anson Committee quoted, seems to have prompted the feeling that advice alone was required. The fact that Perak and Selangor had not undergone all the influences and "education" that Johore and Kedah had undergone was ignored. On the west coast there were states with boundaries and rulers, but no framework of influence to be formalized and no tradition to be regularized.

Initially, Clarke seemed to have carried all before him, thanks in part to the exclusion of the legal advisers of the contending parties and presence of naval force. But merely strengthening the means of imparting advice was not enough. In Perak, the effects of historical misinterpretation were most catastrophic. Here the Resident's advice was not acceptable: J. W. W. Birch offered it tactlessly, and, moreover, no bases had been laid for its acceptance. The murder of Birch and the punishment of the Perak chiefs were the results. Paradoxically, however, they contributed to the maintenance of the tradition of advice and guidance. The Colonial Office blamed the crisis... on Clarke's successor, Jervois', advocacy of annexation, and refused to admit that its original idea of Residents was inadequate. Second, the "Perak War" was in itself an education: it meant that "advice" would be accepted, and again, a tradition built up before 1867 remained part of the pattern of twentieth-century Malaya.

If British policy in nineteenth-century Malaya may be considered more of a unity than has sometimes been suggested, it may also be that a greater continuity should be discerned between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Much work indeed needs to be done on the modern phase. But it will certainly be important to take into account the origins of British influence and the maintenance of the British tradition of advising Malay rulers when discussing the emergence of the educated Malay élite, the attempts or lack of attempts at constitutional change, and the alleged divide-and-rule tactics of the British in more recent times. The pattern established in the nineteenth century was an enduring one; and no doubt, as in the 1870's, conceptions of that pattern, even if historically misconceived, were historically significant.

Chapter Seven

CONSOLIDATION OF THE COLONIAL REGIMES IN MALAYSIA

During the last three decades of the nineteenth century the British rapidly consolidated the position they had gained by the conclusion of the Treaty of Pangkor on the one hand, and by official recognition of the state of Sarawak by foreign powers on the other. The second Rajah of Sarawak, Charles Brooke, continued the work of his uncle and extended his territories at the expense of the Sultanate of Brunei, which was further weakened when the Sultan granted to C. L. Moses three separate cessions of territory comprising a large part of north Borneo. These cessions were in turn transferred to the American Trading Company of Borneo, led by J. W. Torrey. A settlement was formed at Kimanis but this was a failure, and the cessions were ultimately acquired by Baron von Overbeck and Alfred Dent for a so-called Provisional Association. The Association had its rights to north Borneo confirmed by the Sultans of Brunei and Sulu in 1877-8, and four years later the Association was given a Royal Charter and became the British North Borneo Company. In subsequent years it extended its territorial holdings in north Borneo by further cessions from the Sultan of Brunei, and British North Borneo soon came into being. The state was officially recognized by Great Britain in 1888 by the Protectorate agreement of that year.

In Malaya, meanwhile, the experiment of the Residential system introduced by the Pangkor Treaty of 1874 succeeded, after an initial setback. The first British Resident of Perak, J. W. W. Birch, was murdered in 1875 by malcontent Malays who reacted violently to the idea of the sudden incorporation of their state within a more formal constitutional arrangement than they felt was provided for by the Pangkor Treaty, and who resented Birch's rather aggressive manner. Clarke's successor, W.F.D. Jervois, proved to be an intractable and heavy-handed Governor but, after his transfer to South Australia, a

group of well-informed and capable British Officers gave the Residential experiment a large measure of success.

I *Development of the Residential System*

The following reading on the early British Residential System in the Malay States is taken from *About Perak*, written by Frank Swettenham, who served in Selangor as the first Assistant-Resident and who later rose to be Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the Federated Malay States. [Singapore, 1893, 8-19.]

IT may be questioned whether any more interesting experiment in administration was ever undertaken than that initiated by the Pangkor Engagement in January, 1874. Given a beautiful, fertile State, rich in minerals, splendidly watered, almost within shout of the Equator: imagine it sparsely inhabited by a peculiar, sensitive, courageous, superstitious, passionate, and conservative people; suppose that not six white men had penetrated into this country within memory; that there were only twelve miles of cart road in the State, and those only in one Province where the Chinese outnumbered the Natives of the land by ten to one; add that these Chinese had for over a year been in open warfare with each other ignoring every authority; that they had burnt down every house; that all mining had ceased; and that the only positions occupied were forts full of armed men, and coast villages, the head quarters of pirates. Then, consider that, in this country, there were two claimants to the chief authority, each of whom had assumed the title of Sultan, while yet another claimant was in the field with at least equal pretensions, and a fourth chief had for years been playing a skilful game to secure the reversion of power to himself. Of wheels within wheels the number was infinite, but it may be mentioned that Upper Perak was the scene of an open conflict between two aspirants to the post of Sri Adika Raja, while every Malay of any consideration in the State, who could muster twenty followers, sat down on the bank of some river and exacted toll from every passing boat.

Perhaps, it is hardly surprising that, under these circumstances, Raja Abdullah asked for the assistance of the Governor of the Straits Settlements to send him an Officer to teach him how to rule this unruly country. It is more surprising to find the task accepted with alacrity and each difficulty disposed of by one man's energy and insistence, until the Chiefs, so long unaccustomed to any form of control, rebelled against this white man's attempt to put an end to the infamies daily brought before his eyes, and determined to get rid of him, in the firm

belief that no penalty would be exacted and that no successor would venture to trust himself again to Perak hospitality.

When Mr. J. W. Birch first took up the post of British Resident in Perak, the State was divided practically into two parts—Larut, the place of tin mines and Chinese, and the valley of the Perak River where, for ages, the Malay had lived unvisited by any step, and uncontrolled by any voice from the outside world. Here, debt-slavery with all its attendant horrors was an ever-spreading sore;¹ here, too, a Chinese life was of no more account than that of a beast. Murders were unpunished, robbery unnoticed, whole villages defied the authority of their own Rajas, and the will of the strongest was the law of the land. It was specially with this portion of the State that the first Resident concerned himself, and here he met with many unpleasant experiences. Visiting one village, the inhabitants threatened to shoot him if he landed; at others, the sale of every kind of food was declined not only to the Resident but also to all his party. Guides and means of transport could never be found, distances and difficulties were enormously exaggerated, and everything was done to keep him in the dark and misrepresent the state of affairs, the position of places, the resources of the country, and the real views and intentions of its people.

In Larut, the Assistant Resident, Captain [T.C.] Speedy, had a much easier task. A commission had disposed of the Chinese difficulty and settled the boundaries of disputed mining land. After months of fighting and privation, the Chinese were glad enough to resume work, the mines were reopened, villages built, and at once a new tide of prosperity, stronger than ever known before, flowed over the Province of Larut.

At the time of these events, the revenue of what was then called "Perak Besar," i.e. the Perak River Valley, was about \$80,000 a year, every import, each cup or saucer, the most insignificant article as well as such things as rice, salt, tobacco, opium &c., being subject to duty. In Larut, there was no revenue at all. As the result of the first year of the Residential system, Larut yielded a revenue of \$800,000. . . . Many of the most vexatious duties were soon abolished and, as the revenue grew, a few European officers were appointed to assist Captain Speedy in Larut. But, in Perak, the Resident was alone, except for a guard of about 80 Indians, who gave him a good deal of trouble and proved unreliable when asked to justify their existence.

In those ten months during which the Resident lived in a boat, travelling about the State and collecting materials to enable him to introduce measures for the better government of the country, it was impossible for him to actually organize any administrative reform.

¹ See the following reading on Debt-Bondage and Slavery.

He had no material power to enforce an order, and, as there were still two Sultans, each exercising a certain amount of authority in different parts of the State and each utterly opposed to the other, any concerted action was impossible. . . .

In August, 1876, . . . the Secretary of State's instructions were sent to the Residents of Perak and Selangor, and it was added [to Clauses VI and X of the Pangkor Engagement that] "you will observe that in continuing the Residential system Her Majesty's Government define the functions of the Resident to be the giving of influential and responsible advice to the ruler. . . . The Residents are not to interfere more frequently or to a greater extent than is necessary with the minor details of Government &c., &c."

In May, 1878, a further circular was despatched to the Residents of three Protected States warning them that "the Residents have been placed in the Native States as advisers, not as rulers, and if they take upon themselves to disregard this principle they will most assuredly be held responsible if trouble springs out of their neglect of it."

The Secretary of State said the circular was "both necessary and judicious in its terms," but he also wrote: "I fully recognise the delicacy of the task imposed on the Residents and am aware that much must be left to their discretion on occasions when prompt and firm action is called for."

This, naturally, threw the entire responsibility on the Resident, and whether he failed in character and firmness, or whether he shewed excessive zeal and anxiety to remove abuses and advance the interests of the State, he did so with the knowledge that he could not run with the Treaty and hold with the instructions. Perak is the only State where these special Treaty powers are conferred on the Resident, but . . . not only there but also in all the States the Residents have, by force of circumstances, gone beyond the instructions and carried on the administration with a wider authority, but much on the same lines as though the States had formed an integral portion of the Colony. From the earliest days of protection, it was laid down, and necessarily so, that the Native States, in their relations with the neighbouring Colony, would look to the Governor as the controlling authority behind the Residents, and that in all other respects each Native State would supply its own machinery of Government.

In the gradual education of that staff of officers which has grown up to assist the Residents, the experience of the Straits Settlements has been largely drawn upon for rules and orders in the conduct of affairs. Similarly, Colonial and Indian laws have been adapted to deal with circumstances that had a parallel in those places; but in Perak there are prevailing circumstances utterly unknown in the Colony, and, to meet these, local knowledge alone could safely be employed.

During and after a brief occupation of a few posts by English

Troops, the late Mr. J. G. Davidson was British Resident in Perak. He, however, had never liked Perak, accepted the post with the utmost hesitation under great pressure, and very shortly resigned to resume his own profession. His successor came from Labuan as Mr. Low and left as Sir Hugh Low, G.C.M.G., after eleven years of most difficult, tactful, and successful administration. . . .

A State Council was established, and in this Council sits the Sultan, the most important of the Malay chiefs, and some Chinese. It deals with all legislation and with the appointments of all Native Headmen, with their allowances, and with the Civil List. It has been a wonderful safety valve, and to be a member is considered a very high privilege in Perak.

Slavery and debt slavery were both abolished within a few years; but, in making that simple and apparently natural statement, no idea is conveyed of the burning nature of this question and the exceedingly delicate handling that it required and received.¹

In 1874, no Perak Malay man was ever seen unarmed. The man usually carried from three to eight weapons, and boys of a few years old two or three. The carrying of arms was gradually forbidden and is now unknown. A kris, which used to be a Malay's most prized possession, has now very little value.

The Resident's Guard has developed into a highly disciplined regiment of Sikhs; communications have been opened in every direction; all most important questions, land, mines, labour, etc. dealt with; posts, telegraphs, railways established; the country divided into Districts and Divisions with all the usual administrative machinery; and Courts of Justice are found at every centre of population.

Small pox and cholera used to decimate the Malays of Perak and the fear of these scourges amounted to a bad form of panic. Vaccination, sanitation, and the ministrations of qualified medical practitioners have, however, altered all this,—but the Malay still declines to become an in-patient of those excellent Hospitals which are found all over the State. Other nationalities have no such scruples.

Then, of course, there are prisons; very creditable institutions they are and they will bear the closest scrutiny. Education, too, has of late years received some of the attention it deserves and the results are promising. And whilst such evidences of sound government may be treated as matters of course, Perak has spent large sums of money on what some may regard as articles of luxury:—a Museum, Experimental Gardens, and a Trigonometrical Survey. Lastly, in the twenty years of "advice" the population has more than doubled itself, the Revenue is close on three millions of dollars, and the Trade, real imports and real exports, consumed in or produced by the State, is valued at over twenty millions. . . .

¹ See the following reading on Debt-Bondage and Slavery.

No greater mistake could be made...than to suppose that the result might not have been extremely different. Our neighbours, the Dutch, have had in Sumatra an experience as unpleasant as it has been costly.¹ Even now, to imagine that Perak or any other Native State can be treated like a British Colony is culpable ignorance. I have spoken of the Residential system, but in reality there was no system; what there is now has grown of experience gained in attempting the untried. A British Officer, acting under the instructions of a distant Governor, is sent to "advise" a Malay Ruler and his Chiefs. The officer is told he is responsible for everything but he is not to interfere in details. His advice must be followed, but he must not attempt to enforce it and so on. He must keep the peace, see that justice is administered, respect vested interests, abolish abuses, raise a revenue, foster British interests, do his best for the State, and obey the instructions he receives from Singapore, and with it all he is at his peril to remember that he is only the adviser of the Malay Ruler! Out of that somewhat difficult position has grown the present administration,—and the main reason why success has been secured is twofold: first, because a succession of Governors have trusted their Residents and supported them; and, secondly, because of that very possession of large authority which is at once the strength and the weakness of the Residential idea. Had the authority been less, the results to-day would certainly have been very far short of those achieved; but, for all that, it may be safely affirmed that, whilst the power for good is immense, the power for mistakes, for extravagance, for favouritism, or for what can be described as "bullying" is greater than should be placed in any single hand. This is the real flaw and it would be possible to shew that the danger is far from imaginary. It is curious that while, in the past few years, much has been said and written of the need for change in existing arrangements, the reasons given have been so wide of this—which is the vital weakness. To enable members of the Straits Bar to practise in the Native States Courts, to be able to compel the Native States to contribute to the cost of Imperial Troops stationed in Singapore, to induce English speculators to invest money and safeguard their transactions by English laws, to make huge properties obtained by concession from an independent Malay Raja valuable by declaring the land British territory—these are some of the grounds advanced for breaking faith with the Malays, who are now perfectly satisfied with existing arrangements wherein they have an influence and interest of which they would certainly be deprived by annexation.

True, the voice of a public opinion is wanting and that can only come with a public to express it; true, also, the Magistrates are inexperienced and give curious decisions, but that is not peculiar to the Malay States; while, as for the security for invested capital, if there

¹ A reference to the Dutch war with Atjeh, 1873-1904.

be any real doubt on this point, it could be met by strengthening the Bench. The want is, however, a better control of the Resident who, in his capacity of adviser to the Sultan, of actual head of the executive and sole means of communication with the Governor, possesses a power probably without parallel. . . .

All over the world, stupid, extravagant, and partial things are done in the name of government, and, if the truth be told, Perak, while making wonderful progress, through freedom from the trammels of red-tape and many councillors, is still in danger of shipwreck on the rock of personal authority.

II *Debt-Bondage and Slavery*

An important part of traditional Malay society was the relationship existing between the subject and his ruler. This entailed various bilateral obligations which might, in certain circumstances, explained in the following reading, degenerate into various forms of bondage which in Western terms have been referred to as slavery. The reading describes the practice in the Malay States in the late nineteenth century. [J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, London, 1958, 99-105.]

THE European administrators who went into the Malay States in 1874 wrote many reports on 'debt-slavery'. Slavery (in which they included debt-bondage) was a subject on which they and public opinion in the United Kingdom held strong views. The reports were thus written with a prejudice towards the subject-matter. The writers of the reports tended to generalize and to state as facts the stories told them by runaway bondsmen . . . who had an interest in exaggerating their wrongs. Reports based on such data are not likely to be balanced and reliable. On the other hand after the revolt of 1875 known as the Perak War there was a more cautious and objective attitude to the subject since mishandling of the 'debt-bondage' question had been one of the causes of that revolt.

The best general account of debt-bondage is given by [Sir Frank] Swettenham. After explaining that chiefs did not permit their subjects to accumulate wealth he goes on:

'Thus when a *rayat* (or subject) is in want of money he goes to his *Raja* or chief to lend it him, because he alone can do so. Either money or goods are then lent, and a certain time stipulated for payment. If at the expiry of that time the money is not paid, it is usual to wait some time longer, say two or three or even six months. Should payment not then be made, the debtor, if a single man, is taken into

the creditor's house; he becomes one of his followers and is bound to execute any order and do any work the Raja as creditor may demand, until the debt is paid, however long a time that may be. During this time the Raja usually provides the debtor with food and clothing, but if the creditor gives him money, that money is added to the debt. Often, however, the Raja gives nothing and the debtor has to find food and clothing as he can. Should the debtor marry—and the Raja will in all probability find him a wife—the wife and descendants are equally in debt-bondage.

'If, however, a large family were in bondage for the debt, one whose numbers seemed to the Raja to add to his dignity, then he would probably refuse to accept payment, not absolutely, but would say "Wait", and the waiting might last for years.'

The debtor's work and services did not count towards reduction of the debt. Moreover the right of redemption was only nominal.

It is clear from this passage that debt-bondage, although in form an economic institution, was in substance a very mixed complex of several elements. The chief acquired and retained bondsmen as a means of augmenting his power and prestige. The bondsman might expect the creditor to provide him with a wife; the children of this union inherited the debtor status of the parent. The debtor's services, although considered to have some economic value, did not count towards the reduction of the debt. The debtor was usually a dependent of the creditor. Single men became followers, but not married men.

Debt-bondage was particularly significant in terms of the social relationship between the parties. This fact appears particularly in the information given about the transfer of debtors from one creditor to another and about the emancipation of debtors during the period of British protection. The rule was that a debtor could demand to be transferred to any other creditor who would pay off his debt to the original creditor. In practice transfers at the instance of the debtor were rare. Transfers at the instance of the creditor were common. Swettenham says:

'Moreover it was very common for a creditor to sell his debt-slaves when he was tired of them or wanted money, *and the bondspeople not infrequently suffered by the transfer.*'

Transfer broke the personal tie which had grown out of the economic relationship. A Malay still living who can remember the last days of debt-bondage in Pahang has written:

'Some of the older ones had become really attached to their masters and regarded themselves as part of the family establishments. . . .'

Finally there is Hugh Low's report on the reaction of creditors to a scheme in 1883 for emancipation of debtors by payment of their debts from government funds:

'How can we take money for our friends who have so long lived with us, many of them born in our houses? We can sell cattle, fruit or rice, but not take money for our friends.'

This idyllic picture is not to be accepted without reservation. The early reports contain instances of ill-treatment of debtors supported by the personal knowledge of the reporting officer. When one human being is at the mercy of another, there will always be abuses of power. The question is not whether there were ever cases of ill-treatment but whether such cases were typical. One has general statements such as:

'The creditor did what he liked with his debt-slaves, and when they found life intolerable and ran away, if caught they were killed and no one objected, because anyone of position had debt-slaves of their own.'

and others such as:

'Cases of ill-treatment of a debt-bondsman by a creditor are rare and the debt-bondsman has exactly the same redress that any other person would have.'

'No case of cruelty or any great hardship has been brought to my notice since I came into the country.'

On balance it seems fair to conclude that the ruling class treated their bondsmen and slaves fairly. The vice of the system was that the bondsmen and slaves were inferior beings, almost chattels.

The economic aspect of debt-bondage, although it was not perhaps the most significant facet of the institution, deserves consideration. Here a distinction must be made between bondsmen who were and those who were not members of the household and personal following of the creditor.

Debt-bondsmen who were followers of their creditor were indeed an investment which could be realized by sale. They were thus of economic value as capital. But from the standpoint of income and expenditure they cost more to keep than their services were worth. The nature of their relationship with the creditor as 'hangers on' precluded the possibility of their being given regular employment. If they had been assigned tasks, they would not have been available at beck and call. Long periods of idleness inevitably beget demoralization:

'Debtor servants, especially men as might be expected, are indolent and improvident and the worst of . . . labourers. In a few cases the women, as house-hold servants, may be useful. . . . These people are inclined to theft, and their idle habits lead them into companionship of desperate men, which ends in robbery.'

Swettenham noted that among debt-bondsmen 'gambling becomes a mania' and elsewhere relates how on leaving an aristocratic household one morning he could not get anyone to carry his baggage down to

the boat because 'all Che Mida's people were overcome by the effect of opium smoked the night before'.

The question of the economic value of followers who were debtors came to a head when British administrators suggested that debt-bondage should be gradually abolished by counting the presumed value of the debtors' services against their debts. Malay chiefs in Perak replied that the services of their bondsmen had a value 'which was scarcely more than nominal'.

Debt-bondsmen not in the personal following of their creditors were generally married men with families. They were put to agricultural work to produce food for the sustenance of their creditor and his household. They thus contributed to providing the surplus with which to maintain a section of the community in a non-productive military and political role.

The most detailed account of the work of agricultural debt-bondsmen relates to Kedah when it came under British protection in 1909. There were three types of work—(1) *kerja panjang pendek*, odd jobs of personal and domestic service; (2) *kerja dalam bendang*, cultivation in the rice fields; and (3) *kerja dalam dusun*, care of orchards. This last type of work was regarded as nominal and did not entitle the debtor to receive food and clothing from the creditor. Of Perak in the 1870's it was said that the work of a bondsman was 'every species of household drudgery, in clearing ground, and in raising padi and other articles of food'. Another observer said of a chief's bondsmen in Perak that 'they served in his household, cultivated his fields and worked his mines'.

The services of an agricultural bondsman relieved a chief of the necessity of cultivating the food which he ate and of doing domestic chores of one kind and another. He thus had leisure for military and political pursuits. There was no attempt, with the exception of small ventures in tin-mining, to organize bondsmen for production on a large or industrial scale so as to obtain a surplus for sale. The explanation of this fact lies in the absence of market outlets for large quantities of produce and the lack of managerial staff for the organization of large-scale enterprises of this kind.

The assignment of agricultural labour to people of low status had the inevitable consequence that no one of aristocratic birth would willingly demean himself to do such work.

A chief's following included a number of women who were for the most part either bondswomen or slaves. Some had been purchased or born into bondage. Others had been rounded up from the villages of the district under the custom which permitted a chief to recruit women as concubines or domestic servants in this way. To judge from the records this class of people in bondage had more cause for complaint than any other. For example one of them said:

'Our chief works are cooking, nursing, carrying water, splitting firewood, pounding rice, and at nights we are to prostitute ourselves giving half of this earning to the Raja and half to supply ourselves with clothing and provisions for the Sultan's house and other slaves. If we fail to get money by prostitution we are punished with thick rattans, and sometimes with canes on our heads and backs. We are prevented from marrying anyone who wishes to offer us in marriage.'

There is some doubt as to the extent to which prostitution was voluntary or was forced upon them. It was clearly of common occurrence except among the women reserved as concubines of the creditor.

This female retinue was kept as the means of satisfying the sexual appetites of the young, unmarried men who formed the chief's armed following. A chief thus gained two objects. He had the means of attracting to him men in search of mistresses and ultimately of wives. Secondly by providing his followers with the means of satisfying their sexual needs at home the chief prevented them from making forays among his peasant subjects to seduce or abduct their women. No doubt the chief had first to abduct some of these women himself under a more or less legal procedure. But this method was to be preferred to allowing his followers to make raids of their own. If they had done so, the chief's peasant subjects would either have fought back or more probably would have fled. In either case the chief would have been the poorer.

It was a recognized custom that a follower might ask his chief to give him a wife from among the women in his household. There is also evidence that a Sultan, and possibly a district chief, had a right of control over the marriages of all women in the village in which he lived.

A female follower who became a concubine of her master and bore him a child was said to be entitled to her freedom. She must at least have achieved higher status in bondage in that way.

Entry into debt-bondage was not always the unwelcome result of misfortune. It was observed that some 'voluntarily contracted debts when they knew well that it would lead to bondage'.

If it is a fair conclusion that the average bondsman could look forward to reasonably good treatment and friendly relations with his creditor, it is surprising only that men would thus surrender their liberty and run the risk of encountering a bad master. The most likely explanation is that many followers of chiefs were men without a home. It was a period of migration and instability. A part of the population was mere flotsam and jetsam in a hostile world. In these circumstances a homeless man might be tempted to attach himself in bondage to a chief. He thus got a living, the protection of a powerful patron, access to women and the ultimate prospect of obtaining a wife. In this case, as in so many other relationships, the tie arose not so much from

strength on one side and weakness on the other, as from mutual need. The follower needed a patron, a living and a wife. But the chief on his side needed a private army. . . .

Much of what has been said of debt-bondsmen applies equally to slaves. . . .

There were however certain differences. A slave was lower in status than a debt-bondsman who ranked as a free man (*orang merdeka*). A Malay observer states:

'While there was no difference in the nature of the work which the two classes of slaves were made to do for their masters, the debt slaves were less degrading (*sic*) than the ordinary slaves because the former were supposed to be able to redeem themselves by paying off their debts whereas the latter could not under any circumstances regain their freedom except by some act of grace on the part of their master.'

The right of self-redemption was however only rarely exercised. The real distinction of status lay in the fact that debt-bondsmen (but not slaves) were still acknowledged as members of the same society as their masters. The distinction was rationalized by a rule which forbade the enslavement of Muslims by Muslims. Slaves therefore were mainly Africans, aborigines and Bataks (a non-Muslim Sumatran tribe).

There was a hierarchy of status even in bondage. A non-Muslim foreigner could be enslaved. A Muslim Malay peasant could not be enslaved but he could be reduced to debt-bondage. At the next higher level an impecunious aristocrat who became indebted to his patron was not usually treated as a debt-bondsman. Of the only such case which has been traced it was said by a son of the creditor that 'a man like him is not expected to do menial work. He has opportunities of trading on his own account, and the only way his master requires his services is that he is obliged to attend on him'. In effect an aristocrat could be a debtor but was not regarded as a debt-bondsman. It is an example of the pervasiveness of the status concept in the Malay social system. . . .

There are few exact data on the numbers of debtors and slaves. The best figures are the result of a census in Perak in 1879:

STATUS	MALE	FEMALE
Free	24,188	23,171
Slaves	775	895
Debt-bondsmen	728	652

In Kedah in 1909 it was estimated that there were some 1,200 debt-bondsmen.

In Selangor the number of bondsmen and slaves was certainly less than in Perak because there were fewer chiefs and the Malay population was much smaller. In Negri Sembilan the size of the Malay popu-

lation and the number of chiefs was approximately comparable with Perak. Except at the royal palace at Sri Menanti however there were few bondsmen or slaves in Negri Sembilan. This apparent discrepancy in Negri Sembilan is to be explained in terms of the different social conditions of that State. The population was more homogeneous and longer settled. There were fewer homeless fighting men in search of a patron. The district chiefs and clan heads had ties of kinship (or pseudo-kinship) with their peasant subjects and could mobilize a levy as required. Along the Linggi River however conditions more nearly approached those of other States and here each major notable had a stockade and a following of professional fighting men—but recruited by marrying them to local women rather than as debt-bondsmen.

III *The British Forward Movement in Malaya, 1880-9*

The following reading, which is taken from a paper by Eunice Thio, a young Malayan historian of the University of Singapore, describes the British forward movement in the Malay states in the years immediately following the establishment of the Residential System in Perak, Selangor, and Sungei Ujong. ['The British Forward Movement in the Malay Peninsula, 1880-1889', in *Papers on Malayan History*; ed. by K. G. Tregonning, Singapore, 1962, 120-34.]

IN 1874, Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong (one of the states of the Negri Sembilan confederation) accepted the Residential system and thus became British Protectorates. The British then paused for a while only to resume the forward movement in the eighties, so that between 1880 and 1889, the other small states which made up the Negri Sembilan, together with Pahang, were similarly brought under British control. This period also saw Johore enter into closer relations with the British Government. And finally, in 1909, when Siam transferred to Britain her rights over Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, the area of British rule was extended to its northernmost frontier.

... [T]he third phase of British expansion in the Malay Peninsula ... took place at a time when Britain was similarly engaged elsewhere, while France and Russia together with two new colonial powers, Germany and Italy, were likewise pegging their claims in Asia, Africa and the islands of the Pacific. From the seventies onward the British found it increasingly difficult to push their trade and, when needs arose, enlarge their borders leisurely as in the preceding decades. The

competition of other powers had now to be reckoned with. Thus in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, to keep out her European rivals as well as to make possible a more intensive exploitation and development of local resources, Britain found it necessary to extend her formal control over large territories in various parts of the world, the Malay Peninsula being one of them.

* * *

Thus Residents were installed in Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong, who advised the Malay Rulers in theory but governed in practice. From this phase of the British forward movement into the Malay States two things emerged: Firstly, the form of British control known as the Residential system which was later to be extended to other States; secondly, the basic principles underlying British policy in the Peninsula in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, viz. to protect and encourage economic enterprise and to keep out other Foreign Powers whose intrusion would endanger the security of India and the sea route to the Far East passing through the Straits of Malacca.

Expansion into the hinterland of the Colony came to a halt with the murder of J. W. Birch. . . . Faced with these "disastrous consequences" of an experiment launched by . . . his Liberal predecessor, Lord Carnarvon, the new Secretary of State in Disraeli's Government, refused to sanction any fresh extension of British responsibilities. We have therefore a paradox: that under the imperialist Tory Government in power from 1874 to 1880, the local urge for the further extension of British control in the Peninsula was unsupported. It was not until the arrival of a new Governor, Sir Frederick Weld, which coincided with the return of Kimberley to the Colonial Office in 1880 in Gladstone's second ministry, that the British government reconsidered its stand.

An energetic man who had spent many years in various British out-posts such as Western Australia, New Zealand and Tasmania, Weld had an unshakeable belief in the advantages of imperial expansion both for the rulers and the ruled. Soon after his arrival in Singapore, he decided that the forward policy should be resumed. In view of the growing restrictions on Straits trade with surrounding countries controlled by protectionist European colonial powers, the Governor held the view that the future prosperity of the Straits Settlements depended on the opening up of new markets and sources of raw materials in the hinterland. Apart from local needs, in his opinion, there were also British interests in general to be considered. . . .

As the seventies passed into the eighties the competition of newly industrialized nations like Germany, the United States and France

became keener in markets hitherto practically monopolized by British goods. Britain was hit by an economic depression and her future to people like Weld appeared precarious unless her subjects overseas strove to find new openings for British trade. "One thing is clear to me," Weld remarked, "if we ourselves do not labour to extend markets for our goods and to find consumers, nobody else is likely to help us to do so."

Just as the need for colonial markets had become more urgent in the eighties as compared to the seventies, so the danger of "foreign intrusion" also seemed to be more real. Weld was uneasy about the frequent appearance of Russian vessels in Malayan waters in 1880-1881, especially after he heard a rumour that Russia had an eye on some island or "point of quasi-Siamese territory" lying between Province Wellesley and British Burma.... His chief fear after 1881 was of the French who renewed their aggressive policy towards Tongking and Annam, resuscitated Cambodian claims to border provinces then occupied by Siam, and made persistent efforts to secure from the Siamese a concession for the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Kra. Hence, a desire to promote trade, a fear of foreign intrusion coupled with anxiety not to see Britain outdone by the French in Indo-China and similar Dutch expansion in Indonesia, led the Governor to propose that Britain should no longer stand still in the Malay Peninsula but move forward gradually and cautiously, not necessarily introducing the Residential system immediately but only some intermediate stage of British control. In the governor's mind the whole Peninsula as far north as the southern-most tip of the British Burmese province of Tenasserim ought ultimately to be brought under British rule.

Such an eventuality, he was convinced, would be as much in the interests of the local inhabitants as of the British. Like many late Victorians he believed that the Pax Britannica would deliver the Malays from anarchy and oppression and generally improve their welfare. This conviction strengthened his determination to extend the British frontiers in the Peninsula.

As far as the permanent officials of the Colonial Office were concerned, Weld's plea for the resumption of the forward policy fell on deaf ears. They remained reluctant to relax their attitude towards the assumption of new responsibilities in case some future Governor might be too "go-ahead" and resort to annexation on the plea that events were too strong for him. While considering that the Governor should by all means cultivate good relations with the Malay chiefs and give them advice when approached, these officials felt that the status quo should be maintained.

But the Secretary of State thought differently. Kimberley once more held the portfolio for colonial affairs.... Kimberley did not

share Gladstone's aversion for additional imperial responsibilities. . . . Whenever a forward step seemed advisable on economic, political and strategic grounds, he did not hesitate to adopt it. In the case of the Charter for the British North Borneo Company, for instance, Kimberley believed that if the British Government remained indifferent, Spain, the Netherlands and Germany were likely to acquire North Borneo. Should this happen, British trade was bound to suffer from their restrictive policies. Furthermore, from the strategic and political standpoint Kimberley considered that the presence of any of these powers in Borneo would be most undesirable. . . . Consequently when the question came before the British Cabinet in October 1880, he expressed himself firmly in favour of the Charter.

A few months later, for similar reasons, he issued these instructions which enabled the Governor of the Straits Settlements to proceed with his plans for the promotion of British influence and control:

Her Majesty's Government would view with satisfaction that the intercourse between the Straits Government and the Malay States should assume a character of more intimate friendship, but no measures involving a change in the relations of those States with the British Government, beyond what is already sanctioned, should be taken without instructions from home; except for temporary purposes in case of urgent necessity.

The general policy which should be pursued is to avoid annexation, to encourage the Native Rulers to govern well and to improve their territories, and only to interfere when mis-government reaches such a point as seriously to endanger the peace and prosperity of the Peninsula.

On the basis of these instructions Weld took steps to bring into closer relations with the Straits Government the turbulent small states in the vicinity of Sungei Ujong, which together were called the Negeri Sembilan. Between 1882 and 1886, Rembau, Jelebu and the remaining districts which were grouped into the Sri Menanti confederation, promised to bring their disputes and problems to the Governor and to accept his advice. In these states, he did not immediately install Residents. . . . Instead, the chiefs of these states were assisted with funds from the Straits Treasury, ostensibly to be spent on road construction, although in practice a large portion of these loans went into private pockets. However, some roads were made and what was more important, these chiefs began to realize that there were definite advantages in having closer relations with the British. Once they were dependent financially, it was not difficult for British officers slowly to secure control of the revenues and expenditure, and administration of justice, and ultimately the entire administration. By degrees rather than all at once, the British authorities through the Resident came to

exercise in the Negri Sembilan States powers comparable to those which they enjoyed in Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong.

The strengthening of British control in the Negri Sembilan went hand in hand with the policy of welding them together into larger and therefore fewer units. At the outset, there were more than nine small states, excluding Sungei Ujong. By 1887 they had been grouped into four units, namely Sungei Ujong, Rembau, Jelebu and the Sri Menanti confederation. Two years later they were further combined into two administrative units, Sungei Ujong with Jelebu, and the Negri Sembilan consisting of Rembau, Tampin and the Sri Menanti states. The final union took place in 1895 when they all came together to form a single state with the title of Negri Sembilan.

On the east coast the large state of Pahang was also the target of Weld's forward policy. Its ruler, the Bendahara Wan Ahmad, showed no desire for closer relations with the Straits Government and rebuffed all the Governor's overtures of friendship. But a situation developed there which spelt danger to British interests. In the early eighties the high price of tin led to a rush for concessions in Pahang. For sums of money distributed among the Bendahara and his advisers, European, Chinese and other concession hunters were able to secure many grants of land for mining and other purposes on irregular terms and irrespective of the rights of the Malays and Chinese already at work on the land. The Straits Government were afraid that these extensive concessions would not only retard the development of the state but might lead to serious complications involving the subjects of major European Powers.

The Colonial Office were no less concerned, especially in view of Germany's new colonial activity. From 1883, Bismarck extended his official support to German traders and missionaries overseas, and the German flag was hoisted over large areas in Africa and the Pacific. In some territories such as southwest Africa and New Guinea, the British had as yet taken no formal action to safeguard their claims because the Colonial Office thought that other powers could not possibly be interested in these regions. Despite promptings from the colonists in Australia and South Africa, the authorities in London remained hesitant. . . . Bismarck's policy of ignoring British claims to places where their authority was neither based on effective occupation nor formal treaties, together with the methods of German agents in acquiring agreements from unsuspecting chiefs, compelled the British Government to look to the security of states like Pahang, in which their interests were still not provided for by treaty.

Apart from the new German colonialism, French imperialism gained impetus under the energetic direction of Jules Ferry. In the mid-eighties Anglo-French rivalry was intensified in China, Siam and Burma. The Colonial Office believed that "in these days when our

rights and quasi-rights are strictly questioned and boldly encroached upon", action as regards Pahang could no longer be postponed....

Accordingly, several missions were despatched to the Bendahara Wan Ahmad. Persuaded by some concessionaries from whom he had benefited financially, as well as by his relative, friend and adviser, the ruler of Johore, Wan Ahmad eventually signed a treaty with the British in October, 1887. According to its terms the British Government secured the right to protect Pahang against the attack of any third power and to control her foreign relations. Provision was also made for the appointment of a British Agent to reside in Pahang with consular powers only. Such stipulations placed the British in a position to prevent the encroachment of any other Power. But it did not enable them to effect the necessary reforms in the internal administration of the State. The Bendahara, whom the British recognized as Sultan in the treaty, continued to rule in an autocratic and arbitrary fashion. British lives and property were insecure and so in 1888, using the murder of a Chinese British subject as an excuse, pressure was put on the Sultan of Pahang to accept a Resident whose advice must be asked and accepted on all questions of administration. Thus in Pahang as in the western Malay States, the British stepped in to establish a governmental framework within which they could promote trade and economic progress.

Although British officers on the spot professed to be moved by humanitarian among other reasons for wishing to introduce British rule and thus end the misgovernment prevalent in the state, to the Colonial Office the "white man's burden" was not a cogent argument for a forward policy whether towards Pahang or other Malay States. In fact the Colonial Office staff were extremely dubious about interfering on behalf of "general civilization and decency" in Pahang. "If we enter on a general crusade" remarked one of them, "where will it end?"...

In the case of Johore, which remained peaceful and orderly and where the ruler governed with British advice, the British Government was contented to establish its formal protection without acquiring the right to interfere in its administration. In 1885, during the scare about foreign intervention, a treaty was concluded with its ruler by which the British pledged themselves to defend the state against external attacks in return for the right to conduct her foreign relations and for the appointment of a British Agent to reside in Johore having functions similar to those of a consular officer. Despite this provision, however, such an appointment was not made in the nineteenth century. This was in part owing to determined opposition from the Sultan of Johore and in part to the British Government's desire "to encourage and support Native Rulers who are loyal, intelligent and govern well, especially in the case of those whose terri-

tories are in proximity to British Settlements". Besides, the Straits mercantile community were so satisfied with Sultan Abu Bakar's policy of fostering trade, investment and agriculture, that instead of agitating for the flag to follow trade, their representatives in the Straits Settlements Legislative Council opposed the suggested appointments of a British Agent in accordance with treaty stipulations. Abu Bakar, an able and astute ruler, who resembled King Mongkut and King Chulalongkorn of Siam in his efforts to adjust himself to new conditions and flow with the tide of westernization, was in this way able to preserve his independence in internal affairs.

If Governor Weld (1880-1887) and his successor Sir Cecil Clementi Smith (1888-1893) thus succeeded in consolidating Britain's position in the southern part of the Peninsula, their persistent efforts to push British frontiers northwards to Tenasserim had no practical results. The northern part of the Peninsula was claimed by Siam. Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and the Patani group of states, whose population was predominantly Malay and Muslim, were governed by hereditary Malay rulers who sent tribute to Bangkok triennially in the form of the *Bunga Mas* or gold and silver flowers. . . . Their foreign relations were handled by Bangkok. Their rulers had to be confirmed in office by the Siamese authorities. In return for assuming the responsibilities which the recognition of Siamese suzerainty imposed, the vassal states were entitled to Siamese protection from external threats and were allowed to live under their own laws, customs and rulers.

But . . . considerable variations existed depending on the power of the Siamese Government and the proximity of these states to Bangkok. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the Patani states, sometimes called the "Seven States", were probably the most closely controlled of any of the Malay vassals. Perlis and Kedah came next. The Siamese also enjoyed some influence in Kelantan where a struggle for power among members of the royal family caused the ruler to call for Siamese support. Trengganu, furthest removed from Bangkok, sent the *Bunga Mas* once every three years; other than this, there was no interference with the Sultan's administration. The rest of the Peninsula north of these states and right up to the Isthmus of Kra consisted of Siamese provinces inhabited mainly by Siamese and directly governed by Governors or Commissioners appointed and controlled by Bangkok.

Although the ethnological frontier between the Malay and the Siamese states fell short of the southern tip of Tenasserim, yet Weld and other British officials were ambitious to paint the entire Peninsula red on the map. They dreamt of turning the Bay of Bengal into a "British Lake" and hoped one day to see British India and Burma linked to Singapore by railways traversing the Peninsula with a ferry

service effecting the necessary connection by sea to the Australian railway system. As the eighties wore on the fear that Siam would be absorbed by France added impetus to their ambitions. The local authorities constantly urged the Colonial Office not only to preserve the *status quo* as regards Siamese influence in the northern part of the Peninsula but even to push back such influence wherever there were grounds for doing so. Weld tried to reclaim from Reman, one of the "Seven States," several thousand square miles of territory which, it was alleged, had once belonged to Perak. He also pressed the Colonial Office to protest against any Siamese action in Kelantan and Trengganu calculated to strengthen their influence. . . . But apart from friendly representations and desultory negotiations with the Siamese Government about the disputed Perak-Reman boundary, the British Foreign Office steadily refused to press or threaten Siam.

For an explanation of this conciliatory attitude, we must look at British foreign policy towards Siam, which was determined to a large extent by the presence of France in the vicinity and the rivalry between these two powers as their spheres of influence crept closer to each other. France, established at Saigon since 1862, was pushing out westward and northward from Cochin-China into Cambodia, Annam and Tongking, while the British, from their bases in India and the Straits Settlements, were expanding eastwards into Lower Burma and northwards up the Malay Peninsula towards Siam. By the early eighties Siam was pressed by the French on one frontier and the British on the other. Just as the British authorities in Singapore wished to get rid of Siamese influence in the northern Malay States, so the French at Saigon desired to reclaim on behalf of Cambodia and Annam the provinces of Battambang and Siemreap as well as the territory on the left bank of the Mekong River, then held by Siam. Although King Chulalongkorn of Siam continued and expanded his father's policy of accepting western influence and modernising the administration of his domains with the help of foreign Advisers, he was not in a position to resist successfully the encroachment of European powers. Of this fact the British and the French were well aware and they watched each other's actions jealously. Throughout the decade neither could make a move *vis-à-vis* Siam without the other trying to forestall or counter it. Under these circumstances the British Government of India and the Foreign Office in London decided that nothing should be done either to offend Siam or to provide France with a pretext or precedent for nibbling at Siamese territory. It became a prime objective of British foreign policy that Siam should be maintained as a friendly and independent buffer state. This was considered necessary in the interests of India and of British trade with Siam. The Government of India wished to avoid a conterminous frontier with the French. Such a contingency was bound to give rise

to border disputes and would require that British India should be "armed to the teeth" in order to meet Russian aggression on her northwest frontier and the French threat in the northeast. . . .

In 1887 Lord Salisbury, who was then Premier and Foreign Minister, dropped the Perak-Raman boundary negotiations despite the objections of the Colonial Office when he realized that the Siamese were not prepared to give way. Similarly in 1889 he refused to sanction the extension of British protection to Kelantan and Trengganu urged by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. At every critical point, Salisbury resisted pressure to "take the Siamese by the nose," believing, as he did, that if Britain pushed them too far, they would be driven towards France.

The Government of Siam seemed to have made an early and shrewd appraisal of the situation. They realised that their chances of survival depended in some degree on their ability to exploit the existing Anglo-French rivalry to their own advantage. Whenever the British put forward demands which the authorities in Bangkok were unwilling to concede, it was their trump card to show that any acceptance of British proposals would weaken their bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the French who, if not already making comparable demands, were always likely to do so. Presumably the same arguments were used against the French. Of the two powers, however, Siam had a greater distrust of France and not infrequently sought British advice in her relations with the former.

To maintain this confidence, which was sometimes at a low ebb owing to disputes with the Indian Government over rival claims in the Shan and other states, which the British had inherited from the Kingdom of Upper Burma, British diplomatic representatives in Bangkok supported by the British Government held the view that local ambitions in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula should not be pursued at the expense of more important imperial considerations. The extension of British control northwards was always considered secondary to British objectives in Siam. Thus the British forward movement in the eighties was confined to the independent Malay States in the southern part of the Peninsula.

IV The North Borneo Chartered Company and the Mat Salleh Revolt, 1894-1905

Except for some initial trouble in Perak and Pahang, opposition to the extension of British political control in Malaya was not violent. In the early years in Sarawak, on the other hand, the Brookes met

localised opposition to their regime and in North Borneo the British North Borneo Company was faced with a serious rebellion which has become known as the Mat Salleh Revolt. It is described by K. G. Tregonning in the following reading. ['The Mat Salleh Revolt (1894-1905)' *JMBRAS*, XXIX, 1, 1956, 20-36.]

THE Mat Salleh revolt can be said to have begun in 1894. In that year the first stage of the administration of the chartered company ended, and a new and unpleasant one began. From 1878, when what was to become the chartered company first arrived, until 1894, North Borneo had been judiciously administered by experienced and enthusiastic men. They were too weak to be arrogant, too poor to be powerful. By the strength of their character and by the quality of their work, and by the use of a very small iron fist inside a tattered glove, they spread a thin veneer of law and order over what had been a penniless [maelstrom]. Neither the company in London nor the state in Borneo had the assets, the finance, to warrant rapid development; and thereby the rude and disturbing clash of cultures was replaced by a slow and gentle contact. From 1878 to 1894 North Borneo felt the work and wisdom of such men as William H. Treacher, [W.L.] Pryer, W. [M.] Crocker, A. E. Davies, C. V. Creagh and, in London, A[lfred] Dent and Sir Rutherford Alcock, and the State slowly prospered.

Then in London a group of shareholders who had been dissatisfied ever since the company had abandoned the profits of trading for the responsibilities of administration, grouped themselves behind William C. Cowie, an ex-trader from North Borneo waters who promised dividends and expansion. . . .

Cowie was elected to the court of directors, and became immediately its dynamic spirit. Dent, the founder, resigned, and in Borneo the wise cautious gentlemen were replaced by men of a different calibre. Cowie sent out a new governor, Leicester P. Beaufort, a lawyer with no experience of the east nor of administration, with orders to forget the Colonial Office and Malay States principles that had guided the administration of his predecessors and their subordinates, and to govern Sabah in a thoroughly business-like manner. Between them the two nearly ruined North Borneo.

Cowie plunged without consideration into two grandiose projects; a Grand Trunk Road and Telegraph across the country, and a railway linking Brunei Bay to Cowie Harbour. These undertakings became almost immediately extremely expensive, and to help pay for them Beaufort imposed new taxes on the country. There soon arose numerous grievances amongst all the peoples. The natives feared mass levies of forced labour to push the telegraph through an almost uninhabited interior, and increased taxes. The Chinese, with a new

tax falling heavily on rice, their staple food, and their imports and exports taxed, saw the flow of new immigrants from China weaken and stop for a decade; and the European planters found it harder and harder to secure estate labour in an underpopulated country that had grown unpopular in the great reservoir of Hong Kong. On the west coast an independent authority, the railroad constructor, was adding to the resentment by his stupidity and mal-administration. This then was the background: a country new to European control with memories of lawlessness, with poor administrators and new taxes.

Mat (Mahomed) Salleh was a tall, thin, pock-marked man of mixed Bajau and Sulu parentage, who lived with his father controlling a small village up the Sugut River on the east coast, a proud, fiery and commanding personality with all the colourful and warlike characteristics of his ancestors, as well as their dislike of authority. His influence, if not his authority, already extended down stream.

In late 1894 two adventuresome Dyak traders were killed in a brawl with his men. There is no evidence as to who was the wronged party, but following his rather understandable refusal to meet the company's police, who were themselves Dyaks, unless his men remained armed, he was summoned rather weakly to the river mouth. There he assured two government officers . . . that he would obey the law, and he swore to this on the Koran. This apparently had as much effect as the marriage vow has to the modern Christian, for soon Salleh was reported as sheltering runaway robbers, of passing a government post without reporting, and of other similar independent acts. The Sugut River, then as now, was a neglected area, and Salleh was far from any officer. He was regarded as a minor and remote irritant, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. No action, however, was taken.

. . . [I]n August in 1895, leading a large armed following, and sending [A.] Cook, the Treasurer General and acting Governor in Beaufort's absence, a list of complaints signed by himself and by ten headmen that he wanted redressed, he appeared at Sandakan, the capital of the country. It was terrified. . . . Cook . . . refused to see Salleh, accepted the wildest rumours of the bazaar as to his strength, and ordered him to be gone. A patrol of police was kept timidly on the outskirts of town, but no one in authority ventured near the beached prahus. After waiting for ten days Mat Salleh led his fleet northwards. . . .

On the arrival of Beaufort . . . a detachment of police followed Salleh. Pulling up the Sugut it found him busily constructing a stockade. This was attacked as Mat Salleh and his followers fled. With the kampong destroyed, pursuit was undertaken after him into the jungle. . . .

The government was unable to contact Salleh, and Beaufort decided to abandon the area. He wrote "our first duty is to protect Europeans, even if it involves a considerable portion of our staff and police force.

Next—how to govern the natives? My plan is to govern them along the sea coast where we can get at them with some ease and regularity, and at such places as are necessary in the interior...."

Salleh was thus allowed to roam unchecked, and he regained the face he had lost by his rebuff at Sandakan. He wrote asking why he had been attacked after leaving Sandakan, and that he would abide by the settlement of his grievances if [William] Pryer [former Resident of the East Coast and founder of Sandakan] was the adjudicator. Salleh may well have been genuine, but Beaufort and Cook heartily disliked Pryer, who had no official position, and the answer was merely an offer of a safe conduct to Sandakan. He began collecting arms and support, and by August 1896 the government had become aware of its danger. He was declared an outlaw, and an expedition, led by Raffles Flint, set off to get him.

* * *

Cautiously he began the erection of a fort a little way upstream, a cork to keep Salleh in the bottle, and despite the fact that one mid-morning Mat Salleh sailed past down to an estuarine connection with the Sugut, he continued. Beaufort found him surrounded by the piles and beginnings of a huge fort drafting a request for bluejackets and gunboats.... [B]y October the whole project had fizzled out.

Until July 1897 there was silence, complete and undisturbed. Then Mat Salleh struck, but not on the east coast where he had long been known, but on the west, his childhood home. Beaufort from Sandakan reported urgently to London: "last night the S.S. *Memmon* arrived here with letters... announcing that Mat Salleh had burned and sacked Gaya, killing a police constable and a prisoner, wounding another and capturing... the Treasury Clerk there, along with all the money, guns and ammunition. In a sudden and unexpected attack... he looted all he wanted, burnt every house on the island, and finally retired to the Inanam taking all the Chinese traders with him".

By this sudden swoop Salleh had destroyed the island post, the largest depot of the west coast. The government and towkays lost an estimated \$100,000. A clerk, Katick, escaped from the island and fled in a small prahu to Papar, down the coast. From there a Sikh policeman ran forty miles to Mempakul where the cable from Labuan ended. News was flashed there to Hewett, the acting West Coast Resident. He steamed at once for Gaya. He arrived in sight of the island settlement on July 12, and caught the Mengkabong people red-handed burning and looting.... They fled into the jungle of the island, as the tide was out. Hewett captured their prahus on the beach, stuffed with loot. The Bajau village on the island was untouched, as its inhabitants had supported Salleh, but the rest of the settlement, the Residency, offices, Treasurer's house and gaol on the hill, the Chinese shops and

customs house at the foot behind the jetty, and the government boat-house and godowns further around the shore, was all burnt...

In a fury at this destruction Hewett "determined to go to the fountain head of it all, the Inanam River, and simply burn it out and sweep it clean from one end to the other, having done which we intended to do the same to the Mengkabong". Neither of these rivers was in the possession of the chartered company. Both were subject to the extremely vague suzerainty of the Sultan of Brunei, and were, in practice, controlled more or less [by] their territorial lords, who resided pecuniously in Brunei. Hewett felt his intervention might involve the chartered company in complications, but he took the responsibility.

Before leaving Gaya Island... Hewett... summarily executed a Sulu spy who had been sent into Gaya two weeks before to win over the Bajaus. Then he crossed over to attack the Inanam. Here he was held up by the stout resistance at its mouth of several solid forts or bunkers. He landed at Tanjong Aru and marched overland to the source of the rivers. It was not until Sandakan sent its precious Maxim gun and reinforcements that the forts downstream were carried. Then every house on the river, and every pound of rice in each house, was burnt and destroyed. Thus was Mat Salleh's childhood home ravaged.

This invasion of Brunei territory brought a plaintive protest from the Sultan, and he followed the chartered company's bill for damages done by his subjects on Gaya with a similar bill for damage to Inanam. These independent rivers, uncontrolled and lawless, had long been an irritant imbedded in the flank of North Borneo, and the chartered company now took the opportunity to negotiate for their transfer. The west coast had hitherto been neglected, and once nearly abandoned; the wealth of nineteenth century Sabah had lain in the tobacco, timber and jungle produce of the east. But now the absurd project of Cowie to build a railway from Brunei Bay across Borneo to Cowie Harbour had produced disheartening difficulties, one of which was a deep sea terminus. Cowie was sure that there was a suitable port in Brunei Bay. He marked the place in confident blue pencil. But there was nothing but mangrove and shallows. The nearest place was Gaya Bay, and its annexation became immediately desirable. In 1898 the independent rivers were secured, and a line was begun from there southwards to link up with that struggling inland. A new port was begun, originally at Gantisan, at a site chosen by Cowie from his intimate local knowledge, and then when that was proved unsuitable, further inside the Bay. Named Jesselton, after a nonentity on the court of directors, this indirect result of Mat Salleh's rebellion is to-day the capital of the country.

After the successful attack on Gaya, Mat Salleh retired into the interior, over the ranges, to Ranau, sheltering behind Mount Kinabalu. Both from the east and from the west forces were sent from

the coast to pursue him. Heavy flooding of the Sugut forced back the eastern party, and the western force, although it reached Ranau, was repulsed in August, and Reddie, its commander, thinking he was heavily outnumbered, retired to the coast.

In November 1897 Salleh... attacked Ambong, a west coast station. This time, however, he was not successful. Rumours had reached the district officer of North Keppel, [G.] Ormsby, that an attack was likely, and he had put the government post in a state of defence... [Mat Salleh was repulsed, but the company's forces, in pursuit, suffered a serious defeat.]

* * *

... Rajah Brooke of Sarawak, who had been bitterly opposed to the chartered company since its conception, issued a proclamation ordering all Dyaks back to Sarawak. The military wing of the police force of the chartered company consisted largely of Dyaks, and this order to desert, at a critical moment in the revolt, added enormously to the ill feelings between the two states. Sarawak officers endeavoured to post up their government's notice in Labuan, and in other parts of the company's territory. They were informed that it was illegal, as an incitement to commit an offence, and the governor in Singapore, in his role as High Commissioner for Borneo, addressed a terse rebuke to Brooke. Fortunately the Dyaks remained loyal. [Police Commandant] Reddie visited Singapore and, although refused troops, secured that which held the Empire together, a Royal Navy gunboat.

The presence of the Royal Navy re-assured the west coast that the company was there to stay, and had the backing of powerful friends. This was forcibly demonstrated by a Royal Navy river bombardment of Kuala Lama, a village which was sheltering Tali, a notorious ex-convict and follower of Salleh who had looted Loongbawang, killing two of its inhabitants and burning it to the ground. Tali was subsequently captured and killed by Dusuns in a burst of new found loyalty. Loongbawang was abandoned and its inhabitants shifted to a new townsite, located at the spot where the new railway reached the Padas River. Cowie, who had just arrived, named it Beaufort. With the coastal plain at peace, Salleh was attacked again. He fled from Ranau, on January 8, and his fort was destroyed. Again he was a hunted outlaw, with a waning influence.

Cowie proceeded to Sandakan where in January 1898 a Council meeting decided that Salleh must be pursued with vigour. But Cowie chose to perform, against all opinion, a dramatic volte face. He wrote to the rebel offering a pardon if he would swear loyalty. He also induced his old business partner the Sultan of Sulu to write to his wife, the notorious Dayang Bandang, a relative of the Sultan. She was believed to be a witch, with flaming eyes and feet that must never

touch the ground. All accounts agree that her influence over Salleh was profound.

Salleh was located in March, with a few followers, far in the interior. . . . He agreed to a meeting, and in May Cowie was pulled up the Menggatal River to a kampong an hour's journey from the coast. Here he landed, and accompanied by the entire village, nearly all of them participants in the raid on Gaya, proceeded some three miles to a clearing. Here there had assembled some three hundred armed men, who welcomed their Menggatal comrades, and the lone European, with excited cries. They parted, and at the far end of the avenue thus created Cowie perceived Salleh, tall, thin, "dressed in a gold cap, a smart green embroidered tunic and Sulu embroidered trousers with a red waistband".

Cowie promised Salleh a complete pardon for himself and for his followers. He was told he could not go and live in the Inanam, on the coast, but that the government would let him live in the Tambunan Valley, in the interior, and he would be given authority over the people there. If he lived quietly for a year he might expect a payment of money and he might then be allowed to return to the coast. After considerable discussion, Mat Salleh accepted, becoming more and more arrogant as his demands were granted, and the next day, when governor Beaufort was present, agreed again. Jubilantly he proceeded at once to the Inanam, where he installed his own puppet headman, and then retired to his new domain.

These concessions by Cowie precipitated a wave of resignations among the administration. Hewett, the West Coast Resident, said he could "not approve of Cowie's action in raising Mat Salleh from a hunted outlaw with a handful of followers to a powerful chief, an action which risked the lives of the mass of loyal natives in order to appease those who were disloyal". He resigned, so did Reddie, [and] . . . two other west coast officers, and Ormsby, district officer in North Keppel where most of the unruly Bajaus were located. . . . Cowie was left fully aware that his policy was thoroughly disapproved of by nearly all the administrators on the spot. But he never wavered. He was a brave, obstinate man.

In London too he lost the support of his fellow directors, not so much through opposition to his policy as through his inability to explain himself in his cables. The written agreement with Salleh, which was sent after him and which he returned signed, differed from the verbal in one important respect. Cowie had promised complete pardon for all; the written terms of submission pardoned all except escaped prisoners. Word reached Cowie that Salleh considered the verbal agreement as binding as that which he had signed. Misleadingly Cowie wired London saying that Salleh was reported to have revoked a large portion of the terms of submission, that local feeling

was for war, and what did his directors advise? War, they replied. But Cowie was stubbornly committed to a peace policy. His ill-conceived railway was swallowing gigantic meals of money; further punitive expeditions might be ruinous, and he clung to the hope that Salleh would settle down. This point of view he quite failed to transmit, in further cables he expressed himself most badly, and it led to a complete estrangement between the two. Finally he was told to hand over his authority to Beaufort, a governor with whom he was by now at complete variance. He left immediately for London, while affairs in Borneo seemed most precarious.

In Singapore Swettenham, as High Commissioner for Borneo, endeavoured to induce him to return to Borneo and watch over his peace policy. At a conference attended by Swettenham, Cowie, Treacher (the Resident of Perak and formerly governor of North Borneo) and various naval captains the situation was discussed. Cowie revealed that nearly everyone in North Borneo was opposed to his concessions, but that the basis of his power was not in Borneo but in London, and there he must return.

In Borneo Beaufort ignored the court's injunction to resume hostilities, and adhered to the promises Cowie had made, and which he felt obliged to honour. Inland Mat Salleh began building a fort, larger and stronger than ever before. A strange habit this, shared with most other rebels in North Borneo history. The fastnesses of the jungle provide a thousand forts and ambuscades, yet they are ignored, and rebels hole up defiantly in a laboriously constructed but easily discoverable fort of their own....

By promising Mat Salleh the Tambunan Valley Cowie had given away something the company did not possess. Its employees had penetrated into this remote region only twice.... There was no government representative there, the Muruts had never submitted to the chartered company, and there was a clear understanding that the government would respect their independence, and that "if they were left alone they would leave the company alone"....

With Salleh breaking their old jars and taking their rice their dislike of the European abated, and they asked the nearest district officer, [F. W.] Fraser at Keningau, to protect them. Messengers from the Muruts even reached Sandakan, far to the east, asking to belong to the government and offering to pay poll tax. Beaufort decided that the government would never have a better opportunity of peacefully acquiring the Tambunan allegiance, and prepared to go to the valley. He went there in January 1899, met Mat Salleh and the local Murut chiefs, and in an impressive ceremony watched them all swear peace.

* * *

It was decided by Cowie in June to establish a permanent post in

the Tambunan Valley, and the governor was instructed to inform Salleh that he and other chiefs were to sit with Fraser in the administration of justice.... Salleh was in active opposition again, an opposition that Swettenham in Singapore held was justifiable, and that, as the government had invaded Tambunan contrary to their promise to Salleh, he was quite entitled to resist.

From this time on a showdown was inevitable. Throughout the latter half of 1899 there were alarms, excursions, raids and deaths, not only in the interior but also again on the west coast. Inland, Fraser was alone at Tambunan, with his Muruts overawed by Mat Salleh and his men. By December they were raiding and killing almost with impunity. Fraser [had] been refused police by Cowie, and had been instructed to defend himself with local men. They were thin straws for a drowning man, and he reported the situation as becoming more and more out of hand. On the coast in December two messengers, a Bajau and a Dyak, despatched from Papar with a conciliatory note for Salleh, were murdered by three of Salleh's henchmen....

Papar hurriedly constructed a defensive post, over 200 natives helping, and outlying police called in as news of a large band advancing down river from the interior was received. The panic spread to Putatan, where the Chinese shopkeepers and all the natives cleared out to sea, terrified of an alleged band of 200 Bajaus five hours away. On December 13, following these scares and the inactivity of the government, the government chief of Menggatal went over to Salleh, followed two days later by the burning down of the government post at Mengkabong, the killing of two men, and the looting of Inanam and Menggatal shops.

Beaufort had resigned and North Borneo was at its administrative nadir, being governed by an unholy alliance of three old officers, [A.] Cook (Treasurer-General), [E.P.] Gueritz (Chief Judicial Officer) and [R.] Little (Resident, West Coast). The former two lived and quarrelled in Sandakan, and neglected the State in the process. Cowie washed his hands of the whole affair. "There is nothing left but for you to act on your own initiative, and to take such steps as you think fit" he wrote, and Cook acted with promptitude. A force was... marched inland. Consisting of 100 police and 500 Dusun carriers with a mountain gun, the expedition was allowed to wind its way in from the coast... as Salleh sped back from the Lawas River, loaded with powder, gathering in his roaming Bajaus as he ran. By January 1900 he was invested.

The fighting against the 300 Bajaus and 1,000 Tegaas Muruts lasted all the month, increasing in intensity.... After two days of shelling and fighting Latob, one of the strongest of the fortified villages, was taken at a rush. Soon after... Salleh was reduced to his Bajaus and his two remaining forts. These were under fire by the

20th, that of Mat Sator (his chief lieutenant),...catching fire and burning next day. This was then occupied and fire brought to bear from 800 yards on the remaining stronghold. Throughout the last three days of the month the seven-pounder fired down into it. On 31 January Salleh himself was killed, emerging from a tunnel. The survivors fled that night, leaving near on 300 dead behind them in the holocaust, and being hacked down by the Dyaks as they ran.

Slogging over the Crocker Range from Kimanis as this happened was the new governor, Hugh Clifford, later to embody Mat Salleh as his sympathetic hero in "Saleh, A Study." (Edinburgh, 1904), and "Saleh: A Sequel." (London, 1908). He wrote,

... had the government retired from Tambunan as desired by Mat Salleh the day of reckoning would only have been postponed for a short period. Mat Salleh himself might desire peace, but he was surrounded by a number of bad characters whose only means of livelihood lay in harassing and plundering their neighbours, and the policy of pardon and magnanimity adopted by the Managing Director had been misinterpreted by them into a confession of weakness. Any backward step would only have served to strengthen this impression, nor would they ever have rested content until they had once more tried their ability to take the field against the Company's forces.

Clifford arrived on the scene as [Colonel C.H.] Harrington [police commandant] was summarily shooting the captured survivors, including three of Salleh's lieutenants.... He was severely reprimanded for this breach of legality. It was the first breath of a new order.... Mat Salleh, wrapped in a white sheet, was buried where he lay. The numerous other dead fell into a common grave.

* * *

The Tegaas tribe were fined twenty-five buffaloes and \$250 (to be paid in jars, the only currency of the valley), and were ordered to destroy all fortifications, to surrender all fire-arms...and to build a government post for Fraser, whom Clifford considered most tactful, sympathetic and intelligent. He sent back to Sulu the captured wife of Mat Salleh, Dayang Bandang, forbade the entry of any European, Brunei, Bajau, or Dusun and with the interior thoroughly subdued, returned to the coast.

This was the end of Mat Salleh, and the end of Bajau control of the interior; but Salleh's lieutenants, cruel murderers all of them, were still unsubdued. Swettenham in Singapore voiced heavy criticism of the operations against Salleh, and maintained that Clifford had failed to demonstrate the lawfulness of the company's action. Bravely Clifford ignored him.

Originally Clifford had thought that all trouble had ended with the death of Salleh in January. He was rudely disillusioned by a heavy attack on Kudat on April 28. . . [led by] Mat Sator. . . . A ship carrying forty police in transit to Sandakan was in the harbour, bringing them back from the Murut expedition, and their presence saved the town. . . . Sator was killed. Another leader, Mat Daud, fell with him. The remainder fled in panic.

* * *

But now the rebels, dispersed and dispirited after the mauling at Ranau, began to revive. The West Coast Provinces, Keppel particularly, became again most unsettled. The main leader was Kamunta, a lieutenant of Salleh's throughout who had been with Sator in the Kudat raid. In May he attacked an isolated Chinese trader on the Tempasuk, home of the Bajaus, and burnt a village in the Menggatal area. Harrington went with a force of forty Dyaks to conduct a lengthy three month patrol, but trouble flared up elsewhere.

* * *

Clifford decided that patrols and expeditions into the Bajau area were not enough. It was more satisfactory to replace patrols by a permanent officer. He decided to place a post on the Tempasuk River in the heart of the Bajau disturbances, and Kota Belud was established. To-day one of the most attractive and desirable district offices in North Borneo, with the cool Tempasuk river flowing below, and the incomparable Mt. Kinabalu above, this post played a major part in quelling the disturbances.

By 1901 Jesselton had replaced abandoned Gaya, and as the terminus of a new railway. . . [was] the scene of much activity. The town was thrown into a panic almost as abject as Kudat's when in January a large band was reported advancing from Putatan. All the Europeans gathered in one hill top bungalow, while the Chinese barred their shops and the natives fled to Gaya. The attack did not eventuate, and throughout 1901 the wandering bands, while still causing deaths and damage, slowly disintegrated under constant patrolling. . . .

. . . [I]n May 1902 Kamunta himself surrendered. . . . He and Sedik, another leader, were shot by a firing squad at Kudat in July, and three more were hung. . . . By the end of 1902, throughout which there had been surrenders of the rank and file, less than a dozen rebels, led by Si Langkap (the last of Salleh's lieutenants) and Si Gunting, were wandering in the most impassable fastnesses of Sayap Pohun, one of the bluffs of Kinabalu.

By 1903 the constant raiding and burning of the west coast was over. The whole area was under control, and it remained peaceful and comparatively law-abiding. Si Langkap surrendered. . . in March, after being constantly hunted for months by Dyaks and the Dusun

police who were replacing them, and having been refused shelter in every Dusun village he neared. He was shot in Kota Belud. Finally, in 1905, Si Gunting, an insignificant looking little man who for years had been wandering around Kinabalu and Tembukong surrendered. . . . He was granted a free pardon and re-instated as a government chief. He had never associated with Salleh and although his name was a bye-word he had done little damage. . . .

Never again was the chartered company troubled by a rising as serious as this. Year after year layers of peaceful administration were laid down, making revolt and rebellion seem ever more extraordinary and out of the question. But Mat Salleh has never been forgotten. At Ranau the people will still show you the stones where their grandparents were forced to swear oaths and to promise Salleh not to support the government in any way, and on the coast too his memory is ever green. One cannot help thinking that for that the bungling of the government was largely responsible.

V *Brunei and Sarawak*

During the nineteenth century the Sultan of Brunei's territories had been slowly ceded to Sarawak and North Borneo, until Brunei was reduced to a tiny enclave of slightly over 2,000 square miles.

[*North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak (British Borneo)*; ed. by Chester F. Roberts and Irving Kaplan, New Haven, [U.S.A.], 1956, 11, 13.]

IN 1850, the United States recognized Sarawak as an independent state, and by 1853 the sovereignty of the Brooke dynasty was complete. Sarawak proper became *de jure* independent, and Brunei's control over it was relinquished. Recognition was granted by Great Britain in 1864 with the appointment of a consul.

Under the patriarchal rule of the Brookes, the country was not opened either to capitalistic development or to large-scale immigration in the manner of Malaya. The rajahs sought as far as possible to screen Sarawak from the modern world and to secure their rule in the personal loyalty of their subjects. The administration under Brunei had been so corrupt and inefficient that any change must have seemed an improvement to the people, and the benevolence of the Brookes won wide support.

* * *

The efforts of the Brookes to suppress piracy and head-hunting led to the expansion of Sarawak from the time of the accession of the first rajah. . . . By 1849, the area around the Batang Lupar, and Saribas Rivers had been cleared, and the Sultan of Brunei transferred it to

Brooke. Sarawak continued to add to her territories over the years. Once the Brookes were in complete control of their own territory, the pirates merely moved their base of operations eastward to the coastal areas of the present Second Division. Operations carried out by Brooke against them brought these areas under his control, and in 1853 the territory south of the Rajang River and its tributaries was relinquished by Brunei. Between 1853 and 1861 Sarawak gradually extended its control over the entire territory west of the Rajang. In the latter year, the Sultan of Brunei, admitting the ineffectiveness of his control over his minor officials in the south, ceded the entire area south of Kidurong point to Sarawak, at the same time confirming Brooke's control over the previously acquired territories. For many years the sultan had received little if any revenues from these areas, for what had been squeezed from the inhabitants by the *pengirans* (viceroys) went to fill the latters' pockets. The people consequently were happy to be rid of the rapacity of the Brunei officials.

The first rajah died in 1868, to be succeeded by his nephew, Charles Brooke. With his succession, Sarawak entered upon a new period of progressive development and expansion. Piracy was eradicated; transportation and communication facilities were instituted and extended; public indebtedness was wiped out. In 1882 the Kayan of the Baram River were attacking Sarawak subjects. Appeals to the Sultan of Brunei were ineffectual since he was unable to control the area. The next year the sultan ceded the territory covered by the watershed of the Baram River and its tributaries to Sarawak. In 1884 the Trusan River area was acquired in a similar manner. In 1890 the people of Limbang, having seen the release of the Baram from Brunei oppression or ineffectiveness, rose in revolt against Brunei. Although at first the rebellion was suppressed, they decided in 1890 to appeal to the rajah for protection, and his flag was hoisted. The rajah accepted the responsibility, and the area was annexed to Sarawak. Finally, following a short dispute in which Great Britain arbitrated, the Lawas basin was purchased in 1905 from the North Borneo Company.

In 1888 an agreement was concluded with the British government placing Sarawak under British protection. The agreement vested in the British government the right of decision in any question regarding the succession in Sarawak and the control of the latter's foreign relations. Most-favored-nation treatment was accorded British subjects, commerce, and shipping. The British, however, were given no jurisdiction in Sarawak, and their formal powers were strictly limited.

Under the third rajah, Charles Vyner Brooke (1917-1946), the prosperity of the country was maintained. By 1917 Sarawak showed a consistently favorable balance of trade. Continuing favorable balances resulted in financial reserves that could be devoted to improved medical, educational, and social services. . . .

VI *Economic Development in Sarawak,* 1870-1917

During the administration of the Second Rajah, Sir Charles Brooke (1868-1917), Sarawak prospered, and although the economic development of the country was in no sense comparable to that in the British controlled states in Malaya, numerous attempts were made to stimulate economic progress. [A. H. Moy-Thomas, 'Economic Development under the Second Rajah (1870-1917)', *The Sarawak Museum Journal*, x, 17-18, 1961, 50-8.]

THERE are several schools of thought on what went on in Sarawak under Brooke rule. A popular one in this age of rush and bustle is that the country slumbered peacefully...

The Second Rajah [in fact], although something of an autocrat, was a dedicated man and did a surprising amount for Sarawak *on surprisingly little*.

The first subject... is coal, which for many years was almost regarded as... the cure-all of the Country's economic ills. For some years prior to 1870, outcrops of coal were known to exist at Silantek and along the Sadong River. It was, however, in that year that the Rajah despatched a Mr. [James?] St. John to carry out a thorough exploration of the area and to report on his findings... On the submission of this Report a lot of things happened at once. Samples of coal were sent to Singapore for testing in the gasworks there and were found to be of good quality. An elated Rajah advertised a free return trip from Singapore in the steamer "Royalist II" for anyone who was genuinely interested in the coal and, finally, towards the end of 1872 he endeavoured to float a limited liability company with himself as Chairman and the Board sitting in Kuching... Unhappily... there were no "bites" and the proposal lapsed. Steps were then taken by the Government to open up the Sadong deposits and by 1874 sufficient coal was being produced to supply the Government's own coastal vessels and steam launches.

* * *

One must turn now to the Island of Muara, which is just inside Brunei Bay. For some years coal had been exploited there by the firm of C. C. Cowie & Sons, who had the sole concession rights from the Sultan of Brunei. In 1888 the Sarawak Government bought out Cowie and the concession was transferred to the Rajah, who renamed the Island Brooketon. Two years later a disastrous fire broke out at Brooketon which burnt for two or three years, during which time little or nothing could be done about extracting coal.

The Rajah still had Silantek very much in mind and in 1896 he ordered a survey to be carried out with a view to constructing a railway between Silantek and Lingga. It was found even in those days that the cost of the line would have been in the region of £100,000. . . . Once again, the proposal came to nothing and the Rajah abandoned all prospect of working the Silantek field.

Most of Sadong's production was used either locally or exported to Singapore, whilst Brooketon provided bunker coal in opposition to the Labuan coalfield. Maximum tonnages produced over a twelve-month period were in the region of 22,000 and 30,000 tons respectively. The price F.O.B. [was] about \$6 per ton. . . .

Brooketon was closed in 1924 and Sadong at the time of the depression in the early thirties.

* * *

One must now turn to the activities of the Borneo Co., Ltd. which became established in the mid-fifties. . . . Apart from general trade, which was almost entirely between Kuching and Singapore, they did much to open up the mineral potential of the country. For some forty years they mined antimony at Busau and mercury at Tegora, both in the Bau District. In the eighties, they assisted the Chinese gold miners in Bau by providing basic mining machinery on a hire basis. In 1898 with the advent of the Cyanide extraction process, the Company opened the Tai Parit mine in Bau which was followed by further open cast workings at Bidi in 1900. In those days these ventures were described as the "greatest workings in the world". Impressive they were too and it is difficult to visualise that the Bau area was once centre of a major industry employing many hundreds of people.

Bidi mine closed in 1911 and Bau in 1923. All that can be traced to-day is the large chimney in Bau as well as the foundations of numerous buildings covered by undergrowth. . . .

During the early years of the present century a considerable acreage of rubber was put down by the Company at the Dahan and Sungei Tengah Estates. They also established a settlement scheme for the planting of gambier and pepper near Kuching. Gambier, incidentally, is a leaf which when rendered down was used in the dyeing industry; and the residue acted as a good pepper fertiliser.

A certain amount of timber extraction was undertaken along the Rejang although this was never a complete success due to the depredations of borer beetles, etc. Most of the output went to Hong Kong from Tanjong Mani.

One cannot leave the Borneo Company without reference to sea communications with Singapore. In 1877, the Sarawak and Singapore Steamship Company was formed. The chief shareholders being Gov-

ernment and the Borneo Company. The new Company took over the old steamship "Royalist II". Friction was soon created and in the same year Government disposed of all its shares which were taken up by the Borneo Company and leading merchants in Kuching and Singapore. The Company purchased the "Rajah Brooke" (1) in 1890 and this vessel operated a fortnightly service to Singapore. She was considered far too large and even in those days representations were made for a weekly service with two smaller steamers operating.

In 1896 the "Rajah Brooke" ran aground at Pulau Tinggi and became a total loss. . . . The Company was accused . . . of carrying out a monopoly of trade and transit. The advocates of two steamers on the run became more and more vocal. The "Rajah Brooke" was replaced by a chartered German vessel, the "Vorwarts" which was also considered too big and to make matters worse, she also ran aground in the following year.

In 1902 a Chinese firm placed a steamer in service in competition with S. & S.S. Co., but this venture only lasted a year when the former went out of business. However, it finally convinced S. & S.S. Co. that two vessels could usefully be employed and they ordered a further vessel, the S.S. "Kuching". Thereafter relationships with the public were conducted on an even keel and later the Borneo Company were to give up their shipping interests altogether.

The Baram area was ceded to the Rajah in 1882 and the first Resident of the area, Mr. C. C. de Crespigny may be regarded as the discoverer of oil in Sarawak and frequent references to the "Earth Oil" in Miri are to be found in his diaries. Dr. [Charles] Hose, de Crespigny's successor as Resident in Baram, took much more positive action and during his sixteen years service in the area, compiled a detailed map of the known oil seepages. A certain amount of exploratory work and drilling was conducted by the Borneo Company, but it was in 1907 when Dr. Hose retired that he obtained the Rajah's permission to take his celebrated map and oil samples to Shell in London. This action culminated in the Rajah signing the Sarawak Prospecting Licence with the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company, in 1909, and Dr. Hose returned to Miri with one of the Company's experts, during the same year. A rough geological survey of the area was conducted during the latter half of 1909 and continued into 1910. The location for the first well was then decided. The exploration and exploitation of oil in remote areas presents fearful problems even to-day, but the pioneers in Miri had to cope with a shortage of labour and the total absence of any facilities for getting heavy equipment ashore.

An initial shipment of some 500 tons of crude [oil] was made in drums in 1913. During the following year the first submarine loading line was put into place at Tanjong Lobang. This was a six-inch line—2½ miles in length and presented a major engineering problem. This line

proved inadequate and in 1917 an 8" line was laid at Lutong. This was $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles long and, at the time, the longest submarine line in the world.

A very elementary refinery was constructed at Lutong in 1917. Lutong was chosen for the site as the refinery would be conveniently close to the sea line...

Except in Kuching town itself, there were no roads anywhere, and travel was almost entirely on foot or by water.

For many years the Rajah had been keen on providing a railway to open up the hinterland near Kuching and although by 1917 a survey had been completed to 27th mile, the Railway only ever ran as far as the 10th mile.... Track laying commenced in 1911 with the assistance of the light locomotive "Idiot" and in 1912 orders were placed ...for... tank engines.... Secondhand passenger rolling stock was purchased from the Burma Railways and goods stock from the Federated Malay States Railways.... The Railway was opened progressively to traffic during 1915, the official opening taking place on 1st August. On the opening day, the first train knocked down and killed a child at the Green Road level crossing and this was considered to be a very bad omen....

The Third Rajah ordered the closure of the system to regular traffic in January, 1931. During its lifetime as a fully fledged railway it lost \$1,063,760—a not inconsiderable figure for those days.

* * *

The Brooke Dockyard was planned in 1907 at about the same time as the Railway. Excavations commenced in 1909 and were brought to a halt in 1909 when the contractor absconded. Work was finally completed in 1912....

Until 1907, Kuching was dependent on the small reservoir in Reservoir Road for its water supplies. This proved inadequate for the fast growing Town and in 1903 the Matang supply scheme was prepared. This allowed for a 4 million gallon reservoir and a piped supply in the Town—a distance of some ten miles. The pipes arrived in 1906 and all was ready for the grand opening in August, 1907. This was postponed and finally cancelled due to the pipes bursting under test....

The telephone system was installed in 1898 and extended to Bau and Bidi. Wireless stations were erected in Kuching, Simunjan, Miri and Sibu and the first message to Singapore was relayed on 25th October, 1916....

Finally, it is worth recording that tea and coffee were grown on the slopes of Matang and tobacco at Lundu. Sarawak cigars were on sale in London with a picture of Main Bazaar on the box!

VII *Federation in Malaya and its Results,* 1895-1906

Schemes for the federation of the Malay states were advanced during the early 1890's by Sir Frank Swettenham among others. Swettenham was appointed the first Resident-General in Kuala Lumpur when the Federated Malay States, consisting of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, came into being on 1 July 1896. The following reading is taken from his book, *British Malaya*. [London, 1948, 273-5, 284-5, 287-91, 299, 301-2.]

THE Treaty of Federation was a very short document, and what it did was to make the States one for all general purposes of administration; but, in agreeing to the appointment of a Resident-General, it was for the first time plainly stated that he should have executive *control*, under the direction of the Governor of the Straits Settlements, who would in future be also styled High Commissioner for the Federated Malay States.

The Malay rulers cordially approved this scheme, because it did not touch their own status in any way, though it formally recognized the right of the Resident-General to exercise a very large control in the affairs of the States. He was not styled an adviser; his authority, both in the general administration, and as regards the Residents, was clearly defined. Then the Malay Rulers believed that, as a federation, they would be stronger, more important, their views more likely to receive consideration, should a day come when those views happened to be at variance with the supreme authority, be it High Commissioner at Singapore or Secretary of State in England. Two of the States, Pêrak and Sêlangor, were then very rich; Nêgri Sembilan had a small debt, but was financially sound; while Pâhang was very poor, owed a large sum to the colony, and, though believed to be rich in minerals, had no resources to develop the country. By federation, the rich States were to help the poor ones; so Pâhang and Nêgri Sembilan hoped to gain by the arrangement, while the Rulers of Pêrak and Sêlangor were large-minded enough to welcome the opportunity of pushing on the backward States for the glory and ultimate benefit of the federation.

Further, they welcomed federation because it meant consistency and continuity of policy. It meant the abolition of inter-state frictions and jealousies, and the power to conceive and execute great projects for the benefit of the partnership, without reference to the special interests of any partner. Above all, they not only accepted but desired federation, because they believed that it would give them, in the Resident-General, a powerful advocate of their needs and their views,

a friend whose voice would be heard further and carry more weight than that of any Resident, or of all the Residents acting independently. In the past, there had been times when they had had experience of the result of references to the Governor in distant Singapore, when the representations of their Residents carried little weight if opposed by an authoritative voice giving different counsel to an inexperienced or not much interested Governor. They foresaw that the future would accentuate the disadvantageous position of the States; for the tried and experienced men would go, and their successors might not be able to command even as much influence in Singapore or Downing Street as those who had helped to steer the Malay craft through the troubled waters of the seventies into the calm of the nineties. Therefore, the Malay Sultans and Chiefs, whether they were clearly to gain by the new arrangement or apparently to lose—at least for a time—unanimously declared for federation.

It was perhaps more curious that the four Residents were equally in favour of a proposal which seemed likely to deprive them of some authority and status. Speaking of the others, I can say that, whilst quite alive to that view of the position, they cordially favoured federation because they realized that the existing arrangement was unsatisfactory and becoming impossible, while federation must make for unity of purpose and effort, for efficiency, for progress, for help where it was most wanted, and for a government no longer of one man but of five—the Resident-General and the Residents—with all the best special advice which federation could attract to the service of the Malay States. . . . In order to ease possible friction, and to put the High Commissioner (supposing him to be a stranger with no experience of Malay matters) in a position to exercise something approaching effective control, the federation scheme provided him with a Secretary to be selected from the best of the rising men of the Malay States service—some one who knew not only the work of all the States, but possessed a knowledge of the Malay language and people and men of other nationalities, Europeans and Chinese, engaged in the development of the Malay States. . . .

As soon as federation was accomplished, Kuala Lumpur, in Selangor, was, because of its central position, selected for the headquarters of the Resident-General and of the heads of the Federal Departments. The writer was appointed Resident-General. . . .

One of the best results of federation was the opportunity it gave for the Resident-General to meet all the Residents (and any of the federal heads of departments) in consultation, and so settle in a few days matters which months or years of correspondence would have brought no nearer to finality. A signal instance was the fact that a Land Code for all the States was unanimously adopted at the first conference, and subsequently a Mining Code and many other meas-

ures of an equally important and controversial character were discussed, revised, and adopted. . . . As regards the land question and the terms on which Government land (and that was practically all land) should be alienated, held, and transferred, there had been for years the most serious controversy, the most divergent opinions ever called forth by any administrative question in the Malay States. A very simple set of almost identical regulations had been a sufficient guide for nearly fifteen years. Then something much more elaborate became necessary, and as by that time there were in the States British Residents with very strong views on this and other questions, the result had been that policies were in some cases reversed, in others maintained and accentuated, and there were in different States widely different land laws, causing much very natural dissatisfaction. It was therefore a notable achievement to secure unanimity on a matter of so great importance, and this early promise of enthusiasm for a common cause has been maintained in subsequent conferences of the Residents with the Resident-General. . . .

In order to bring home to the Malays, in the most striking manner possible, the reality of federation arrangements were made to hold a Conference of Malay Rulers, members of State Councils and Chiefs, as nearly as possible on the first anniversary of the coming into operation of the new system. . . . The Malay Rulers took up the suggestion with enthusiasm, Kuala Kangsar, the seat of the Sultan of Pêrak, was chosen as the meeting place, and, in July, 1897, the Conference was duly held and proved a most unqualified success. . . .

The following is from the Resident-General's Official Report of the proceedings:—

"From every point of view the meeting has been an unqualified success, and it is difficult to estimate now the present and prospective value of this unprecedented gathering of Malay Sultans, Rajas, and chiefs. Never in the history of Malaya has any such assemblage been even imagined. I doubt whether anybody has ever heard of one Ruler of a State making a ceremonial visit to another; but to have been able to collect together, in one place, the Sultans of Pêrak, Sêlângor, Pâhang, and the Nêgri Sambilan is a feat that might well have been regarded as impossible. . . . It was hardly to be expected that a man of the great age of the Sultan of Sêlângor could be induced to make, for him, so long and difficult a journey, and to those who know the pride, the prejudices, and the sensitiveness of Malay Rajas, it was very unlikely that the Sultan of Pâhang would join an assemblage where he could not himself dictate the exact part which he would play in it. It is not so many years since the Governor of the Straits Settlements found the utmost difficulty in getting speech with Malay Rajas in the States which are now federated; Sir Frederick Weld, even though accompanied by the present Sultan of Pêrak, by Sir Hugh

Low, and the present Residents of Sēlāngor and Pāhang, all officers accustomed to deal with Malays, had to wait several hours, on the bank of the Pāhang River, before any one could persuade the Sultan of Pāhang to leave a game of chance in which he was engaged with a Chinese, in order to grant an interview to His Excellency. It is difficult to imagine a greater difference than between then and now, and, though the Sultan of Pērak has been far more nearly associated with British officers than any other of the Sultans, he has always been extremely jealous of his rights as a Ruler. I was, therefore, surprised to hear the frank way in which, at the Council, he spoke of British protection, which he did not hesitate to describe as control.

"The deliberations of the Council were both interesting and useful, and there is no doubt that, in some respects, we could not have arrived at the same ends by any other means than the meeting of the Rajas of the Federated States and their responsible advisers. All the proceedings of the Council were conducted in the Malay language, and I am convinced that, if ever it were necessary to introduce interpretation, no such successful meetings as those just concluded could ever be held. The Sultans and all their chiefs spoke on all the subjects which interested them, without either hesitation or difficulty, and on matters concerning the Mahammadan religion, Malay customs, and questions which specially touch the well-being of Malays. . . . Nothing can be decided at the Council, which is only one of advice, for no Raja has any voice in the affairs of any State but his own. This was carefully explained and is thoroughly understood. But it is of great value to get together the best native opinions and to hear those qualified to do so thoroughly discuss, from varying points of view, questions which are similar in all the Federated States. On several important subjects the members of the Council expressed unanimous views, and it now only remains to take action in the various State Councils to secure identical measures embodying the opinions expressed."

This 1897 Conference was such a pronounced success that by the desire of the Malays, it was decided to repeat it from time to time as found desirable and convenient, and on each occasion to assemble in a different State, so that each Sultan in turn might have the pleasure of welcoming the neighbouring rulers, of showing them his country, and the hope was expressed that the friendships then so happily made might be renewed.

A second and equally successful Conference was held at Kuala Lumpor, in Sēlāngor, in July, 1903. Again the deliberations of the assembly, after much interesting discussion, resulted in a number of important decisions chiefly connected with matters in which the Malay population was specially concerned. This Conference was rendered notable by the fact that the Rulers of all the western States were conveyed to Kuala Lumpor by train, only the Sultan of Pāhang and his

chiefs having to travel by sea, and also by reason of a remarkable speech delivered by the Sultan of Pêrak at the close of the proceedings, when His Highness gave a graphic account of British intervention in the Malay States, and the benefits which had been conferred on the country and people by the adoption of British methods of administration....

The following... gives a general view of the progress of the States under British advice and control... from the first appointment of Residents to 31 December, 1905. It shows the revenue and expenditure, the trade (that is, the value of imports and exports), the duty paid on tin, the land revenue, the forest revenue (which prior to 1901 appeared as land revenue), the postal and telegraph receipts, and the railway receipts.

The population of Pêrak was returned, in 1879, as 81,084, and in 1889 had risen to 194,801. The first year which records the population of the four States is 1891, when the total was returned as 424,218. In 1901 the numbers had risen to 678,595, and the estimate for 1905 is 860,000.

All these figures are so significant that it seems a small thing to mention that a country which, in 1874, had no post office and had never seen a postage stamp, in 1904¹ dealt with about 10,000,000 covers, issued money orders to the value of over \$1,250,000, had \$275,000 in the Post Office Savings Banks, and maintained over 2000 miles of telegraph wires. In the same year the prisons received 10,000 prisoners, the hospitals treated 46,000 in-patients and 130,000 out-patients at a cost of over £50,000 a year, and the schools were attended by over 15,000 scholars. In 1875 the States did not possess a mile of first class road, but in 1904 there were over 2500 miles, the greater part of which will compare favourably with the roads in any country, while 340 miles of railway, built at a cost of \$32,000,000, were open for traffic, and, when the present extensions are completed, the Federation will have constructed and equipped close on 500 miles of railways, out of current revenue, without borrowing a farthing. Indeed, the Government balances at the end of 1905 amounted to no less than \$22,000,000. It may be questioned whether it is possible to find, in the history of British administration over-seas, a parallel to this record.

How far the present prosperity of the Federated Malay States is due (1) to Chinese, (2) to Europeans, and (3) to British officers in the service of the Malay Government, is an interesting question which admits of an unhesitating reply. Chinese enterprise and Chinese industry... supplied the funds with which the country was developed.

¹ It is possible to give the following figures for 1905. Postal revenue, \$296,323; money orders issued, \$1,798,147; in-patients in hospitals, 55,467; out-patients, 120,304; schools attended by 15,241; cost of education, \$322,512; railways open, 396 miles, at a cost of \$37,261,922.

But without the British officers to secure order and justice, the Chinese would never have entered the country in tens of thousands; without British control of the revenues, there never would have been any money to spend on the construction of roads and railways and all the other works of development; and without the exercise of foresight and intelligent direction, the funds available would have been much smaller and might have been spent in vain. European planters and miners only came into the States when the result of Chinese enterprise had already proved the rich resources of the land, but to these Europeans belongs—especially in three notable instances—the credit of valuable assistance in the advancement of the Protected States. They introduced hydraulic sluicing and other scientific methods in dealing with the alluvial tin deposits. They extended the use of machinery, and they were the first seriously to attempt underground mining, whether in alluvial deposits or in the rock, and whether in mining for tin or gold. Secondly, it was Europeans who introduced scientific planting on a large scale. They hold the field in this respect; they are rapidly extending the cultivation of valuable and permanent products, and their work may in time prove as useful and contribute as largely to the revenue as the mining industry. Thirdly, it was the European planters, chiefly men who had migrated from Ceylon, who introduced, or influenced the introduction of, a very large proportion of those Indian immigrants on whom they and the spending departments of the Government depend so largely for cheap labour.

VIII *Indian Immigration into Malaya*

One of the essential prerequisites for the economic development of Malaya was labour, especially insofar as the plantation sector of the economy was concerned. Few Malays could be found who were willing to work on the early sugar plantations in Province Wellesley or on the rubber plantations when these began to be developed at the end of the century. Chinese were sometimes employed, although the largest number went into tin mining and other activities. It was the Indians who provided the backbone of estate labour in Malaya during the nineteenth century. The following reading describes aspects of the problem of Indian immigration into Malaya down to the middle 1880's. [R. N. Jackson, *Immigrant Labour and the Development of Malaya 1786-1920*, Kuala Lumpur, 1961, 57-69.]

UNTIL 1867, the Straits Settlements of Singapore, Penang and Malacca were governed as part of British India, and Indian laws applied to them. . . . Tamil labourers from South India

(often referred to in those days as Chuliahs or Klings) came to Penang from the time the settlement was founded, to work for periods of one or two years before returning to India....

This spontaneous and voluntary movement 'was not assisted by any law neither was it impeded by any law till the year 1857'. The labourers were employed mainly in Penang and Province Wellesley, on European-owned sugar, tapioca and coconut estates.

Because of overcrowding in the ships carrying immigrants across the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Government in 1857 and 1859 passed laws regulating this passenger traffic, ruling that 'no vessel shall carry Native Passengers... in a proportion greater than one passenger to every four tons of burden of such vessel, without a licence'... and licensed vessels were 'to carry provisions according to an approved scale' and 'to supply passengers with prescribed allowances of food and water'. [George W.] Earl¹ states that:

In some cases the emigrants pay their own passage money, from eight to ten rupees, these being for the most part emigrants returning to the Straits after a visit to their friends at home; but the great bulk are very poor people who have been starved out at home, and are brought by the owners of the vessels on speculation...

When the passenger regulations were enforced:

The effect was to increase the expense of the voyage and lessen the number of emigrants, and to meet the change there sprang up a system of assisted emigration. The larger employers sent over agents to India to engage and advance money to persons willing to emigrate but too poor to pay the cost of the passage themselves, and it also became customary for shipowners, merchants and others to recruit and carry over labourers either on commission for employers or as a speculation, the expenses in such cases being defrayed either by the employer of the coolie or by the coolie himself from his wages.

Because of the increased expense, the length of the contract to be served by the labourers, hitherto one year, was increased first to eighteen months and then two years, and the daily wage rose from 10 to 11 and then 12 cents. A 'joint and several' contract was customary; under this, all the labourers of a gang signed a contract rendering each of them liable for the default of any of the others—a system 'capable of very inhuman application, even to the making one man in a hundred work out the defaults of ninety-nine absconders'.

* * *

¹ George Samuel Windsor Earl, 1819–65, Assistant Resident Councillor, Penang, and author of *The Eastern Seas* (London, 1837), and other works.

By Indian law it was illegal for Indian labourers to emigrate to places outside India except by special provision. The restriction automatically applied to the Straits Settlements when in 1867 they ceased to be part of British India and became a Crown Colony. When this was realised (which was not until 1870) emigration ceased for two years, until the Indian Government passed a law to allow it to resume in 1872 (to the Straits Settlements but not to the Malay States) on certain provisional conditions. These were that the planter's agent should bring the recruited labourer before a magistrate in India and declare the particulars about repayment of passage cost, money advances, diet during voyage, wages when at work, nature of work, length of contract, and return passage. The magistrate must make sure that the labourer was going willingly and understood the conditions, and was to send a copy of the declared particulars to the Straits Settlements for incorporation in the contract to be signed when the labourer landed.

* * *

... [I] here were reports of some instances of poor treatment of Indian labourers on some sugar estates in Province Wellesley. A new Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Andrew Clarke, arrived in Singapore in November, 1873. The following account is given in his biography:¹

On the first December 1873, barely a month after his arrival in the colony, unpleasant news arrived from Colonel (afterwards General Sir) Archibald Anson, Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, who reported that on two or three of the estates in Province Wellesley many of the coolies had been shamefully neglected when sick, and had been sent to the Government hospital only in time to die. On one estate he suspected that coolies were forced into re-engagements and otherwise badly treated. Sir Andrew ordered an inquiry to be held, with the result that the manager of one estate and the agent for some others were brought to trial, which attracted public attention, and were noticed in English newspapers and in Parliament. Government supervision of coolie labour was made stricter, and regulations issued to ensure that the coolies should be better fed and protected. . . .

The final arrangements were incorporated into legislation in both territories . . . and these two laws controlled Indian immigration to the Straits until 1884. The Indian law restricted emigration to specified ports in India, at each of which would be an Emigration Agent appointed by the Straits Settlements Government and a Protector of Emigrants appointed by the Government of Madras. The Agent was to establish depôts at each port, which would be subject to the Pro-

¹ R. H. Vetch, *Life of Lt.-General Sir A. Clarke*, London, 1905, 126.

tector's inspection and approval. Recruiting was restricted to persons licensed by the Protector and to the districts specified in the licence. Each recruit must be taken before a magistrate, who would make sure the emigrant was going voluntarily, and a written contract specifying minimum wages (to be not less than 12 cents a day) and maximum term (to be not more than three years) was to be signed in India. There was to be a medical examination, and there were measures to ensure proper treatment on board ship.

The Straits Settlements Ordinance, called the *Indian Immigrants Protection Ordinance*, applied to persons arriving 'Under an engagement to labour in the Colony or to pay money to any person in the Colony or elsewhere in repayment of money advanced, in respect of passage provided to the Colony, in respect of subsistence during such passage'. The form of contract was prescribed—the immigrant undertook to labour on the estate for the agreed number of years and to 'repay to the said employer the sums advanced to him by the said employer'; the employer undertook to advance all necessary funds for the voyage, to pay him monthly wages calculated at 12 cents a day 'if working in the first class gang' and 10 cents 'if working in the second class gang', not to deduct more than one dollar in any one month in repayment of advances, and to supply rice and other prescribed items at the proper prices, deducting the cost from the wages.

No Indian immigrant was to work for more than six days a week, or more than ten hours a day, or more than six hours without a break. And if a man had worked for the previous six days, he must be paid for his weekly rest day. But:

The obligation to provide on holidays for the care of animals, the cleaning of machinery and such other attention to machinery as may be necessary for maintaining it in a condition for the resumption of work, the cleaning of premises for sanitary purposes, and of their own lines, and the necessities of life should not be considered as work under this Ordinance.

The magistrate could cancel the contract, at the immigrant's request, if wages were in arrears for over four months, or if the employer was convicted of maltreatment or if ill-usage was proved. On the other hand, an immigrant 'absenting himself or neglecting or refusing to labour' lost wages during his absence and forfeited fifty cents for each day absent, and if absent for more than seven days or for a second offence, he could at the employer's request be sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen days. For 'disobedience of orders', he could be fined fifty cents for a first offence and up to one month's rigorous imprisonment for a second offence. For desertion he could get one, two or three months rigorous imprisonment for the first, second and subsequent offences respectively. And conviction did not

operate to release an immigrant from the terms of his contract. Any person enticing an immigrant away from his employer before the end of his contract could be fined.

The Governor of the Straits Settlements wrote to the Colonial Office... that 'the provisions of the Immigration act have been cheerfully accepted by the Planters of Province Wellesley and the Public'. One of the European planters, Mr. J. Lamb, however, was not of his opinion. In a letter to the Protector of Immigrants on the 18th February, 1879, he complained:

In former times when immigration to the Straits was practically free, and men emigrated entirely of their own accord in search of employment, few did so except those who really meant to work. But since the many restrictions imposed by the Indian Government have rendered Agents and recruiters necessary in every case when a man cannot pay his passage money beforehand, a good deal seems to be done, in spite of frequent remonstrances from employers here, in the way of sweeping up the dregs of humanity from the highways and by-ways and bringing them forward as emigrants, if they can only pass muster physically, no attention being paid to their fitness in other respects....

A Government source provided some confirmation of this:

There was a large number of more newly arrived Immigrants on the Estate (Batu Kawan Estate) and they are men who before arriving here have, in nine cases out of ten, never had a changkol in their hands before. I have heard that an outside planter of experience well up in diagnosing these Indian Immigrants and who had seen them, confirms this statement and says they have been principally weavers before coming here—a very different occupation....

Mr. Lamb was concerned to show the satisfactory position of labourers employed on the estates, and wrote:

... the pay of a new coolie here, working full time, amounts to \$3.60 for a month of thirty days. Of that sum \$1 is deducted for his passage money, leaving \$2.60 available for his living expenses. The quantity of rice consumed by an average working man costs, at present prices, which as yet have fallen little below the famine rates, \$1.20 a month (in ordinary times less than \$1) leaving him even now \$1.40 for extras, or about three times the average income of an inhabitant of India. Moreover, free house accommodation is provided for him, fuel he has in abundance for the gathering, whilst fresh vegetables, curry-stuff, salt, and every necessary of life are cheap and easily procurable everywhere, nor has he any taxes either direct or indirect to pay unless he chooses to drink

arrack, which is not necessary. The result is that an industrious coolie not only feeds himself well, according to his tastes and habits, but begins to save money from the very first, and this is done by hundreds every year. Further, he is entitled to food and medicine gratis when sick, sickness does not injure his circumstances beyond stopping for the time being his power to save....

But the Principal Medical Officer of the Straits Settlements, who had visited the estates, reported a different picture to the Colonial Secretary, Singapore:

Mr. Lamb... makes out very clearly that a cooly has at the end of the month \$1.40 to buy extras, which really are more than extras and are in my opinion essentials. This appears very well, and would be very well were it the case, but... it is more likely the new cooly has nothing at all left from his pay at the end of the month and is probably in debt, with no surplus to buy anything with. He gets victimised right and left by the older hands on the Estate and by the Tindals, becomes entangled in debt and is beset with troubles on all sides, and any planter will tell you who sees to paying his coolies himself that as a matter of fact this \$1.40, as a rule, is not in his possession for five minutes before it is pounced upon by his creditors, and openly so, before the very eyes of the paymaster himself....

He also described what happened when an estate owner, who was obliged to supply rice to his indentured labourers, discharged his obligation by giving them the whole month's supply at once:

To give him, who knows not how to take care of himself and who has no thought for the morrow, a month's supply of rice ahead is so utterly absurd that I cannot understand how the experiment should have gone on for so long without its being put a sudden and well-merited stop to. What happens as the result is this, that probably two-thirds of the recent arrivals have their monthly stock of rice finished before half of the month is over, having sold what they have not eaten for arrack, and thus starving, they eat all the rubbish they can lay their hands on, living the remainder of the time on unripe fruit, sugarcane, garbage and offal of all descriptions and if they do happen to get any rice their physical condition makes them too lazy to cook it, and they eat it in its raw state, soon bringing themselves into a condition of poverty which, if death does not supervene, requires months to recover from; added to which they lie skulking about among the canes in all weather, sleep in the ditches at night, get wet, lose all interest in life, contracting bowel complaints which soon terminate their existence.

From these extremes, it is welcome to read the more balanced opinion of the Straits Settlements Protector of Immigrants, in his annual report for 1881:

The wages given here are, I believe, considerably lower than in any other Colony, and the employer recovers a considerable sum from the coolie of the expenses incurred in bringing him here, which is not done elsewhere, so the employer has advantages here which he could not get in other Colonies, while the coolie is far less liberally treated. Are then desertions from the estates to be wondered at?

He added that:

There can be no doubt that the coolies, as a rule, are well treated and cared for, and where there has been any cause for complaint it is the Native subordinates who are to blame, though doubtless it would be better if some employers did not repose such implicit confidence in their Native assistants.

The previous year he had written:

From what I have seen of the Indian natives who settle here and in the Native States I am convinced that they are able to earn a much better livelihood here than they could in India.

At that time there were 11 estates in Province Wellesley which employed South Indian labourers; these had 4,802 labourers, of whom 2,487 were protected immigrants (i.e. indentured or 'statute' labourers) and 2,315 'non-protected Indian coolies'. There was negligible immigration of Indian agricultural labourers into Singapore and Malacca, and their immigration into the Malay States was still not allowed by Indian law. The number of Indian immigrants arriving annually about this time was:

Indian Immigrants Arriving at Penang

YEAR	PROTECTED IMMIGRANTS	OTHER PASSENGERS
1880	1,191	5,053
1881	879	6,807
1882	1,452	9,937
1883	1,450	10,605
1884	1,539	10,081

The Indian Immigration Department of the Straits Settlements in its report for 1880 stated that about one-third of the 'Other passengers' were in fact persons who ought legally to have entered into contracts

as protected immigrants 'but they are so well tutored that it is impossible to obtain a conviction against the importers'.

Employers in Province Wellesley appear to have had difficulty in making many of their labourers complete their contracts. The number of employer-against-labourer cases taken to Court was large—106 in 1871; 124 in 1872; and 179 in 1873... [T]he employers repeatedly asked for a more comprehensive labour law, since the Indian act only applied to contracts under advances and ceased to apply as soon as the advances were repaid. As a result, *The Labour Contracts Ordinance* was passed in 1882. Under this, in the Straits Settlements *unwritten* (verbal) contracts to labour must not be for periods of longer than one month, and could be ended at any time by either party at a month's notice, or without notice if the party ending the contract paid one month's wages to the other. *Written* contracts to labour could be made, either with or without advances to the labourer, but they had to be signed before a magistrate or justice of the peace. There were legal provisions for the punishment of breaches of contract, absence from work and other offences, and provisions for the arrest of deserters, payment of wages within prescribed periods, and settlement of disputes arising out of the contracts. Written contracts could before completion only be terminated by mutual consent or the disablement of one party. One great benefit to the labourers was that the 'joint and several' system... was made completely illegal.

In 1878 the Indian authorities were asked to permit labourers to emigrate to the Malay States. In 1880 desertions of indentured Indian labourers from estates in Province Wellesley totalled 319, equivalent to 11.29%. The Protector of Immigrants wrote:

I fear this cause of annoyance and considerable loss to employers will continue so long as the demand for labour so greatly exceeds the supply as it does at present, but should emigration to the Native States... be sanctioned, we may shortly look for an improvement in this direction.

* * *

The desertions increased to 567 in 1883 and 586 in 1884. 'The great demand for labour in Perak, where wages rising to 35 cts. a day for an ordinary cooly, as against 12 cts. given in Province Wellesley, continues to entice large numbers of contract coolies from the estates'. In 1883 the Indian Government agreed to allow immigration into the protected Malay States...

By 1881 the Indian Government had become convinced that it would be in the interests of both countries to abolish all restrictions on the emigration of indentured labourers to the Straits, and to leave their welfare to the Straits Settlements Government. After consulta-

tions (made necessary largely because the *Madras* Government was in favour of retaining the restrictions) a new Straits Settlements law—the *Indian Immigration Ordinance*—was agreed upon and passed in 1884, to replace the 1876 law. The Indian Government thereupon repealed its 1877 law, concerning *indentured* labourers, and three years later removed all restrictions on the emigration of *non-indentured* labourers to Malaya.

Under the *Indian Immigration Ordinance* the labourer signed no contract until he arrived in the Straits Settlements. The law applied to agricultural labourers under indenture, whether newly arrived or not, whereas the 1876 law had only applied to new arrivals. The working of the Ordinance, 'both in the Colony and Native States, is under the general supervision of the Indian Immigration Agent. . . . His office is at Penang. . . (with) an Assistant who shares the duty of inspecting the Province Wellesley Estates, which is ordered to be carried out once in three months'. The law required employers to provide, for indentured immigrants, 'sufficient and proper house accommodation. . . such as shall be considered sufficient and proper by the Indian Immigration Agent'. This was the only regulation at the time governing the house accommodation to be provided for estate labourers.

The contract which the labourer signed under the new law bound him to do 36 months work. But in practice it was liable to be extended for an indefinite period. For one thing, 'the average man does not, and will not, do more than twenty days work in a month'. For another, the labourer had to make up lost time for days spent in prison or attending court, for days on which absent from work without reasonable excuse, and days away sick in excess of thirty per year, and he was also under the obligation to continue to work until any sums due to the employer in repayment of advances were paid. Only a small minority of the labourers were in fact released at the end of three years.

Advances, however, were limited to payments for maintenance in India, cost of travel to port of embarkation, clothes and cash given in India, passage money, maintenance on board ship and on arrival in the Straits, and cash advanced in the Straits Settlements. The total amount recoverable from the immigrant could not legally exceed \$12, and it could only be deducted from wages in instalments of not more than one dollar monthly.

The labourer could not be compelled to work more than six days a week or nine hours a day. He must be paid 12 cents a day for each day worked, and 12 cents for the weekly rest day if he had worked for the six previous days. After one year's service, if the advances had been paid off, his pay was to increase to 14 cents a day.

As each immigrant ship arrived at Penang, it was boarded by an officer of the Indian Immigration Department, who saw that all the

deck passengers were landed and moved to the Government dépôt. The 'free' men were at once discharged, but the indentured labourers were detained until they had signed their contracts and could be handed over to the representatives of their employers for transit to their places of employment. Each indentured labourer signed his own separate contract—one copy was sent to the employer, a copy in Tamil was retained by the labourer, and a record of the contract was kept by the Indian Immigration Department. Immigrants for Selangor and Johore did not sign contracts in Penang, but were sent on to those states, where they signed contracts on arrival.

Chapter Eight

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROGRESS IN MALAYSIA TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The readings in this chapter illustrate the rapid economic and political progress that was made in the Malaysian territories during the last decades of the nineteenth and first four decades of the twentieth centuries. In 1906 the Sultan of Brunei accepted a British Resident, and British influence in Malaysia was further extended when, in 1914, Johore agreed to receive a General Adviser, an officer similar to the British Adviser in the other Unfederated Malay States. By the time of the First World War, therefore, Britain had consolidated her sphere of influence over the entire area that was to become the Malaysian Federation. During the years following the war, but before the greater conflagration known to Malaysian history as the Japanese War, several important administrative and constitutional changes were made throughout the area. At the same time Malaya and Brunei, in particular, were experiencing major economic advancement, the former on the basis of tin and later rubber, and the latter through exploitation of large oil reserves. Communications were improved during the same period, and between 1885 and 1918 railway lines were laid from the Thai border to Johore Bahru. In 1929 the link was completed across the causeway to Singapore. An excellent system of roads opened up the interior of the Peninsula even further, binding the states closer together with ribbons of steel and macadam.

I North Borneo under Chartered Company Rule

The following reading briefly summarizes the development of North

Borneo under the rule of the North Borneo Company. [C. Buckley, *A School History of North Borneo*, London, 1960, 58-61, 63.]

FOR the next quarter of a century [after the Mat Salleh revolt¹] the Chartered Company ruled over a land which became more and more peaceful. Year by year, before 1880, the population of North Borneo had shrunk: there had been piracy and head-hunting, bad health and no medical help, and naturally, many people had left the country to look for peace and happiness elsewhere. Yet between 1915 and 1940 the population rose by 50,000 from 250,000 to 300,000. In 1880 there were many fewer people...but of course nobody knows the real figure. During this period villages were built all over the country, whereas a hundred years ago people were afraid to go anywhere near most of the large rivers or the east coast itself. To look forward a little, [the] population today must be nearly twice as large as it was in the year 1900.

This great increase in population is due to several things. The Chartered Company Government built hospitals and dispensaries; doctors and dressers worked in these to improve the health of the people. As long ago as 1921 an X-ray machine was bought for Jesselton Hospital, and in the same year the Government engaged an English dental surgeon too. The Government also encouraged Chinese immigrants to come to North Borneo, and because the country was at last a peaceful one, many Chinese were glad to do so. For the same reason new estates were flourishing, and in these too employees were looked after in hospitals and given good working conditions.

Year by year it became easier to move around the country and to keep in touch with the inhabitants of places in other parts of North Borneo. As long ago as 1921...post offices handled more than 1,500,000 letters and parcels during the year. The railway was finished long before then, and as a result it was easy to reach Melalap.... It is strange to recall that in 1882 [F.] Witt was exploring the Keningau plains for the first time, whereas only forty years later railway passengers could travel from Jesselton to Keningau in less than a day.

Progress under the Chartered Company would have been even more rapid but for the Great War which ravaged the world between 1914 and 1918. Another great tragedy came in 1930 when the Great Depression spread through the world. This threw men out of work everywhere; trade was almost halted; there was no sale for rubber; great companies collapsed. Hardly had the world recovered from this when the Second World War started in 1939. Therefore between

¹ See reading IV in Chapter Seven.

1914 and 1945 only the ten years from 1920 until 1930 were normal ones. In this decade the Chartered Company did very fine work.

Great rubber plantations were developed until they covered an area of 125,000 acres. That is why the rubber industry is by far [the] most important one. Tobacco and hemp companies were also attracted into North Borneo. The Government also established at Keningau a cattle farm to improve the quality of Borneo cattle. Timber extraction from forests of the East Coast Residency was developed too at this time.

... [T]he Roman Catholic Mission set up its first tiny school at Sandakan in 1881. By 1940 there were no fewer than 150 schools in North Borneo, a very great achievement, especially as 10,000 children were being educated in these schools. Some of the schools were built and staffed by the Government. Many more were mission schools, to most of which the Government gave a grant of money. Others were Chinese schools built and maintained by the various Chinese communities.

Progress was not rapid. The revenues of the Government were never large and therefore it could not afford to spend vast sums of money. Yet if we compare the North Borneo of 1880 with the North Borneo of 1940, the change is amazing. Where there had been savage barbarism, peace and a reasonable degree of prosperity were widespread. Sicknes could receive no proper treatment before the Chartered Company came. Yet at the end of company rule over 300,000 patients called for treatment at hospitals and dispensaries every year.

The cost of living was very low....

Everything was going very well, when suddenly the Japanese army appeared.

II *Sarawak under its last White Rajah*

The following reading describes the administration and economic development of Sarawak under its third Rajah, Charles Vyner Brooke, who succeeded his father as ruler of the state in 1917. [Vernon Mullen, *The Story of Sarawak*, Kuala Lumpur, 1961, 74-7.]

VYNER Brooke continued his father's work of bringing peace to the up-river tribes. In 1920 there was a big meeting to talk about peace at Simanggang between the Ulu Ai and Engkari Ibans on one side and the Sekrang, Layar, and Lemanak Ibans on the other. At Simanggang they exchanged valuable jars and killed pigs in front of the Rajah as signs of a promise to keep peace.

A few years later in 1924 Rajah Brooke held one of the last great peace meetings of Sarawak. More than four thousand Iban, Kayan, and Kenyah fighting men came to Kapit on the Rejang River from both Sarawak and Dutch Borneo. Dutch officers from across the border were present also. After the tribes had agreed to stop their wars, the Rajah made gifts to all the chiefs. He gave a special honour to Penghulu Koh, the Iban chief of Sarawak, by making him Temonggong. Temonggong Koh was honoured for bringing the warring people together to make peace.

In 1931 Penghulu Asun led a small rebellion among the Ibans against the government in the headwaters of the Kanowit, Entabai, and Julau Rivers. There Penghulu Asun and his followers took some heads. Rajah Vyner Brooke sent up the Kanowit River a police expedition which soon captured Penghulu Asun and most of the other leaders. The government then built a new fort, Fort Brooke, at Nanga Meluan on the Kanowit River. Since that time there have been almost no wars and very little headhunting among the up-river people. Penghulu Asun died of old age in 1958....

During most of the years of Vyner Brooke's rule Sarawak's trade increased. People sold more rubber, pepper, or timber. With the money they received they were able to buy more manufactured products, such as bicycles, radios, boat engines, or better clothing. The government collected more money in taxes, and it spent more on roads, buildings, hospitals, and education. In 1925 the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China built its first office in Kuching to take care of the payment for Sarawak's increasing business with other countries. For a few years after 1930 Sarawak had a poor time of business, but just before 1940 her exports increased until the country became much busier. At that time the government started to build a road to Serian as part of a plan to connect Kuching and Simanggang. In 1937, work was also started on an airfield a few miles south of Kuching. Before that airport was built, seaplanes from Singapore or Labuan used to land in the Sarawak River below Kuching.

The Seventh Day Adventist (S.D.A.) mission first came to Kuching in 1918, and two years later built their church and Sunny Hill School on the edge of the city. The Borneo Evangelical Mission (B.E.M.), founded in Australia, started missionary work in 1928 on the Limbang and Trusan Rivers in the Fifth Division....

The year 1941 marked the end of exactly one hundred years of Brooke rule in Sarawak. Rajah Vyner Brooke decided to give the people a birthday present by changing the form of government. During the past century the rajahs had always had complete power to make laws and control the government as they wished. Now Rajah Brooke made a new plan to give more power to the people of the country through the Council Negri....

In the past the Council Negri had been able only to advise the rajah. The 1941 constitution gave the Council Negri more power. It allowed them to make laws for the "peace, order, and good government" of Sarawak. In addition, the constitution stated that the government could not spend money without the permission of the Council Negri. The Council was to meet at least twice in every year instead of once every two or three years as it had done in the past. The new Council Negri met once in November of 1941, but before the new plan of government could really be used, the Japanese captured Sarawak in World War II.

III *Growth of Chinese Population in Malaya*

The following reading is taken from Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Modern Malaya*. [Singapore, 1956, 8-9.]

IN the years following the Perak War... there was great influx of Chinese into the States. By 1882, the number of Chinese miners had increased from about 9,000 in 1871 to nearly 50,000. In 1888, the total population of Pahang consisted of about 50,000 Malays and a few hundred Chinese (located mostly at Bentong), but when the British intervened in that State in that year, the Chinese began to flow in to take advantage of the consequent opening-up of the State. By 1891, the population of Perak was estimated at 215,000 of whom 100,000 were Malays and 90,000 Chinese. The story of population growth is similar for Selangor and Negri Sembilan.

The result of British intervention in the Malay States was that order was established and the country became ripe for development. But the lack of an adequate labour force delayed the investment of British capital. Tin-mining remained largely in Chinese hands until the first British mining company was floated in the 'eighties, and as late as 1920 the Chinese still owned two-thirds of the tin-mines. But the introduction of modern methods of mining, especially by dredges which called for large capitalization and special technical skills, resulted in the British and Chinese changing places and within a few years the British share of the mining was two-thirds and the Chinese one-third. At the turn of the century the output of tin was greatly increased to meet the expanding world demand and Chinese flocked in to provide labour for the mines.

The theory behind the treaties of protection with the Malay Rulers was that the Malay States belonged exclusively to the Malays. But in spite of this theory, immigration remained completely unrestricted until the Great Slump of 1929-32. The consequence of this was a

complete revolution in the racial pattern of Malaya. This will become clear from the following statement of population.

Between 1911 and 1941 the population of Malaya (Straits Settlements and Malay States together) more than doubled, increasing from 2,673,000 in the former year to 5,511,000 in the latter. In 1911, the Malays (including other Malaysians from Java, Sumatra, etc.) accounted for 49.2 per cent of the total, the Chinese for 35 per cent, and the Indians for 14 per cent: in 1941, the respective percentages were 41 per cent, 43 per cent, and 14 per cent (the last figure, it will be noticed, unchanged). Malaya, in fact, had become a 'plural society' with the main communities living side by side without intermarrying and with quite different methods and standards of life and sentimental ties.

IV *The Role of Immigrants and the Growth of Communalism*

The Chinese had come to Malaya comparatively early, and the Nanyang (South Seas) Chinese, as they called themselves, had reason to look upon Malaya as their home. None the less, cultural traditions were such that they preserved their identity, developing the tin industry and opening retail shops, and still looking to the Chinese homeland for their cultural values. If the Chinese, long in South-East Asia, did so, it was not surprising that the Indians—more recently arrived, and by virtue of their position, as labourers on rubber estates having little direct stake in society—retained close ties with their homeland. A plural society was evolving which inevitably would place heavy emphasis on communal rather than 'national' or environmentally-induced values. The following reading discusses the role of these immigrants in the development of the Malayan economy. [T. H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz, 'Nationalism in Malaya', in *Asian Nationalism and the West*; ed. by William L. Holland, New York, 1953, 271-8.]

It is unlikely that many of the Chinese traders brought much wealth to Malaya when they came. Such evidence as there is shows that most of the wealth of the present trading class was made in trade or contracting in Malaya and its neighbourhood. Most of these first immigrants were free agents, coming to Malaya to improve their prospects. The labourers in the early years were not free agents but indentured. Whether they were lured by extravagant promises or merely kidnapped, they usually came to Malaya bound to a particular employer, and under contract to repay a debt for their

passage. Sometimes, but not always, their position improved after their indenture period—if they lived that long in the unhealthy conditions then prevailing. Sometimes they remained labourers; sometimes an opportunity came for them to become small shopkeepers or contractors; sometimes they returned to China. That all three of these things happened on a considerable scale is certain.

We know a few things about these labourers: for example, that their conditions improved steadily after 1877, when the Chinese Protectorate was established, and that after 1914 indenture for Chinese was abolished and labourers had to be landed free. Presumably this made it considerably easier for them to acquire money and either rise in the social scale in Malaya or return to China. But large numbers of Chinese labourers continued to be imported, especially in the decade after the first world war, by private recruiters sent to China. The 1931 Census of Malaya gives evidence, some of which now, in the light of the succeeding decade, seems a little unconvincing, that the great majority returned to China. The only things of which we can be reasonably certain are, first, that very few of the Chinese who came to Malaya intended originally to break their ties with China and settle abroad; and second, that the number who by marriage, by the formation of new social links in Malaya and the breaking of old ones in China, and by economic circumstances, have become in fact settled in Malaya had enormously increased during the last fifteen years. Very large numbers of these are now either employers or workers on their own account: thousands of small or large merchants, tens of thousands of contractors and small shopkeepers, possibly hundreds of thousands of independent peasants or "squatters".

Indian traders have been numerically less important. From the earliest times they seem to have been a smaller community than the Chinese, though never negligible. The failure of all the numerous attempts, during the nineteenth century, to force the rupee on the Straits Settlements, and the far more frequent references to Chinese trade, in current reports, indicate the greater strength of the Chinese trade; and the importation of Chinese labour, in spite of much closer official ties with India, points in the same direction. . . .

Much of the labour employed by the Europeans in the early days of the Straits Settlements was convict labour brought from India. Some of the early public buildings were certainly built by convict labour. But contemporary records in the first decade after the separation from India show clearly that Chinese labour even in building had become predominant.

With the opening up of the Malay States to European development in the last quarter of the century, Indian labour was sought for the plantations. Later, when rubber drove out the other plantation crops, and especially with the rapid expansion of rubber at the beginning of

the twentieth century, Indian labour became very scarce and was eagerly recruited from rural areas of South India. Chinese labour, working under contractors, has apparently always been used for the more arduous work of clearing jungle and opening up new ground. For the regular work of the European estates, however, at least a nucleus of South Indian labour was usually wanted. Indian labourers were easier to organise as a regular labour force, partly because it was easier for the planter to learn enough Tamil, Telugu or Malayalam to communicate with them directly, and partly because their attitude to the sale of their labour was less commercial. By this is meant not only that they normally accepted lower wages (though this was no doubt an important reason) but also that they were more prepared to accept a regular daily wage and a regular routine as members of an organisation, while the Chinese labourer regarded himself more as a separate economic unit, working through a contractor who was partly making money out of him but also partly helping him to make money out of the "red-head". Naturally the "red-head" preferred to have a monopoly of commercial principles and to pay for labour on a basis of providing a certain standard of living sufficient to secure an adequate supply.

There was a serious danger, in the first decade of the century, that another commercial principle would disturb the profits of the rubber industry. Planters began to find that it was a good deal cheaper to offer a slightly higher wage, or better terms of employment, and tempt away another planter's labour, than to recruit labour in India themselves. This practice, which was known as "crimping", threatened to upset the whole basis of immigrant labour. A country can be opened up either by voluntary settlers or by imported labour. In the former case wages tend to be high enough to attract labour to pay its own passage to the country. In the latter some means must be found of securing to the employer the advantage of importing the labour. This can be done if the labourer is indentured to work for a particular employer for a set time to pay off a debt incurred for his passage. The Chinese labour contractors had their own way, usually none too scrupulous, of enforcing these obligations. But European planters, employing labour more or less directly, found crimping an evil that they could not fight with any weapons ready to hand.

It was this evil which led to the establishment of the system of immigration which was for many years Malaya's pride: the system of financing Indian immigration, and providing all the services necessary to maintain it, by means of a special tax levied on all employers of Indian labour. This system, combined with a Labour Code enforced by inspection, wages fixed in key areas, and special camps in India through which labour could be recruited, made possible a very high degree of economic control without curtailing the freedom of the

individual labourer. If unemployment was developing at any given wage, the wage could nevertheless be maintained because unemployed labour would tend to ask for repatriation, which in these conditions would be given very freely. If labour was scarce, wages could be prevented from rising by importing large numbers of additional immigrants.

It would probably be a mistake to accept either the extreme view of some Indian nationalists that this system was merely a machine for the maximum possible exploitation of labour, or the apologetics of the early Labour Department reports, which tend to suggest that it existed mainly to protect the interests of Indian labour. On the one hand we must accept the view that it was an instrument for preserving, at least in one respect, the existing economic structure. Malaya had been, and was being, opened up by European capital and enterprise. Since it was not suitable country for full European settlement, and was under-populated, this implied immigration on a large scale by other races. Without deliberate importation of labour by employers such immigration would have been slow, and would also have secured a much larger share in the advantages of opening up the country for the immigrants themselves. In these conditions it was inevitable, even if it was not very creditable, that labour should be imported at the employer's expense, and as far as possible for the employer's advantage. But if we enquire why the original system of importation, which was in fact a form of temporary slavery, broke down under pressure of crimping, we shall find that it was not because of any resistance either by organised labour or by nationalism in India or China but because both Europeans and Chinese in Malaya had earlier objected to the methods by which this semi-slavery had been enforced. In this respect the Indian Immigration Fund, the Labour Code and all the work of the Labour Department may fairly be represented as a continuation of a more liberal and generous attitude to labour, and as a genuine attempt to improve labour conditions.

Moreover, the officers who administered the system were all men who had begun their training by a study of language and customs in South India, and there is little doubt that they regarded themselves, as did their colleagues in the Chinese Secretariat, as protectors of the interests of one section of Malaya's working class. On the fundamental economic issue they may have been on the wrong side, for their ultimate purpose was to maintain a labour supply at a more or less stable price by importing or exporting labour. But it would be wrong to make too much of their inevitable social contacts with business interests or to suggest that they were ineffectual or half-hearted protectors of labour's interests. The Malayan Labour Code before the war implemented far more recommendations of the International Labour Organisation than was generally the case in Asia; and when

later a representative of the Indian Government was regularly given access to estates employing Indian labour, there were very few instances reported in which the Code was not being adequately enforced. Moreover, the report issued by Srinavasa Sastri on his visit to Malaya on behalf of the Government of India in 1937 certainly did not give the impression that exploitation of labour was the purpose or even the consequence of the Government organisation in Malaya.

Nevertheless, if we make proper allowance for certain hysterical exaggerations designed for propaganda rather than as a serious contribution to truth, there remains a substantial element of truth in the prewar attacks by Indian nationalists on immigration policy in Malaya. It is natural for an Englishman, reading the statements that Malaya threw back its labourers like sucked oranges to India when it had no further use for them, to point to the undeniably better economic conditions in Malaya than in India, even during bad times; he draws attention to the large sums remitted to India in small postal orders, points to the well-built labourers' lines, the water supply, the free milk and so on, and dismisses the accusation as a hysterical lie. Yet the "sucked orange" propaganda drew attention to a real evil, the import and export of labour as a commodity, in response to varying demand, which took the place of genuine immigration. Similarly, the suggestion that Indians, for all their toil, rarely rose far above their wretched starting point may have exaggerated the wretchedness but contained a sound attack on immigration policy conducted on commercial principles.

The effect of the policy was to accentuate the transient character of Indian labour in Malaya, so that relatively few Indians were absorbed into Malayan society. At the same time it encouraged Indian labourers to look to the Government for protection rather than to organise themselves or even to care very much for their individual advancement.

There were few channels of advancement by which Indians could pass into the local middle class, and few inducements to bring wives to Malaya and settle there. The average Indian worker's stay in Malaya was one of a few years only. True, there has always been an Indian middle class in Malaya; but, unlike the Chinese middle class, it has not been recruited from the workers in Malaya. Doctors, lawyers, teachers and clerks came in originally from the middle class in South India or Ceylon, and have since been recruited mainly from the descendants of this class. The ubiquitous chettiar has lent money, mainly against real property; the merchants have in the main been little more than agents of firms in India, or local firms retaining very close ties with the homeland. . . .

Immigration of Chinese in the 'thirties was affected chiefly by two events—the great depression and the war in China—and by the

reaction of the immigration policy of the Government in Malaya to these events. The great net outflow of Chinese as a result of depression from 1931 to 1933 led to a demand for controlling the inflow, and in 1933 an Aliens Ordinance was passed, limiting the monthly number of alien deck passengers admitted, though until 1938 it was in fact used only to limit the number of males by a quota which varied from time to time. Female deck passengers were allowed to enter without restriction, except for precautions to prevent as far as possible the importation of prostitutes....

Japan's invasion of South China following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937 greatly increased the flow of female immigrants to Malaya. But even before this time another factor had begun to increase this flow. This was the absence of any criterion for limiting or selecting immigrants. The shipping companies were simply allotted their quota of the total permitted, and left to make their own arrangements. Since passages to Malaya were in keen demand, the price rose quite sharply. But the companies appear to have raised the prices a good deal less than market conditions would have allowed. European companies tend to charge prices based broadly on average cost, even where it is not in their immediate interest to do so, and though average cost per passage would be raised by the limitation of numbers, and the companies probably increased their charges a little beyond this, a situation arose in which the demand for passages from the lodging houses in South China exceeded the supply, and the companies were in a position to select those to whom they would sell. Naturally they gave preference to those who bought non-quota tickets; and since the sale of these tickets was highly profitable, the lodging houses were given a strong inducement to encourage women to migrate to Malaya.

This large-scale immigration of women, together with the virtual cessation of the importation of male labour for profit, profoundly modified the character of the Chinese population in Malaya. Enormous numbers of Chinese homes were established in Malaya, as a result partly of the improved status of labour and partly of the improved sex-ratio. Many of these homes were merely overcrowded cubicles or peasant huts; and the parents in most cases were a husband who had come as a labourer on a temporary basis and a wife who had come either on similar terms or as a refugee. There was probably not, in most cases, any intention to settle or to plant roots in the soil of Malaya. But the long civil war in China and the Japanese occupation of Malaya gave chances for families to grow up and for local social and economic ties to be formed.

The effects on social structure among the Chinese will need much further study. There has been, of course, a distinct decline in the importance of the *kongsi-house* of male labourers only, having vir-

tually no contact with the country in which they were (as they believed) temporarily earning their living. In so far as these men have married and brought up children, their actual attachment to Malaya has clearly increased. But the *kongsi-house* has in some measure been replaced by the Chinese settlement or Chinese village; and the settlements have clearly had more chance to influence the Chinese families that had already been assimilated than the *kongsi-house* could ever have done. It is apparent that fewer Chinese women now wear Malay dress, and other cultural contacts with the Malays may also have declined. The specifically "Straits-born" characteristics of Malaya's Chinese may have become more widespread as a result of a better sex-ratio and improved economic status; but they may also have become diluted and weakened in the process.

V Tin Mining

As Malaya developed, her demographic pattern had been formed by considerations of trade and by site and situation factors relating largely to her riverine and rice-growing culture. But the exploitation of tin, at first by the Chinese and later by Europeans, led to alterations in the patterns of settlement. Kuala Lumpur and Ipoh, and indeed most of the Kinta Valley, were first settled in a concentrated fashion because of tin deposits, and later, in the twentieth century, the presence of tin would elevate Perak and Selangor, in particular, over other states in the peninsula in terms of communication systems, trade, and general wealth. The first selection (a) tells of the founding of Kuala Lumpur. [J. M. Gullick, *The Story of Early Kuala Lumpur*, Singapore, 1956, 11-15.] The second reading (b) discusses the general development of the tin mining industry. [Siew Nim Chee, 'The Tin Mining Industry in Malaya', in *Problems of the Malayan Economy*; ed. by Lim Tay Boh, Singapore, 1957, 34-5.]

Reading (a)

ONE day in 1857 a flotilla of boats could be seen setting off from Pengkalan Batu—the Stone Jetty—which is now called Klang Town. It was a party of eighty-seven Chinese tin-miners setting off on an expedition up the Klang River into the interior of Selangor.

The boats used for these journeys would take ten men each and a load of provisions—or thirty men without any cargo. For this trip they were loaded with sacks of rice, jars of coconut oil, with tobacco, gambier, spirits and opium in chests. There were hoes, axes and other tools, baskets for carrying earth. They took weapons for their

protection—muskets, gunpowder, knives and spears. Each man too had his personal bundle or box containing his spare clothes and his few other possessions in the world...

Here and there along the river bank they came on a small settlement of a few flimsy houses. These were villages of traders and miners, mostly Sumatrans—but a few of them Chinese. The houses stood at the water's edge, built of jungle poles with roofs of atap. The sparse population of that empty country clustered along the river bank because the river was the only highway through the jungle, the main road into the heart of Selangor.

Up the river, past Bukit Kuda, Damansara and Petaling went the boats, laboriously poled against the stream at the rate of five to ten miles a day. The men in shorts, a blanket or some other tunic, their heads shaded by the broad-brimmed Chinese wicker hat, took their turn at poling. During their spells of rest they squatted on the cargo and chattered to each other. They were in good spirits. They had little idea where they were going but it was an adventure into a new country. Miners, mainly Sumatran immigrants, had been there before them. But few had stayed long or made a success of their venture.

In one of the leading boats travelled the Chinese head-man of the expedition and the Malay agent of the chief of Klang. They knew better the history of mining in the Klang valley. Twenty years before, the old Sultan Mohamed had risked and lost a large sum of money in trying to open up mines along this river. It was borrowed money and the Sultan had been hard pressed to keep out of the hands of his creditors among the merchants in Malacca. His nephew, Raja Juma'at, had taken over responsibility for the old man's debts. In return the Sultan had given him a grant of the district of Lukut (near the modern Port Dickson) and he had become fantastically rich from the success of the mines of Lukut.

Now Lukut was paying its debt to Klang. Raja Juma'at at himself was the mind who had planned the expedition on which they were now travelling. His brother, Raja Abdullah, had become chief of Klang a year or two before. The two brothers persuaded Chee Yam Chuan and Lim Say Hoe, merchants of Malacca, to risk more money in a search for the tin along the upper reaches of the Klang River. Thirty thousand dollars borrowed in Malacca was the mainspring of this venture.

After several days travelling up the river from Klang the miners in their boats came to the confluence of the Klang and Gombak Rivers. This place is now the heart of Kuala Lumpur. Then it was probably empty and deserted. At most there may have been a small cluster of traders' houses. Beyond this river junction it was difficult to move the heavy boats when fully loaded, as the water of both rivers became too shallow. Here, then, the miners clambered ashore up the muddy

banks, unloaded their stores and supplies, made them up into head-loads and moved off in Indian file into the jungle. A few miles farther on they came to the place which was later called Ampang (because of the miners' dams), on the outskirts of modern Kuala Lumpur. They began to prospect for tin.

The tin for which they sought was buried treasure and hard to find. Several feet below the surface there might be a layer of coarse black gravel or glistening sand, or even small nuggets. This was tin ore. But how to be sure of the place where the tin ore lay buried? Chinese miners, ever superstitious and strangers in the country, were glad to rely on the skill of Malay magicians (pawang). Malays had been mining for tin in a small way for centuries and might be presumed to have established relations with the genies of their country.

First, then, the magician, clad in the black tunic which only he might wear, instructed the miners in building an altar to the spirits. Then he prayed. In his prayers he stood with his left hand on his hip, meanwhile waving a long piece of white cloth in his right hand, calling upon each hantu or spirit by name. Next he walked slowly to and fro with a switch in his hand which served as a diviner's wand. From its vibration he knew the spot where the tin lay. There the miners dug a small pit or shaft down into the soil until they found the tin, if tin there was, at a depth of six or even ten feet. By the success of this test they knew that it was safe to begin mining.

Before starting to mine, however, they built themselves a single large dwelling-house—a "kongsi hut"—and they erected runnels to bring the flow of water which they needed to work their mine water-wheel.... With these preparations completed they began to open up their mine by enlarging their trial borehole. As they cleared the ground and dug down, the water collected in holes and hollows. There was their death. Mosquitoes multiplied and spread the germs of malaria—a sickness of which they knew neither the cause nor the cure, though it was familiar enough. Fever was always worst on a newly opened mine. So it was at Ampang. Each day several more men went down with fever, lay rambling in delirium for a day or two, and then died. Within a month of their arrival all but eighteen of the eighty-seven pioneers of Ampang were dead.

To Raja Abdullah at Klang this news was the signal for a renewed effort to obtain the tin which he now knew was within his reach. One hundred and fifty more men from Lukut, travelling light in five boats, came up the river to take the places and live on the supplies of those who were dead. As the mine became established the death-rate dropped. In time smelted tin came down the river and Raja Abdullah could send it to Malacca to pay his debts.

The prosperity of the new mines was the cause of a regular traffic

along the Klang River. Boats came up the river with supplies for the mines and took back tin. . . .

Traders came up from Lukut attracted by stories of the success of the mines. First of these traders to arrive was Hiu Siew. He brought with him as his partner a mild-tempered little man called 'Ah Sze Keledok'—'Sweet Potato Ah Sze'—who had in the past been a prospector for tin in Selangor. While still at Lukut these two had had dealings with a Sumatran trader, Sutan Puasa, already at Ampang. Sutan Puasa persuaded them to try their luck at the new mines. So they came and set up a trading-store at the place where the supplies were landed from the boats for the last lap overland to the mines. They made a clearing a little way back from the landing-place on the dry ground. . . . From their store a track ran down to the river bank. This was the beginning of Kuala Lumpur—in about 1858 or 1859.

Reading (b)

THE most important factor in developing the west coast of Malaya was the tin industry. The first roads and railways were built to connect tin mines to the ports and towns. Until 1914 the duty on tin accounted for between 25% and 50% of the total revenue of the Federated Malay States. Although in the post-war period it only accounted for about 15% directly, it is interesting to note that in the peak year of 1951, the export duty on tin was over 76 million dollars and the tin output was worth almost 490 million dollars. Other industries are bound up with tin—foundries, smelters, timber, transport—just to mention a few. And when we add the income tax paid by the tin miners and companies, the revenue derived from the tin industry is of tremendous importance.

The earliest Chinese immigrants were brought . . . to work in the tin mines. Today, the labour force is only about 40,000 but in 1913 it was almost 230,000. This was when dredges were first introduced. About 70% of the workers are Chinese; 15% Malays and 15% Indians. In addition, there are over 10,000 female Chinese dulang washers who sometimes work as casual labourers on the mines. They are an important group because if they did not recover tin ore by washing, it would be lost to the country. Although their output is only about 2%, they are very necessary. In Chinese tin mines, basic wages of unskilled labour are lower than in European mines, but total earnings are about the same.

Since the Emergency, relations between the employers and the workers have been fairly satisfactory. There have been few strikes of importance. The employers are well organized and are represented

by the F. M. S. Chamber of Mines, the All-Malaya Chinese Mining Association and, the most important of all, the Malayan Mining Employers' Association.

The largest workers' union is the Malayan Mining Employees' Union formed in 1951. It has about 10,000 registered members and almost all are working on dredges. The National Mining Workers' Union of Malaya has about a thousand members working on Chinese mines. There are two other unions which represent mostly the monthly paid staff. There has been some talk of all these unions uniting. That would of course increase their bargaining power.

The chief mining areas are in Perak and Selangor and they account for about 90% of the output and employment. The richest areas are in the Kinta and Kuala Lumpur districts. The chief methods of mining are by dredges and gravel pumps. In December 1955, there were 76 dredges and 634 gravel pumps, and the output in that year was 61,000 tons—a post-war record. All dredges are owned and operated by European companies and almost all gravel pumps are run by Chinese. About 60% of the output comes from European-owned mines and the Chinese account for the remainder.

VI *The Introduction of Rubber to Malaya*

It was not tin but rubber that gave the most important boost to the economy of Malaya in the twentieth century, and by the end of the first third of the century Malaya had become one of the world's leading suppliers. Rubber brought wealth also to those states that had been left out of the tin boom, and it brought the Malay States and their entrepôt, Singapore, into closer trading contact than ever before with the purchasing nations of the world, especially in Europe and the United States. The following account is by J. Kennedy, formerly Senior Lecturer in History at the Malayan Teachers' Training College, Kirkby, England. [*A History of Malaya A.D. 1400-1959*, London, 1962, 202-8.]

THE introduction of rubber to Malaya has had such important consequences that the story of the early seedlings has often been told. The first phase was a botanical experiment with a view to possible economic results. The initiative came from the head of the geographical section of the India Office, Sir Clements Markham, and the Director of the Botanical Gardens at Kew, Sir Joseph Hooker. Two expeditions were sent to the Amazon from the India Office. The second of these expeditions, led by Mr. H. A. (later Sir Henry) Wickham in 1876, obtained a collection of 70,000 seeds, and these

were despatched to Kew Gardens for germination in the artificial heat of the conservatories. From Kew about 3,000 seedlings were sent to British colonies in tropical regions, most of them to Ceylon. From Ceylon twenty-two plants reached Singapore in 1877; some of these were planted in the Botanical Gardens in Singapore, others were taken by the Curator to Perak and planted in Hugh Low's Residency Garden at Kuala Kangsar. Thus, as a botanist, Low was linked with the experiment, and in Singapore and Kuala Kangsar the Malayan rubber industry was born.

For many years cultivated rubber remained at the experimental stage. Few people had any knowledge of the '*hevea brasiliensis*', as this type of rubber-tree was technically known, a yield of liquid rubber (latex) could only be expected after five or six years' growth, and efficient methods of 'tapping' the tree for latex were unknown. Moreover, while the rubber-trees were still in the Botanical Gardens, coffee-planting had been established with success in the western Malay states which were under British protection, and neither government nor planting interests had any enthusiasm for rubber.

A number of factors coincided to produce a rubber boom in the Malay States. The misfortunes of the coffee-planters in the 1890s and early 1900s, when a drop in prices was followed in a few years by plant diseases, made some of them willing to try an alternative crop on land which was already in use for coffee. Some planters, while continuing with coffee, placed rubber-trees between the coffee-plants to give shade, and waited to see what the yield of rubber would be.

The appointment of Henry Ridley as Director of the Gardens at Singapore in 1888 brought a remarkably able and energetic man to the experimental side of rubber in Malaya. As a scientific investigator he studied every aspect of rubber-growing; he held shows in Singapore at which rubber samples were displayed, and he sent samples to London. He tried to convince the coffee-planters that there was a promising future in rubber, and he distributed seeds, packing them with damp charcoal powder in closed tins. A Chinese writer has described his activities in this way:

'It was his practice to stuff seeds in the pockets of planters and others begging them to make a trial: and among planters he earned the soubriquet of "mad Ridley" or "rubber Ridley".'

Neither the planters nor government officials surrendered easily to Ridley's enthusiasm, but a few were persuaded to put his experiments to a practical test. A Malacca Chinese, Tan Chay Yan, planted forty acres of rubber among tapioca in 1896. A British coffee-estate partnership in Selangor planted five acres as a separate rubber crop in the same year. In the following year another British coffee-estate in Perak inter-planted rubber and coconuts among 200 acres of coffee, and felled the coconuts a few years later. By this time (1897), twenty

years after the appearance of the first seedlings in Malaya, only 345 acres were under rubber. Even in 1905 only 200 tons of rubber were produced in Malaya as against some 60,000 tons of jungle rubber produced elsewhere, mainly in Brazil.

Very significant expansion was, however, taking place in the first decade of the present century, and by 1910 the rubber boom was at its height. Ridley again contributed to this. It was he who perfected in Malaya the method of tapping which is used to-day so as to extract the maximum flow of latex with the minimum damage to the tree. The other important new element was the rise of the car industry in the West, with its heavy demands for rubber, especially for tyres. Subsequently, especially from the time of the First World War, the market for rubber was further increased by its use for clothing and footwear, electrical and medical equipment, and household goods and furniture.

Newly-formed companies for rubber-planting obtained land concessions in the Malay States, often using established merchant houses in Singapore as their agents and as advisers on local conditions. Most of these companies were British, but there were others from continental Europe (including an important Franco-Belgian company) as well as from Australia and America. Other companies were floated in Malaya, with substantial backing from Malayan Chinese. Until 1913, when the states of the F.M.S. were empowered separately to set aside areas reserved for the use of Malays by the Malay Reservations Enactment, land concessions could be obtained fairly easily on perpetual lease, subject to certain requirements about cultivation.

Most of the rubber-planting took place in Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Johore, where a pattern of communications already existed. An important exception was the syndicate formed by Robert Duff, an ex-police officer, who obtained a tremendous concession of 3,000 square miles from the Sultan of Kelantan in 1900. This concession was the subject of much debate between Duff, the British government and Siam, and its size was eventually reduced. At first the company concentrated on mining, lumbering, and general trading, but from 1906 onwards it became increasingly concerned with the cultivation of rubber, and has remained so until the present time.

Manufacturing interests were represented among the early rubber companies, and these included the Dunlop Company and the United States Rubber Company. High profits were made by plantation companies which had rubber crops maturing by 1910 or 1912. The price of rubber in sterling rose from four shillings a pound at the beginning of the century to over twelve shillings a pound in 1910. By 1920 the exports of rubber from Malaya had reached an annual total of about

200,000 tons, over half of the world's supply at that time. The supply of cultivated rubber by this time exceeded that which came from the South American jungles.

It was not only the plantation companies which were concerned with rubber; once the success of rubber was apparent, it was planted by smallholders, especially Malays, and in recent years smallholder crops have represented between a third and a half of total production in Malaya.

Annual Reports supply modern statistics on rubber, which now has an annual production in Malaya of over 600,000 tons. Two features of the 1920s call for a brief mention. The general depression of trade following the First World War had an adverse effect upon rubber prices. With stocks piling up and prices as low as about six pence a pound, rubber companies in Malaya began to make economies, and the Rubber Growers' Association, which represented estate interests in Malaya, began to urge the British government to intervene by outlining a restriction scheme for all producers. The outcome was the Stevenson Committee, appointed in 1921, and the Stevenson scheme of restriction for Malaya, which took effect from November, 1922. Each rubber producer in Malaya was assigned a quota based on his output for the year ending October 1920. Any amount in excess of the quota was subject to a prohibitive export duty.

The Dutch East Indies refused to join the Stevenson scheme, and the output of rubber there was doubled between 1922 and 1928, while there was only about a 40 per cent increase in Malaya. The scheme was abandoned in 1928, but following the depression of the early 1930s, with prices even worse than in 1921, an International Rubber Regulation Agreement to restrict exports on a quota basis was signed in 1934 between the British, Dutch, French, and Siamese governments. . . .

The effects of the growth of large-scale rubber cultivation in Malaya during the present century have covered such a wide field that they are difficult to summarise. Labour for rubber plantations was recruited in south India, first through agents and an indenture system, later, after indentured labour was abolished in 1910, through a system of assisted passages. Money for this scheme was raised jointly by the estate-owners and the government of the F.M.S. in an Indian Immigration Fund. The Indian Government imposed a ban on the further emigration of unskilled Indian labour shortly before the Second World War.

The cultivation of rubber cleared vast acreages of land and eventually provided a means of livelihood for a large proportion of Malaya's workers. It has provided a very valuable addition to the income of the smallholder. It is sometimes overlooked that rubber

production both in estates and smallholdings has been an important reason for immigration of Malaysians (or Indonesians), mainly from Java and Sumatra, to the Malay States.

Rubber has provided industrial as well as agricultural occupations. The processing of rubber, and, to a lesser extent, the growth of factories for the manufacture of rubber goods, plays an important part in the Malayan economy. Directly and indirectly, rubber has contributed to the growth of towns, ports, and communications.

Perhaps most important of all, rubber has provided the largest single source of government revenue. As with tin, the bulk of the revenue is derived from an export duty, and the revenue from rubber has been in some years more than double that from tin. The export duty is based on a scale which varies between about 4 per cent and 15 per cent according to price; there is also, as for tin, an income-tax of 30 per cent on company profits. This very important source of income, together with the tin duty, was largely responsible for government surpluses which were applied to public utilities and social welfare, and this still holds true today. Rubber, more than any other single item or factor, determines the standard of life in present-day Malaya. The need for quality and efficiency in the Malayan rubber industry is even greater at the present time, in view of the competition from synthetic rubber production, particularly in the United States of America.

Rubber, which now occupies about two-thirds of the total acreage under cultivation in Malaya, stands paramount in importance among agricultural crops for the export market....

VII *Constitutional Development in Malaya*

The differential pattern of constitutional development in the Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, Malacca), and the Federated and Unfederated Malay States of the Peninsula during the early decades of the twentieth century is analysed in the following reading from S. W. Jones' book, *Public Administration in Malaya*. As the author was Colonial Secretary of the Straits Settlements between 1940 and 1942, he writes with considerable authority on this subject. [London and New York, 1953, 78-80, 83-90.]

THE Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements was governed by a Governor, appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was advised by an Executive and a Legislative Council. In the former the officials were in a substantial majority; in

the Legislative Council officials and unofficials had become equal in number in 1924, but the Governor as President possessed both an ordinary and a casting vote to secure an official majority. For many decades Singapore had been one of the great ports and marts of the world and its continued submission to a Crown Colony form of government must arouse curiosity.

The circumstances of the Colony were seldom such as to arouse political activity or even questioning. The impress of the East India Company's view that the paramount interests of government were those fostering trade had never altogether disappeared. Trade had flourished, bringing great individual wealth to leading citizens, and even its moments of interruption or decline had been of too short a duration to resemble a crisis. The Colony had become set in its ways even before the Malay States, advancing with furious strides to come abreast of their great neighbour, had taken the limelight on the stage of history, yet it was still a very young country, too young certainly to have produced a wealthy, influential class which regarded the Colony as its home. The leading men were to be found mainly among those of European or Chinese origin who looked forward to retiring to their country of origin as the culmination of a successful career overseas, and it was not to be expected of them that they would entertain the advanced opinions which demanded a more representative form of government or be moved to strong action towards achieving it. In 1920 a Select Committee of the Legislative Council considered the matter and made the following points: (a) the vast majority of the population of the Colony had no roots of loyalty towards the country; Malays, Eurasians, and those of the Straits-born Chinese who took pride in calling themselves 'the King's Chinese' claimed the Colony as their home, but none had any heritage and few any experience of self-government, and fewer still possessed the degree of political education which was desirable before adopting that form of government; (b) it would be difficult to assess how far racial, religious, social, and economic differences would obstruct the proper exercise of self-government; (c) the existing form of administration served well the paramount desire of all, i.e. the opportunity in circumstances of peace and good order to acquire wealth, as the vast tides of population which surged into the country testified. The Select Committee found very little ambition for self-government and a good deal of opposition to it among responsible opinion. It did, however, recommend a small majority of unofficial members in the Legislative Council, but this view was not accepted by the Government. Ten years later a proposal for an equal number of official and unofficial members (the latter to be elected) for both Executive and Legislative Councils, the Governor to have an ordinary and casting

vote in order to secure an official majority, failed to stir public opinion. The unofficials in the Legislative Council had been put on a numerical parity with the officials in 1924 and their representation given a communal cast—7 Europeans, 3 Chinese, 1 Indian, 1 Malay, 1 Eurasian. Never at any time was there any substantial feeling in favour of a change to some degree of elective government, or any serious dissatisfaction with the existing form of government. For the moment 'good government' was preferred to 'self-government'. The good government was not a concentration of purely autocratic or bureaucratic government. The influence exercised by the unofficial members combined with the instinctively democratic outlook of the official members made the Government one of decision by discussion....

Federated Malay States

The Federation had a Federal Council. In addition there were the four State Councils and two other conferences which played an important part in framing policy—the Residents' Conference, held as often as meetings of the Federal Council brought the High Commissioner and the four Residents to Kuala Lumpur, the capital, and the Durbar of Rulers. The Federal Council had an official majority, 16 to 12, and transacted much the same sort of business, with the same procedure, as the Legislative Council of the Colony; it differed, however, in that the legislation enacted in the Federal Council was not the whole corpus of the law of the Federated Malay States and its budget contained provision for the four States in the form of a lump sum in each case. Each State Council appropriated at its own Budget Council the expenditure for purely State services up to the sum allocated by the Federal Council and, just as the Federal Council had its Finance Committee, composed of the Financial Secretary, the four Residents and all the unofficial members, for the purpose of scrutinizing and approving the annual estimates, so the State budgets were examined by a committee of the State Council which was overwhelmingly unofficial in composition. The unofficials of both Federal and State Councils were nominated by the High Commissioner but their influence was just as potent in the Federation, and in the same ways and for the same reasons as in the Colony, but in the former the influence enjoyed a wider distribution because of the greater number of Councils. It was true that duplication occurred, since unofficial Federal Councillors were also State Councillors in the State of their abode, but on the State Councils sat Malays, Europeans, Chinese, and Indians who were not Federal Councillors, and it was seldom that the three

latter groups at least drew back from the exercise of their right of addressing the Council. The State Councils gave further scope to the unofficials by the existence of various Standing Committees to which were delegated certain functions of the Council.

Between them, the Residents' Conference and the Durbar performed some of the functions of an executive council. The purpose of the former was to advise the High Commissioner on such matters of high policy as he or any Resident wished to have decided. They were of great value and responsible for the more momentous administrative policies of the Federation but, being so infrequent, could not alone meet requirements. They were supplemented by a system of circulating official files on which discussion could be carried out until the High Commissioner found himself able to reach a decision. The Durbar, at which the High Commissioner presided over the four Rulers and their Residents and the Federal Secretary, offered the Rulers opportunity to bring forward any suggestion or problem of policy to which they wished the administration to give its attention. It was on such occasions that they expressed unequivocally their dissatisfaction with the situation which was being created by the mounting inundations of the Chinese, and displayed a spirit of independence and a political sense which made nonsense of any talk of 'puppets'.

Unfederated Malay States

The written Constitution of Johore provided for an Executive and a State Council. Both contained a strong unofficial element and that of the State Council behaved as a political opposition. In the Executive Council, over which the Sultan presided and which in its deliberations covered the whole field of administration, they made their own contribution to an impartial survey of the administrative policies at issue. The other Unfederated States, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu arranged their affairs differently. Each had one Council which combined the legislative and financial powers of the Councils already described with the executive functions of the Executive Councils of the Colony and Johore. Their language was Malay, not English as in the . . . Colony or the Federal Council, or English or Malay as in the State Councils of the Federation and Johore. The Kedah Council consisted of four Malays and the British Adviser; there were no unofficials. The Kelantan Council numbered 15, comprising major Malay chiefs, senior Malay officials and unofficials, the Adviser, Legal Adviser and Assistant Adviser, the three latter being seconded British officials. In Trengganu the Prime Minister presided over a Council of 19 composed as in Kedah, except that no British official

was a member; the Adviser attended all meetings and his advice was sought before any resolution was passed.

It was left to one of the Federated States to provide a radical variant of this conciliar pattern, the significance of which was perhaps more prospective than actual. Negri Sembilan had two chambers. The supreme authority rested in the Yang-di-pertuan ('He who is made lord') and the Undang (in the other Malay States the Ruler was called the Sultan; in Negri Sembilan there was no person so absolute in authority as was the Sultan in the other States. The supreme authority was divided as above but one person, the Yang-di-pertuan, was regarded as possessing sufficiently more power than the others to justify his being regarded as the Head of the State). The Undang are territorial chiefs and they, with another Malay potentate and the Resident, formed the upper chamber over which the Yang-di-pertuan presided. The Lower Chamber, or State Council, was composed of the Resident (presiding) and 8 official and 7 unofficial members. In legislation the Upper Chamber's powers were those of confirmation or amendment, it had certain executive powers which had been vested in the former State Council and it dealt with matters concerning Malay religion and custom. This constitutional medley was new and unique in the history of Malaya and its existence must be regarded as a *douceur* accompanying the reforms of Sir Cecil Clementi in the early nineteen-thirties, which were the final chapter in the chronicle of attempts to break the Federal Government's excessive usurpation of power.

Constitutional Changes

The Federal Council had been instituted in [1909] and its constitution had been amended in 1927 and again in 1933, on both occasions amid cries of battle. Creation and change alike were dictated by conscience protesting that the Rulers had been unfairly treated. The Treaty of Federation had declared that it was not its purpose to weaken the power or authority of the Rulers, but, even before the establishment of the rubber industry, the development of the Federated Malay States had moved at a pace which shut out the Rulers from participation in much of the administration and demanded too much of the attention and energies of the Residents to allow them to turn aside and carry the Rulers with them. In due course as the Federal administration gathered strength the Residents themselves began to fall out of the race. The State Councils and Governments ceased to count for much, the Federal Council and Government were absolutely successful usurpers. When in 1907 the Governor and High Commissioner, Sir John Anderson, wished to do right by the Rulers by bring-

ing them back into the government of the Federation he chose the Federal Council as the agency. As he constituted it, the four Rulers sat with the High Commissioner, the Resident-General, the four Residents and four unofficials nominated by the High Commissioner. The language was English which none of the Rulers spoke and they had no privileges to balance their inability to debate. Their own particular Councils, over which they presided and exercised majestic influence, were robbed of their last pretence of importance. However good were Sir John Anderson's intentions his plans further sapped the Rulers' actual power. They may have been brought into the limelight, playing in the centre of the stage, but they were not given the chief parts. Another change made the Resident-General Chief Secretary, and its purpose was to exalt the High Commissioner and put the Resident-General in his place, which was lower down.

Sir Laurence Guillemard in 1925 was prepared to go even further in his attempt to arrest the all-devouring centralization; he proposed to abolish the appointment of Chief Secretary and secure a gradual devolution of his powers to the States and Federal Departments. The business interests, European and Chinese, were opposed to the plan. They feared for the credit of the Federation, foresaw hindrance and complexity in the transaction of their business so far as it was controlled by four Governments instead of one, and scented a danger of the subordination of the Federated Malay States to the Colony, where the High Commissioner as Governor spent most of his time. The projects came to very little except to produce the disappearance of the Rulers from the Federal Council. They were to discuss the agenda of the Council before the meeting with their Residents, who would later give a report of the proceedings. From an administrative point of view the change was a sensible reform. Politically it was a further lessening of the majesty of the Rulers which not even the institution of an annual Durbar could counterbalance, for that was a conference only, with no power to enforce any conclusion which might be arrived at in discussion. Many good arguments could be advanced to support this partial dethroning of the Rulers. In truth, until a new generation of Rulers should arise, with ability to join in the English debates and with understanding, and perhaps experience, of the problems of administration, the changes so far as they centered round the Federal Council were politic. Those who, by their opposition, wrecked the scheme for decentralization failed to take into account the needs of healthy political growth which could be fostered by associating more and more people with the administration of public affairs as a means of instructing them in the art of self-government.

In 1927 and the following year two very important political announcements were made. Sir Hugh Clifford, returning after many years to Malaya as its Governor and High Commissioner, declared that

for all the changes, 'phenomenal and radical' though they were, the status of the Malay States had been in no wise modified. They were Malay States and Muhammadan monarchies still and no mandate had ever been 'extended to us by rajas, chiefs, or people to vary the system of government'. And he emphasized 'the utter inapplicability of any form of democratic or popular government to the circumstances of these States. The adoption of any kind of government by majority would forthwith entail the complete submersion of the indigenous population'. Any such situation would amount, he said, to a betrayal of the trust which the Malays of those States had been taught to repose in the British Government. Next year, Mr. [W.G.A.] Ormsby-Gore (now Lord Harlech), Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited Malaya and repeated Sir Hugh Clifford's pronouncements, adding, too, that 'the mere fact of federation, the great economic development that has taken place, and the recent immigration of so many non-Malays, have all tended to make British administration appear, to say the least of it, to be more direct than in the Unfederated States', and expressing the view that the spirit and intention of British policy in Malaya had been carried out both more simply and more completely in the Unfederated Malay States. The criticism, if not actual rebuke in his words 'To me the maintenance of the position, authority, and prestige of the Malay rulers is a cardinal point of policy', was severe in all its implications.

It was not surprising, therefore, that in 1931 Sir Cecil Clementi tried again. But his purpose was twofold. He wanted to guide the Unfederated States into the Federation by reproducing in the Federated Malay States a good measure of the independence and self-sufficiency which the Unfederated States enjoyed. The iron grip of the Federation would have to be broken. Federal departments would pass under the control of the States, their heads would lose executive control and become Advisers, the Chief Secretary would dwindle into a Federal Secretary, junior in rank to the Residents. The Federal Council was not to escape; it was to retain its hold over certain branches of the Government which indubitably transcended individual State control, such as railways and labour, and although revenue was to be divided between Federal and State Councils the former remained the supreme authority in financial matters. But the number of subjects to be transferred to the State Councils was very great. This common pattern for the Malay States having been accomplished, the whole of Malaya was to be embraced in a common customs union and ultimately in a Pan-Malayan Union. Opposition was vehement. The Colony objected strongly to a proposal which swept away its foundation of free trade; the Unfederated refused to lie down with the Federated States. Business interests in the Federated Malay States were better suited, in their own opinion, by the Federation;

they dreaded the concession to the Colony of any chance to interfere with the affairs of the Federated Malay States and saw no advantage in becoming the rich relations of struggling economies such as Kelantan and Trengganu. The uproar was sufficiently strident and sustained to bring out an Under Secretary of State from the Colonial Office in 1932. In view of a later attitude of the Colonial Office it is worth while recording his opinion that a purely economic view would emphasize the desirability of one central government administering the whole of Malaya, but that a political view suggested a need for decentralization and in support of this latter opinion he repeated the arguments of Mr. Ormsby-Gore. His backing was enough to set the machine moving and the transfer of departments to State control, the abolition of the Chief Secretaryship, and the change in role of the departmental heads by which they became Advisers went ahead. The financial proposals were modified at the expense of the States which were not to enjoy specified sources of revenue but to receive an annual block grant from the Federal Council.

Other changes were the acceleration of promotion from the Malay Administrative Service (which had been established in 1910 and had served to staff junior posts in district administration), and the creation of a separate clerical service open to candidates of all nationalities born and educated in the Federated Malay States with preference for Malays. The latter innovation had a passing value in reviving the morale of the State Governments, and the sharp revision of the standing of Federal Heads was all to the good, since it checked the strongest influence at work in smothering under a purely British organization political systems which the British Government had been instructed only to advise. But by far the most valuable reform of all, one which not merely served to correct a fault but seemed likely at long last to shape the right course for the goal of self-government, was the rehabilitation of the State Councils. The readjustment of the relations between Federal and State Councils was skilfully made. While surrendering to the State Councils' powers which gave them body and spirit, the Federal Council yielded little of its position as the supreme authority, under the High Commissioner, in the Federation. The State authorities happily busied themselves over their budget proposals but it was the Federal Council which disposed of them. The central body of law was enacted by the Federal Council in the names of the Rulers, and the State Councils legislated for matters of purely local significance. A wise move was the appointment of unofficial Federal Councillors to be State Councillors. At one and the same time it benefited the State Council by the participation of the leading men of the State, and it profited the Councillors themselves, especially if they were lawyers or business men, by introducing them to the world of the Malayan countryside into which their affairs seldom led them.

VIII *Malay Nationalist Movements*

Although nationalism was already much in evidence in India and other parts of South and South-East Asia by the 1930's, Malayan nationalism was far slower to develop. The Chinese, Indians and Europeans looked elsewhere when they thought in national terms, and the loyalty of the Malays was focussed on the individual Sultans. From 1926, however, when the *Kesatuan Melayu* was established, a growing Pan-Malay sentiment among young intellectuals began to enjoy a certain, predominately literary, popularity. [Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz, in *Asian Nationalism and the West*, 284-6.]

THE growth of Malay nationalism in Malaya had barely begun when the second world war broke out. But like Chinese nationalism its main interests were not (at least at first) in Malaya. It was spun from two strands, the cultural reaction of Islam against the West and the nationalist movement of Indonesia. These were the conscious intellectual forces. But another strand which has since come to light may have been there all along: a desire, against all reason and probability, to defend against excessive outside intrusion the shy, aristocratic, leisurely culture of pre-Islamic custom which characterises the Malay race in the uncrowded lands of Malaya and parts of Sumatra and Borneo.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the combination of British rule and prosperity in the plantations had provided for parts of the Malay aristocracy incomes that enabled their sons to go to Cairo or Beirut or Mecca for education. These boys, when they returned, became a small and rather frustrated Malay intelligentsia, circulating (in private) magazines in Arabic and Malay that dealt with forbidden topics of nationalism and the politics of the Middle East. They established literary associations and small debating societies which, though denied overt political influence, created small circles of friends that were to form nuclei, thirty or more years later, of political bodies.

On this scattered intelligentsia three new influences impinged in the third decade of the century. A rising Indonesian nationalism was implanting its ideas through personal contacts and Malay journals; Japanese business men were beginning to spread the pan-Asianism that was later to produce the collaborators of the Pacific War; and the British decentralisation policy in the Malay States was beginning to restore to these Malay aristocrats some of the cultural leadership of which the earlier Federation policy had deprived them.

Apart from contacts in sport between Malays in different states there was nothing to draw the Malays of the peninsula together. Only

one pan-Malay organisation emerged in the fourth decade of the century, and this was only loosely connected with politics. The *Persaudaraan Sahabat Pena* (Brotherhood of Pen Friends) was founded about the middle of the decade, with branches throughout Malaya. Its objects were mainly cultural; to raise the standard of the Malay language and safeguard Malay culture from extinction, and to increase the quantity of Malay literature.

This body appears to have drawn its members mainly from the section of the intelligentsia which was subject to Arab influence. It had some religious bias, though it was not a religious organisation. Many of the contacts made through this organisation, and some of the ideas it helped to spread, reappeared later in the United Malays National Organisation.

It is a matter of some significance that the first Malay political movement in the peninsula began not in the Malay States but in Singapore, where the Malay Union (*Kesatuan Melayu*) was founded in 1926. Malay nationalism began as a defensive reaction against the virtual extinction of Malay culture, and it began where that culture had been most suppressed by alien elements—in Singapore, where large numbers of the Malays had degenerated to hired servants of other races. The Malay Union's objects were, from its beginnings, to struggle against the economic and educational backwardness of the Malay race and enable it to hold its own against the immigrants.

The Malay Union's first branch was established in Malacca in 1937 and it was only after this that it began founding branches in the Federated Malay States. Its first pan-Malayan conference was not held until 1939, and the branches in the Unfederated States and in Penang were not formed until after this. This first conference, under the chairmanship of a Malay lawyer, was exploratory only. The second conference in December 1940 was the first and only prewar example of political activity by the Malays on a pan-Malayan scale. The resolutions passed indicate that in the main the Malay Union was an aristocratic body tending to identify the preservation of Malay culture with the fostering of the interests of the intelligentsia. There were demands for the creation of a post of Malay Assistant Director of Education, for Malay representation on all external missions, and for exemption of the Malay States from income tax. There was much talk of improving the economic position and political power of the Malay race, but no detailed suggestions which could effectively further this object.

It is important to emphasize that, along with the influences of Arab, Indonesian and Japanese nationalism, which all played their small part, an important component of Malay nationalism was bewilderment. The Malays were being drawn into a political and economic world which formerly they had regarded as outside the

narrow circle of their village economy and their small states based on hereditary aristocracy, leisure and intrigue. They were being drawn in, too, in a subordinate position. It is not so much that they were materially poorer. Like other primary producers, the Malays were considerably worse off in the 'thirties than in the 'twenties, but the intelligentsia had little detailed knowledge of this, and they themselves were probably better off because of the general development of the country. Rather, they were acutely conscious of increasing political and economic dependence. They saw Malays everywhere in debt to Chinese and needing to be protected by a land reservation policy to prevent them losing their land. They saw Malays as messengers in offices where Chinese and Indians were clerks. They saw Malays employed as car drivers by Europeans and even Chinese. They began to realise the dependence of the Malay fisherman and small holder on the Chinese dealer and Indian moneylender.

The decentralisation policy, and the building up of the influence of the Malay aristocracy in the states encouraged the Malay nationalist intelligentsia to regard itself as an instrument for preserving an inherited culture not strong enough to stand unaided. Influenced by Arab pan-Islamism, by Indonesian attempts to absorb them in Indonesia and by Japanese pan-Asianism, they nevertheless saw their own political awakening not as any brave new world, but as a tardy recognition of dangers threatening to convert their race into an 'aboriginal stock' and their culture into a museum piece.

Chapter Nine

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION AND THE RISE OF NATIONALISM

Constitutional and economic progress in Malaysia was halted suddenly late in 1941 and early in 1942 when the expanding imperial power of Japan came into conflict with the Western governments of the area. Although fairly brief, the period of the Japanese invasion and occupation, 1941-45, produced great changes throughout South-East Asia, and while Malaysians undoubtedly were glad to see the Japanese go in 1945, there were those who were determined that the return of the British should be of short duration only. A genuine Malaysian nationalism gave rise to an independence movement which reached its culmination on *Merdeka* (Freedom) Day, 31 August 1957, when Malaya became an independent member of the Commonwealth of Nations. During this period and after, until the decade of the 1960's, Britain and then Malaya had to fight a long, gruelling war with Malaysian Communists. This war first intensified communal feelings, but ultimately it was to give added strength to the national movement. Singapore and the Borneo territories also experienced major constitutional changes, both Sarawak and British North Borneo becoming Crown Colonies while Singapore moved from Colony to State.

I Japanese Conquest

The Japanese invasion of Malaya and the Borneo territories was sudden, brutal, and efficient. The British repeatedly suffered serious reverses as the Japanese pressed rapidly down the Malayan peninsula to Singapore. There, after several days of intensive fighting, of heavy bombing and bombardment, 'the fortress of Singapore', presumed by the British to be impregnable, capitulated. The effect of this defeat,

the most serious military disaster ever sustained by Britain in the long course of her military history, was to leave Japan supreme in South-East Asia and—in conjunction with the fall of the Philippines, the Borneo territories, and the Dutch East Indies—in the entire western Pacific Ocean. Eighty thousand British and Indian troops were captured.

The actual events of the campaign in Malaya remain controversial. Although a commission of inquiry was to be appointed to investigate the causes of the British defeat at Singapore, it was, in fact, never established. Blame for the defeat was popularly placed upon the various services—air, naval, and ground—by the champions of each. No doubt all must share, in some measure, in the final apportionment of blame. The following selections form a coherent but controversial account of the campaign. Readings (a), (c), and (e) provide the Japanese version and are taken from a translation of an eye-witness account written by Masanobu Tsuji, the Chief of Operations and Planning Staff for the 25th Japanese Army in Malaya. [Masanobu Tsuji, *Singapore: The Japanese Version*; trans. by Margaret E. Lake and ed. by H. V. Howe from the Japanese edition published in Tokyo in 1952, London, 1962; (a) 93–7, 153–6, 166, 176–9; (c) 216–22; (e) 266–9.] Reading (b) provides an eye-witness record of the fall of Kuala Lumpur by a British journalist. [Ian Morrison, *Malayan Postscript*, London, 1942, 108–17.] Reading (d) is from the account of *The War in Malaya* by Lieutenant-General Arthur E. Percival, the General Officer Commanding in Malaya and Singapore at the time. [London, 1949, 128–30, 160–1, 199, 254, 291–3.]

Reading (a)

KOTA BHARU was the northern gate of the British Dominion of Malaya. It was the metropolis of Kelantan Province, and was the base of operations for the Royal Air Force, which had a fully equipped and well-defended aerodrome there. Lying about two kilometres from the coast it was protected by a triple line of pillboxes and wire entanglements between it and the beach. Topographically Kota Bharu lies in a moat formed by the arms of the Kelantan River, which here flows in several streams into the sea. In strength the position was second only to the fortified positions of Mersing and Singapore. We believed the beach was heavily mined by the enemy and we waited eagerly—and anxiously—for our opportunity to land under protection of our fighter planes...

At midnight on 7th–8th December... three transports had anchored off shore, and despite the heavy seas that were running successfully transhipped their troops into the boats. Then the naval escort began a bombardment of the coast as a signal to commence the landing. The enemy pillboxes, which were well prepared, reacted

violently with such heavy fire that our men lying on the beach, half in and half out of the water, could not raise their heads.

Before long enemy planes in formations of two and three began to attack our transports, which soon became enveloped in flame and smoke from the bursting bombs and from shells fired by the shore batteries. The *Awagisan Maru* after ten direct hits caught fire; later the *Ayatosan Maru* did likewise after six hits. The officers and men of the anti-aircraft detachment, although scorched by the flames, finally shot down seven enemy planes. As the fires burst through the decks of the ships, the soldiers still on board, holding their rifles, jumped over the side. Kept afloat by the lifejackets with which they had been equipped, some managed with difficulty to get into boats while others swam towards the shore. For these men it was a grim introduction to war.

Groups of enemy fighter planes attacked our launches and poured a hail of bullets into them as they drifted on the surface of the sea, but nevertheless by degrees most of our men got ashore and formed a line on the beach. There, as daylight came, it became impossible to move under the heavy enemy fire at point-blank range. Officers and men instinctively dug with their hands into the sand and hid their heads in the hollows. Then they burrowed until their shoulders, and eventually their whole bodies, were under cover. Their positions were so close to the enemy that they could throw hand-grenades into the loopholes in the pillboxes. All the time they were using their steel helmets to dig their way further forward, with their swords dragging on the sand beside them. Eventually they reached the wire entanglements. Those with wire-cutters got to work, but they had scarcely commenced when there was a thunderous report and clouds of dust flew up completely obscuring the view for a time. The attackers had reached the British mined zone. Moving over corpses the wire-cutters kept at their work. Behind them followed a few men, piling up the sand ahead of them with their steel helmets and creeping forward like moles. The enemy soldiers manning the pillboxes fought desperately. Suddenly one of our men covered a loophole with his body and a group of the moles sprang to their feet in a spurt of sand and rushed into the enemy's fortified position. Hand-grenades flew and bayonets flashed, and amid the sound of war-cries and calls of distress, in a cloud of black smoke the enemy's front line was captured.

Across the river was the second line. Our men did not know the depth of the water, but some who still wore lifejackets charged into the stream, sending up clouds of spray, and managed to cross the river and capture the second line at bayonet point.

Reorganizing his troops after the landing, the commander of the detachment at sunset prepared for a night attack against the enemy aerodrome. Heavy rain unexpectedly closed down on the battlefield,

but by 8 p.m. one corner of the aerodrome had been attacked, and the whole aerodrome was occupied by midnight. Kota Bharu town was not captured until after 2 p.m. on 9th December. This victory was followed up by the capture of Tanah Merah aerodrome on the 18th, and of Kuala Kulai aerodrome on the 19th, which completed the destruction of the British military and air base at this northern gate of Malaya. In this action we captured 27 field guns, 73 heavy and light machine-guns, 7 aeroplanes, 157 motor cars and trucks and 33 railway goods wagons.

As well as the *Atwagisan Maru* and *Ayatosan Maru*, our losses totalled 320 men killed in action and 538 wounded. It was one of the most violent actions in the Malayan campaign. . . .

The success of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour had exalted Japan. The second news of a great victory came from Imperial Headquarters. Even the voices speaking through the microphones seemed to tremble with gratitude. At five minutes past four on the afternoon of 10th December, Imperial Navy Headquarters made the following announcement:

From the outbreak of hostilities the movements of . . . two British capital ships have been closely observed. Yesterday afternoon they were discovered by one of our submarines carrying out a reconnaissance in co-operation with naval surface ships and the Navy Air Force. At half past eleven this morning our submarines again confirmed the position of the British ships, off Kuantan on the east coast of Malaya. Without losing a moment the Naval Air Force entered into a dauntless and daring attack and in a twinkling of the eye attacked at about twelve forty-five. The *Repulse* was seriously damaged by the first bombs dropped and shortly afterwards the *Prince of Wales* was hit and developed a heavy list to port. The *Repulse* sank first, and shortly after at ten minutes to three the *Prince of Wales* blew up and finally sank.

The third day of hostilities has resulted in the annihilation of the main strength of the British Far Eastern Squadron.

This announcement, worthy of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, caused wild excitement among the people of Japan, but of course the whole of Britain was shocked. . . .

The naval action off Kuantan had annihilated in one blow the main strength of the British Far Eastern Fleet by sinking the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, and had given us complete command of the sea off the east coast of Malaya. But Singapore remained in good condition, and the air base in Sumatra and the sea off the western coast of Malaya were still in the grasp of the British. Those who planned our small-boat operations had to take due account of these facts. Our plan,

which appeared to disregard the principles of war by driving our Air Group forward to the enemy air base in the northern part of Malaya, was based on the assumption of air-sea co-operation. The small boats to be used were roughly forty large and small motor boats used in the Singora [Thailand] landing, which... had been taken overland by road and rail to the Alor Star River. After being launched again there they were collected in the neighbourhood of Lumut at the mouth of the Perak River, together with about twenty other boats which had been captured at Penang. Altogether these boats carried a battalion of infantry—more or less—and they travelled along the coast in the rear of the enemy, ceaselessly menacing their retreat. It was a problem what troops to put aboard the boats to increase the scale of this operation. Eventually the 1st Manoeuvres Unit... was selected to be ferried from point to point along the coast as required to harass the enemy's retreat.

At army Headquarters, in Taiping, the regimental commander came to say goodbye. "I wish you to keep the regimental colours at Army Headquarters in Taiping," he said. I thought, "This unit is not under the direct control of Army, and as orders are given by the division commander, being sent to him from Army, so naturally the regimental colours should be in the custody of the division commander. The colours must share the fate of the regiment's main strength, which is putting into operation these vital manoeuvres from which the whole Army expects so much!"

It is natural for a regiment to protect its colours, but if I had been the regimental commander I should have wished to raid the enemy territory carrying them, for, if the boats carrying the regiment were sunk, would it not be better if the colours were sunk too? Thus the soldiers would be inspired by the thought that their cherished colours would share in their own fate of life or death.

Feelings of misgiving were apparent in the regimental commander as he said his pathetic farewell before departing. General [Tomoyuki] Yamashita encouraged him. "Don't worry about the colours," he said. "They'll be all right. I shall certainly take care of them. You do your duty with all your might."

While the regimental commander was going away, without knowing why it seemed to me I could see the shadow of death at his back.

* * *

During the night of 30th December the detachment put out from Lumut at the mouth of the Perak River. While they were celebrating the New Year on the open sea, they were discovered by enemy planes and swept by machine-gun fire, which they returned, bringing down one plane. A number of men of the detachment were wounded, and

there was some uneasiness about the future because of the enemy's early discovery of the expedition, which nevertheless continued on its way.

On 4th January, reaching Sungkai, they were in a position to menace the enemy line of retreat in the rear of the main British forces.

The 5th Division had for many years been trained in military landing operations, and was a land force with good knowledge of the sea. There was some danger that their over-confidence might over-ride their common sense. Everything depended on the discretion and general character of the commander, and this well-trained division had successfully carried out the maritime operations assigned to it.

By contrast the Imperial Guards, when they took over the small-boat operations from the 5th Division, were completely without maritime experience and "rushed in like fools where angels feared to tread". Entering Port Swettenham, which is the outer harbour of Kuala Lumpur, they landed deep in the rear of the key position of Morib, and, smashing enemy resistance, seized the strategic point of Kajang above the main road south of Kuala Lumpur. This reckless action took the enemy unawares, and was the real reason for their abandonment of the important capital city of the Federated Malay States.

In this operation the detachment of our men in the small boats had thrown common sense to the winds, but they caused consternation to the commander in charge of the units of the British Army on the spot. In face of the threat to his rear he retreated immediately and swiftly, leaving our men with their objective achieved.

Prime Minister [Winston] Churchill, from London, indignantly protested to General [Sir Archibald] Wavell and rebuked General [Arthur E.] Percival—which in the circumstances was not unreasonable. "Control of the western coast passed to the Japanese Army, which did not have even one naval vessel there. The failure was a blot on the past history of the British Navy", wrote the old Prime Minister, who repeatedly referred to the position. "Why did not the Navy oppose the enemy advance with destroyers, submarines or aeroplanes?" he asked. That was one of the questions we also asked ourselves.

Admiral [Sir Dudley] Pound, replying to Mr. Churchill's rebuke, stated that his inability to prevent the Japanese attack along the west coast of Malaya was due to the inferiority of the British aeroplanes, the failure of scorched-earth tactics at Penang, and Japanese utilization of the small boats left behind by the British. Those may have been some of the reasons, but even if the British Navy had shown the fighting spirit of the Japanese officers and men, it might not have been able to prevent the successful operations of the fleet of small boats...

The Takumi Detachment first came into contact with the enemy

around Kuantan on 29th December, and on the morning of the 31st commenced the assault on the town and took possession of it. The enemy however obstinately defended the aerodromes on its circumference. The Takumi Detachment thereupon made a detour through the jungle, and attacked the enemy from the west, thus intercepting their line of retreat. In a night attack on 3rd January our troops destroyed nearly the whole of the enemy brigade, and finally seized the aerodromes.

During this battle the enemy brigade commander, who was taken prisoner, was asked, "Why did your men raise their hands so quickly?"

He replied, "For what reason did you attack only on the front where we had not prepared to meet you?" He went on to say, "When we defend the coast, you come from the dense jungle. When we defend the land, you come from the sea. Is it not war for enemies to face each other? This is not war. There will be no other way than retreat, I assure you."

This criticism was characteristic of the British attitude throughout the whole period of operations, and was common to every front....

Observations from the beginning of the campaign, throughout the important battles of Jitra, Kampar, and Slim River, had shown the necessity to abandon the old conception of attacking by outflanking movements in favour of concentrated fire and penetration on a narrow front by sudden raids. If one catches fish slowly by throttling them in a big net, it is essential that they should not escape in all directions through the sides. In Malaya the main roads ran lengthwise throughout the peninsula, with jungle on either side except where cultivated rubber plantations allowed the deployment of troops for a kilometre or so on either or both sides of the road. Because of this special characteristic of the country large forces could not be used on a wide front. We had noticed that when the enemy's front was broken their troops took refuge in the jungle, but finding they could not escape through it, were driven by hunger to surrender after two or three days.

The Army Commander, General Yamashita, appeared still to prefer the tactics of large-scale outflanking movements from the west coast, but the staff was very impressed with the significance of the breakthrough by the 5th Division using concentrated power on a narrow front at Slim River, and urged that the same tactics be used by the Imperial Guards Division to break through the anticipated fortified position in the neighbourhood of Gemas, the barrier to Johore State. It was decided that the Imperial Guards Division should attack Gemas along the rear road running beside the mountain road on the north.

The coastal districts of Malaya are intersected by many rivers

running into the sea, and these constitute serious obstacles. As there were practically no bridges in the area, our troops would have to cross the rivers by ferry boats. The Army Commander's plan required the allocation to the Imperial Guards Division of the greater part of the available bridge-building material as well as most of the engineer units and tanks.

From the Army Commander's point of view the move on Gemas was more than a simple tactical problem. It was complicated by the fact that the Konoe Imperial Guards divisional commander was of lower seniority than the commander of the 5th Division, and in this operation would command the larger force. The Konoe divisional commander was not happy with this position, about which there were long discussions.

The Takumi Detachment, which was in Kuantan on the east, was transferred to the trunk-road area of the west coast, and, as arranged, the Imperial Guards division moved towards the rear of Gemas, inflicting a crushing defeat upon the enemy at Bakri. Depending largely on the small boats formerly used by the 5th Division with the Kunishi Detachment, the Imperial Guards ceaselessly menaced the enemy's rear. Troops landing from boats in the neighbourhood of Morib occupied Kajang, a strategic position on the main road. Naturally the successes of the Imperial Guards facilitated the advance of the 5th Division, which, after the break-through at Slim River, was able to continue pursuing the enemy with undiminished momentum.

While the Imperial Guards continued their advance into Johore State, the 5th Division without pause moved towards Kuala Lumpur and reached the prepared position at Tanjong Malim—the last trench line before the federal capital—which had been prepared before the outbreak of hostilities. It appeared a very solidly built defence line, and severe fighting was expected before it fell. Owing to their heavy losses at Slim River, however, the enemy had sufficient strength to man only one line of firing trench, which was soon left behind like the cast-off skin of a snake.

On 11th January at 8 p.m. our troops entered Kuala Lumpur, capital of the Malay Federation, without serious enemy resistance. This metropolis presented a dignified and imposing modern appearance. There were Chinese merchants' shops on practically all the main streets, and from each of these hung the firm's name, written in *kanji*. We felt as though we had entered the crossroads of the central provinces of China.

The occupying troops had now been on continuous military operations for forty days since the departure from Samah Harbour, without a single day's rest. This must be a rare occurrence in military operations, ancient or modern, domestic or foreign.

Kuala Lumpur had suffered no war damage and its recovery was

swift. There were no breaches of military discipline, and the day after the Japanese troops entered the city the shops of the inhabitants were allowed to open...

Reading (b)

ABOUT noon on January 8th we visited corps headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and met one of those ineffably complacent and incredibly stupid young staff officers who deservedly bring my generation into disrepute. I had known him slightly in Japan where he had occupied a junior position in one of the big oil companies. Here he was now, on the staff, having acquired a captaincy and a moustache and all the stage mannerisms of the British officer. That morning, he grudgingly admitted, there had been just 'a spot of bother' up on the Slim River. Reports of 'the battle' were just coming in. But the situation was 'quite well in hand'. The spot of bother was perhaps the most decisive engagement fought on the mainland during the entire campaign. As a result of it, all the British forces in north Malaya fell back upon the Johore line, and the largest city on the mainland, Kuala Lumpur, was occupied by the enemy with hardly a shot fired within a radius of thirty miles from it.

The Japanese had surprised us by suddenly bringing up a force of medium tanks. We knew they had the light two-men armoured carriers but these twelve-tonners were a complete surprise. The attack was launched in the early hours of the morning under cover of darkness. Because of the prevailing obscurity it was difficult to establish exactly how many tanks took part. It appeared, however, that at least six armoured carriers, twelve medium tanks, and possibly some even heavier tanks, advancing in that order, took part in the assault. Using an estate road, they came round our advanced posts on the main road where we had anti-tank guns ready, and joined the road some distance in the rear of the anti-tank guns. They then advanced down the main road for several miles, shelling and machine-gunning our men and their vehicles and whatever else they could see. Then again they took to open country and, after making a detour, attacked our positions on a bridge over the Slim River. Fortunately one of our twelve-five pounders had got stuck on the bridge. Firing through open sights at point-blank range this gun succeeded in knocking out two and possibly three of the medium tanks. Shortly afterwards the tanks disappeared into a rubber estate up an estate road and did not put in an appearance again until they went into action against the Australians south of Muar about ten days later. According to the usual Japanese practice, the attack was accompanied by much waving of flags and shouting of 'Banzai'. The Japanese tanks wrought tremendous havoc. Our men and equipment were strung all

along the road down which they rumbled with their guns to stop them. They caused unspeakable confusion. They were closely followed by Japanese infantry who took advantage of the disorganization caused by the mechanized spearhead to fall ruthlessly upon our men. Losses were heavy, particularly amongst the Argylls and the Gurkhas. Fortunately, however, the attack was not pressed home as hard as it might have been. British forces from the rear succeeded in stabilizing the situation several miles south of the Slim River and the survivors of the units who had been so badly shot up were able to re-form again in the rear. A good many of the troops who had been cut off north of the Slim River succeeded in making their way back. Some came down the railway, some through the jungle, nearly all had to swim the river. A young gunner officer whom I met in Rasa had had two remarkable escapes. When the tanks first came down the road a shell from a tank cannon grazed his head but only touched it very lightly. During the course of his trek south he and his companion were surprised at one point by a camouflaged Japanese tank which promptly opened fire with a machine-gun at fifty yards range. A bullet went right through the heel of his boot without touching his foot. Worn and unshaven, he sat in the saddle of his motor-bike under the trees of the Malay village recounting his experiences. Another man we met there was a British planter from Kedah whose estate was overrun in the first few days of the war, since when he had been working with the army as an Intelligence and liaison officer. When the attack began he was with the Gurkhas and he had just brought a troop of them back with him from a point several miles north of the Slim River. The finest thing he had ever seen, he said, was the way in which those Gurkhas [*sic*] had stood up to that tank attack. Although it was dark and they could not see their targets clearly, although they were tired after many days of continuous fighting, although their rifles were useless against tanks, nevertheless the Gurkhas behaved like the trained and disciplined soldiers they were. They did not run or panic, but calmly took up positions at the side of the road and fired their rifles as best they could against the enemy.

The whole engagement was a *débâcle*. But it made our Command realize that this sort of thing could not continue. Another engagement of this nature and we would have no troops left in this north-western sector at all. Our men were bone-weary after over three weeks of non-stop heavy fighting. We were losing them at far too high a rate. The enemy kept on throwing fresh troops into the fighting. Now these tanks had come into action. If they had been effective on the estate roads north and south of the Slim River, they would be infinitely more so when operating on the numerous tarred roads that form a well-developed network all round Kuala Lumpur for many miles in every direction. . . . General Wavell arrived at the front on the

following day (Friday, January 9th), and the sensible, indeed the only decision was taken. But it was a big decision. The entire British forces in north Malaya, the 9th Division from the east coast and the 11th Division (or what was left of it) from the west coast, were to fall back a distance of some 125 miles. A very small force was to seek to delay the enemy while the main bulk of the army withdrew. The next engagement of any magnitude after 'the spot of bother' on the Slim River was that fought at Gemas when the Australians first went into action.

The great move south began on Saturday morning. All Saturday and Sunday, all day and all night, the great withdrawal continued. An interminable convoy began to roll south. It was composed of all manner of vehicles. Large lorries filled with British troops, so dog-tired that they slept in spite of bumps and jolts. Civilian motor-cars commandeered by the military and hastily camouflaged by being spattered with mud. Lorries bearing the names of half the rubber estates in Malaya. Dispatch-riders darting in and out of the traffic on their motor-bicycles. Eleven steam-rollers belonging to the Public Works Department which had steamed all the way down from Kedah and Perak. Two fire-engines also making their way south. Enormous tractors used for clearing belted jungle trees in the construction of aerodromes, so broad that they took up most of the road, so heavy that their treads churned up the tarred surface. Low trollies towing sticks of heavy aerial bombs saved from the northern airfields for further use. Private motor-cars, from Austin 7's to Rolls-Royces, carrying Local Defence Volunteers, A.R.P. wardens, police officials. Camouflaged staff cars through whose windows one caught a glimpse of red tabs and hat-bands. Red Cross ambulances, ordnance vans, trucks fitted with cranes and lathes and all equipment needed for field repairs. At intervals of about one mile there would be a lorry or car in the ditch, sometimes overturned, sometimes completely smashed up, sometimes burnt out and still smouldering. Light Aid Detachments, who did splendid work throughout the campaign and put hundreds of vehicles back on the roads, were at work on some of the cars which were only slightly damaged. These numerous smashes bore witness to frayed nerves, to tired drivers who had gone to sleep at the wheel or been suddenly dazzled in the black-out by oncoming headlights. When one reflected that most of the drivers had been driving almost continuously for the best part of the previous forty-eight hours, it was really amazing that there were not more accidents. The only casualty to be seen was a dead buffalo calf that had been knocked down and killed. Nobody bothered to get out and move it off the road and its mother stood on the grassy verge lowing in her puzzled distress. English, Scottish, Australian, Indian, Malay, Chinese drivers were at the wheels. Soot-blackened Tamils were

keeping the steam-engines chugging along. When we came to a railway crossing, we saw one of the troop-trains proceeding south, filled with Indian troops. At another station there was a Red Cross train in the sidings, with its freight of pain and suffering. The trains were being driven by English and Australian drivers and fired sometimes by survivors from the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*. (Nearly all the Indian engine-drivers returned to their homes when the war began. Their wages were meagre. There was little to induce them to stay and face the dangers of driving trains on the railway. Scratch European drivers were hastily recruited.)

In the villages and towns along the route Malays and Chinese and Indians stood in silent little groups, watching the long procession wind its way south. Neither pleasure nor malice nor sympathy were to be seen in their impassive countenances. Bewilderment was perhaps the emotion uppermost in their minds. Never before had warfare come to the Malayan peninsula. War was a phenomenon completely strange to these . . . people. And now they saw the white *tuans*, who had always been in Malaya since they could first remember, heading for the south. In a few days' time another procession would wind its way through the village, also on its way south.

* * *

The Japanese must have marched into Kuala Lumpur on January 12th. . . .

The scene that met one's eyes in the city was fantastic. Civil authority had broken down. The European officials and residents had all evacuated. The white police officers had gone and most of the Indian and Malay constables had returned to their homes in the surrounding villages. There was looting in progress such as I have never seen before. Most of the big foreign department stores had already been whistled clean since the white personnel had gone. There was now a general sack of all shops and premises going on. . . . The streets were knee-deep in boxes and cardboard cartons and paper. Looters could be seen carrying every imaginable prize away with them. . . .

The only thing that was not being looted was booze. Several days previously the army had collected as much of the liquor in Kuala Lumpur it could find. Tens of thousands of bottles and cases were amassed. When the time came for a move south, Local Defence Volunteers laid into the cases of gin and whisky and other intoxicants with sledge-hammers and destroyed them. . . .

We went up to the Residency to see if the Resident was still there. It was a large spacious white house in parklike grounds filled with flowering trees, surrounded at a distance by other official residences. The place was deserted. The flag was down. There seemed to be none within miles. The big house was empty. . . . In the Residency a

half-finished whisky-and-soda stood on the small table by the sofa in the drawing-room. Upstairs a woman's dress, half-ironed, lay on the ironing-table in one of the bedrooms. Two dispatches addressed to the Governor, typed out but unsigned, lay on the desk upstairs. In the offices on the ground floor the files were intact. The staff appeared to have downed pens in the middle of whatever they were doing and made off. A lorry, still in good order, was parked at the side of the building. Cases of beautiful silver ornaments, daggers of superb native workmanship, the presentations, doubtless, of Malay princes, lay in glass cases in the hall. The official portraits of the King and Queen smiled down from the walls....

Those beautiful houses on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, those spacious mansions, with their lovely tropical gardens, where bougain-villaea and canna and hibiscus and many other flowering shrubs and creepers were in full bloom, were absolutely deserted, save perhaps for an old Chinese servant on the back premises or some dog whose master had not been able to take him south. At the hospital the Indian medical officer told us that all the European patients and staff had left for the south. He was in charge. The Majestic Hotel, which had remained open so long, thanks to the courage of the Chinese manager, one of those little men who in a crisis reveal unsuspected capacities for courage and strength, was closed at last. Indian sappers were preparing to demolish some of the buildings and sidings at the railway station.... The big clock in the clock-tower was smashed.... The office of the Government Survey Department was boarded up and barricaded. We wondered how much they had taken with them when they moved south. The maps of Malaya, of many different kinds, large-scale and small-scale, published by the Survey Department, were superb productions. I threw a box through the large plate-glass window, smashed the glass, and climbed in. (All of us were in a reckless, truculent mood.) Not a thing had been removed. Motoring maps of Malaya, geological maps, forestry maps, maps of states, of districts, of villages, of islands off the coast, of rubber estates, maps of so large a scale that every tree was marked, lay there, tier upon tier, not in their hundreds but in their thousands. The Japanese undoubtedly had copies of many of these maps since they used to be on sale to the public. We know that they had excellent maps of the peninsula with them, or they would not have been able to use the terrain to such good advantage. But even so, it was difficult to see how all these maps could have been left behind for the enemy. I wanted to set fire to them. I wish now that I had done so. But one of my companions pointed out that it would also mean burning down the municipal building, several stories high covering several acres, and in a craven moment I desisted from starting such an enormous conflagration.

Meanwhile the milling crowds of looters in the streets seemed to

be becoming larger. Men were coming in from miles around to see what they could bag. Others were coming in for second and third trips. Only in some areas did the Chinese shopkeepers, with that toughness of fibre which is the secret of their country's greatness, arm themselves with long wooden staves and band together to protect their property from the ravages of would-be despoilers. Such were the last hours of the largest city on the Malayan mainland.

Reading (c)

SINGAPORE was Britain's pivotal point in the domination of Asia. It was the eastern gate for the defence of India and the northern gate for the defence of Australia. It was the axis of the steamship route from Europe to the Orient, north to Hong Kong and through to Shanghai, and to the treasures of the Dutch East Indies to the south and east. Through these two arteries alone, during a period of many years, Britain controlled the Pacific Ocean with Singapore as the very heart of the area. . . .

Britain's boast that Singapore was an impregnable fortress, and her attempted coercion of Japan by dispatching to Singapore the two great and efficient battleships *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales*, were things that remain fresh even now in the memory of the people of Japan.

Singapore was naturally easy to defend, and with consolidation of its equipment could be shaped into an impregnable fortress. Facing the sea coast a battery of fifteen-inch guns was installed which dominated the eastern mouth of Johore Strait and protected the vast military barracks at Changi. The fortress was constructed in steel and concrete, and the world's greatest guns directed their forbidding muzzles towards the sea front. The military aerodromes of Tengah, Kallang, Seletar and Sembawang were good bases of operation for a large air force, and in Seletar naval harbour two great docks were installed which could easily take in fifty-thousand-ton battleships. . . .

In this great fortress, which Britain boasted could never be captured by attack from the sea, there was however an important weak point. . . . [T]he rear defences in the region of Johore Province were incomplete. This resulted from a defect in the organization of the fortress, or rather from a defect in the plan of military operations.

In other words, to land in southern Thailand, brave the intense heat and the long distance of eleven hundred kilometres, and advance through dense jungle, was probably deemed an impossibility by what seemed to the British common-sense judgment. A Japanese Army contemplating such operations in an emergency, would, it appeared, in view of the long distance overland, have to labour for perhaps more than a year to reach Singapore from Thailand. In the meantime it was

not difficult to imagine that the British would complete fortification of the landward front.

In barely fifty-five days, however, the Japanese Army overwhelmed Malaya, carrying everything before it, and during the campaign the British, not being gods, were never certain of our whereabouts.

According to Mr. Churchill's memoirs, Singapore's rear defences (the Johore front) were believed to be in readiness. This was accepted by everyone as a matter of course.

On the morning of 19th January, from a telegram from General Wavell, Mr. Churchill for the first time heard not only that there were no permanent fortifications for the rear defence of Singapore, but also that since the outbreak of hostilities, especially since the Japanese had been building up strength in the southern part of Indo-China, the lack of rear fortifications had not even been considered or discussed by any commanding officer in Singapore. The suggestion had not even been made that field-operation fortifications should be constructed.

It seems inconceivable that the British in Singapore should neglect even to report the truth of the non-existence of rear defences. In the circumstances Mr. Churchill's rebuke was quite proper. Among the commanding officers in the Malayan theatre there was not one who had a tinge of the enthusiasm and feeling of responsibility of Mr. Churchill. This however was to be considered the unexpected good fortune of the Japanese Army....

Our estimate of the British defences and strength in Singapore was made on the basis of information that had been accumulated by all possible means. The five chief points were as follows:

1. Before the outbreak of hostilities it was estimated that the British forces in Malaya numbered from five to six brigades of regular troops, and two brigades of volunteers. Later, after examination of prisoners of war taken up to the end of January, this estimate was revised. Enemy troops in Singapore were then believed to comprise: (a) No. 3 Army Corps (9th and 11th divisions), reduced to about half strength by casualties in battle and losses of prisoners; (b) Australian 8th Division (two Brigades and 2/4th Machine-Gun Battalion), reduced to about two-thirds strength by casualties and prisoners lost; (c) 53rd and 54th Anglo-Indian brigades, annihilated; (d) 18th British Division (54th and 55th brigades); (e) reinforcements of about one brigade of fresh troops from India; and (f) roughly two brigades of the Malay and Chinese (born in the country) Volunteer Army. This, we considered, gave a grand total effective strength of roughly two divisions, with an actual fighting strength of about 30,000 men (though the real fighting strength was about twice our estimate).

2. The enemy, relying on the strength of the fortress, would prob-

ably resist strongly, but owing to the fact that there were a tremendous number of non-combatants in Singapore, it was unlikely they would resist to the last man. With the addition of the refugees who had fled into the island during the hostilities on the mainland, the population of the island was considered to exceed one million. There were sufficient rations for the army for from one to two years, but there were not enough provisions to feed a population of one million for any length of time. This was a very serious weakness from the point of view of defence.

3. The pivotal point of the defences was the sea front only. After the commencement of hostilities rear defences were hurriedly constructed in about two months. They were well sited, and behind barbed-wire entanglements, but without permanent fortification they were little more formidable than ordinary field entrenchments. We considered that these positions would be relatively [easy] to neutralize with field-army guns lighter than 15 centimetres.

4. The key point of the defensive positions was the sector east of the Dyke road (the Causeway), because of the naval-port defences. The last line of resistance of the city would be the heights of Bukit Timah. Loss of the reservoir would be fatal.

5. The rise and fall of tide in Johore Strait is roughly two metres and the current flows fairly fast, but there was a possibility we would be able to use collapsible motor boats. Because of the presence of enemy gunboats and their remaining air force the crossing of the strait presented some difficulty, and it did not appear possible to exercise effective control of troops who survived the crossing. Fortunately, mechanical mines had not been laid in the strait, except at its mouth. The adoption by the enemy of "seafire" tactics (ignition of crude petroleum discharged on the surface of the water) was anticipated and counter-measures were taken. . . .

The enemy, exhausted and demoralized after their retreat from the mainland, had sought shelter in the fortress. We had to commence out attacks without giving them even a day's respite to rest and reorganize and recover their morale. We knew accurately our own fighting power and the condition of the enemy, and had the whole island fortress under close observation. It was decided to issue the orders for assault without delay.

I finished writing the final plan for the reduction of Singapore by sitting up all night. It was approved by the Army Commander at Kluang Headquarters the following morning. On 1st February at 10 a.m., divisional commanders and senior officers numbering about forty were assembled in the Skudai rubber jungle, and to the rumble of the guns General Yamashita impressively issued the Army orders to those present. Reading in a clear voice his face was flushed, and on the cheeks of the men listening tears could be seen. The spirits of the

seventeen hundred men killed in action since the landing in Singora were believed by all to be present at this meeting.

Each of us received, in the lid of a canteen, a little of the Imperial gift of *Kikumasamune* [wine], and we drank a toast: "It is a good place to die. Certainly we shall conquer."

Reading (d)

AT sea a great disaster had befallen us. On the eighth, Admiral [Tom] Phillips, with a view to helping us to repel the invasion, had decided to take action with his two capital ships against the Japanese forces in the Gulf of Thailand. He was put into direct touch with the Air Officer Commanding Far East with regard to the air co-operation required and asked for three things:

- (a) Reconnaissance one hundred miles to the north of the force from daylight Tuesday, 9 December.
- (b) Reconnaissance to Singora and beyond ten miles from the coast starting at first light on 10 December, and
- (c) Fighter protection off Singora at daylight on 10 December.

The Air Officer Commanding replied that he could provide the first, hoped to be able to provide the second, but could not provide the third. The doubt about the second was that the reconnaissance would have to be provided by Blenheim IV's based on Kuantan aerodrome, and it was uncertain whether this aerodrome would be out of action or not. The reason why the third requirement could not be provided was mainly that the northern aerodromes were either untenable or else had been badly damaged by bombing. This meant that fighters would have had to operate from aerodromes at considerable distance from Singora and, owing to the short endurance of the Buffalo, they would have been able to remain only a very short time over that area before having to return to refuel. There was a shortage of fighter aircraft and it was therefore impossible to guarantee continuous fighter protection.

Late on the afternoon of Monday, 8 December, the battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse*, escorted by four destroyers, left Singapore. It is more than likely that their departure was announced by a pro-Japanese wireless set which throughout the campaign transmitted messages from the Singapore-Johore area but which defied vigorous and repeated efforts to locate it. In any case, on the evening of 9 December the British fleet, when steaming northwards off the east coast of Malaya, appears to have been located by a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and by a Japanese submarine. A Japanese air striking force, which was being held in readiness in South Indo-China for this purpose, set off for a night attack on the

fleet but ran into thick weather and was forced to return to its base. The Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet, however, realized that his movements had been seen and that the element of surprise had been lost. He decided to abandon the project of entering the Gulf of Thailand and to return to Singapore. Then intervened one of those chances of fate which so often influence great events. Early on the night 9-10 December beach defence posts in the Kuantan sector had reported hostile ships closing the shore. Fire was opened and spread along the front. No landings actually took place, but there is evidence to show that there was either an attempt to land or a feint. Reports of these happenings which were sent back by wireless were transmitted to the Eastern Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief, spoiling for a fight, decided to clear up the situation before returning to Singapore. Reconnaissance aircraft were flown off and the fleet closed the shore. But the Japanese were not idle. At dawn they sent off more reconnaissance aircraft which, at about 10.15 a.m., located the British fleet for the second time. Off went the air striking force again and at about 11.15 a.m. it attacked the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* when about sixty miles off Kuantan. Torpedo-bomber attacks succeeded high-level attacks with startling rapidity. The great ships were turned this way and that to meet the attacks but they could not be turned quickly enough so rapidly were the attacks delivered and before long both ships had been dealt mortal blows. By 1.20 p.m., both ships had been sunk. Fighter aircraft from Singapore answered the S.O.S. call immediately but could only arrive in time to see the ships go down and to protect the destroyers as they picked up the survivors. Fortunately two thousand one hundred and eighty-five of the ships' crews were saved, though many of them were badly burned and most of them were suffering from shock. But the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet, Tom Phillips, was lost, as also was John Leach, of the *Prince of Wales*. Bill Tennant of the *Repulse* went down with his ship but had the good fortune to be picked up by a destroyer.

The news of this disaster spread rapidly through Malaya. There is no denying that its moral effect was great, as few people, even in the Services, knew that the fleet had put to sea. Only a week before, the arrival of these splendid ships had been heralded with great rejoicing, and now they had gone. It hardly seemed possible. But when the first effects had worn off dismay gave place, at least among the British, to a grim determination to avenge them. Anyway, we knew now what we were up against.

Professional and amateur naval strategists may argue for many years to come whether Admiral Phillips was right to accept the risks he did and whether he got all the air support that could have been given him. Perhaps the latter question is easier to answer than the

former. I can say without hesitation that he did. [Air Vice-Marshal C. W. H.] Pulford had been a naval officer himself. He knew what the navy wanted, told them what they might expect, and left no stone unturned to do everything possible to help them. I was constantly with him during those days and I know this to be true. As regards the first question, let us realize that the ships had been sent out to the Far East as a threat to the Japanese in the hope of deterring them from entering the war. The threat failed, partly because by the time they arrived the Japanese were already irrevocably committed to war. The Commander-in-Chief then found himself in the invidious position of having an unbalanced fleet—two capital ships with very little to protect them. It was no good keeping the ships inactive at the Singapore base where they would have been subject to constant air attack. Perhaps, taking the long view, the best course would have been to join up with other Allied naval forces. Certainly the presence of these ships in the battles round Java would have been invaluable. But who at that time could have foreseen the events of the next few months? The immediate problem was to hold Malaya and neighbouring allied territories, and it was in an endeavour to help to solve this problem that Tom Phillips led out his fleet. He gallantly "marched to the sound of the guns", as we say in the army, and in doing so he followed the great traditions of his Service. Undoubtedly he accepted great risks, but "nothing risked nothing gained", so let us pay tribute to a very gallant effort which failed more from the inherent weakness in the composition of our fleet and from the brilliance of the enemy's attack than from any fault in planning....

In sixteen days the Japanese... succeeded in capturing the whole of that part of Malaya which lies north and west of the Perak River, including the island of Penang, and also the State of Kelantan. The undefended State of Trengganu lay open to them. They had also sunk two capital ships and decimated the offensive strength of our air force, which had been driven off the northern aerodromes into which so much money and labour had been poured. There is no denying that those were remarkable achievements. Yet they were not nearly so remarkable as had been planned and the Japanese were already well behind their programme. For we now know that their grand strategy was to cut off and destroy the whole of our forces in Kedah by a rapid thrust from Patani via Kroh to cut the west coast communications west of the Perak River and that they hoped to reach the line of that river in two days. Had they done so, not only would our land communications to North Malaya have been severed but the whole structure of our defence would have been undermined. The road to the south would have lain wide open and the communications to our east coast forces would have been exposed. As a result of all this hard fighting

and of these desperate situations we still had a force with which to oppose the enemy on the line of the Perak River. That was no mean achievement....

During the whole of this time our troops were fighting practically without air support. Those who have had a similar experience, when enemy planes seem to be always in the air reconnoitring, bombing, and machine-gunning, and when you never see one of your own planes, will know what that means and what a great moral effect it has. It was not the fault of our air force in Malaya. Their resources at that time were at their lowest. They did their willing best and it was no fault of theirs that it was a poor best. The responsibility lies much higher than that....

The fact that no defences had been constructed on the north and west coasts of the island [of Singapore] in pre-war days, and only limited defences even after the war started, has been the subject of much critical comment even in the highest quarters. It has been imputed to a lack of foresight on the part of successive general officers commanding. Such criticism is most unjust. In the first place, general officers commanding had no authority to construct defences when or where they liked. The defences of Singapore were built up in accordance with a War Office plan, though of course recommendations of the local commander always received consideration. Then there was the question of the object of the defences. It was quite definitely the protection of the Naval Base—not the defence of Singapore Island. Now a very ordinary principle of warfare is that you site your defence in advance of the object to be protected; the distance in advance depends upon the range of the enemy's weapons and increases as that range becomes greater. The Naval Base itself lies on the north shore of Singapore Island, and it would have been sheer folly to have sited the defences also on the shores of that island allowing the enemy to bomb, shell, and machine-gun the Naval Base at will. It would have been very nice no doubt to have had defences there in addition to those up-country, but finance prohibited that.... [T]he expenditure on the defences in Malaya was always strictly controlled from home, and such money as was made available, apart from the defences on the south coast of the fortress, was of course spent, and quite rightly so, on defence works on the mainland. Even for these works there was never sufficient money available....

Sunday, 15 February—Black Sunday. The first event of the day was a Communion Service at Fort Canning, but then the bad news started to come in. The water report from the D[irector] G[eneral] C[ivil] D[efence] showed a serious deterioration. He summed up the situation by saying that he anticipated that the water supply would not last for more than another twenty-four hours. I told him to verify this

and to come to a commanders' conference which had been summoned for 9.30 a.m. Then I received a disturbing report on the administrative situation generally. The military food reserves under our control had been reduced to a few days, though there were still fairly large civil reserves. Deprived of the Alexandra ammunition magazine, where fires were still burning, the 25-pounder field-gun ammunition reserves were getting very short and the reserves of Bofors ammunition were almost exhausted. We had practically no petrol except what was in vehicle tanks.

That was the situation which I had to report when the conference assembled. The D.G.C.D. was asked to report on the water situation in more detail. He confirmed what he had said before and added that, if total failure took place, it would be some days before piped water could be obtained again. Ways and means of overcoming our various difficulties were discussed. None of them were really vital except the water problem. Heath¹ stressed the danger of the water shortage as it affected the Indian troops, while the danger to the civil population was also taken into account. I felt that there was no use in remaining passively on the defensive as we were. There seemed to be only two possible alternatives, i.e. either to counter-attack to regain control of the reservoirs and of the military food depots and to drive back the enemy's artillery with a view to reducing the damage to the water supply system, or to capitulate. I put these alternatives to the commanders. They were unanimously of the opinion that in the existing circumstances a counter-attack was impracticable. Some of them also doubted our ability to resist another determined attack and pointed out the consequences that might result to the crowded population in the town. It was in these circumstances that I decided to capitulate. . . .

The only thing to cheer our gloom was a telegram received from the Superior Commander that morning, from which the following is an extract:

So long as you are in a position to inflict losses and damage to enemy and your troops are physically capable of doing so you must fight on. Time gained and damage to enemy are of vital importance at this juncture. When you are fully satisfied that this is no longer possible I give you discretion to cease resistance. . . . Inform me of intentions. Whatever happens I thank you and all your troops for your gallant efforts of last few days.

. . . The meeting with the Japanese commander, Lt.-Gen. Yamashita, took place in the Ford factory near Bukit Timah village in the evening. There was not much chance of bargaining, but I did what I could

¹ Lt.-General Sir Lewis Heath, Cmd. 6th Indian Division, 1939-41; General Officer Commanding the 3rd Indian Corps, 1941-2.

to ensure the safety of both troops and civilians. In this connection it should be recorded that General Yamashita never allowed the main body of his troops to enter Singapore Town. He received more placidly than I had expected my statement that there were no ships or aeroplanes in the Singapore area and that the heavier types of weapons and some of the military equipment and all secret documents had already been destroyed under my orders.

Little did I think at that time that later in the war I should myself be present at General Yamashita's capitulation—but so it was to be.

Hostilities finally ceased at 8.30 p.m. on 15 February 1942, British time...

Japanese troops entered Singapore Town on the morning of 16 February; 175 medium and light tanks took part in a military demonstration.

After the cessation of hostilities it was five and a half days, with engineers and water parties working at full pressure, before water again reached the lower levels of Singapore Town which had been deprived of it. It was ten days before water again reached the General Hospital and many other buildings on the higher levels.

And so after seventy days of great and continuous effort, fighting and marching day and night with little or no rest, the army of Malaya passed into captivity.

Reading (e)

MAJOR Wylde,¹ an English staff officer, came bearing the flag of truce.

Like lightning this was reported to Bukit Timah headquarters. Immediately on receiving the news Staff Officer Sugita,² in charge of intelligence, who was in a plaster cast because of a broken collar-bone, was taken by car to the front line, where he personally delivered to the bearer of the flag of truce documents which had been prepared in anticipation at our Army Headquarters. The British staff officer at once returned to Singapore with them to enable the British commander of the fortress to consider our proposals, which were as follows:

1. At eighteen hours on 15th February, both Army Commanders to meet at Bukit Timah.
2. The British Army to promptly suspend resistance all along the line and disarm.
3. Normal administration of the economic structure to continue to maintain every existing business, obeying our demands in succession, then handing over to the Japanese Army.
4. Ships, aircraft, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, provisions, fuel

¹ Major C. H. D. Wild, who was Japanese interpreter.

² Ichiji Sugita.

- reserves and so forth, the whole of the buildings and land belonging to or used by the Army, communication facilities, harbour equipment, aerodrome equipment, maps and documents—all are to be handed over to the Japanese Army without damage, demolition, or destruction. There must be absolutely no conduct whatever that will cause injury to the Japanese Army.
5. Those involved in termination of conflict with the Japanese Army must make assurance doubly sure and suppress at once any local conflicts which may arise.
 6. All prominent persons on the side of America, the Dutch East Indies, and Chungking are to be immediately held as prisoners of war and placed under protection of the Japanese Army.
 7. All Japanese men held as prisoners of war are to be handed over forthwith to the Japanese Army.
 8. Committees are to be appointed for Army, Navy, Air, Finance, Administration, Sanitation, Prisoners of War, etc., the presidents of which are to be responsible for meeting the requirements indicated by the Japanese authorities.

The streamlined motor car with the Union Jack and the white flag crossing each other stopped in front of the Ford Car factory north of the three-pronged Bukit Timah road. The British Commander, Lieutenant-General Percival, accompanied by Brigadier Torrens [correctly, K. Torrance], Brigadier Newbigging (Deputy Adjutant-General) and Major Wyld, were led to the place of interview by Staff Officer Sugita. General Yamashita, who was roughly five minutes behind time, entered followed by his staff officers, exchanged handshakes, and took his seat. . . . General Yamashita indicated to General Percival a document written in English, saying, "I wish you to answer these questions very briefly."

The questions and answers were:

"Does the British Army surrender unconditionally?" — "Yes."

"Are there any Japanese prisoners of war?" — "Not even one man."

"Are there any Japanese men held prisoner?" — "All Japanese civilian prisoners have been sent to India. The guarantee of their position is being entrusted to the Government of that country."

"Do you agree to this document unconditionally?" — "Please wait until tomorrow morning for the answer."

"Then, in that case, up till tomorrow morning we will continue the attack. Is that all right, or do you consent immediately to unconditional surrender?" — "Yes."

"Well, then, there will be a cessation of hostilities from 10 p.m. Japanese time. The British Army, using a thousand men as a police force, will please maintain order. In case of any violation of these terms a full-scale attack on Singapore will immediately commence."

General Percival then said, "I wish to receive a guarantee of the safety of the lives of the English and Australians who remain in the city."

"You may be sure of that. Please rest assured. I shall positively guarantee it."

In this way the curtain dropped on the campaign for the occupation of Singapore. Even more dramatic was the arrival at that time of the Emperor's military aide-de-camp at Bukit Timah. In 1819, one hundred and twenty-three years earlier, Stamford Raffles had landed on this island. Everything that Great Britain had since built up here in the Far East had now been beaten to a standstill.

II *Japanese Racial Policies in Singapore*

The following reading is extracted from an article by a young Chinese History graduate of the University of Singapore. [Lee Ting Hui, 'Singapore Under the Japanese 1942-1945', *Journal of the South Seas Society*, xvii, 1, 1961-1962, 55-65.]

On entering Singapore, General T. Yamashita declared: 'We ... hope that we sweep away the arrogant and unrighteous British elements and share pain and rejoicing with all concerned people in a spirit of "give and take", and also hope to promote the social development by establishing the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere on which the New Order of justice has to be attained under "the Great Spirit of Cosmocracy" giving all content to the respective race and individual according to their talents and faculties.

'Nippon armies here wish Malayan people to understand the real intention of Nippon and to co-operate with Nippon Army toward the prompt establishment of the New Order and the Co-prosperity Sphere.'

This proclamation of Yamashita describes the character of Japanese racial policy. Firstly, Japanese racial policy was anti-British and, in a wider application, anti-Western. The conquered peoples were urged to build up an Eastern racial consciousness, and take pride in the fact that they were Asians. All Asians were said to be equal and the principle governing their mutual relation was the Great Spirit of Cosmocracy or Universal Brotherhood. The pro-Malay policy practised by the British in Malaya was condemned. The British were charged with robbing the majority of the people native to Malaya—the Chinese and Indians whose connections with Malaya were of a hundred to several hundred years' standing—of the privileges and rights as citizens of the Malay States simply because they were not Muslims.

On the other hand, Indonesians, who were aliens, could acquire citizenship straightway because they professed Islam. This unfairness was aggravated by the fact that Malaya was developed by these non-Malay pioneers while the part played by the Malays was negligible. This treatment had embittered many of the Chinese and Indians and did not promote racial harmony. Under the Japanese this pro-Malay policy was to go and every one would be equal.

The action of the Japanese afterwards certainly contradicted these theories. The Chinese and the Indians were not regarded as the citizens of Malaya as was clearly shown by the fact that the Japanese tried to secure their co-operation by directing their loyalty to pro-Japanese regimes in their homelands instead of to Malaya. The Japanese also adopted a divide-and-rule policy to obtain the support of the Malays, particularly support against the Chinese. Finally, under Japanese rule there was certainly no rejoicing but only pain; the Japanese only took and never gave; the New Order did not bring justice or equality; and the people were not contented. This first principle of declared racial policy was violated because of the methods the Japanese employed to realise the second principle of their racial policy and the aims of the Military Administration.

The second principle of Yamashita's racial policy was the requirement that the people should understand the aims of the Japanese and co-operate with them. Japanisation and propaganda would secure understanding; and the methods used to obtain co-operation were as just shown above. Understanding and co-operation the Japanese did obtain, but they were only outward understanding and co-operation. In their hearts the people hated the Japanese as Japanese "true intentions" were equivalent to mere atrocities and economic exploitation.

The largest community in Syonan ['Brilliant South', the Japanese name for Singapore] were the Chinese. The problem about the Chinese was that they were economically useful but politically undesirable. With the departure of the Europeans, the economy of Syonan became virtually a Chinese one. Economically, therefore, the Japanese could not do without the Chinese although Chinese economic activities might be brought under Japanese domination. On the other hand, the Chinese offered the greatest resistance to the Japanese. How was this contradiction to be reconciled? The Japanese attitude was to allow the Chinese to retain their economic position if they co-operated with the Gunsei [Military Administration]. The Japanese tried two ways to obtain Chinese co-operation: by terrorising them and by attaching them to the pro-Japanese Wang-Ching-Wei regime.... [T]he Japanese massacred thousands of Chinese only three days after they had entered Singapore.... The Chinese were the most suspect community, and were incessantly watched by the Kempeitai [secret police]. The Japanese tried to win the Chinese for

Wang by representing him as the true follower of Sun-yat-sen. They also utilised pro-Japanese and pro-Wang (whether forced or real) community-leaders to win, exploit, control or take care of the Chinese through a community organisation—the Overseas Chinese Association—which was formed at the instance of the Japanese immediately after the massacre. Community meetings and mass rallies were common. At these meetings community-leaders made speeches and urged the people to co-operate with the Japanese. The first case of exploitation was the forced contribution of 1942. By it the Chinese were compelled to make a gift of \$50,000,000 to the Japanese. Many people had to mortgage or sell their property to pay for the fund. Later, the Chinese, like other races, were required to make monetary gifts to wounded soldiers, to donate fighter-planes and to render Labour Service. The Association was also required to help to maintain law and order, particularly against anti-Japanese elements who were largely Chinese. It was severely reprimanded when it failed in this duty. Besides these, the Association had a number of other obligations. Thus the Association helped to secure labour for "reconstruction" and to ease unemployment; helped in the self-sufficiency drive; aided in the savings drive to absorb excessive purchasing power; engaged in relief work like building a home for destitutes; helped in air raid defence and in propaganda.... Notwithstanding this, the Chinese policy was a failure. Collaborators there were; but on the whole "Outwardly there was compliance... inwardly there was an evergrowing hatred". The anti-Japanese movement at the end of the occupation was stronger than ever.

The Malays in Syonan were a far less numerous community than the Chinese. But as their fate was bound up with that of the Malays on the mainland, they were, nevertheless, important. The Malay problem was just the reverse of the Chinese one. The Malays were politically desirable but economically much less useful than the Chinese. The Japanese solution to this problem was to utilise budding Malay nationalism to Japanese advantage (a method used throughout Nanpo [the Southern Areas]) and direct it against the British and the Chinese. This results in a divide-and-rule policy. The second method was to break the economic lethargy of the Malays to enable them "to stand on their own feet". It is common knowledge that in their invasion of Malaya, the Japanese obtained most co-operation and assistance from the Malays, particularly from the Kesatuan Muda Melayu organised by Malays who had already established connections with the Japanese before the invasion. (The KMM was banned by the Japanese a few months after the conquest of Malaya.) Propaganda about the New Order certainly appealed to these nationalists.

The Japanese... regarded the Malays as the rightful owner[s] of Malaya... [O]nly Malays were invited to the "independence con-

ference" in Kuala Lumpur.... This attempt to rouse the nationalist feelings of the Malays was successful except in the remote Eastern states....

The attempt to make the Malays more economic-minded failed to arouse general response. In Syonan, the bulk of the Malays continued to live in their old ways while many of their youths joined the volunteer forces. The Malays eventually also came to dislike the Japanese as a result of the economic hardship which they had to undergo.

The relatively favourable Japanese attitude towards the Malays did not spare them from being exploited and controlled. The Malays also had a community organisation—the Mala[y] Welfare Association—which engaged in the same activities (farming schemes, relief, etc.) as the Chinese Association.

As regards the Indians the Japanese also attempted to utilise Indian nationalism for their own purposes. First Rash Behari Bose and later Subhas Chandra Bose tried to organise an external force to liberate India from British rule. The movement was based on Syonan and then on Burma as the number of Indians in Nanpo was greatest in these two regions. (Burma was also an invasion base.) Thus the Indian Independence League and the Indian National Army had their head-quarters in Syonan. On 21 October, 1943, the Provisional Government of Free India was established in Syonan by Chandra Bose. The movement spread like a tide over Malaya and massed wide support from the Indians. The Japanese gave Bose every assistance... granting him press and radio facilities. The Japanese were careful not to control or exploit the Indians as they did... the Chinese. This attitude, however, changed after the decisive defeat of the INA and the Japanese forces at Imphal. At first, the Indians were dealt with through the Independence League. In April, 1944, the Indian Welfare Association was established which was independent of the IIL and was not to interfere with politics....

The Japanese did not trust the Eurasians. In April, 1942, they were assembled at the Esplanade and registered. At the assembly they were told by the Japanese that they would be punished if they did not co-operate. The Syonan Times later told them to abandon their feeling of superiority which their European blood had given them. They were henceforth to regard themselves as Asians, and Asians were all equal. They were also told not to stick to clerical jobs, but change to farming or shopkeeping, or to any of a variety of other trades and occupations. Otherwise they would have to starve. There was also a Welfare Association for them.

In February, 1942, the British and other enemy aliens (not including POW's) were ordered to assemble also at the Esplanade and be taken prisoners. They were a condemned lot; the Japanese did not hesitate to disgrace and humiliate them—

"To-day in Syonan and whenever the victorious Nipponese Armies have brought the New Order, Europeans may be seen, nude to the waist, doing jobs that Asians only were made to do before.

"Many of them cut ludicrous figures slouching their way through work which even Asian women are able to tackle with greater ability."

In Syonan, "enemy aliens" were interned in two camps, at Changi and at Sime Road. When the British returned they found these internees living in filthy conditions, on semi-starvation diet and subject to the spasmodic brutality of the Japanese. In October, 1943, occurred the Double Tenth Case in which 57 internees were arrested from Changi under suspicion of having taken a part in the explosion of seven Japanese ships in Syonan harbour. They were subjected to torture and consequently 15 died.

Interning enemy aliens was not a fundamental measure, however; Japanese ambitions lay in the elimination of all Western influence from the Co-prosperity sphere and its Japanisation. Thus a writer in the Syonan Times said,

"One of the first imperatives... is the breaking down of the habit and custom left behind by the haughty and cunning British...."

"Side by side (with this)... must proceed the work of reviving Oriental culture based on moral and spiritual principles...."

Japanisation meant the acquisition of the Nippon Spirit (i.e. the Tennocult) and Nippon-go which was to become the lingua franca of the Sphere. Youths were to be trained to become useful citizens, to be both spiritually and physically fit to render service to the Japanese Empire. Indigenous cultures and religious freedom were to be respected but "moral unification" was necessary. The organs at the disposal of the Japanese for executing this plan were chiefly education, the press, the radio and the cinema....

The Japanese converted all the former English schools into a system of primary Common Public Schools. Besides these, vernacular primary schools were allowed to continue.... Nippon-go inevitably replaced English; and... vegetable gardening was introduced. Physical training was emphasised. Every morning the students sang the Japanese national anthem and bowed in a north-easterly direction to Tenno-Heika. In short, education was reorientated on a thoroughly Japanese basis....

The reason advanced by the Japanese for not establishing high schools was that their educational policy emphasised industrial and technical education. They charged that the former British system turned out only clerks. According to this policy, a number of technical and trade schools, marine and fishery schools, telecommunication and agricultural schools were established besides a number of Army, Air

and Naval depots and institutions... Training was largely of the "lightning" type to turn out men for military requirements.

* * *

The first editorial of the Syonan Times declared that "The Press ... comes under the domination of the Nippon troops." On 10 September, 1942, the War Office instructed the Press in Nanpo to be re-organised. Under the new arrangement, the Domei News Agency took over Press work in Malaya, Syonan, Sumatra and North Borneo. ... The Military on the spot controlled the policies of Domei. In July, 1943, the Kai directly ran the Syonan Pictorial and the Syonan Sinbun (with Nippon and English editions) in Syonan. Under its "guidance" were the Syonan Nippo (Chinese), the Berita Melayu (Malay) and the publications of the Indian Independence League.

The people of Malaya were prohibited to use shortwave radios. All such radios were converted into medium wave sets. Disobedience was severely punished. This meant that the people could listen to Japanese propaganda only...

The Japanese propaganda and Nipponisation machine was a powerful one. Chin Kee Onn¹ is of the opinion that, considering the great rate at which Japanese propaganda was absorbed by the people, given sufficient time the Japanese would have laid an extremely strong foundation for their Empire.

III *Post-war Changes in Sarawak*

The following selection is drawn from the Sarawak Information Service's summary, *Information on Sarawak*. [Kuching, [1960?], 18-21.]

THE Japanese War was to effect as great a change in the history of Sarawak as the arrival of James Brooke in 1839. The Japanese quickly overran Sarawak, capturing Kuching after a spirited defence by a battalion of Punjabis on Christmas Day, 1941. Europeans were interned and the handful who sought to remain at liberty were all killed with the exception of those who were captured in the Ulu Limban and Ulu Trusan.

It is a curious fact that despite its apparent immensity not a single European, no matter how experienced, was able to remain at liberty in Borneo during the war years. There was a particularly horrible massacre by Japanese troops of Europeans from the Third Division who had escaped to Long Nawang in Dutch Borneo.

¹ Chinese novelist, author of *Ma-rai-er*, a novel of the Occupation.

The Japanese occupation was typical of its kind. The people of Sarawak suffered greatly and many lost their lives. The Japanese were unable to provide either an efficient administration or to clothe and feed the population properly. As the tide of war turned and the allies surged back on the heels of the retreating Japanese, it was decided to organise military groups inside Sarawak. Parties were successfully dropped into the Kelabit area at the head of the Baram, and at the same time as the Australian 9th Division was moving into Labuan and the Brunei Bay area, the Japanese came under attack in the Third, Fourth and Fifth Divisions. A particularly interesting and little known effort was that undertaken by a handful of European officers in the Third Division who, with the aid of loyal chiefs, kept hordes of wildly excited Dayaks under control and so forestalled an indiscriminate attack on innocent Chinese as well as on the Japanese.

The Australian forces reoccupied Sarawak, and their military administration was withdrawn in 1946, when His Highness the Rajah resumed charge. But in the meantime the Rajah had concluded that owing to changed post-war conditions the future welfare of the country would best be safeguarded if it became a British Crown Colony. The Rajah therefore ceded Sarawak to the Crown on the 1st July, 1946. Since then it has been administered as a British Colony.

It may be appropriate at this point to mention that the Rajah received no financial consideration of any kind for ceding Sarawak to the British Government apart from the grant of a pension. Indeed he handed over to the new Colonial Administration reserves amounting to the sum of \$13 million, as well as \$6 million in cash, and donated £50,000 from his own pocket for educational purposes.

The first Governor of Sarawak was Sir Charles Arden-Clarke. During his tenure of office there was unfortunately agitation against cession on the part of some Malays, and this culminated in the murder of his successor, Mr. Duncan Stewart, in Sibu in December, 1949.

The third Governor, Sir Anthony Abell was, however, successful in healing these unhappy rifts during the course of his long and popular tenure of office from 1950 to 1959.

The good normal relations between all communities and government, which have always been characteristic of Sarawak, have been fully restored and strengthened. Political, social, educational and economic development has been steady and sustained. . . . Sir Anthony Abell was succeeded by Sir Alexander Waddell in February, 1960.

The Brooke regime was a benevolent and popular autocracy which relied upon a very small core of devoted European officers who spent their entire careers in Sarawak and who came to be most intimately associated with the country and its people. This core of European officers was buttressed by the Native Officers' Service staffed by an

intermediate type of local administrative officer. Members of this service, who were mostly Malays, were in charge of the small government stations. Its senior members were trusted and experienced advisers. Native officers helped still further to bring people and government together.

There was a state advisory body known as the Council Negri which had an official majority and met every 3 years. It could hardly be regarded as a live political body. The government was well suited to the needs of the people and was popular and respected. Its weakness lay mainly in the inadequate attention it paid to matters of education and preparation for political development. No local men occupied senior posts in the Government and, although it was the object of the Rajahs to fit the people to run their own affairs, in practice very little was done to prepare them for greater responsibilities.

The process of preparation for self-government has been greatly expedited since the war. Educational services have been rapidly expanded, though native education has still a long way to go, and particular attention has been paid to the development of local government.

The entire country is now covered by 24 separate Local Authorities, all members of which are elected. In some cases, the District Officer remains as an adviser but many of the functions which were formerly the direct responsibility of the District Officer have now passed to the Local Authorities.

The Local Authorities elect representatives to Divisional Advisory Councils from amongst their own members. These councils are otherwise purely advisory in function. They do, however, elect from their own members the unofficial representatives in Council Negri. There are five Divisions, each under the administrative charge of a senior government official known as a Resident. There is a majority of unofficials in Council Negri. Out of a total membership of 45, 24 are elected unofficials, 14 are officials, 4 are nominated and 2 are standing members originally appointed by the Rajah in 1941. From this it will be seen that Sarawak is seeking to develop democracy from the roots upwards and that the framework for popular government has been established. Further progress must largely depend on the political and educational development of the people themselves.

In the meantime political parties are being formed, the first of these in the field being the Sarawak United Peoples' Party and the Party Negara. The country-wide Local Authority elections held at the end of 1959 were unfortunately characterised by a good deal of communal feeling and communal voting particularly in the 1st Division. However, the danger signs have been given at an early stage in the country's development and given the restraint and goodwill which is so abundantly present in Sarawak, the political future should be a reasonably stable and secure one.

At the same time everything possible is being done to increase the proportion of local men in the government senior service. The number of suitable candidates has not, however, kept pace with the post-war expansion of the government services and there is still a need for the services of the so-called expatriate. The former Native Officers' Service has been re-named the Sarawak Administrative Service, and is now open to men of all races, including Chinese. A number of officers have been promoted to senior posts in the government service from this and the clerical services.

The major difficulty is that of uneven education development between the various communities. Effective Native education only started after the war whereas the Chinese already had a highly developed educational system of their own as well as the majority of students in the Mission schools. The result is that there are far more qualified Chinese candidates available for the higher ranks of the government service than Natives.

The simultaneous bringing on of the Native peoples and the orderly and harmonious integration of the Chinese into the body politic are the two main problems facing the peoples of Sarawak as they move towards the goal of independence.

IV *The Chartered Company Retires*

The following selections tell of developments in British North Borneo to 1946, when the Chartered Company transferred its administrative duties to the British Colonial Office. The reader may wish to make reference back to Chapter Seven, reading IV, on the Mat Salleh Revolt, which is referred to in the selection. The various steps leading to co-ordination between the three territories, referred to in (c), helped to prepare the area for the concept of a Malaysian state. [Readings (a) and (c) are taken from *North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak (British Borneo)*; ed. by Chester F. Roberts and Irving Kaplan, pages 14-16 and 16-17 respectively. Reading (b) is taken from the *Colony of North Borneo Annual Report, 1959*, Jesselton, 1960, 182-5.]

Reading (a)

IN 1872 the Spanish attempted to blockade the Philippines with the objective of excluding the vessels of other nations from Philippine trade. An Englishman, William Clarke Cowie, thereupon established a profitable business running guns and ammunition into the port of Jolo, capital of Sulu. Cowie recognized the necessity of establishing a safe harbor in the area if his trade with Sulu was to

continue. The Sultan of Sulu, realizing the value of British trade as a counterweight to the Spanish and Dutch monopolies, gave Cowie permission to establish a port at Sandakan Bay for transshipment of goods and trade with the natives of Sulu. He was permitted also to trade in the North Borneo area from Pindassan in the northwest to the Sibuku River in the east. In Hong Kong, however, Cowie found his trading right disputed by an American named [Joseph W.] Torrey representing the American Trading Company of Borneo. Torrey claimed prerogatives under an old concession from the Sultan of Brunei. Seeking to make capital of the old American title, he joined with an Austrian, Baron Overbeck, who represented a syndicate headed by Dent Brothers, commercial agents of Shanghai. Torrey and Overbeck succeeded further in getting the Sultan of Brunei to cede them virtually the entire coast of North Borneo, despite the objections of the Dutch and Spanish consuls. The cession was worthless, however, since the sultan did not actually have title to most of this land, a large part of it having previously been ceded to the Sultan of Sulu, while other small parcels were under the control of various chieftains who denied the right of the sultan to cede their hereditary lands. As a result of a complicated series of events, the Dents emerged as the possessors of a grant of territory between Pindassan and the Sibuku River. Their next move was to form a Limited Provisional Association, which in 1878 sought a charter from the British government.

The acquisition of the territory brought immediate objections from the Spanish, Dutch, and German governments, all of which claimed certain rights in the area. These counter-claims were quieted, however, and in 1881 the British government of Gladstone authorized a newly formed British North Borneo Company to acquire the concessions of the Provisional Association and incorporated the company by Royal Charter.

The charter was essentially not one of privilege but of restraint. The company was to remain British in character and domicile; all directors and officials were to be British subjects; territory was not to be alienated without the consent of the British government; foreign affairs were to be controlled by the British government; slavery was abolished; religious freedom was guaranteed; general commercial monopoly was prohibited; and the appointment of the governor was made subject to British approval. Great Britain assumed, in fact, the role of protector.

Two major tasks faced the company; the economic development of the country and its territorial consolidation. Land and loans were offered to various groups to encourage development. The immigration of Chinese was encouraged in order to provide a labor supply. Serious attempts were made to exploit what were considered the

three major assets; timber resources, mineral deposits, and an abundance of arable land. The first two proved of lesser importance, but the development of the land resources for tobacco plantations was the salvation of the company after 1890. A serious economic crisis was averted by the development of a boom in the production of rubber in the early twentieth century. Rubber became, in fact, the mainstay of the country's economy. A west coast railway... opened up land extremely suitable for rubber production. A degree of economic security resulted from these economic developments, which were also accompanied by a rise in population.

Territorial consolidation occurred mainly between 1884 and 1902 and involved the absorption of coastal enclaves either through direct pressure on local chieftains or upon the Sultan of Brunei. The hinterland, a vast, unknown land, fell to company control by default. In 1905 through the sale of the Lawas district to Sarawak, the boundary with that state was defined. Between 1890 and 1906 the company also administered the crown colony of Labuan.

Even in the presence of these developments, North Borneo remained of peripheral importance. Experiments in colonial government typical of other British colonial areas were not tried here. Benevolent and paternalistic, the company did little to encourage self-government or to develop social services. It remained for the period after World War II to assign to this area a new strategic and substantive importance.

Reading (b)

THE country possessed three main attractions: its timber, its reputed minerals and its land. The timber trade has now grown to be the second of the Colony's industries, while the much sought-after minerals, with the exception of deposits of coal, have never been exploited. The land has proved the most valuable asset. There was considerable speculation in the early days of the Chartered Company concerning the most suitable crops for cultivation; sugar, coffee, coconuts, tobacco, ramie and cocoa were all tried. By 1889 no less than 78 companies had taken up land, nearly all for tobacco cultivation. Tobacco, although initially far and away the most important form of cultivation, did not prove a permanent crop; today there is only one company planting tobacco in North Borneo (though the wrapper leaf that it produces is of world-wide reputation). The tobacco boom, however, set the new State upon its feet and assisted in opening up the country about which very little was then known.

In due course new stations were opened at Gaya, Silam, Kudat (the capital until 1884), Tawau, Penungah and Semporna, and later

at Keningau, Tenom and Beaufort. Various enclaves of territory not included in the territory acquired initially were absorbed over a number of years to knit the State into a compact whole of about 29,400 square miles (the area of the present Colony). A few of the additions were the result of punitive expeditions that the Company was compelled to undertake. The last enclave to be acquired was the Membakut district, which was ceded by an independent chief in 1902.

In 1894 it was suggested, as a result of an economic set-back experienced after the subsidence of the tobacco boom, that North Borneo should be federated with Sarawak; but this proposal, although strongly supported by Lord Brassey, who had visited North Borneo in 1887, was rejected by the Company's share-holders. Economically the country went slowly ahead. Capital started to flow in and the immigrant population (principally Chinese) gradually increased. In 1896 a telegraph line from Jesselton to Sandakan was completed. A metre-gauge railway to run from Weston to Beaufort was begun in the same year, being opened to traffic in 1898 and completed in 1900. An extension from Beaufort to Jesselton on the west coast (and also to Melalap in the Interior) was then commenced, which was finally taken over from the contractors in 1905. The railway opened up the west coast. Although there is now air connection with Keningau, it continues to supply and to carry the export produce of much of the west coast and the Interior. The railway proved its value at the time of the rubber boom in the early nineteen hundreds; it ran through miles of land eminently suited for rubber cultivation which the Chartered Company by offering absurdly attractive terms was able to dispose of to a number of companies and small holders. Today it is estimated that there are more than 125,000 acres of rubber under cultivation in the Colony, the greater part being on the west coast and in the Interior.

Apart from a number of minor set-backs—including the insurrection of Mat Salleh in the years 1894–1900 and the Rundum rebellion in 1915—the Chartered Company was able to achieve creditable, although somewhat slow, progress. The first world war did not directly affect the State, which had, however, its share of the world slump of 1931. When the second world war broke out the Company was unable to point to any marked development such as characterised Singapore, Malaya or Hong Kong; but it could look with justifiable satisfaction upon an ordered system of government and a populace well contented under its administration. Sandakan was the permanent seat of Government and the centre of commerce; Jesselton, Beaufort, Tawau and Kudat were small but prosperous towns. Rubber was the industry upon which the economy of the State rested. There were few roads and no air connections with the outside world. This peaceful state of affairs was changed abruptly by the war.

In January, 1942, North Borneo was invaded by Japanese naval and military forces. For over three and a half years the country remained under enemy occupation until final liberation by units of the Ninth Australian Division, who landed in Labuan on 10th June, 1945. The behaviour of the population during this period was exemplary, and many paid for their loyalty with their lives. The British Military Administration, which contained a few former Chartered Company senior officers, found the Colony in a state of appalling devastation. Many towns had been completely destroyed or badly damaged by fire or bombing, and many of the inhabitants massacred, among them a large number of Government servants. The Military Administration continued until 15th July, 1946, when North Borneo became a Crown Colony and civil Government was resumed. On the same date Labuan was incorporated into the new Colony.

The almost total destruction during the war period of the progress made by the Chartered Company in its sixty years of administration was a severe handicap to the new post-war government. Quite apart from the wholesale devastation which was the war's principal legacy, it was found that the greater part of all pre-war official records had been destroyed. The emphasis in the immediate post-war period had necessarily, therefore, to be on rehabilitation.

There are four factors with which the post-war Government has been most concerned; firstly, rehabilitation and reconstruction; secondly, economic development; thirdly, the extension of social services; fourthly, the association of the local population in the work of Government. Reconstruction and development have marched hand in hand. A reconstruction and development plan for the years 1948-1955 was adopted in 1948 and in 1955 a further development plan for the years 1956-1960 was approved. This plan was substantially modified in 1956. There has been much progress in the field of social services. In 1950 a new Constitution came into being, which provides for the establishment of Executive and Legislative Councils. These Councils were inaugurated in October, 1950. In recent years considerable progress has been made in the field of local Government. Town Boards have been constituted in the major towns of the Colony with unofficial majorities and with control over their own finances and local authorities, recently renamed District Councils, are playing an ever increasingly important part in the Government of rural areas.

Reading (c)

THE Japanese occupation during World War II was in effect an interregnum. It was a period of general decline characterized by devastation, disruption of social services, communications, and administration and the uprooting of large numbers of the popula-

tion. The people, oppressed by forced labor and afflicted by famine and general deprivation, were decimated. Under the misery brought by the Japanese, there was little significant deterioration of the loyalty of the people toward the Brookes, the sultan, or the British North Borneo Company.

With the re-establishment of British control in the area, military government was immediately established. It was continued in Brunei until July 6, 1946. In the two other areas most important post-war changes were brought about. The White Rajah of Sarawak with the approval of the Council Negri (but against Malay opposition) ceded the country to Britain. It became a crown colony on July 1, 1946. The task of rehabilitation and reconstruction being beyond the company's resources, North Borneo became a crown colony (incorporating Labuan, important as a prospective naval base to succeed Singapore) on July 15, 1946.

Since the institution of direct British rule in Sarawak and North Borneo in 1946, a number of significant internal developments have occurred in British Borneo as a whole.

In the political sphere, important steps have been taken in the direction of greater integration of the administrations, legal systems, and policies of the three states, and the encouragement and expansion of local self-government....

The two most important economic developments have been the reconstruction and development and the increasing role of the Seria oil fields in the economic position of the area. Both Sarawak and North Borneo, unable to finance their own reconstruction programs, have received large allotments out of the British Colonial Development, Welfare, and Reconstruction Fund. These have totaled in some instances nearly half the entire governmental expenditures of the two colonies. With this aid, both have been able to rebuild towns, re-institute and expand communications and transportation services, increase educational facilities, and enter upon an extensive economic development program. Brunei, on the other hand, made prosperous by its oil fields has not required economic relief but has, in fact, made loans and grants to the other two colonies and to Malaya.

With respect to social services, there has been co-ordination among the three territories. They have also competed to see which could outdo the others in the provision of variety and quality of services.

V Singapore: from Colony to State

IN 1946 the Straits Settlements ceased to exist constitutionally and Singapore became a separate Colony. Thirteen years later, in 1959,

Singapore was a State with a large measure of self-government. The following reading drawn from the *State of Singapore Annual Report, 1960*, provides a detailed account of the political changes that took place during those thirteen years. [Singapore, 1962, 20-38.]

OF decisive importance in the story of Singapore is the Aliens Ordinance of 1932. It was passed in the middle of the world slump which gravely affected Malaya and sought for the first time to control immigration to Malaya by imposing a monthly quota—but only on men. The immigration of women was left uncontrolled. The effect is described in this way by Mr. W. L. Blythe in an article on 'Chinese Labour in Malaya': 'There was no limit to the number of women who could enter Malaya. It was therefore to the advantage of the lodging-houses and ticket agents to encourage the emigration of women to take up these non-quota tickets. As a result, from 1933 onwards until May 1938, when a quota of 500 monthly was introduced for women, ship-loads of Cantonese women—mostly from Shun Tak and Tunk Kwun Districts—came to Malaya. Their ages ranged between 18 and 40 years. In the five years 1934-38 there was a migrational gain to Malaya of over 190,000 female Chinese deck passengers. The majority of these women were peasant women, workers who have entered the rubber and tin industries, the building industry and factories. They have settled here and many of them have married.'

An immigration which had always been treated as temporary was on the way to becoming permanent. The new immigrants married in Singapore, and their children were born in Singapore, and became automatically by law citizens of the territory. The instincts of home and the outlook to the future symbolised by the children turned Malaya-wards and family ties with Malaya were to challenge family ties with China and India. The Japanese occupation which froze migration, and which made Malaya the country for which the people suffered, confirmed this inward-looking trend. The Singapore Fortress had fallen to the Japanese on 12th February 1942, and remained under Japanese occupation until 5th September, 1945, when the forces of South-East Asia Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten recovered Singapore after the defeat of the Japanese in Burma by his forces and the over-all surrender of the Japanese Government after the bombing of Hiroshima.

Until 31st March, 1946, administration was taken over by the British Military Administration which, anticipating the future separation of Singapore from Peninsular Malaya, treated Singapore as a separate unit. But it was a different Singapore to which the British

regime was restored. The recovery of Britain never erased the effect [on] British prestige of the defeat in the Battle of Malaya; with British protection withdrawn, the people had to face their own individual problems and make their own decisions during the Japanese occupation; many had greater responsibilities under the occupation and could measure their own abilities and experience against that of previous colonial administrators. The freedom restored after the Japanese occupation was social and economic as well as political and would not confine itself to a restoration of the *status quo ante*. Sacrifices had established new bases for rights. The part played by the guerillas, who had mainly been Chinese and Communists, raised the issues of the place of the Chinese in the new Malaya, and raised the question of the economic pattern of the new Malaya. Finally the rehabilitation of Singapore was a joint endeavour in which all races played their part. The new Singapore reflected a very different balance of power and ability than that of pre-war Singapore. The new climate in Asia represented by Nehru in India and Soekarno in neighbouring Indonesia set a new political climate, while the bitter conflict of K.M.T.¹ and Communist in China reflected itself among the China-born community in Singapore who were directly and emotionally involved in the dispute. While, therefore, the aim of British policy was a gradual and educational transfer of power, it thought mainly in terms of the Straits-born group, who alone had citizenship rights at the time. It under-estimated the more intense and increasingly Malaya-directed activity of those more recently and directly influenced by events—natural and ideological—in China. The dynamic and direction of this group was given less by the non-citizen parents and more by their children in the Chinese-language schools who were potential full citizens by birth and whose political actions did not wait the adult achievement of the political power of the vote they would inherit at the age of 21.

British policy for Singapore was outlined in a White Paper which was laid before the British Parliament in January 1946 and set out the policy for a Malayan Union on Peninsular Malaya. Singapore was, in consequence, to become a separate Colony, but, it was added, it was 'no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government to preclude or prejudice in any way the fusion of Singapore and the Malayan Union in a wider union at a later date should it be considered that such a course were desirable'. In confirmation of this attitude, three proposals were made; first, common arrangements between the Malayan Union and Singapore on matters of common concern; secondly, a joint 'Malayan Union Citizenship' for which residents of the Malayan Union and Singapore would be eligible; and thirdly, the

¹ Kuomintang.

appointment of a Governor-General with powers of co-ordination and direction.

Civil Government was restored on 1st April, 1946. The Straits Settlements ceased to exist constitutionally. Penang and Malacca were merged with the nine Malay States in the Malay[an] Union, and Labuan was incorporated, after a further period of military administration, in North Borneo in July. The separation of Singapore was the result of two forces; first, the growing importance of the Singapore base and the special political problems which it raised; and secondly, as the Malayan Union had reduced the powers and status of the Sultans, and had given greater citizenship rights to the Chinese, it was felt that the Malayan Union would be more acceptable to the Malays if the predominantly Chinese and more politically active Singapore were temporarily given separate status. But even when the success of U.M.N.O.¹ and the opposition of the Sultans to the Malayan Union led to the decision to replace the Malayan Union and restore the position of the Malays in a new Federation, gave the opportunity for re-consideration, the separation of Singapore was not, in fact, re-considered.

* * *

Singapore's first elections were held on 20th March, 1948, 13,458 of the 22,395 electors casting their votes. Of the six members of [*sic*] elected from the territorial constituencies, three were members of the Progressive Party. The Legislative Council was inaugurated on 1st April, 1948. In spite of the heavy official majority, the work of the Council taught parliamentary procedures not only to the members, but to the public through the Press reports of the debates. At this time the ten members of the Executive Council whose functions were purely advisory were nominated; and control of the Civil service, including appointments and promotions were centred on the Colonial Secretary and through him on the Governor who held the final responsibility. In anticipation of the triennial election in 1951, the Legislative Council on 21st March, 1950, resolved to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies to add three more popularly elected members to their numbers. This request, along with the right to appoint a Deputy President who would be an unofficial member, was agreed to in the Order in Council of 21st December, 1950. The thirteen ex-officio and nominated members, even without the votes of the President, retained their majority over the 12 elected members. The electoral register continued to be based on voluntary registration and electors had reached the number of 48,155 before the 1951 election.

¹ United Malay National Organisation.

The second general election was held in March 1951. Twenty-two candidates contested the nine seats. 52 per cent of the electors voted. Of the nine popularly elected members, six were members of the Progressive Party and two were members of the Labour Party which also, at a bye-election, won a third seat when the Independent member elected in the general election vacated her seat. Both parties were non-communal. The constitution had been amended to allow the election by the unofficial members of two of their number to sit on the Executive Council. Both were Progressive. The Governor announced that should all the unofficial members of the Executive, now increased to six out of a total membership of 12, vote against him he would not make use of his reserve powers except in situations where as President of the Legislative Council, he would have to make use of them. Throughout this period, the ex-officio and nominated members of the Council were in the majority, but if there was to be a further increase of the elected members to 15, bringing the total membership up to 29, the official government could not guarantee control of the Council and ensure the essential legislation and finance of government. It became necessary, therefore, to introduce responsible cabinet government if progress towards self-government were to continue. The reports of two Committees of the Legislative Council on constitutional and electoral reform which had recommended an increase[d] membership of the Council and in the electorate were too restricted by their terms of reference, to meet the need for change. The life of the sitting Council was extended for one year and a Commission was set up in 1953 to make recommendations for the new constitution. Apart from the Chairman, Sir George Rendel, after whom the constitution was named, all other eight members were drawn from the Legislative Council, five chosen by the Unofficial members and three by the Governor.

The Commission made its report in February 1954. Apart from the minority proposal of a second legislative house, the substance of the Commission's report was accepted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and formed the basis of the constitution set out in the Order in Council made on 1st February, 1955. The basic electoral qualification continued to be citizenship of the U.K. and the Colonies but as only some 25 per cent had taken the initiative to register they would now be automatically registered from the data included in the counterfoils for identity cards. This brought the total electorate from 75,000 to 300,292, giving predominance to the Chinese-educated and increasing the women's vote from 8 to 50 per cent. The Chamber of Commerce representation and the nomination of officials were dropped. Each of the 25 constituencies into which the island was divided would return one member. The Chief Secretary, the Financial

Secretary and the Attorney-General would be ex-officio members. The remaining four members would be nominated by the Governor at his absolute discretion. A Speaker nominated by the Governor would preside. Responsible to this Assembly would be a Council of Ministers presided over by the Governor, and including as members, the three ex-officio members of the Assembly, and six unofficial members of the Assembly only one of whom could be a nominated member. Each Minister had his separate portfolio. The reserved powers of the Governor remained.

The old Supreme Court, Singapore's oldest building, was reconstructed as the Assembly House and was opened on 7th July, 1954. Later in the year, Sir George Oehlers was selected for appointment as Speaker. In anticipation of the substantial increase in the electorate and the substantial powers which would lie with the new Government, new parties were formed towards the end of 1954 to challenge the position of the Progressive Party. A coalition of left-wing and Trade Union groups formed the Labour Front, and the P[eo]ple's A[ction] P[arty] was formed on a platform of socialism and anti-colonialism. Early in 1955, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce decided to enter politics and formed the Democratic Party to challenge the Progressive Party. Both the U.M.N.O.—M.C.A.¹ and the Singapore Malay Union fought separately. The Malays as well as the Right and Left Wing groups were therefore divided. In order to allow as much electoral activity as the continuing Emergency situation allowed, the police restrictions on public meetings were relaxed.

The last colonial-type Legislative Council was dissolved on 5th February. After an excited but orderly campaign, the election was held on 2nd April, 1955. Seventy-five candidates—69 representing six parties, and ten independents—contested the 25 seats. 53 per cent of the electorate voted—6½ times the number who had voted in 1951. The outcome of the election brought a majority of Assemblymen to the Left-Wing parties, the Labour Front, with 26.3 per cent of the votes, won ten seats and the P.A.P. won three of the four seats they contested, with clear majorities, making 13 out of the 25. The Democratic Party split the votes of the Progressive Party. Although both together polled 44.1 per cent of the total votes, the Progressives won four seats and the Democrats two. These two groups were later to combine to form the Liberal Socialist Party. The Labour Front under Mr. David Marshall, as the largest single party, was asked to form a government. They did so in alliance with the three members of U.M.N.O.—M.C.A.—S.M.U. Alliance and with the addition of two Labour Front members nominated by the Governor. These with the three ex-officio members constitutionally required to support the

¹ Malayan Chinese Association.

Government gave the Government 18 votes in the Assembly of 32. The Speaker had no vote. Singapore's first ministers were sworn in on 7th April, 1955....

The Labour Front Government set up a Commission on the Malayanisation of the Public Service, the public sessions of which spelled out the practical implications of the changing pattern of power in Singapore. Mr. David Marshall, the Chief Minister, seizing on the issue of the refusal of the newly-arrived Governor, Mr. Robert Black, to accept his proposals for four Assistant Ministers, persuaded the Assembly in August 1955 to vote for an immediate advance to self-government. The dispute was referred to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd, during his visit to Singapore in September 1955 during a tour of South-East Asia, and he agreed that the Governor's discretion in accepting the advice of the Chief Minister under the constitution should be withdrawn except in the case of proroguing and dissolving the Assembly. He also agreed that an All-Party Mission should go, ahead of the anticipated time-table, to London in April 1956 after one year's experience of the working of the Constitution, to consider amendments to allow further substantial progress towards self-government. In preparation for the visit of the Mission, a Mass Signature Campaign and a Mass Rally were organised to demonstrate Singapore's eagerness and readiness for advance, and, at the invitation of the Singapore Government, an All-Party delegation from the House of Commons visited Singapore in March 1956 to make their own assessment of the situation. Following meetings of members of all the elected groups in the Assembly, the Legislative Assembly on 5th April defined their brief: 'to seek forthwith for Singapore the status of an Independent Territory within the Commonwealth and to offer an agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Singapore Government whereby the United Kingdom would exercise control over external defence and give guidance in foreign affairs other than trade and commerce....'

The Constitutional Mission, consisting of thirteen Assemblymen representative of all parties in the Assembly, took part in discussions in London from 23rd April to 15th May, 1956. There was a large area of agreement—the Colony would become the State of Singapore; the elected membership of the Assembly would be doubled and the official and nominated element be eliminated; the Prime Minister would preside over the Council of Ministers which would consist entirely of elected Assemblymen; Malayanisation of the Civil Service; a separate Singapore citizenship within the Commonwealth similar to that of a fully-governing member. The practical point on which negotiation broke down was the power of the United Kingdom Government to intervene unilaterally by Order in Council where it would be

unable otherwise to carry out its responsibilities for external defence and external affairs. A last minute attempt by the Chief Minister on his own responsibility to re-open negotiation on the bases of laying any Orders in Council before Parliament, of the appointment of a Malayan Governor-General and the transfer of ministerial responsibility in the U.K. from the Colonial Office was not sustained by the delegation.

Following the failure of the talks, Mr. David Marshall resigned his post as Chief Minister on 6th June and two days later Mr. Lim Yew Hock was sworn in as Chief Minister with the same group of Ministers and the same policy. The change of government reflected no change of public mood, particularly among the politically active trade union and leftiest [*sic*] elements who still sought to set the political pace. There were stay-in strikes at the Chinese Middle schools against the authority of schools and government alike. Police action[s] to clear the schools were resisted and the schools received the support of the Shop and Factory Workers Union. As a result of the rioting which followed, a curfew was imposed from 26th October to 2nd November, and the leaders of both groups were detained under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance. These events had established the fact that the next two years were to be years of constitutional preparation for the next and now accepted step towards self-government and of political preparations to decide which party with which leadership and which policy could achieve the reconciliation of the forces, whose divergence had so far been illustrated, in an agreed pace and direction of policy.

In February 1957 All-Party preparations for a renewed approach to the Colonial Office began. Agreement was reached on the special position of the Malays, and, on 5th March, the All-Party Mission were 'instructed' by the Legislative Assembly to 'secure from Her Majesty's Government for the people of Singapore the status of a self-governing state with all the rights, powers and privileges there-to appurtenant in all internal affairs and the control of trade, commerce and cultural relations in external affairs'. It was also agreed that the general election promised for 1957 should be postponed to allow the introduction of Singapore Citizenship and the widening of the electoral register which would follow. The All-Party Mission to London consisted of Mr. Lim Yew Hock and Mr. Chew Swee Kee for the Labour Front and Che Abdul Hamid bin Haji Jumat for the U.M.N.O., Mr. Lee Kuan Yew for the P.A.P. and Mr. Lim Choon Mong for the Liberal Socialists. After the talks, which lasted from 11th March to 11th April, agreement was reached with the Colonial Office, the proposal of an Internal Security Council resolving the fundamental disagreement over internal security. One discordant note remained in

the unilateral insistence of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that those who had been detained under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance should not be eligible for membership of the first Legislative Assembly under the new constitution, a provision 'noted with regret' by the delegation. Mr. Marshall's back-bench opposition to the agreement led to the resignation of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and Mr. Marshall from the Assembly. Mr. Marshall retired from politics but Mr. Lee Kuan Yew fought a bye-election on the issues involved in the agreement and was successfully returned by his constituency. The P.A.P. leadership in August surmounted an extremist attempt within the party to replace them, and their policy of an 'independent, democratic, Socialist, non-Communist Malaya'.

The groundwork of advance was also laid in the implementation of the Malayanisation policy and the passing of the citizenship legislation. A new Public Service Commission with executive powers was set up in January 1957, and they appointed Malaysians to replace the expatriates as Permanent Secretaries to all Ministries. The Citizenship Bill, which was passed on 16th October, established the new Singapore Citizenship not only for those born in Singapore but for citizens of United Kingdom and the Colonies of two years' residence and others of eight years' residence. Registration was carried out from 1st November, 1957 to 31st January, 1958. During this period 325,000 new citizens were created, bringing for the first time the majority of the resident adults on to the register of citizens and later of electors, and establishing the Chinese-educated as the majority of the electorate who would determine the outcome of the coming general election.

With the passing of the Education Bill in November 1957, after six months' gestation in the Legislative Assembly, the final legislative steps were taken to make the Chinese schools equal partners within a national system of education and to remove the isolation and frustration which had been a major obstacle to the unity which was essential to any stability of political progress.

The constitutional developments were not considered in isolation... for the importance of leaving the way open to full association with the Federation was constantly in mind. This was publicly expressed in the message from the Legislative Assembly on 21st August, 1957 to the Federation Government on the achievement of *Merdeka*...

In December 1957 were held the elections for the first fully-elected City Council... The P.A.P. won the largest number of seats, 13 out of the 14 they contested, the remaining 17 being divided between four parties and two Independents. Mr. Ong Eng Guan, the leader of the P.A.P. in the City Council and the Party Treasurer, was elected as the first, and as it was to prove the only, Mayor of Singapore. Not only a

new party but a new popular idiom and a new generation had taken over the fully-elected City Council. It was the first P.A.P. experience of power and the first public demonstration of fully representative government. . . .

During 1958 the final steps were taken towards self-government. . . . The All-Party Mission with the same membership as in 1957 went to London in April 1958 and signed the final agreement on 28th May. The general pattern of the constitution now firmly including the Internal Security Council was finally adopted, the Federation Government having confirmed their readiness to play their part. Special emphasis was laid in the Preamble to the constitution on the obligation to protect minority interests and particularly those of the Malays as the indigenous people of Malaya. The State of Singapore Bill enabling the new constitution to be promulgated passed smoothly through the U.K. Parliament and received the Royal Signature on 1st August; and the Constitution Order in Council was finally laid before Parliament on 27th November.

Meanwhile, the party [alignments] crystallised out for the coming election. On his return at the end of June from the constitutional talks in London, Mr. Lim Yew Hock publicly proposed a United Socialist Front. During a City Council bye-election in the Kallang constituency, the Liberal Socialists offered to support a Labour front candidate against the P.A.P. candidate. In spite of this combined opposition the P.A.P. won the seat. This united the opposition in the City Council and the heightened temperature led to two attempts by the Mayor to persuade the Council to dissolve itself. In November, the Singapore People's Alliance was formed from members of the Labour Front, Liberal Socialists and Workers Party, though each party continued its independent existence and was to fight the 1959 election. In the Legislative Assembly in December, four Liberal Socialist Assemblymen joined the Government benches, giving the Government a majority of members for the first time. Meanwhile, the P.A.P. was re-organised on a cadre basis and its policy was re-defined in an Anniversary Souvenir spelling out the detailed implications of its policy of an independent, democratic Socialist non-Communist Malaya.

During 1958 . . . the . . . most outstanding event in the public mind was the ceremonial opening of the Nanyang University on 30th March towards which taximen and trishaw drivers and hawkers, as well as towkays, had made their contribution in good faith. Legislative recognition was given and the first steps taken to set up an international commission to assess the quality of the degrees the new University would confer.

On 27th November, 1958, the Constitution Order in Council had been laid before Parliament. The "pilot" Order in Council which had been issued previously, authorised the introduction of the new electoral machinery; the boundaries of the 51 constituencies were gazetted and the electoral registers prepared. These included the names of all adult citizens either by birth, or by registration under the Citizenship Ordinance of 1957. The number of registered electors was 555,655 compared with the 300,299 eligible to vote in the 1955 elections.

The machinery of elections was strengthened by the Legislative Assembly Elections (Amendment) Bill. . . . Its recommendations were based on those of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Corrupt Electoral Practices which had been set up in 1957 under the Chairmanship of Mr. S. H. D. Elias, following the raising of the issue by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew in the light of his experience during the bye-election which he fought in his constituency of Tanjong Pagar in June 1957, and whose report was made in March 1958. Voting was made compulsory, the number and size of posters was brought under control, and the definition of treating was made more rigid; on election day free transport, canvassing, the use of badges, and loud-speakers, undue influence by crowds gathering near polling stations, and participation by students or secret society members were all forbidden.

The initiative in setting the pace and direction of the election campaign was taken and retained by the People's Action Party whose leader in the Assembly since 1955 had been Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, the Secretary-General of the Party, and whose leader in the City Council, as Singapore's first Mayor of Singapore, had been Mr. Ong Eng Guan, the Treasurer of the Party. The Opposition to the P.A.P. was divided to the end.

The election campaign opened in effect with the first P.A.P. rally which was held on Hong Lim Green on 14th February. At the rally, the allegation was made that the S.P.A. had received \$500,000 from American sources as a fighting fund for the coming election, and that these funds had, as such, been exempted from Income Tax. Following challenges by those concerned, of the truth of the allegation, the party asked for a Commission of Inquiry and in the text of the motion which they submitted to the Assembly the name of the Minister for Education, Mr. Chew Swee Kee, was first given as the alleged recipient. The day before the motion was debated, the Minister announced his resignation from the Government and from the Assembly "to clear the good name of the S.P.A." . . . The following day, 4th March, after a heated and emotional debate in the Assembly the Chief Minister announced his intention of setting up an Inquiry Commission.

On 19th March, the Assembly agreed to set up a Commission of Inquiry into the leakage of information from the Income Tax Department which had been revealed in the debate on 4th March as the source of information to the P.A.P. The Assembly was dissolved on 31st March, a day before the last possible date under the constitution.

A parallel growth of political tension in the City Council arising out of the relationship of the Mayor with the opposition and with the Chief Administrative Officer led to the setting up of another commission. On 13th March, the opposition walked out of a City Council meeting in protest against the way in which the Mayor was conducting the meeting and immediately took their protest to the Minister for Local Government, Lands and Housing. He asked for a verbatim report of the meeting of the Council. On 26th March, the Minister under the Ordinance took over certain powers of the City Council. The Minister also announced his intention to set up a Commission of Inquiry into the working of the City Council and the relations of the Mayor with the Administration.

On 3rd April, the Commission was set up under the Chairmanship of Mr. S.H.D. Elias. At an election rally the following day the P.A.P. announced that, should they be elected, they would abolish the City Council, transferring its Public Utilities to a Board and the remaining functions to appropriate government departments. The Inquiry was not carried through. On 19th April, following the Minister's use of certain of the resumed powers, the Mayor and the P.A.P. Councillors, 12 out of 14 of whom were candidates for the Assembly, resigned from the City Council.

On Nomination Day, 25th April, 194 candidates were nominated for the 51 constituencies, 160 from 10 different parties, and 34 Independents. The P.A.P. nominated a candidate for every constituency. The forces against them were divided. Mr. Lim Yew Hock had failed to bring any other Party into his Singapore People's Alliance. . . . The U.M.N.O.—M.C.A. nominated 13 candidates while the Labour Front, led by Mr. Francis Thomas, and the Workers Party, led by Mr. David Marshall, each nominated three candidates.

* * *

In many ways it was a model campaign and if the practice of elections is an essential part of the Parliamentary democracy, the lessons had been learned. There were no incidents involving police action, and the tighter legislation to prevent secret society or other intimidation or the undue influence of school-children worked out well. A committee under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, Mr. E. B. David, and consisting of members of the major parties met weekly and provided a forum where the complaints of parties could be heard

and the parties could agree on means to keep the election flowing smoothly.

* * *

The process reached its successful climax on Election Day. It was a day unlike any previous election day for the law forbade canvassing of voters, free transport to the polls, or any gathering at or near polling stations of crowds which might intimidate the voters. It had the atmosphere of the Public Holiday which it was by law. Yet 90 per cent went to the poll and they went early. Fifty per cent had voted by noon and 85 per cent had voted by 5 p.m. . . . The day including the counting ended without incident to the surprise of those who feared trouble of some kind and had decided to stay at home. . . .

The P.A.P. won 43 of the 51 seats, including every seat in the rural areas. In 31 of these seats they had an absolute majority over all other candidates. . . . Of the 16 elected members of the previous Assembly who contested the election all the three members of the P.A.P. and only two of the former Ministers won re-election.

During their election campaign the P.A.P. had declared that they would not take office until 8 of their former colleagues, detained under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, had been released. When, therefore, Sir William Goode, as Governor, following the resignation on 1st June of Mr. Lim Yew Hock, asked Mr. Lee Kuan Yew as leader of the majority party to form a government, the request for the release of the detainees was formally made. On 2nd June, the Governor announced that "in the changed political situation" and "in order to achieve a swift and smooth introduction of the new constitution" they would be released on 4th June. Mr. Lee then agreed to form a government and on 3rd June the new constitution was brought into force by Proclamation of the Governor and Sir William Goode took his oath of office as Yang di-Pertuan Negara of the new State. . . .

The following morning the 8 detainees were released from Changi Gaol. They went immediately to the P.A.P. party headquarters to meet the newly-re-elected Party committee, and six of them afterwards gave a Press Conference at which they declared, in a statement prepared two months previously, their loyalty to the Party and to its objective of achieving an "independent, democratic, non-Communist, socialist Malaya by peaceful, democratic and constitutional means" and of "complete identification with the ideal of a United Malayan nation".

The following afternoon in the City Hall Council Chamber. . . the nine Ministers were sworn in before Sir William Goode. . . . The first immediate act within an hour of taking office was the suspension of the City Council.

* * *

On 15th June the membership of the Internal Security Council was announced. Sir William Goode, as U.K. Commissioner would be Chairman. The Singapore representatives were Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ong Pang Boon, the Minister for Home Affairs, and Mr. Ong Eng Guan, Minister for National Development. The remaining two U.K. representatives were Mr. H. T. Bourdillon, the Deputy High Commissioner and Major-General C. L. Richardson, the G.O.C., Singapore. The Federation representative, the seventh member with the crucial casting vote, was Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, the Federation Minister for External Affairs.

* * *

The month of introduction ended with the first meeting of the Legislative Assembly on 1st July at which the new members took their oaths of office, and the Yang di-Pertuan Negara, Sir William Goode, in a lounge suit, his colonial uniform laid aside, read in Malay language the speech which set out the detailed policy of the government for the first session. For the first time the system of multilingualism by simultaneous translation into Malay, English, Chinese and Tamil was in use....

The year of revolutionary yet peaceful and constructive transition from Colony to State ended appropriately with the celebrations which were focussed on the installation of Che Yusof bin Ishak as the first Malaya-born Yang di-Pertuan Negara. In this week were inaugurated the new symbols of the new State. The words and music of the new National Anthem *Majulah Singapura*—Let Singapore Flourish—were written by Che Zubir Said. The new flag is of red and white, incorporating a crescent moon and five stars, the red representing universal brotherhood and equality and the white purity and virtue and the five stars representing Democracy, Peace, Progress, Justice and Equality. The animal supporters of the armorial crest are the Singapore lion and the Malayan tiger. All burst on Singapore in lavish decoration for the day of the installation of the Yang di-Pertuan Negara which was the opening of the National Loyalty Week with its crowded programme.

Sir William Goode, the last Governor and, by the constitution, the first Yang di-Pertuan Negara, left on 2nd December with the words "You have many friends who wish you well; and none who will watch your progress with keener and more affectionate interest than those who have been happy to serve here in the past to the best of our ability." The following day on the steps of the City Hall the Yang di-Pertuan Negara took his oath of office in the Chamber of the City Hall, and then the Prime Minister on the City Hall Steps addressed the rally on the crowded Padang before they began their long and proud procession.

VI *Nationalism in Malaya*

Events during and immediately after the war further stimulated nationalism in Malaya, and by 1947, when the British attempted to restore and even to exceed their pre-war constitutional powers in the Peninsula, through the Malayan Union, or by 1948, when the Communist insurrection began, a wider Malayan nationalism was apparent. The following readings (a), (b), and (c) discuss Malayan nationalism. The first and third are by a Malayan scholar of the post-war generation, Wang Gungwu, Professor of History in the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. The second reading is by Sir Richard Winstedt, who strongly opposed Malayan Union. [Readings (a) and (c) are taken from Wang Gungwu, 'Malayan Nationalism', *Royal Central Asian Society Journal*, XLIX, October 1962, pages 317-20 and 320-5 respectively. Reading (b) is taken from Winstedt, *Malaya and its History*, 6th edition, London, 1962, 140-2.]

Reading (a)

THE large immigrant population of Malaya, whether Indonesian (largely Sumatran Malay and Javanese), Chinese or Indian (to include Indians, Pakistanis and Ceylonese), have always been subject, to a greater or lesser extent, to pressures from outside the Peninsula. These pressures have, before this century, been limited largely to the economic demands made by relatives at home. Since the beginning of the century, however, there have also been pressures related to political changes in the immigrants' respective homelands. The most significant of these were the nascent national and international movements of Pan-Islamism; Chinese, Indian and Indonesian nationalism; and later Communism. The cultural and political pressures exerted by these movements were at first limited, but they were aggravated by the almost uninhibited flow of new immigrants and the free travel between Malaya and their homes during the two decades before the war. Of special importance is the change in immigrant pattern during the later years. In addition to the Malay, Chinese and Indian peasants who had come to Malaya in search of a livelihood, there were in the 1920s and 1930s an increasing number of educated men who came to fill "white collar" jobs and, especially, to become the teachers of the children of the immigrants. And among the newcomers were some of the actual bearers of "alien" nationalism who were able, through their education, to challenge the traditional leaders of the immigrant communities who were mainly the successful merchants. This was specially true of the Chinese and Indian people. While the British officials were still grappling with

the problems of how and how much they should rule, the rising nationalist movements in China and India, and later in Indonesia, were claiming, and in some instances reclaiming, the loyalty of their people overseas. Thus, before the idea of loyalty to Malaya and Malaya alone was yet conceived, attempts were already being made to stir the imagination of the immigrant peoples with distant but powerful loyalties.

One of the remarkable factors we have to bear in mind is that the native Malay people were the last to feel the stirrings of nationalism. The idea of "nation" was, of course, a foreign one which seemed to have no place in a community which was badly fragmented into at least nine Malay units, the four Federated Malay States and the five Unfederated Malay States. Until the hinterland was opened up and communications improved between these states, there was no basis for a "national" feeling. The Sultan or Raja, the feudal nobility, the Imam and Kathi of the Muslim religion were the symbols of authority and loyalty and these were usually limited to the local raja's domain. But as the Chinese and Indians became more openly nationalistic, the Malays in the different states began gradually to share one common experience. This was their attitude towards the immigrants. Before the 1920s the Malays were indifferent to, and at most amused by, the festivals and customs of the Chinese and Indians. But as these immigrants became more and more aggressively enthusiastic towards the Chinese Fatherland or Mother India, the amusement turned into alarm. Some of the Malay leaders, of course, were still content to believe that only the British who had brought these foreigners to Malaya could protect them. Others, however, felt that it was time that they took their fate into their own hands, and from the years just before the [Japanese] war there grew among these younger leaders the idea of a Malay nation.

During these same decades, the British officials who were conscious of the need for a more settled population had encouraged many of the immigrants to remain. They extended the education system of the Straits Settlements and offered English education to a small class of people in the Malay States, which the urban Chinese and Indian population were on the whole ready to accept. Also, for the Malays, there was set up the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar, which was meant to serve as a centre for the development of an enlightened aristocratic élite. Various groups of Christian missionaries also provided English schools, again mainly for Chinese and Indian children as the missionaries were not allowed to proselytize among the Muslim Malays. Through these government and Christian schools, through a hesitant westernization, the different communities were provided with the only means to come together, to ignore their differences and to communicate with each other in English. Although

the purpose of this English education has been thought to be no more than the practical one of producing clerks and Christians, the education did, in fact, serve as the beginnings of a common identity, an identity which at worst would have been a detribalized limbo between being English on the one hand and Chinese, Indian or Malay on the other; or at best, with more conscious direction and clearer purpose, what could have been the basis for a new "Malayan" nation.

I have suggested that this was a hesitant westernization. In fact, it had come too late to do anything more than give a handful of Malays, Chinese and Indians a shallow veneer of Western culture and standards. Before there was time for a more profound effect on the population, the British were defeated by the Japanese in 1942. This was a traumatic experience for the English-educated. Also, it gave the Japanese a chance to set the different communities further apart. The Japanese announced that they were liberating the Malays; that they were helping the Indians to achieve independence from the British and that they were saving the Chinese from the Communists. In fact, Pan-Malay nationalism received only a qualified support and Indian nationalism was only nominally glorified, while the Chinese were isolated as the potential enemies of everyone else. Within the Chinese community, the Japanese were also able to divide the "collaborators" from the sullen majority.

As a result of this Japanese policy the uneasy harmony of the three main communal groups was broken, and even after the return of the British in 1945 the residue of bitterness between Chinese and Malay remained a major feature of post-war reconstruction. The British returned with a bold plan to form the Malayan Union in order to help recapture some of their pre-war authority. But the tangled developments in Indonesia, India and China during the first few years after the war made their task extremely difficult. Anti-colonial slogans which were being widely used elsewhere in South-East Asia became allied to the emergent nationalist cause in Malaya, but in the effort to be as anti-colonial as any other, the communal leaders discovered how divided their peoples really were. Two developments, however, had far-reaching effects on the growth of Malayan nationalism. The first was the short-lived Malayan Union in 1947 inspired by the British, and the other was the Communist insurrection led by the Malayan Communist Party.

The Malayan Union represented a British attempt to break away from a long tradition of indirect rule in Malaya, or perhaps to be more accurate, it was an attempt to bring the Unfederated Malay States under more direct rule. The reasons for this move and the way the Union was hurriedly brought about are still subjects for hot debate, but one thing seems certain. The establishment of the Union would have eventually destroyed the foundations of the privileged

position of the Malays. It was the most serious threat their survival as a dominant community had ever experienced from the British and they realized this quickly enough to react in an uncharacteristically aggressive manner. The threat thus brought about a unity among all classes of Malays which the British did not foresee, and it gave Malay nationalism a boost and also a legitimacy which had not been intended. But perhaps equally important were the hopes raised by the Union in the minds of the non-Malay communities. For the first time, Indian and Chinese nationalists who had all been working for causes in India and China were shown the possibilities of local Malayan politics. And for the partially westernized leaders of both communities, the short period of the Union was like a door to full political participation which was for a fleeting moment opened and shut again. Thus, in one bold and abortive act, the British succeeded in releasing the energies of all three main communities and inducing them all to consider their potential rights in a new Malaya. The Federation of Malaya Agreement in 1948, which did away with the Malayan Union and created the Federation of Malaya, did not radically change this picture. The Federation recognized the basic rights of the Malays, but also made allowances for the non-Malays to make their homes in Malaya and to play their part in a future nation. The Agreement was drawn up by realists and practical men. It was drawn up at a time when the whole world was horrified at the communal riots in a partitioned British India and also at the killings and murders between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The British, the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians in Malaya perhaps would never have fought so bitterly against each other, but the events elsewhere warned them to draw up a reasonable document as the basis for a future nation.

The second development to have vital consequences on the growth of Malayan nationalism was the Communist insurrection. The Malayan Communists, largely Chinese-led and Chinese-financed, put themselves forward as nationalist leaders, but, in fact, received little support from nationalists who did not care for Communism. It is perhaps true to say that by harassing the British the Communists played an important part in hurrying the transfer of power to independent Malaya, but their main contribution to Malayan politics was, in the long run, even more important. This was the way their methods of terrorism, which were eventually to fail, made the majority of the people reject violence and murder as a solution to the country's political problems. After the initial shock of guerrilla successes had worn off, the Communists succeeded in driving the Chinese and Indian trading and professional classes to support the Malay aristocracy and civil service in a "national" demand for political rights. Together, they offered a more moderate, even conservative, leadership and their alliance was to take the form of the U[nited] M[alaya]

N[ational] O[rganisation]—M[alayan] C[hinese] A[ssociation]—M[alayan] I[ndian] C[ongress] Alliance to whom the British transferred power in 1957. Thus, although only in a negative way, the Communists made the new Malayan leaders more willing to accept a peaceful, constitutional and democratic basis for nationhood, and this may conclusively prove to be the best approach in a multi-racial plural society.

Reading (b)

BEFORE the Japanese invasion the Malays were probably the only people in Asia who as a race not only respected but felt affection for the British. The Straits-born Chinese entertained the same feeling, but they represent a community, not a race. Both the Malays and the Straits-born Chinese were wild with joy at our return and welcomed our troops with single-hearted gratitude. It might therefore have been expected that after failure to secure for the peoples of Malaya the protection that treaties had guaranteed, the British would have healed their wounds and assuaged their hunger and even listened to their views before any thought of altering their treaties and giving officials new English designations irrelevant to good government and confusing for the local inhabitant. But instead of showing consideration for an unnerved people, Whitehall dashed into the recovered Malaya as Mr. Birch dashed into Perak in 1874, as if it were an Augean stable instead of a country that for half a century had been a model for the smooth administration of mixed races. The attempt to cleanse it was made in haste and with a measure of ignorant prejudice. For Whitehall felt, quite groundlessly, with the example of Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway before it, that a strong centralized government might have done more than a patchwork federation to halt the Japanese conquest. There was also a mistaken notion that the Malays, disappointed at Britain's failure to protect them, had helped the invader. The new deal aimed therefore at bureaucratic efficiency, ignoring Malay sentiment altogether and tending to favour the Chinese who still, except for the Communists, respected as a mirror for administrators the ancient sage Shun, who "did nothing but governed well". So incubated in extreme secrecy (a tactic prompted by the war) Whitehall proceeded to sponsor a new policy for Malaya that compared with its last prewar policy was another complete *volte-face*. For in 1933 the Colonial Office had published and accepted the following opinion of its then permanent head:

"From a purely economic point of view it would no doubt be advisable in a country the size of Malaya to have one Central Government administering the whole territory. There is, however, the political aspect of the problem. . . .

"Moreover it seems clear that the maintenance of the position, authority and prestige of the Malay Rulers must always be a cardinal point in British policy; and the encouragement of indirect rule will probably prove the greatest safeguard against the political submersion of the Malays which would result from the development of popular government on western lines. For, in such a government the Malays would be hopelessly outnumbered by the other races owing to the great influx of immigrants that has taken place into Malaya during the last few years.

"Politically everything seems to point to the desirability of the Rulers and their respective Governments being allowed to have control of their own domestic affairs without interference except in those cases where a unified policy is clearly necessary."

The new deal scorned this conclusion, lumping the protected Malay States along with the Settlements of Penang and Malacca into a Union under His Majesty's jurisdiction, with Singapore as the one relic of the Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements. In the new Union the states were no longer described as protectorates but as a protectorate. Rulers who had always presided at State Councils were no longer to be members, and the chair was to be taken by a British Resident Commissioner. Even the prerogative of mercy was no longer to be exercised by the Rulers. *Crown* grants were to be issued for unoccupied lands not by a High Commissioner but by a Governor as in a colony, and the laws were no longer, as heretofore, to be signed and ratified by the Sultans, but by that Governor whose very title symbolized the annexation of the protected states, or let us say, their descent to a colonial status unprecedented for such highly organized and civilized countries. Jurisdiction, of course, means full powers of government from Whitehall. This in fact existed under the decent formula of the old treaties. But the new agreements, which the Sultans, taken by surprise and without time or leave to consult their people, were induced to sign, gave a blank cheque for the future disposal of the Malays, compelling them to accept "such future constitutional arrangements for Malaya as may be approved by His Majesty". One of these arrangements was that any Malay chief appointed a member of a State Council should swear allegiance not to his own Sultan but to the King of England. Humiliation could hardly go farther.

Reading (c)

WHAT emerged clearly within three years of the end of the Second World War was the awakening of the bulk of the Malay people to the threat of being overwhelmed by the non-Malay population of Malaya. Under the able leadership of the

late Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, the Malays found a unity they had never known before. He united them against the Malayan Union fostered on them by the British Government, and their unity won them an exhilarating victory. The confidence they gained from that victory they have never since lost and it was this confidence which made the Malays agree to accept Chinese and Indian co-operation in their efforts towards independence. In contrast to Malay unity, both the Chinese and Indian populations were badly divided. The Chinese were the most seriously divided, mainly on ideological lines drawn originally in China and transferred to Malaya but also on lines of educational background—Chinese and English education. The Communist victory in China in 1949 only added to the Chinese dilemma—pride at China's new-found unity and strength and distaste for the Communist methods in Malaya. The Indians, on the other hand, became openly split between Moslem and Hindu, as in India and Pakistan, and also between the majority of Tamils and other southerners and the small numbers of northern Bengalis, Punjabis and Gujeratis.

The advantage which the Malay leaders had under the circumstances was crucial. And when these leaders were further backed by the British, who found that the real danger to stability was from the Chinese Communists, that advantage became decisive. Thus when pressure was put on the Malay leaders by both the British and the non-Malays to modify their national aspirations, they were prepared to do so with the confidence that their own unity could hardly be challenged. When we bear this in mind it is easy to see why Malayan nationalism is really a modified or attenuated Malay nationalism. If we were to venture a definition at this stage it would probably be fair to say that "Malayan nationalism consists of two component parts: a nucleus of Malay nationalism enclosed by the ideal of Malay-Chinese-Indian partnership." This is perhaps not the way which many Malay and non-Malay politicians would like to see it. There are some Malay leaders who equate Malayan nationalism with Malay nationalism and prefer to use "Melayu" instead of "Malayan" in every possible context. And many Chinese and Indian leaders who describe themselves as "Malayan" refer to an altogether new political identity and would refuse to consider it as in any way similar to "Malay". But what cannot be denied is that the dynamism, the single-mindedness and the leadership in Malayan nationalism has been ably provided by the present Malay ruling group. These Malays have been supported by both Chinese and Indians, but they have at no time surrendered their claim to, or their rights of leadership.

I have already suggested that there is no unanimity about the meaning of Malayan nationalism at the moment. This might appear strange when we say that Malaya is an independent nation. But, in fact, Malayan leaders are fully aware that the work of national unifica-

tion has only just begun. Of course, there are many Malays and a few Chinese and Indians who already consider themselves first and foremost Malaysians, but the bulk of the population are still not sure what part of their present identity they would have to sacrifice before they can become "Malayan". It might be said, to paraphrase Professor Joseph Strayer, that the Malay is first of all a Malay, then a Muslim and then a Malaysian; and the Chinese first of all a Chinese, then a Buddhist or Christian if he is religious and then possibly a Malaysian; and the Indian is first of all an Indian, then a Hindu or Muslim and then possibly a Malaysian. This would make the act of being a Malaysian at best a tertiary experience, but when we consider how new the concept of Malaya is—since 1947—none of the three communities can be expected to be fully adapted to the national identity in so short a time. What is remarkable is that many people have already begun to be so.

There are several important problems, however, which will remain as threats to the stability of the new nation-state if they are not solved fairly soon. Among these problems are those concerning the economic basis of the nation, problems of productivity, diversity of industry and the distribution of the nation's wealth. Most Malayan leaders realize that these are fundamental to the viability and stability of the nation, and the problems have received a great deal of attention from both the Alliance and the Socialist parties. The major controversy, for example, of how much . . . state control there should be, still goes on. But in the unequal distribution of wealth and economic power a far deeper problem arising out of communal differences is to be found. It is clear to the observer how much more wealth the non-Malay communities have as a whole, compared with the Malay community. Although no survey has yet been made to show how many times total non-Malay incomes exceed those of the Malays, there has never been any doubt that the economic gulf, both in terms of present resources and potential growth, is enormous. This brings us back to the basic divisive factor in the Malayan nation—communal rivalry as an obstacle to national assimilation.

From the studies of famous scholars of nationalism like Carlton Hayes, Hans Kohn and their students, it is possible to define a nation in the commonest and most acceptable form as consisting of three minimum features: a definite state, a geographical area more or less clearly demarcated and a distinctive common culture. Of the three, Malaya seems to have no serious difficulties with the first, but the second and third, the question of territory and that of a common culture, are still far from settled. Both the problems of territory and culture hinge on the fine balance of population.

. . . Singapore cannot be safely excluded from Malayan nationhood. And in order to absorb Singapore and its one million Chinese, it is

necessary to go further afield to the three territories in North Borneo to find the counterweight against Chinese dominance. There is nothing surprising in the decision to include Singapore. It is merely the delayed effect of separating Singapore from the Federation of Malaya in the first place. What is more controversial is the inclusion of the three Borneo territories. But recent developments suggest that there is no serious difficulty about the inclusion. Two factors are responsible for this. Firstly, Malayan nationalism is not so strictly defined that Borneans would be considered outsiders who will be ruled by Malaysians in future. In fact, the four-year-old national ideal has not yet penetrated into the subconscious of the ordinary people and the Bornean peoples do not appear at all alien to that ideal. At the same time, none of the Bornean territories has reached the point of exclusive nationalism themselves and many Bornean leaders now realize that it is not in their own interests to foster such nationalist feelings in Sarawak, Brunei or North Borneo alone. On the other hand, the fact that Malayan nationalism is still in its early and broadly defined stage makes it both feasible and desirable for the Borneans to join in a larger national conception, the Federation of Malaysia.

The establishment of Malaysia in the near future would not seriously affect what we have so far been calling *Malayan nationalism*. Many of the problems of the future Malaysian nation will be the same ones which have faced the Malayan nation during the past few years, except that they might be more extensive when we think of Northern Borneo and at the same time more intensive when we think of Singapore.... The uncertainty of national boundaries is not in itself a grave situation; it merely reflects the determination of Malayan nationalists to look for bold solutions to the problem of the large Chinese and Indian minorities who have as yet little inclination to be assimilated.

This leads me then to the question of the distinctive common culture—"language, literature, history and the common hope (of the citizens) to live together in the future". Most Malays believe that this common culture should have as its nucleus traditional Malay culture. This would follow if it is recognized that Malayan nationalism has Malay nationalism as its nucleus. But most Chinese and Indians would deny that this is a fair claim. In their view, the Malayan nation should involve only a new political loyalty and not a denial of the multi-cultural basis of the present society. A third minority view, held mainly by the English-educated Chinese and Indians, is that cultural differences may remain so long as most people accept more intensive modernization and come to share a common outlook which is not deeply anchored in any single traditional culture. These different ways of looking at the problem of a national culture may appear incompatible with one another. But the real difficulty does not lie in

the various proposals for the growth of a national culture. Proposals can be made, discussed and either accepted or rejected if there is first a measure of communication and understanding. This communication, however, has been extremely limited and can be primarily attributed to the language barriers in the country.

Let me give some concrete examples. There have been fervent debates among the Malay people throughout Malaya about the place of Malay culture as the basis of the future national culture. Some of these have been conducted with great care and reported in full in the Malay press, in the *Utusan Melayu* and the *Berita Harian*, and also in important official journals like the *Dewan Bahasa*. Few of them, however, are even mentioned in the newspapers printed in English and Chinese. Similarly, what discussion there is among the Chinese is reported in the Chinese press but receives no attention in the English and Malay newspapers. Each of the discussions, therefore, is usually addressed to the converted and little effort is made to reach understanding between different language groups. Another example is the rapid development of local literature. Malay novelists and poets have been writing vigorously since the war—the famous group is the “Angkatan Lima-puluh”, that is the generation of 1950—and only in the past two years have the titles of these works been mentioned in a few Chinese and English newspaper articles.¹ In this writing, the Malay conception of their national destiny comes out clearly but has received virtually no attention in the other language publications. In a similar way, Chinese poets and novelists and short-story writers have been astonishingly active during the past five years. Their works may not yet compare with the best modern writings of China, but they are distinctive, and what is more important, distinctively South-east Asian, if not actually Malayan. But none of the writings have been introduced to English- and Malay-reading audiences. Few non-Chinese, in fact, are even aware that the Chinese have responded directly to Malayan independence and have, through their numerous literary works, recorded Chinese thoughts about our plural society and the multi-racial nationalism it has produced.

What gives rise to anxiety is the way the national ideal has been interpreted to each community separately and often without reference to the feelings of other communities. Occasionally, when the views of another community are reported, there is the danger of oversimplification or distortion. Fortunately, there has been considerable goodwill on all sides and the high standards of toleration of cultural differences in Malaya are probably unique. The fact that Malay is the national language is also a step forward to the breaking of our lan-

¹ See *Modern Malay Verse 1946-61* [*Sajak2 Melayu Baru*], intro. J. Kirkup, Kuala Lumpur, 1968.

guage barriers. A great deal of encouragement has been given to non-Malays to master the language. For example, during the past two years there have been Chinese writings in Malay published in journals of relatively good quality like the *Dewan Bahasa* and also in newspapers like the *Berita Harian*; and although the Malay used is not distinguished, they have, as far as I know, been well received by Malay readers. This goodwill and toleration has been the tone set by the present Malayan Government, and from their efforts it is clear how crucial the function of the state is as a buffer and mediator in a plural society.

This leads me to my final point concerning the minimum needs of a new nation. I have so far suggested that two of the three minimum features of a nation, territory and culture, have yet to achieve definition and identity. But the first, and probably the primary, requirement, the state itself, is, happily for us, well set up and apparently stable. I would now like to refer briefly to some of the ways this single established entity may, during a period of frequent change, mould the society in the national "Malayan" image.

I have already referred to the historical circumstances which have led to the growth of a moderate and conservative leadership committed to the achievement of the democratic state by constitutional means. The Malayan nation is by our constitution completely identified with such a democratic state. Through a series of elections at local, state and federal government levels more people are being brought to deal, not only with the problems of democracy, but also at the same time with the issue of nationhood. At each election and in every political party more of the politically conscious are being made to affirm their loyalty to the nation and gradually to identify that nation with the political system which they are learning to manipulate. At the same time, a major tenet of modern democracy is a broad basis of education, and our government has announced its policy for universal education. Through the schools, especially the National Schools directly controlled by the state, it is hoped to bring the ideals of Malayan nationhood to future generations of children. The syllabus and curriculum have already been redesigned for this purpose in both National Schools and private schools which receive grants from the government. Such private schools, especially Chinese schools, which had reached a high peak of development before 1957, have already felt the pressure from the state to adapt and become part of the National Schools system. There is no reason to believe that, with the present policy of determining educational needs and standards by the state, resistance to Malayan nationalism can survive in the schools for long.

We now have to await the cumulative impact of democracy on the Malayan peoples. The great test of our nation's viability is still ahead

of us. Already some politicians are asking if democracy is efficient enough for the building of a new nation almost from scratch. Is nationalism in Malaya compatible with democracy? If we want our people to be identified solely and fully with Malaya—or say, in future, with Malaysia—can we afford to use only the methods of persuasion and education? Do we have the time which we badly need to convert, if not most people of this generation, at least the bulk of the next generation, to the national ideal? The modern state machinery can be a powerful weapon, on the one hand, for education and indoctrination and, on the other, for coercion and strict political control. Will this weapon always be in wise hands? Or should it not really be used forcefully and ruthlessly since it is the *one* of the three minimum features of nationhood which we actually have?

These are questions... whose implications must be judged in the present Malayan perspective and not against ideal standards drawn up in the light of Anglo-American or European political history. At this stage of Malayan history, perhaps no problem is as important as that of the people's willingness to live in Malaya and be loyal to the country. Whatever emphasis different peoples may give to Malayan nationalism, it remains the only thing which can eventually unite them all.

VII 'The Emergency'

From 1948 to 1960 the British Government and the independent nation of Malaya fought a twelve-year war against the Malayan Communist Party, a war which focussed unprecedented world-wide attention on Malaya. The following history of 'The Emergency', as the undeclared civil war was called, is drawn from the Federation's *Official Year Book, Volume Two, 1962*. [Kuala Lumpur, 1962, 387-409.]

ON 12th July, 1948 was issued a Proclamation declaring that "a state of emergency" existed in all parts of the Federation of Malaya. This Proclamation replaced a similar one issued a month earlier which confined the area of emergency to central Perak and west-central Johore. Twelve years were to elapse before a further Proclamation was issued (on 31st July, 1960) in which His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong declared that the state of emergency had ceased to exist in the Federation as a whole.

This state of affairs was brought about by what was for all practical purposes an unannounced declaration of civil war against the people of Malaya by the Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.). Its aim,

which was warmly supported by international communism, was the establishment of a communist republic in Malaya. Its declared object however was couched in that curious Orwellian jargon which is the hall-mark of communist propaganda: fascist imperialism would be eradicated: the people would be set free: liberty would reign: the aspirations of the masses would be fulfilled: and so on. The subsequent activities of the M.C.P. indicated that, even if the intention had been pure, the performance was of doubtful quality. The communists organised a reign of terror—of murder, intimidation, arson and extortion such as has seldom been seen this century outside Nazi Germany and the Iron Curtain countries. This particular system of terror has always since been referred to (perhaps somewhat euphemistically) as "The Emergency"....

Malaya is today... a plural society of many racial origins. Many of its most faithful sons came originally from China and India, and today they are Malaysians. Having stated this, it may truthfully be said that only since the last war has there been a national *Malayan* sentiment irrespective of the racial or national origin of the citizen. Most true Malaysians will be the first to agree that the Malays and the Eurasians, quite naturally, have always looked only to Malaya; the Chinese and Indians tended until recently to look beyond the frontiers to China and India respectively. This reflects little discredit on them, as nationalism was barely embryonic before 1945 and racialism was a perfectly natural sentiment in the absence of the former. Today, the picture has changed—racialism is vestigial, and Malaya is the nation and home of all its citizens. It is of the utmost importance that this point should be fully understood because, unfortunately, the communist movement here was almost entirely confined to those Chinese who in 1948 looked to China. The Malays, being Muslims, regarded the atheistic materialism of Marx and Engels as complete anathema and rejected it out of hand as an undisguised attack on their religion. The Indians likewise were hardly influenced. In short, the whole communist movement was entirely alien and could in no sense be described as a national movement. Because the communists were predominantly Chinese, it is not surprising that the history of the Malaysian Communist Party should have been inextricably linked with the history of China since 1911, when the Manchu dynasty was overthrown by President Sun Yat Sen's Kuomintang (K.M.T.) party.

The Russian Revolution, despite the gigantic problems it raised for its organisers in Russia itself, was never conceived as a purely national revolution. Its ultimate aims were *international*, and it sought to achieve world revolution by any or all means, including force. By about 1922, a strong communist movement had come into being in China. Following a prototype plan which was later mass-produced for use elsewhere, the Chinese Communists successfully made over-

tures to the K.M.T. and entered into a loose collaboration with that party. The K.M.T. was building the new China which, in the eyes of all Chinese, would take its rightful place in world affairs. Chinese people domiciled overseas can hardly be blamed if they viewed with enthusiasm the progress their mother-country was making, and in many South-East Asian territories—almost all of which were possessions or protectorates of the various European colonial powers—Kuomintang branches were established. Again, this is a logical sequence: firstly, immigration to these territories from China was limited by quota systems which reacted particularly unfavourably against females, and this posed matrimonial problems inherent in the Chinese "clan" or "surname" matrimonial custom; secondly, many of the overseas Chinese had relations in China whom they wished to rejoin when they had accumulated sufficient money. It is hardly surprising that they should wish to maintain a sort of personal diplomatic connection with the ruling party of the country to which they intended to return.

The way was accordingly open to the Chinese Communists in China to further the dream of world revolution. They had already penetrated the K.M.T. and were regarded as colleagues. There was nothing to stop them from using the oversea K.M.T. branches as a *pied-à-terre*, which is exactly what they did. Several teams of expert propagandists came to Malaya during the first few years of the nineteen-twenties and established a system of cells which was to survive until today. Even after Chiang Kai Shek had broken with communism in 1926, these cells continued to operate. . . .

Having secured a foothold in Malaya, and particularly in Singapore, the communist agents cast around for troubled waters in which to fish. Their task was not particularly easy to begin with: the great slump of the early 'thirties had yet to break, and in general the expatriate Chinese were doing far too well financially to risk sanctions as members of an unlawful organisation; they could sympathise with the Kuomintang, perhaps (even after it too became unlawful after 1930); but to take part in active politics was another question. In any case, any such political activity was at that time unlawful. In consequence, the communists made little impact on the Chinese community as a whole until about 1935. . . .

The first group to [show] any sign of promise from the agitators' point of view was oddly enough, the Hainanese. For some inexplicable reason, these people (who originate from Hainan Island in South China) have always enjoyed what amounts to a monopoly on the catering trade; they were and are widely employed as domestic servants in European households. For another equally inexplicable reason, the mainland Chinese have always tended to look down on them, possibly because they came from a comparatively undeveloped

island away from the more sophisticated mainland. It may be that the Hainanese reacted against this superior patronage; the fact remains that they were remarkably clannish. Experts are unable to agree whether the choice of the Hainanese for exploitation by the communists was fortuitous or calculated. It is just conceivable that the wide-spread ramifications of the catering industry provided an excellent cover for cell-breeding and courier routes, particularly as so many of the restaurateurs were inter-related. It is equally just conceivable that senior officials and prominent members of the public could be kept under observation by their domestic-servants either with a view to garnering intelligence or to liquidation in the event of an uprising. Both these explanations are of course pure conjecture, and it is impossible to say where lies the truth. But there is no doubt that the early communist cells certainly flourished amongst the Hainanese community and, to a slightly lesser extent, among the Khehs (or Hakkas), who share with the Hainanese a reputation for clannishness.

The next step taken by the communists was to infiltrate certain selected trade guilds. The shoe-trade was one of the first to fall under the spell when the communists intervened in a purely industrial trade dispute in Singapore in 1928. . . .

Thereafter schools became a prime objective. Junior schoolmasters in the completely uncontrolled (and unsubsidised) Chinese Schools were a comparatively easy target. Being literate in a community largely illiterate they enjoyed a measure of status and were in an excellent position to influence the young. Few of them had had any real education in the strict sense of the word. They could read, and they did read, the insidious propaganda put out by the Chinese Communist Party and were duly impressed; it was a question of literacy outrunning the development of that critical capacity which might well have impelled them to reject Marxian theorising as shallow and meretricious. . . . The police task was a particularly difficult one, particularly in Common Law jurisdictions where independent evidence of criminal or quasi-criminal activities must be conclusively proved before sanctions can be imposed. The Communists knew. . . all the legal technicalities, and the common-law rules of evidence were perhaps their surest safeguard. Whilst sheltering under the rule of law, they were at the same time committed to its ultimate destruction.

The world trade recession of the 'thirties next provided an opportunity for fruitful agitation. At about this time, the Soviet Government, through the agency of the Comintern, had succeeded in establishing a Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai to co-ordinate the activities of its agents. . . . A directive issued in 1933 enjoined upon the M.C.P. the duty of organising cells on all rubber estates, tin

mines and other primary industries with a view to promoting strikes. In 1936 and 1937—when rubber and tin restriction were at their height and employment was hard to obtain—agitators were able to bring about a really serious series of strikes. At Batu Arang, Malaya's principal coal mine, several thousand strikers took over the property and proclaimed a soviet in miniature. The equivalent of "people's courts" were set up and only the immediate intervention of police and military reinforcements restored order.

... The Japanese invasion of China... again turned the attention of the Malayan Chinese towards their ancestral homes. Probably very nearly all of them had relatives who were in or likely to become involved in the battle zone, and feeling ran high against the Japanese. Many completely honest Malayan Chinese who were not basically politically-minded organised societies aimed at impeding Japan's war activities by undermining that nation's trade [and]... solidarity became the watchword, even if many viewed the communist propaganda askance. The boycott societies were eventually merged into the "anti-Enemy Backing-up Society". Needless to say, it was a communist creation dominated by trained agitators...

It must always be remembered that all this time the Communist Party of Malaya was underground, constantly being harried by the police in Singapore and in the Malay States. This being the case, the cell and courier systems were daily being improved and, when found wanting, modified. If the Russo-German pact of August, 1939... was a surprise to the rest of the world, it was another heaven-sent opportunity for the M.C.P. The entry into the war of the entire Commonwealth was an act of "fascist-capitalist aggression"... Now, with the Allies branded as aggressors, a full-scale campaign of agitation took place in the primary industries closely related to the Allied war effort. The wave of strikes which ensued continued for nearly two years until... war broke out between Russia and Germany. Hitler was now the enemy of the Allies, and Russia the friend of the latter. The Allies were still looked at somewhat askance until the Japanese invaded north Malaya at the end of the year. Thereafter, the *volte-face* became complete...

This was exactly the situation the M.C.P. must have been praying for. By the time Singapore fell and the whole of South-East Asia was under Japanese military occupation, the communists had been given a measure of recognition by the British Government, which can hardly be blamed in its predicament for enlisting any support (no matter how small) for the allied cause. The Malayan Communist Party were ready: they had been underground for years, and a change in political opponents hardly affected their organisation except insofar as the Japanese were less meticulous than the British in observing the niceties of the law. The new propaganda line was both bland and

disarming: were they not friends of the Russians, fighting for the noble Allies against the fascist Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis? Were not the British, the Americans and the Chinese engaged in a death struggle against the hated Japanese, who had ravished China? Were they, the M.C.P. not helping in the common cause? To the simple worker, the answer to these questions could only be in the affirmative

Thus it came about that the machinery of international communism became in theory the tool of the allied war effort: in fact, it was the other way round. The very few British officers who had been left behind, and the few reinforcements from Force 136 who were landed by submarine or dropped by parachute, had absolutely no executive authority at all...

They were unwelcome guests who were tolerated with barely concealed dislike. Nevertheless, they had their uses—as time went on they were able to establish radio contact with the allied forces in India and Ceylon and arrange for airdrops of arms...

Any other form of resistance was labelled as "fascist"... In the unreal atmosphere of a mountain or jungle hide-out, men have little to do except talk—guerrilla warfare involves long periods of utter and complete boredom—and the M.C.P. political commissars took good care that the talking should be done by them... The M.C.P., which now called itself the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Union, had formed its own private army (the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army). A fighting force, dedicated solely to international communism, had come into political being.

As to the population outside the jungles more must be said. They were already undergoing a severe ordeal quite apart from the sporadic cruelty of some members of the occupying power. In particular, the activities of the *Kempetai* (the Japanese security police) were arbitrary, ruthless and cruel, and torture was all too often resorted to, sometimes followed by public execution by beheading. The main problem of the average Malayan was one of pure survival, particularly in the towns, where food was very hard to come by. Industry and commerce was practically non-existent, and unemployment was rife. The result was an emigration from the towns to the jungle fringes, where land could be cultivated on the basis of "squatter's rights" and where the cultivators could till the land far removed from the *Kempetai*. But here again the cultivator falls between two stools—he is now in close proximity to the M.P.A.J.A. If he fails to meet their incessant demand for food, his expectation of life is small (he is now a "traitor"). In consequence the cultivators handed over the necessary supplies for two other reasons: firstly, the M.P.A.J.A. were considered less vicious than the dreaded *Kempetai* (indeed, they were said to be fighting them); and secondly, there still remained that

confused loyalty which varied from individual to individual. . . . If the jungle could afford to be neutral, the population of Malaya most certainly could not.

The arms and ammunition dropped in Malaya were carefully stowed away in well camouflaged jungle hide-outs. In dropping these stores, the British were taking a calculated risk. They were by no means unaware of the final objective of international communism, but that was a matter for the future. The first objective was to win the war, and to win it as quickly as possible. It would be libellous to suggest that these arms were never used against the Japanese—there are a great number of individual acts of gallantry on the record—but the fact remains that the majority of the arms were earmarked for future use. It so happened that when the Japanese Empire collapsed in 1945, the M.P.A.J.A. was the only comparatively well-armed force in Malaya. The British were still in India, Ceylon and Burma and were not in a position to arrive in Malaya at that moment. The M.P.A.J.A. felt with some reason that it now enjoyed a monopoly of force. There was nobody to oppose it, the Police Force being disarmed, almost wholly demoralised and discredited as "Kempetai tools". . . .

With the collapse of Hitler's Germany in the spring of 1945, the Allies prepared to concentrate their combined military might on the Pacific area. The likelihood that the war would be over in a matter of months rather than years was something known to only a very few of the statesmen who were privy to the secret of the atom bomb. Planning to liberate Malaya was inevitably made on the assumption that the Japanese would hotly contest a landing and that the invasion of the peninsula would have to be a carefully mounted operation with nothing left to chance. As it turned out, there was no contest, and the British on the other side of the Bay of Bengal found themselves with quite the wrong type of machine to carry out a peaceful operation. The landings at Morib have been the subject of much merriment to those who participated in them; they were a classical example of "muddling through". . . .

The fact remains that there was an interval of some weeks before the protecting power was in a position to resume full control; and during the early part of that interval there existed a political and administrative vacuum in which the Japanese, as the occupying power, were in a position in which it was all but impossible for them to govern.

It was during this interregnum that the communists made their first attempt to secure a measure of power. It is improbable that they ever imagined they could establish a viable "People's Republic"; but they certainly knew that the time had come for them to indulge in a propaganda offensive, and in doing so they achieved a fair measure of success. Bands of the M.P.A.J.A. with their attendant political

commissariat, converged on the smaller towns and villages, disarmed the police and established an administrative machine with all the trappings of a totalitarian regime. Persons accused of collaboration with the Japanese were brought before "people's courts" and were generally given short shrift....

However, by early December, the British administration was again functioning. The people were being fed, employment was being created and the currency restored. The Police Force was also re-established on a monolithic nation-wide basis and despite its lack of equipment and experience, was able to maintain law and order. On 4th December, the M.P.A.J.A. was disbanded with full ceremonial and panoply....

With the re-establishment of the civil government in 1946 the Federation began to address itself to the task of post-war rehabilitation. On the political front, however, the position remained confused. Many sections of the public had lost confidence in the power of Great Britain to guarantee the external defence of Malaya....

At this point we must of necessity discuss the dilemma in which the Chinese in Malaya again found themselves. The uproar which had been caused by the Malayan Union Constitutional proposals made it clear to them that never again could they rely on the traditional "live-and-let-live" attitude of the Malays, who had discovered a political consciousness. The Chinese with their quick intelligence realised that they could not look both inwards and northwards to China. But if they chose to look to the north, what then? China was in the throes of civil war, K.M.T. versus communism, and in such a situation neutrality was impossible as an intellectual exercise. It was unthinkable as a matter of practical politics. The M.C.P. was still in existence: now, in the flush of post-war liberalism, it had been given legal recognition, largely at the insistence of the new British Labour Government, which conceived itself as a bridge between socialist capitalism and socialist communism....

By obtaining a stranglehold on the Chinese vernacular press, the M.C.P. was able to broadcast their ideology and their veiled threats without fear of contradiction.

At this juncture it is possible to see more clearly the M.C.P.'s line of thought. True, the party had achieved a propaganda success; equally true, the M.P.A.J.A. was in no position at that time to defy the might of a still-mobilised United Kingdom. So be it. But was civil war the only means of creating the chaotic conditions in which communism could seize power? Might not equally chaotic conditions be created by the total disruption of the country's economy, dependent so extensively as it was on the rubber and tin industries? If dynamite might not be used to sabotage installations, was it not possible for industrial peace to be sabotaged by subversion and moral pressures?...

All that lacked was the machinery, and this was rapidly supplied by (of all people) the British Government. In 1940, the F.M.S. had enacted legislation encouraging the formation of trade unions in pursuance of the policy of the protecting power. Shortly after the resumption of civil government, this somewhat defective legislation was extended to the whole Federation at the instance of the Labour Government in Britain, which itself had largely secured power through the trade union movement. The beneficial attractions of responsible trade unionism are too well known to require justification, but what had worked in Britain might not necessarily suit Malaya's special needs. In this instance, such was the case. The Trade Union Ordinance was a comparatively uncomplicated law which vested almost complete discretion in the union itself as to the selection of officials and the election of its executive. Here was the chance the M.C.P. was so eagerly awaiting. They not only formed their own unions but managed to penetrate others which were well-intentioned but inexperienced. . . .

To organise the whole operation, the Party established under its direct control a Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions which was prepared to stop at nothing to wreck the industrial machine. . . .

Whilst industrial relations were going from bad to worse at a time when the free world needed every ounce of rubber and tin it could obtain to repair the ravages of war, a further event took place which in many ways marks the turning-point of this twilight economic war. The general policy of fomenting industrial unrest was formulated in London and underwritten in Calcutta in 1948 at two Cominform conferences convened . . . at the instigation of Soviet Russia. The M.C.P. was represented, and the delegates on their return duly reported back to the central committee. The upshot was a plenary conference at which the M.C.P. made what was probably its greatest mistake—it decided to resort to violence of every description. Nothing was ruled out: murder, intimidation, arson and terrorism generally were now the rule of the day and the means by which "anti-imperialist" activities would be conducted. . . .

The first six months of 1948 saw the revised policy of the M.C.P. being put into effect. Murder and arson was rife, particularly on rubber estates and tin mines. The European executives of these industries were perhaps the main targets, but by no means the only ones. Many Asians paid the penalty for failure to support the party "cause" . . .

Lenin once observed that the purpose of terrorism was to terrorise, and his disciples in Malaya undoubtedly proved his point. From this time on—particularly in outlying villages, estates and mines—the principle of "sealed lips" was observed for pure self-preservation. Murders in crowded streets and market-places were commonplace,

but few members of the public ever volunteered any information. The hands of the police were tied, and the forces of law and order found themselves in stalemate. . . .

On 16th June, 1948, the High Commissioner (Sir Edward Gent) declared that a state of emergency existed in the Sungei Siput area of Perak and in West-Central Johore; but conditions of banditry continued to spread and the Officer Administering the Government (Sir Alec Newbould [Gent having been killed in an air collision]) extended the state of emergency to the whole peninsula on 12th July. These declarations were made under the Essential Regulations Proclamation of the British Military Administration. The wheel had again turned through full cycle, and the M.C.P. was once again underground and outlawed as a subversive organisation. Its members styled themselves "The Malayan Peoples' Anti-British Army"; later, with unexpected finesse, they renamed themselves "The Malayan Races Liberation Army" (M.R.L.A.) and sought to monopolise "the struggle against Colonialism". Here they miscalculated—a spirit of genuine nationalism had in the meantime started to grow, and responsible Malayan leaders of a variety of political outlooks had little difficulty in seeing through the M.R.L.A.'s spurious pretensions. If the military action to subdue terrorism was the responsibility, basically, of the protecting power, the duty to create conditions under which communism could have no attractions for Malaysians lay squarely with the Federation Government: and from that time onwards, almost imperceptibly perhaps, the burden was assumed in ever-increasing measure by responsible Malayan leaders themselves. . . .

There is probably no activity so difficult to counter as widespread and sporadic forays by guerrillas. The very fact that the latter have no cohesive tactical command makes it virtually impossible to predict what will be the next target, when and where. A guerrilla leader himself often has little idea as to his next move, but as the initiative rests with him he is generally able to exploit any opportunity which comes his way with comparative impunity unless there is an enormous standing army to garrison all likely target areas, and this was most certainly not the position in Malaya in 1948. The Malay Regiment was still in the process of reforming, and reinforcements of British troops had yet to arrive. In any case, regular troops are not trained in the ordinary event to cope with "civil" unrest of this nature. Even if they had been, there did not exist the necessary intelligence network so vital to identify and attack enemy targets. . . . The Police Force likewise was still in the process of reforming. . . . Shortage of funds contributed *inter alia* to its apparent inability to meet, with the full requisite force, all the commitments with which it was suddenly confronted.

And yet, it contrived to meet its obligations. The military was given the doubtfully profitable role of harrassing the Communists whenever they could be detected and brought to battle. The police accepted liability for the finding of static guards for the vital points—the main industries—which the London and Calcutta Conferences had indicated as prime targets. To do this some thirty-thousand special constables were recruited and armed with such weapons as could be procured or made available. These men were almost wholly untrained, and the senior officers of the Police Force found themselves faced with an administrative problem (not to mention the operational one) far in excess of what they could reasonably hope to control....

New legislation to supplement the Essential Regulations was rushed through the Federal Legislative Council and became law on 7th July, 1948. The Emergency Regulations Ordinance gave very wide powers to the executive to make regulations which greatly affected the liberty of the individual. The Courts still retained their powers, but the principle of *habeas corpus* was restricted to the extent that the Government could place any person in protective detention for two years at a time if he was suspected of activities in support of the terrorists. This power was a harsh necessity, but not one which was harshly applied, even though many thousand people were detained over the next ten years. Most of the latter were known subversives and were detained pending an opportunity to ship them back to China, a slow process. Even so, the Emergency Regulations provided for a check on arbitrary detention or abuse of power: detained persons were entitled to have their case examined by a review committee consisting of a High Court Judge sitting with a panel of unofficials. This was an important safeguard, even though the public outside saw little of it—hearings were necessarily *in camera* to prevent the names of informers being communicated to the terrorists.

The Emergency Regulations made under the new Ordinance constituted a number of new penalties for offences. Death was prescribed for unauthorised carrying of arms, for consorting with armed terrorists, and for intimidation to secure comfort and assistance to the terrorists. Other serious offences became punishable with life imprisonment or less. Conviction for offences could however only follow the verdict of a court with proper jurisdiction, and the principle of a "drum-head" court-martial was never entertained by the Government; the rule of law always prevailed.

As time went on, other Regulations were made (fifty-three different sets came into existence between 1948 and 1953). These in general affected the daily activities of the great proportion of the population. Power was given to re-settle squatters; to control food-stuffs and the carriage of food; to create prohibited areas, where a person was liable to be shot on sight (this applied mostly to the

jungle fringes where the terrorists operated); to impose curfews, restrict residence or exclude individuals from specified areas; and so on. These repressive measures were unpalatable to government and public alike, but were nonetheless absolutely necessary to meet the crisis, and the public accepted them with a generous and understanding loyalty....

It would be interesting to peer into the mind of the new High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, when he took over the reins of government in September of 1948. He was faced with a formidable task. As Sir Henry was murdered three years later in an ambush we cannot gauge his innermost thoughts. We do know, however, that he saw the problem in a context of the future prosperity and independent status of the new nation which was being welded together; he was deeply conscious that pure police action by itself could never defeat the M.C.P.; political advancement running *pari passu* with economic development was an absolute necessity to prove to the people that their future was better ensured by a democratic process than under a totalitarian dictatorship. He also appreciated the need to secure the assistance of a really senior and experienced military officer: and Lt.-Gen. Sir Harold Briggs was persuaded to come out of his retirement to assist in the prosecution of the war.

The Gurney-Briggs combination was in many ways a remarkable one. These two men had between them a wealth of experience in different but complementary fields. Whilst Gurney the administrator took firm control of the governmental machinery, Briggs the soldier took over direction of the military and the paramilitary planning as Director of Operations.... [T]hey worked on approximately the following lines:

(1) The first step was to contain the Communists so far as possible whilst the police were strengthened and the sources of intelligence improved....

(2) Local security was to become the duty of Home Guards who would be trained and equipped to protect their kampongs and places of employment—the mines and the estates—and to complement the work of the military, the Police and the Special Constabulary. Many units were raised in various shapes and forms over the next four years, some of them on a semi-specialised basis. An interesting example of the latter was the Kinta Valley Home Guard, a force armed and equipped by the Government in 1952 but financed by the Chinese mining companies;

(3) Thirdly, the "squatter" problem had to be solved. These squatters were still living on the jungle fringes and were completely dominated by the M.C.P. and M.R.L.A.... There was only one answer—to resettle the nation's several hundred thousand squatters in areas where they could not only be protected, but where

the authorities could afford the facilities for social and economic development which were so sadly lacking. Here a calculated risk had to be taken—nobody likes to be compulsorily moved from the home he has built with the sweat of his own brow, and resettlement in new villages was likely to make the squatters even more intolerant of the Government and probably much more tight-lipped and intractable than hitherto; but the risk was adjudged to be justifiable in the long run, and the resettlement policy was adopted. Nonetheless, it was a bold decision and a costly one in terms of finance and manpower;

(4) As to phasing, resettlement and kindred operations would start in the south at the Singapore Causeway. As the "map was rolled up from south to north", so would the security forces be able to deal with the terrorists on more equal terms in the "killing grounds" on the jungle fringes. Concurrently with this, there would be a stringent control over the movement of foodstuffs and a rationing system would prevent supplies, notably rice, from being passed to the communists;

(5) All activities, whether administrative or operational were to be co-ordinated by committees at all levels, containing administrators, local leaders, soldiers and policemen. A Federal War Council would be established, with War Executive Committees at State and District level;

(6) Whilst all this was in progress, the High Commissioner would use his best efforts to commit the people to the side of the Government. One of the means he used was the enlargement of the Executive Council by the inclusion therein of Malayan leaders who would shoulder executive power as unofficials in charge of informal cabinet-like portfolios. . . .

Meantime, the policy of containment continued as more units of the Malay Regiment were raised and as reinforcements came not only from the United Kingdom but also from other parts of the Commonwealth. . . .

The brutal murder by the communists of Sir Henry Gurney in October 1951 reacted on the public in two ways. One was a feeling of general revulsion that so unassuming but capable an administrator, who had secured the trust of all who came into contact with him, should so callously have been liquidated. The other reaction was one of depression bordering on despair; Sir Harold Briggs had left the country some months earlier, broken in health; the nation felt itself to be without any form of political or military leadership, the main political parties as we know them today being still in a largely formative stage. It is however at this point that. . . General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed High Commissioner in January of 1952, and he not only assumed his gubernatorial duties but also took over the

detailed day-to-day command of all aspects of the Emergency. He also arrived armed with a *directif* issued by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London with Cabinet approval.

General Templer immediately addressed himself to the tasks before him with that incisiveness which has since become almost legendary. He endorsed the Briggs plan as not only viable but also as having the greatest likelihood of success. He also endorsed the Gurney principle that national responsibility could only come about by making Malaysians personally responsible for the conduct of Malaysian affairs, subject only to his over-riding discretion as co-ordinator and representative of the protecting power. . . . [P]olitics were invested with a new and urgent importance—on the political side at "parish pump" level there was enacted the Local Authorities Election Ordinance and the Local Councils Ordinance, both of which sought to make the people responsible, through their elected representatives, for their good local governance. Here, the people were being given a real voice . . . where it mattered most, in the New Villages and areas hitherto regarded as M.C.P. strongholds. At the same time, General Templer slightly adjusted the priorities of the Briggs Plan more to strengthen the Information Services and the intelligence network of the Police. He also lent his support to the new force of *nationalism* which was growing apace by encouraging the formation of multi-racial units in the armed forces—a factor which ran squarely beside the aspirations and platforms of most (if not all) of the newly-formed political parties. . . .

By the time General Templer had handed over his post to his deputy (Sir Donald MacGillivray) in 1954, the main threat of international communism had been broken; and the General was able to announce, to a cheering Legislative Council, that Her Majesty's Government no longer regarded the communist threat as a bar to the introduction of parliamentary elections or the achievement of Malaysian Independence. . . .

[A] consortium of the three largest parties—the United Malay National Organisation, the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress (all of which had started as racial organisations in 1945–1949) had now joined forces intent on destroying the communalism which had hitherto divided them. It is one of the more remarkable combines in a history, formerly running as it did on racial lines: race became of almost secondary importance, and national unity—a *Malayan* national unity—became the watchword. This watchword was not restricted to only one party, but was common to most. With the election in 1955 of the Alliance Party with an overall majority in the Legislative Council, together with an Executive Council which was but little removed from an ordinary Cabinet system, the new executive was in a position to meet the M.C.P. on its

own terms. An amnesty was now declared and all M.C.P. personnel were invited to surrender, but the results were thoroughly disappointing. The M.C.P. was not prepared to parley on the specious grounds that Malaya was not yet independent and the elected leaders could not truthfully be regarded as national and nationalist leaders. After an exchange of letters which was much publicised, the Chief Minister (Tunku Abdul Rahman) met the Secretary-General to the M.C.P. at Baling in Kedah to discuss terms. He was accompanied by the then Chief Minister of Singapore (Mr. David Marshall) and by that veteran Malayan Chinese statesman, the late Tun Tan Cheng Lock.

As had been anticipated, the Baling talks produced very little result. Chin Peng, the M.C.P. Secretary-General, insisted that the M.C.P. should be legitimised and allowed to participate fully in the political life of the country; he also insisted terrorists who surrendered should neither be detained nor even interrogated—he clearly wished to convert a military defeat into a political victory. The Government for its part was adamant that surrender should be unconditional although a number of assurances were given that surrendered terrorists would be treated with humanity and even with a measure of generosity. Deadlock was reached and the talks were broken off. Nevertheless, Chin Peng did give one interesting (if rash) undertaking: he affirmed that once Malaya was independent, the M.C.P. "would leave the jungle and lay down their arms". The Government representatives accepted this by agreeing to meet him again at any time if he was prepared to accept their conditions....

The next point in the political arena was reached when Tunku Abdul Rahman returned from London in February, 1956. He had successfully concluded an agreement with the British Government which not only immediately gave the Alliance Government control over internal security *but which also fixed the date for Independence for 31st August, 1957*. The Prime Minister immediately broadcast an appeal to Chin Peng and the terrorists to honour their side of the Baling understanding. No reply was received direct although certain influential members of the public received indirect communications from the jungle offering to negotiate *de novo*. This was clearly unacceptable, and the Prime Minister rejected these manoeuvres. Finally, Independence came exactly as scheduled, and the last vestige of excuse on the part of Chin Peng vanished—generous surrender terms were broadcast by radio and leaflet offering a waiver of prosecution for offences committed in connection with the Emergency. As this offer percolated throughout the jungle, surrenders increased—the rate had jumped from about eight per month for the first eight months of 1957 to some thirty-six per month during the first four months of Independence. Once again Chin Peng made a desperate attempt to parley on his own terms; once again the Prime Minister

repeated that unconditional surrender was the only measure he and the Government would accept. Chin Peng remained in the jungle, and there he is to this day—totally discredited as a man who could not or would not honour an undertaking....

Today, the forces of communism are roaming about somewhere on the Thailand frontier where they are being harassed by Malayan, Thai and Commonwealth forces. Their only aim is survival. From having once been a real menace, they are now (to use a Churchillian phrase) little more than a squalid nuisance....

With the declaration of His Majesty on 31st July, 1960, that the "state of emergency" had now ceased, the unpopular but most necessary Emergency Regulations which had for so long affected the day-to-day lives of the people were revoked.

VIII *The Independence Movement*

The following statement traces administrative and constitutional changes in Malaya from 1877 to 1957, providing a legal scholar's perspective on the Federation of Malaya Independence Act, 1957. It appears in *An Introduction to the Federal Constitution*, by R. H. Hickling. [Kuala Lumpur, [1962], 5-14.]

WHILE between 1895 and 1939 the pendulum of politics tended to swing first one way, then another, now in favour of a stronger central government and now in favour of decentralisation, the constitutional development of the Malay States proceeded at a more leisurely pace.

Legislatively speaking, the history of Malaya might be said to begin... in 1877, with the establishment in Perak, on September 11th of that year, of a State Council. This body, which originally consisted of the Ruler, the principal of Chiefs of the State, several leading Chinese, and the ubiquitous British Resident, as well as an Assistant Resident, was probably the first formal legislative body for any of the Malay States. In its origin can be seen the influence of the classical form of Crown Colony government developed throughout the British colonial empire, under which a Governor rules with the advice of a group of persons appointed to advise him. From the first, however, it appears that the State Council—which represented a form of constitutional government soon adopted by the other Malay States—combined both executive and legislative functions: although it must be remembered that both these functions were, in theory, advisory.

The State Councils, the predecessors of the present State Legislative Assemblies, were not in general the creation of any form of

written constitution. Indeed, until 1948 none of the Malay States (with the exception of Johore and Trengganu) possessed written constitutions, although in place of this they developed certain fixed constitutional conventions. Until 1896, for example, legislation in the Malay States was promulgated in the form of Orders in Council: but from 1896 until the present time all State laws have been styled "Enactments", as were all laws passed by the Federal Council of the Federated Malay States. Johore, however, by virtue of a Constitution granted in 1895 possessed an Executive Council as well as a State Council: while Negri Sembilan had, in theory at any rate, a State Council functioning as a kind of lower house, or House of Representatives, with an upper house consisting of the Yang di-Pertuan ("He who is made Lord", a title subsequently adapted to describe the Supreme Head of the Federation) the Ruling Chiefs and (it is almost needless to add) the British Resident.

* * *

At what might be called the Federal level there developed, in addition to the Federal Council of the Federated Malay States, two other important constitutional authorities whose influence is to be traced even to the present time. These were the Durbar of Rulers—a title indicating the historic influence of the old East India Company—and the Residents' Conference, which together constituted an informal kind of executive council or advisory body for the High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States. The Durbar of Rulers was presided over by the High Commissioner and attended by the Rulers of the Federated Malay States, their Residents and the Federal Secretary (whose office was the successor of that of Resident-General and the predecessor of that of the Chief Secretary and, finally, the Prime Minister), and gave the Rulers—who after 1909 had ceased to take part in the proceedings of the Federal Council—an opportunity to discuss matters of policy with the High Commissioner. The Residents' Conference constituted a similar kind of advisory body of which meetings were held whenever the Federal Council met in Kuala Lumpur—which since Federation was the Federal capital and headquarters of the Federal Secretariat.

These two conferences may be said to have survived, although in considerably altered form, in the Conference of Rulers and the Conference of Federal Executives. In 1946, by virtue of certain provisions of the Malayan Union Order in Council, 1946, there was to be established a Council of Sultans consisting of the Rulers of the nine Malay States, together with their senior civil servants, the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary, and presided over by the Governor of the Union. These particular provisions were never in fact brought into force, and in 1948, under Part VI of the

Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, there was established a Conference of Rulers possessing certain important functions set out in that Agreement. This body now survives as the *Majlis Rajah-Rajah* (Conference of Rulers)... As for the Residents' Conference, this has been succeeded by the Conference of Federal Executives, an informal but nevertheless powerful body attended by the *Mentri-Mentri Besar* and Chief Ministers of the States and the heads of various Federal departments, and presided over by the Prime Minister.

Such was the position obtaining in 1941, and in the period immediately following the three and a half years of the Japanese occupation.

By 1945 it had become clear to the British Government that some radical reform was necessary if Malaya was to be welded into a single effective political unit. In a White Paper presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Parliament of the United Kingdom in January, 1946 it was noted, in the excellent jargon of the civil service, that the increasing complexity of modern administrative, economic and social developments demanded a system of Government less cumbersome than that previously in force, one more adequate for large common services, and making better use of time and labour. It was considered that a return to the old position would be manifestly contrary to the interest of the territories and their inhabitants; that a stage had been reached when the system of Government should be simplified and reformed; and that the pre-war system would not, on a long view, lend itself to that political adjustment which would offer, through broad-based institutions in which the whole community could participate, the means and prospects of developing in the direction of responsible self-government. The White Paper—the principles of which had been worked out in London during the war years as part of the plan of general re-construction following the conclusion of hostilities—also recommended reforms in the political structure of other British territories in South-east Asia...

The first major change recommended was that the nine Malay States and the two Settlements of Malacca and Penang should be amalgamated into a Union to be called *Malayan Union*: a Union from which Singapore, which would be erected into a separate Colony, would for the time being be excluded...

The second major proposal lay in the creation of a *Malayan Union* citizenship, designed to create a broad base of citizenship which would include all those who could establish a claim by birth or a suitable period of residence to belong to the country...

In order to bring about the establishment of the *Malayan Union* the United Kingdom Government sent a British Officer, Sir Harold MacMichael, to Malaya, with directions to invite the co-operation of each Malay Ruler in the establishment of a fresh constitutional organisation of Malaya "intended to ensure and facilitate the pro-

gress of the people of the country towards unity and ultimate self-government within the British Empire". Sir Harold was not only authorised to conclude new agreements with each Ruler, but he was given the power to decide who was competent to sign on behalf of each State; he could, in other words, confirm a Ruler in his position or replace him with a candidate whose relations with the Japanese had been less close, or who was in other ways more acceptable to the British Government.

The British Emissary worked quickly and without publicity, and his immediate objective was successful, in that agreements were, between October 20th, 1945, and December 21st, 1945, concluded with the Rulers of all of the Malay States whereby it was agreed that His Britannic Majesty should have "full power and jurisdiction" within each State; the Straits Settlements Act, 1866, which had constituted the four Settlements of Singapore, Malacca, Penang and Labuan as a Colony, was repealed by an act of the United Kingdom Parliament, which enabled Singapore to be constituted as a separate Colony and Labuan to be annexed to North Borneo; while Penang and Malacca were combined with the Malay States within the Malayan Union by virtue of an Order in Council—the Malayan Union Order in Council, 1946—which came into force on April 1st of that year. . . .

In fact few of the provisions of the Order in Council were brought into force, and between 1946 and 1948 (when the Union was replaced by the Federation) all the laws, or *Ordinances*, of the Union were made by the Governor of the Union, in consultation with an Advisory Council consisting of the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary, together with such other persons as the Governor thought fit to appoint.

As for the proposals concerning Malayan Union citizenship, the Order in Council intended to create this was never in fact promulgated by reason of the fact that opposition to the proposals of 1946 relating to the Union—and in particular those relating to citizenship—gained ground throughout Malaya. For the consequence of the proposals for Malayan Union citizenship would have been the enfranchisement of a large proportion of, amongst other, the two million or more Chinese in Malaya. Altogether there arose in consequence what a White Paper called "a revulsion against what was regarded as a deprivation of sovereignty, and a continued fear of non-Malay domination as a result of the proposed new citizenship." Indeed, it was considered that the proposals would prejudice the special position of the Malays which it had been the object of all preceding treaties to preserve: and feeling became so vehement on this issue that the British Government had to withhold the bringing into force of all the provisions of the Constitution of the Union (as the Order in Council of 1946 may correctly be regarded), and to initiate legal discussions which led to the

replacement of the Malayan Union by the Federation of 1948. Even so, the British Government did not abandon its view that it was fundamental to introduce "a form of common citizenship open to all those, irrespective of race, who regarded Malaya as their real home and as the object of their loyalty"....

...[I]n July, 1946, a Working Committee was appointed by the Governor of the Malayan Union, the Rulers of the Malay States and representatives of the United Malays National Organisation, the largest Malay political party, to work out in detail "fresh constitutional arrangements, in the form of a provisional scheme which would be acceptable to Malay opinion, and which would provide a more efficient administration and form the basis of future political and constitutional developments".

Certain general principles were resolved in the course of the discussions of the Working Committee, and these have... a historic significance, as offering certain basic principles which afford a key to an understanding of the present Constitution. These principles were as follows:

- (i) There should be a strong central government, so as to ensure economical and effective administration of all matters of importance to the welfare and progress of the country as a whole.
- (ii) The individuality of each of the Malay States and of Malacca and Penang should be clearly expressed and maintained.
- (iii) The new arrangements should, on a long view, offer the means and prospects of development in the direction of ultimate self-government.
- (iv) With a view to the establishment of broad-based institutions necessary for self-government, a common form of citizenship should be introduced which would enable political rights to be extended to all those who regard Malaya as their real home and as the object of their loyalty; for as the subjects of the Rulers of the Malay States had no alternative allegiance or other country which they could regard as their homeland, they therefore occupied a special position and possessed rights which should be safeguarded.

It was at this time, as a result of discussion in the Working Committee, that the title of *Federation of Malaya* was conceived, a strict translation of the Malay title *Persekutuan Tanah Melayu*. This title was preferred to two others which were also the subject of considerable discussion, namely *Malayan Federal Union*—which was objected to because it did not put the necessary emphasis on the sovereignty of each individual part of the territory; and *Malayan Federation*, which was opposed by the Malay representatives on the ground that the word "Malayans" had come to mean people who had some association with Malaya, but did not include Malays. Neither of the two

rejected titles could, it was considered, be adequately translated into Malay.

The proposals of the Working Committee appeared to the British Government "to be calculated in general to achieve their own fundamental objects of essential cohesion and the basis for a common loyalty", and were conditionally approved by that Government, subject to further discussions to be held in the Federation. Accordingly in December, 1946, the Governor of the Union appointed a Consultative Committee consisting, mainly, of influential representatives of the non-Malay communities, which was instructed to invite the opinion of all interested individuals, communities and groups in Malaya on the proposals for a Federation, and to hold such sessions as might be necessary for that purpose.

In general the Consultative Committee found that most of the proposals for Federation were acceptable and, after consideration by the Advisory Council, further discussions were arranged with representatives of the Rulers and of the United Malays National Organisation.

From these discussions emerged a scheme for Federation acceptable to all concerned. The essence of the proposals was that the Malayan Union should be abolished and a Federation established by means of an Agreement; new State Agreements would be made with each of the Rulers and ratified by the State legislatures; and thereafter His Britannic Majesty would have jurisdiction in the Malay States only in respect of external affairs and defence, and for the purpose of appeals to the Privy Council—a condition which, in substance, is that now [1960] obtaining in the State of Singapore.

The Federation of Malaya came into existence on February 1st, 1948, and the method by which it was created may be summarised as follows:

First, the unhappy Malayan Union Order in Council, 1946, was revoked by the Federation of Malaya Order in Council, 1948, which prescribed constitutions for the Settlements of Malacca and Penang. Second, separate State Agreements were concluded between His Britannic Majesty and Their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States, under which the Ruler of each State agreed to govern his State subject to the provisions of a written constitution which would be in conformity with the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948. Third, an Agreement, the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, was concluded between His Britannic Majesty and Their Highnesses the Rulers, reciting that it seemed expedient that the Malay States and the Settlements "should be formed into a Federation with a strong central government and that there should be a common form of citizenship in the said Federation, to be extended to all those who regard the said Federation or any part of it as their real home and the

object of their loyalty". Fourth, the legislature of each Malay State passed enactments ratifying the provisions of the State Agreement and the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, and declaring that they should "have the force of law" throughout the State.

The Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, was more than an Agreement: it was in fact a formal federal constitution for the new Federation which, like the Malayan Union, consisted of the nine Malay States and the two Settlements. Indeed, it is interesting to compare the 1948 Federation with the 1946 Union. In the Union there was a Governor, appointed by His Britannic Majesty; in the Federation there was a High Commissioner, who represented both the Crown of the United Kingdom and the Rulers, appointed by a Commission from His Britannic Majesty. In the Union there were Executive and Legislative Councils, the latter designed to consist of the Governor as President, the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary, and such number of Official Members (not exceeding twenty-one) as His Britannic Majesty should direct; in the Federation there was an Executive Council which consisted of the High Commissioner and the same three *ex-officio* members, together with not less than twelve nor more than twenty-four members appointed by the High Commissioner; and the Federal Legislative Council was designed to consist of the High Commissioner as President, the same three *ex-officio* members as for the Executive Council, the President for the time being of each Council of State (or legislature) of the Malay States, and one representative of each of the Settlement Councils, together with eleven Official Members and fifty Unofficial Members. In the Union the Legislative Council could legislate "for the peace, order and good government of the Union", whereas it was intended that a State Council or a Settlement Council could make laws only on a subject declared by order of the Governor in Executive Council to be of a purely local nature, or in respect of which the Legislative Council of the Union had delegated powers of legislation to the State or Settlement concerned; but the Federal Legislative Council had power to legislate on some one hundred and forty-four subjects set out in the Second Schedule to the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948....

In the Federation there was a *Conference of Rulers* consisting of Their Highnesses the Rulers only, and having power to consider legislation to be introduced into the Federal Legislative Council and every new draft salary scheme or major amendment to an existing salary scheme of Federal public officers, and every draft scheme for the creation or major re-organisation of any department or service of the Federal Government; and the Conference had to be consulted upon the immigration policy of the Federal Government, and, in particular, upon any major change in that policy....

In one respect... there was a major difference: the Malayan Union contemplated the establishment in each of the Malay States of a Sultan's Advisory Council intended to advise the Ruler on all matters affecting Muslim religion and on the making of laws relating solely to "matters of Muslim religion" and not involving "the imposition, collection or remission of any tax or tithe". No similar provision existed in the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, nor is any parallel provision made in the Constitution of the Federation.

However, there exists in each of the former Malay States a Council to advise the Ruler on all matters affecting the Muslim religion and Malay Customs. These Councils have existed since 1948 when, under the various State Constitutions, power was given to the Rulers to establish such Councils...

It was not... any restriction on the powers of the States that led to *merdeka*... but rather a continuous pressure of political events having a multiplicity of origins. Citizens of the new Federation—a status that carried no international consequences whatever—could not be indifferent to the attainment of independence by the neighbouring State of Indonesia and (within the Commonwealth) by India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Furthermore, it was expressly stated in the preamble to the Agreement of 1948 that "progress should be made towards federal self-government" and that legislation should be introduced as soon as circumstances permitted for the election of members to the Federal Legislative Council, the Councils of State and the Settlement Councils.

That this was no mere pious hope was shown by the introduction of a "member" system in 1951, under which certain nominated members of the Legislative Council were made responsible for various departments and functions of Government. In 1952 the Federal Executive Council was expanded so that all Members with portfolios could become Members of the Executive Council, while in the same year new legislation provided for citizenship on a much wider basis than under the original provisions of the Agreement. Finally, in 1955 the Federal Legislative Council was reconstituted with, for the first time, an elected majority: and the Alliance (the major political party)... secured 51 of the 52 seats available for elected members at the elections of 1955. From its inception the new party emphasised its desire for the attainment of independence at the earliest possible date, and in January, 1956, a conference was held in London, attended by representatives of Their Highnesses the Rulers and the Alliance, as a result of which the basic principles upon which independence could be achieved were resolved. It was also agreed at that conference that an independent Constitutional Commission should be appointed "to make recommendations for a form of constitution for a fully self-

governing and independent Federation of Malaya within the Commonwealth".

It was decided that the Commission should be a small one, and that the chairman and one other member should be nominated by the United Kingdom, while Canada, Australia, India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate one member. Unfortunately it was not possible for the Canadian Government to make a nomination in time, and it was decided that the five members appointed by the other territories would be adequate. These consisted of the Rt. Hon. Lord Reid, LL.D., F.R.S.E., a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary; Sir Ivor Jennings, an expert on Commonwealth constitutional law; the Rt. Hon. Sir William McKell, K.C.M.G., Q.C., a former Governor-General of Australia; Mr. B. Malik, a former Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court; and Mr. Justice Abdul Hamid of the West Pakistan High Court.

The terms of reference for the Constitutional Commission, which was appointed in the name of Her Majesty the Queen and Their Highnesses the Rulers, were as follows:

"To examine the present constitutional arrangements throughout the Federation of Malaya, taking into account the positions and dignities of Her Majesty the Queen and of Their Highnesses the Rulers; and

To make recommendations for a federal form of constitution for the whole country as a single, independent, self-governing unit within the Commonwealth based on Parliamentary democracy with a bi-cameral legislature, which would include provisions for:

- (i) the establishment of a strong central government with the States and Settlements enjoying a measure of autonomy (the question of residual legislative power to be examined by, and to be the subject of recommendations by the Commission) and with machinery for consultation between the central Government and the States and Settlements on certain financial matters to be specified in the Constitution;
- (ii) the safeguarding of the position and prestige of Their Highnesses as constitutional Rulers of their respective States;
- (iii) a constitutional Yang di-Pertuan Besar (Head of State) for the Federation to be chosen from among Their Highnesses the Rulers;
- (iv) a common nationality for the whole of the Federation;
- (v) the safeguarding of the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities."

... The Commission embodied its recommendations in a report, together with a draft Constitution, which was formally submitted to

Her Britannic Majesty and Their Highnesses the Rulers on February 21st, 1957.

It had been agreed at the Constitutional Conference held in London in January, 1956, that full self-government and independence for the Federation within the Commonwealth should be proclaimed by August, 1957, if possible. In consequence, if the target date of August was to be achieved, there was only a matter of six months for the report and recommendations of the Constitutional Commission to be considered, settled and the final Constitution proclaimed by August 31st. A Working Party was appointed in the Federation to examine the report of the Constitutional Commission and this Party, consisting of the High Commissioner, four representatives of Their Highnesses the Rulers, four representatives of the Alliance Government, and the Chief Secretary and the Attorney-General, held a series of meetings between February 22nd and April 27th, and reported to the Conference of Rulers and to the Federal Executive Council by early May of that year. The report was at the same time being studied in the United Kingdom, and when the Working Party in the Federation had agreed upon its recommendations a delegation consisting of the High Commissioner, the Chief Minister (an office created as a result of the re-constitution of the Executive Council in 1955), the Attorney-General and representatives of Their Highnesses the Rulers and the Government of the Federation went to London to discuss the report and agree on the final details of the new Constitution. The draft Constitutions contained in the report of the Constitutional Commission were reviewed and amended both in substance and form, but basically the existing Federal Constitution follows the provisions of the draft Constitution recommended by the Constitutional Commission.

The machinery devised for bringing the new Constitution into force consisted of a new Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1957, revoking the previous Agreement of 1948 and containing (in the form of Schedules) the new Federal Constitution and the Constitutions of Penang and Malacca. In the United Kingdom the Federation of Malaya Independence Act, 1957, was passed, and an Order in Council was made under that Act giving the force of law to the constitutions set out in the Schedules to the Agreement of 1957, and revoking the Federation of Malaya Order in Council, 1948. In the Federation the Federal Constitution Ordinance, 1957, was enacted by the Federal Legislative Council and, in each of the Malay States, State Enactments were passed approving and giving the force of law to the Federal Constitution.

In such a way did the new Federal Constitution come into force on August 31st, 1957, with the Proclamation of Independence . . .

Chapter Ten

TOWARDS GREATER MALAYSIA

Six years after independence Malaya was preparing to federate with at least three of the territories—North Borneo (now being referred to increasingly as Sabah), Sarawak, and Singapore—of greater Malaysia. Economic progress was more rapid than the region had ever known, and Malaysia had achieved the second highest per capita income in Asia. In 1960 'The Emergency' had ended, and in 1962 the people of Singapore had voted for merger with Malaya. A process of Malayanisation in the civil service had eliminated most of the 'expatriates' (Europeans), and the service was operating efficiently with a staff drawn largely from the Malayan community. Rural development schemes were being pressed forward with speed and determination. New roads, and a growing use of telephone and radio communications, were binding the Peninsula increasingly into a single nation. Major changes in education, and increased emphasis on the use of Malay as the national language, together with an expanding economy, were helping to overcome communalism. But major problems remained: left-wing movements, often in sympathy with Communist China, remained strong in Singapore; the price of rubber and tin fluctuated and markets for both suffered from uncertainty over what the United States would do with the vast supplies of both commodities it had stockpiled during and after the Korean War. The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, an ultra-conservative, communal Malay group, captured the local governments of Kelantan and Trengganu; the Commonwealth of the Philippines laid claim to North Borneo; and in Brunei a local revolt demonstrated that the idea of a greater Malaysia by no means had major popular support there. Still, Malaysians had reason to be proud of their achievements and, with or without Brunei, the creation of the new nation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963, brought keen hopes for the future.

I *Independence*

The Proclamation of Independence was read by the Malayan Prime Minister on August 31, 1957. [Text from *Malayan Constitutional Documents*; ed. by R. H. Hickling, 2nd edition, vol. 1, Kuala Lumpur, 1962, 17-18.]

PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE

IN THE NAME OF GOD, the Compassionate, the merciful. Praise be to God, the Lord of the Universe and may the blessings and peace of God be upon his messengers.

AND WHEREAS the time has now arrived when the people of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu will assume the status of a free independent and sovereign nation among the nations of the world;

AND WHEREAS by an agreement styled the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1957, between Her Majesty the Queen and Their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States it was agreed that the Malay States of Johore, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perak and the former Settlements of Malacca and Penang should as from the 31st day of August, 1957, be formed into a new Federation of States by the name of Persekutuan Tanah Melayu;

AND WHEREAS it was further agreed between the parties to the said agreement that the Settlements of Malacca and Penang aforesaid should as from the said date cease to form part of Her Majesty's dominions and that Her Majesty should cease to exercise any sovereignty over them;

AND WHEREAS it was further agreed by the parties aforesaid that the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, and all other agreements subsisting between Her Majesty the Queen and Their Highnesses the Rulers or any one of them immediately before the said date should be revoked as from that date and that all powers and jurisdiction of Her Majesty or of the Parliament of the United Kingdom in or in respect of the Settlements aforesaid or the Malay States or the Federation as a whole should come to an end;

AND WHEREAS effect has been given in the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1957, by Her Majesty the Queen, Their Highnesses the Rulers, the Parliament of the United Kingdom and the Legislatures of the Federation and of the Malay States;

AND WHEREAS a constitution for the Government of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu has been established as the supreme law thereof;

AND WHEREAS by the Federal Constitution aforesaid provision is made to safeguard the rights and prerogatives of their Highnesses

the Rulers and the fundamental rights and liberties of the people and to provide for the peaceful and orderly advancement of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu as a constitutional monarchy based on Parliamentary democracy;

AND WHEREAS the Federal Constitution aforesaid having been approved by an Ordinance of the Federal Legislatures, by the Enactments of the Malay States and by resolutions of the Legislatures of Malacca and Penang has come into force on the 31st day of August, 1957, aforesaid;

Now in the name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful I, Tengku Abdul Rahman Putra ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Abdul Hamid Halimshah, Prime Minister of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, with the concurrence and approval of Their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States do hereby proclaim and declare on behalf of the people of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu that as from the thirty-first day of August, nineteen hundred and fifty-seven, the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu comprising the States of Johore, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, Perak, Malacca and Penang is and with God's blessing shall be for ever a sovereign democratic and independent State founded upon the principle of liberty and justice and ever seeking the welfare and happiness of its people and the maintenance of a just peace among all nations.

KUALA LUMPUR

31st day of August, 1957.

T. ABDUL RAHMAN

Prime Minister

II *The Malayan Economy*

The Federation government encouraged Malayan manufacturing by granting 'pioneer' status (a tax relief programme) to numerous new enterprises. Although Malaya remained dependent on imports for heavy manufactured goods, by 1963 she was filling many of her own needs in lighter goods. Rubber and tin remained at the base of the Malayan export economy, and while rubber had experienced an exceptional 'boom' during the Korean War, by the 1960's the price had fallen and synthetics were posing a major challenge. The following readings view the mid-century economy. Reading (a) summarizes the first five years of economic growth and outlines the Second Five-year Plan. [*The Sunday Times*, Singapore, 1st July 1962.] Reading (b) reviews the state of the rubber industry in 1954 in Malaya. [*Report of the Mission of Enquiry into the Rubber Industry of Malaya*, 1954, Kuala Lumpur, 1954, 4-7.] Reading (c) describes an effort to resolve the problem of American stockpiles. [*The Malay Mail*, Kuala Lumpur, 2nd July 1962.] Reading (d) summarizes the general

situation in tin and rubber in 1962. [*The Straits Times*, Singapore, 31st August 1963.]

Reading (a)

IN less than five years, independent Malaya has made remarkable progress in trade expansion and industrial production. Imports have expanded by more than 45 per cent and exports by 13 per cent over the total six years ago.

Statistics show that 5,000 Malayan establishments now produce goods with a total value of more than one and a quarter billion dollars.

They employ 60,000 full-time workers and more than 5,000 part-timers, who receive a total of \$90 million in wages.

The speed of Malaya's economic development is increasing rapidly, with more foreign investments coming in and more industrial sites being opened up.

Already 94 new factories with a total nominal capital of \$300 million have been set up and granted pioneer status. They employ about 10,000 people, and produce 133 types of products.

Just over 50 per cent of the capital comes from Australia, the Bahamas, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Formosa, Germany, Holland, Hong Kong, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States.

The effect is that Made-in-Malaya goods are not only finding local markets, but are also opening new ones in foreign countries, especially in Ceylon and the Persian Gulf area.

The goods include torchlights, car batteries, pharmaceutical products, canned tunas and canned pineapples.

With increased exports of rubber and tin, Malaya is in the happy position of enjoying a favourable trade balance every year.

Of course, the trade balance varies, depending on the year's imports and exports. For Malaya's exports are mainly made up of primary commodities, with 60 per cent rubber and 20 per cent tin.

Other main export commodities are palm oil, coconut oil, timber and canned pineapples.

Malaya's imports consist mainly of foodstuffs and consumer goods, such as textiles, chemicals, machinery and transport equipment.

Malaya's Second Five-Year Plan, drawn up under the guidance of United Nations experts, calls for capital investments totalling \$5,050 million between 1961-65.

Of this, \$2,150 million will be spent on the public sector. Industrial, agriculture and land development will take \$572.3 million.

A total of \$2,900 million is expected to come from the private section of business and commerce.

The plan envisages an increase of national output by an additional 25 per cent to take care of a population growing at the rate of 3.5 per cent a year.

It also expects to provide employment for an additional 340,000 people, and to accommodate an additional 200,000 children in schools.

Reading (b)

IN Malaya, as in most other countries, rubber producing units are divided, somewhat arbitrarily, into "estates" and "smallholdings". The estates have lands aggregating not less than 100 acres planted with rubber, or set apart for planting with rubber, and owned by one company, individual or group. The smallholdings are the remaining units, and are sometimes divided into those of less than 25 acres and "medium holdings" of 25 to 99.9 acres. The following table sets out briefly the distribution of acreage and production between smallholdings and estates of various sizes. The numbers of smallholdings and estates are not directly comparable, since, whereas most estates are run largely as separate units, the numbers of smallholdings relate to "lots" of land and many smallholders manage more than one "lot".

MALAYA 1953

ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION OF RUBBER

	NUMBER OF HOLDINGS OR LOTS	NUMBER OF ESTATES	PLANTED ACREAGE per cent.	PRODUCTION per cent.
SMALLHOLDINGS				
Less than 25 acres	385,208	—	37	33
25 - 99.9 acres	7,274	—	9	7
TOTAL	392,482	—	46	40
ESTATES				
100 - 999 acres	—	1,886	14	12
1000 - 2999 acres	—	454	20	24
3000 - 4999 acres	—	96	10	12
5000 acres and over	—	53	10	12
TOTAL	—	2,489	54	60
TOTAL	392,482	2,489	100	100

Sources - *Rubber Statistics Handbook for 1953* and *Surveys of Estate, Small and Medium-Holdings by the Joint Working Party.*

Estates have to submit regular returns to Government and, particularly after 1934, when the rubber restriction scheme was introduced, the figures for estate production, planted area, tapped area, etc., may be taken to be reasonably accurate, but it must be remembered that a small estate may not actually register itself as such, and so not send in returns. The provisions of the Replanting Ordinance have brought

many such cases to light. During 1952 and 1953, the total number of new estates registered was 251 with an acreage of 52 thousand acres.

* * *

The measurement of the main changes in total production is, however, reliable, and it is possible to make comparisons with changes in average annual production elsewhere.

PRODUCTION OF NATURAL AND SYNTHETIC RUBBER

<i>Three-year Period centred on:</i>	MALAYA (INCLUDING SINGAPORE)	INDONESIA (N.E.I.)	OTHER COUNTRIES	WORLD TOTAL	
				<i>Natural rubber</i>	<i>Synthetic rubber</i>
				<i>thousand tons</i>	
1924	182	167	102	451	—
1936	414	350	210	974	—
1948	672	381	372	1,425	510
1953	573	704	457	1,739	840
				<i>per cent. of total</i>	
1924	40	37	23	100	—
1953	22	27	18	67	33

Before World War II, the main competitor of Malaya was Indonesia. Now the main competitor, both of Malaya and other tropical producing countries, is the synthetic industry. In recent years Malaya has been supplying only 22 per cent. of the total new supplies in the world market, whereas in the middle 1920's she supplied 40 per cent. This is a large and significant change, due mainly to the rise of synthetic production. But it is also to be noted that Malaya's share of the total new supplies of natural rubber alone has fallen to 33 per cent., as compared with 40 per cent. in the middle 1920's. This decline is due mainly to the fact that Malaya's trees are now older and less productive, in comparison with those of other tropical countries as a group, and to the fact that her planted area has increased less proportionately since the 1920's.

The decline of Malaya's output in recent years is noteworthy. Yearly production in the Federation has fallen from 670 thousand tons in 1949, by which year the flush production due to resting during the Japanese occupation may be considered to have been over, to 575 thousand tons in 1953. Estate production fell 59 thousand tons (15 per cent.); and smallholding production, 38 thousand tons (14 per cent.). On the estates the yield of the tapped area fell from 541 to 473 lbs. an acre, that is by 13 per cent. and most of this seems to have been experienced on the area of ordinary seedling trees, which are much older than the "high-yielding material". The area of tappable mature trees has decreased by 4 per cent. mainly because some of this area

was replanted, but a slightly higher proportion of the tappable area was actually tapped. The tapped area has decreased by only 2 per cent. The main cause of the fall in production on estates seems, therefore, to have been the decline in yields with ageing of the older trees. The same influence has undoubtedly also been at work on the smallholdings, although there, changes in yield cannot be correctly measured because the data on acreages are not sufficiently accurate. Overall, the decline in yields has been approximately the same as would be expected from ageing alone. . . .

... [O]n estates, neither the Korean boom in prices, nor the Emergency, very greatly influenced average yields per acre nor the proportion of the total tappable area tapped. On smallholdings, however, the intensity of tapping, and probably also the proportion of the total trees tapped, increased markedly in 1950 and to a lesser extent in 1951. But the main underlying determinant of trends in production is the ageing of the trees.

Malaya cannot, however, afford anything but a vigorous and progressive rubber industry. The importance of it in her general economy is well known. The number of workers employed by estates in 1953 was 280 thousand, equivalent to 56 per cent. of the total recorded "employed" population. Adding those employed on smallholdings, the total number of rubber workers must be well over half a million. The total wages bill of rubber estates in 1953 was over \$200 million, and, in addition, the labour earnings of workers on smallholdings, apart from the returns on trees and equipment, may be estimated as about \$150 million.¹ Of the gross national product, it has been calculated that the rubber industry was *directly* responsible for about 16 per cent. before the Korean war. For 1950 the figure was 33 per cent., being exceptionally high because of the very high prices for rubber. But the full importance of rubber in the economy is even greater than these *direct* contributions suggest. From the standpoint of the Federation's balance of international payments, it may be noted that, in 1952, exports of rubber and latex were \$1,287 million, equivalent to fully 60 per cent. of total exports. It is no exaggeration to say that if the rubber industry were to be allowed to fall into irretrievable senility Malaya's present type of developing economy would collapse.

The Malayan rubber producer has now to compete, not with his opposite number in other countries of South-East Asia, but with the industrialists and scientists of the U.S.A., Germany, and other countries. In the past, the question has been how to raise the price of natural rubber to cover costs. Now the question is how to lower costs to bring them below the likely prices of synthetic rubber in the future.

¹ In 1962 the international rate of exchange made one Malay dollar equal to 33 cents, United States, or 2 shillings 4 pence British.

Productive capacity and costs in other countries producing natural rubber are no longer of any great importance to Malaya unless we can assume that the production of these countries can be increased to such an extent and their costs brought so low, as to drive not only Malayan rubber but also synthetic rubber out of the market. Such a possibility can be dismissed, with some confidence. The possibility of 'over-production' in Malaya is considerable only if costs of production cannot be reduced to levels at or below those for synthetic rubber. Malaya can do nothing to alter the cost of synthetic rubber, she can only conform to it.

In this report, therefore... there is really only one main question—"Is it possible to increase Malaya's output of rubber, or must we resign ourselves to a gradual decline and eventual decay?" On the answer to that question Malaya's future very largely depends.

Reading (c)

THE United States Government has agreed to make two modifications to its releases of national stockpile rubber, in the interest of eight natural rubber producing countries.

This agreement was reached at consultations held in Washington [in June, 1962] and attended by representatives from Malaya, Indonesia, Ceylon, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Nigeria and Liberia...

At the moment, America limits her disposal of stockpile rubber to the sale of 5,000 tons a month at prices above US 28 cents a lb.

One of the modifications reached was that America would give away, under the United States aid programme, rubber amounting to 12,000 to 15,000 tons a year which would be counted as additional to the present disposal limit.

The important point... was that this extra 12,000 to 15,000 tons would not come onto the market and at the same time would help to reduce the American stockpile.

The second modification was that in future the United States Defence Department would change the specification in the ratio of natural to synthetic rubber used for the manufacture of tyres.

At present, only 10 per cent of natural rubber and 90 per cent of synthetic is being used for the manufacture of tyres for the Defence Department.

The proposed change will result in 60 to 70 per cent natural rubber being used, and the remainder synthetic, for the making of tyres required by the Defence Department.

This means that the United States Defence Department will consume an additional 24,000 tons of natural rubber every year...

This additional rubber will be taken from the stock pile and will not go onto the market, causing price fluctuations...

The United States Government agreed...to try out these two modifications for a few months on a trial basis.

Reading (d)

ALL the States of the coming Federation of Malaysia have a common interest in rubber. On it for many years to come they must depend for about half their joint export income. Fortunately it still shows plenty of bounce...

Malaysia's strongest partner is additionally highly dependent on exports of refined tin of the world's highest quality. Tin provides about one-third of the export income brought in by rubber, and far behind follow iron ore, palm oil, copra and timber.

In Malaya, both tin and rubber bear very high taxation for, in addition to the 40 per cent tax on company profits, they incur heavy export duties.

This year [1962], for instance, the export duty on an estimated 58,000 tons of tin will bring in close to \$70 million, and this month duty of more than five cents is being paid on every pound of rubber exported.

Malayan ports and Singapore export more than a million tons of rubber every year, much of it on behalf of surrounding territories, as Singapore is such a convenient port.

Tin exports, which pass mainly through Penang, exceed Malayan production by about 20,000 tons a year because of the Indonesian, Burmese and Thai tin ore that comes to Malaya for smelting.

It is obvious how much the new nation will depend on two basic commodities. Both face serious challenges, but in the meantime they should provide a vital financial breathing space for the states of Malaysia to advance the urgent tasks of diversification into new lines of agriculture and industrialization.

Both these commodities are much under the shadow of huge stocks built up in the United States before and during the Korean War and now affected by revised estimates of the duration of future wars and thus the quantities of strategic materials required to fight them, assuming supplies were cut off.

Of the United States stock of 350,000 tons of tin—some of it, we have recently learned, of very poor quality—164,000 tons has been declared surplus, and the U.S. Congress has authorised the phased sale of 50,000 tons of this.

The United States at the end of the year had a stock of 1,020,000 tons of natural rubber, of which 342,000 tons had been declared excess to strategic requirements. Senator [S.] Symington, chairman of the stockpile inquiry, said early this year that of all stockpile surpluses, "none is more burdensome than our surplus of natural rubber".

Let us examine the outlook for these two commodities in more detail.

Rubber

Natural rubber has two great competitors at the moment, first the synthetic rubber industries developed as a matter of necessity during the war, all major suppliers except Ceylon having fallen into Japanese hands, and second the surplus American stocks.

The United States is by far the largest consumer of rubber and tin, but synthetic rubber accounts for nearly three-quarters of American consumption.

All over the world synthetic plants are being established and an ominous sign recently was the news of Russian progress in this direction. Russia was the biggest buyer of Malayan rubber last year and has been running second to the United States this year.

Overseas countries have good reasons for establishing these plants. First they save foreign exchange. Second they make them independent of political threats to supplies of natural rubber, which are concentrated in South-East Asia. They provide domestic employment and, perhaps most of all, they help mop up the current overproduction of oil.

For the basic ingredients of synthetic rubber are petro-chemicals. Russia has so much spare oil that she is now exporting it, hence her interest in synthetic rubber. Oil is in surplus everywhere, at least for the present.

But there is a curious discrepancy. Synthetic factories in the United States have been reported selling only about 60 or 70 per cent of their production, while the world's rubber plantations are able to sell every pound they grow, albeit at prices little more than two-thirds what they enjoyed in 1960.

One reason for this is that the synthetics that most closely duplicate natural's qualities are in small, though rapidly increasing, production.

A leading rubber grower has said: "The main field of competition in the fight for survival is not so much between natural and synthetic but rather within their own fields. High-yielding natural rubber produced at a low cost with a high standard of cleanliness and quality and in accordance with manufacturers' specifications will have the best chance of survival.

"Similarly the new stereo rubbers with their improved qualities and, in due course, reduced costs will replace largely the present conventional synthetic rubbers."

Another has quoted calculations that the cost of land, buildings and plant capable of producing a given tonnage of synthetic rubber almost exactly equals the present cost of bringing into full bearing with

equipment an acreage capable of producing an equivalent quantity of plantation rubber.

He has quoted expert opinion that a modern high yielding plantation would have an economic life of 30 years and a synthetic plant probably less: "There are indications that there may not be continuance of the inter-company rivalry which has probably resulted in a large excess of plant construction which may have to work uneconomically as a result of over-production.

"Today there is little sign of over-production of plantation rubber, and growers find it difficult to quarrel with the lower price level for the commodity now ruling."

"The overproduction of synthetic substitutes makes a runaway price for plantation rubber impossible, and this in its turn will discourage any large projects on the part of the oil and chemical companies."

Both these statements used the term "high yielding." Between the wars 500 lb. an acre would have been regarded as high yielding. One thousand lb. by today's standards makes an estate "high-yielding", and figures two, three and four times that have been achieved with the new clones. . . .

Rubber growers are now resigned to lower prices and even welcome them as the best means of keeping their product saleable. High yielding strains by producing so much more per acre greatly reduce the cost per pound.

Good estates have little to fear, but for those among both small-holders and estates who have ignored repeated appeals to replant (with Government aid) hard times surely lie ahead. . . .

The second challenge mentioned earlier is the United States rubber stockpile. Disposals have been in progress for a long while and it has been shown statistically that they have had little effect on rubber prices.

The U.S. has been selling 5,000 tons a month and Britain 1,000 tons from a stock now standing at about 17,000 tons. Additionally the U.S. is requiring Government agencies to draw on the stockpile, and one result is that the Defence Department has increased the proportion of natural rubber in the tyres of military vehicles. Heavy duty tyres demand a high proportion of natural because of its better resistance to heat.

Deterioration in storage is one reason for the American desire to run down this stockpile and there is still considerable anxiety as to their future intention.

Tin

Unlike rubber, whose properties have been synthetically dupli-

cated, there is no known substitute for tin as such. In many uses it is quite unchallenged.

It has been estimated that about $7\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of tin goes into every car produced by the world's currently booming motor industries.

The greatest single user, however, is the tinplating industry, principally in containers for foods and beverages, in which it faces competition from bottles, aluminium and plastics.

The tinplate industry is fighting back vigorously and even increasing its capacity. It has produced a "thin tin" to counter the weight advantage of aluminium, and its research has evolved a method of successfully canning acidic fruit juices.

Cans are easier to store and stack than bottles, they do not break and they do not have to be returned after use.

Electrolytic tinning has greatly reduced the amount of tin used in the old hot-dipping method of tinplate manufacture but, in spite of the minor fraction that tin represents of the cost of a can, the United States steel companies have shown a not unnatural desire for lower tin prices.

Everything now known suggests that demand for tin will continue at a high level into the remote future.

A short-term complication is the pressure to run down the U. S. tin stocks and for a year past a heated debate has been in progress with the producing countries which feel that, having endured several very lean years when exports were restricted, they should not now be deprived of the compensatory higher prices brought about by revived demand.

Some official U.S. spokesmen have questioned the wisdom of disposals when the U.S. is heavily committed to maintaining the tin-based economy of Bolivia, America's closest source of tin, and the world's highest-cost producer.

They have urged the U.S. to regard the stockpile as a national asset, insuring against an interruption of future supplies and providing a means of preventing runaway prices should a shortage of supplies follow an increase in consumption.

In the free world the outlook is for tightening supplies. Malaya is increasingly having to work low-grade deposits and to rework old ground previously mined by the less efficient methods of the past.

Dredging is the most profitable method of mining but not necessarily the most efficient, and dredges, having to work to planned courses, tend to leave small pockets of ore-bearing land behind, particularly where limestone pinnacles may damage the machinery.

The Chinese mines, which produce about 40 per cent of the nation's output, largely from such pockets, are much more vulnerable to changes in the tin price.

The greatest remaining supplies seem to be left in Bolivia, but the

entire Bolivian industry is "marginal" by Malayan standards and the Bolivians have repeatedly pleaded that they need a price of at least £1,000 a ton to make a profit. Their mining is carried out underground, at high levels in the mountains and in ground about half the assay of Malayan tin ore.

A mystery in tin affairs is the production from China and there are no reliable figures since the Communist take-over. East Europe has very little domestic tin and it has been believed that the greater part of Chinese tin has gone to Russia, though some has found its way to the West.

III *The National Language*

In Malaya encouragement was given to fostering Malay as the National Language. A language institute, the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, was established; civil service examinations were given in Malay; and school and adult classes were intensified. The following selections describe (a) the beginnings of the Department of Malay Studies at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. [R. Roolvink, *Malay Studies: An Inaugural Lecture*, Kuala Lumpur, 1962, 3-4. Roolvink was Professor of Malay Studies at the University of Malaya at the time]; and (b) and (c), the use of National Language Months to bring the goal of a Malay-speaking nation by 1967 closer to reality. Lively debates over the use of English, over the development of Malay literature, and over the extension of Malay to the Borneo territories, marked the early 1960's. [*Sari Berita, Weekly Digest of the Malayan Press*, II, 19 July 1962, 2-3, and 23 August 1962, 2, respectively.]

Reading (a)

IT was the British who first made a serious study of Malay and Malay literature—scholars like William Marsden, John Leyden, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, John Crawfurd, followed by men like W. E. Maxwell, R. J. Wilkinson and R. O. Winstedt, to mention a few names only. . . .

A great many of the scholars and students of Malay in the past were officials of the colonial governments, while the study of Malay and research into it at university level was done outside the area of the Malay language itself, although there was always research in the field, too. . . .

At present there exists a University of Malaya, and it is very appropriate that a number of years ago it was made possible to study, and carry out research into, the Malay language in the University of Malaya in the Malay Studies Department. It was the first Head of

Department, Dr. Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad, the well-known Malay Pendita, who laid the basis for this department and began its development. Without the persistent and magnificent efforts of Za'ba it would have been impossible for the department of Malay Studies to continue developing as far as it has to-day.

The establishment of a Malay Studies Department in the University of Malaya was appropriate for still other reasons. That the Federation of Malaya is the very area for the study of the Malay language does not need to be argued, and apart from this, such a department is a *conditio sine qua non* for a University of Malaya to develop a truly Malayan character and to firmly establish itself with its roots deep in its own country.

Reading (b)

THE Minister of Commerce and Industry, Enche Khir Johari, speaking at a meeting of leaders of Commerce and Industry in connection with the promotion of the National Language at the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, said:-

The second phase of the National Language Month this year [1962], from 21st July until 18th August, is a continuation of the efforts which the Government first initiated in 1960 to introduce the use of the National Language in all phases of life in this country.

The Constitution of the Federation provides that the National Language will be the sole language for Government administration by 1967. Government does not see any reason why this target date should not be achieved and it has therefore adopted the principle of gradualness in introducing the use of the National Language. This evolutionary introduction of the use of the National Language is, we feel, the most realistic approach to the problem, as it will allow the multi-racial people of this country to be acquainted over a period of time with the National Language. The Government policy is therefore to introduce the use of the National Language by persuasion rather than by force, although there is nothing, of course, to prevent the introduction of legislation to make it compulsory to use the National Language. I hope and I believe that this will not be necessary, for we in this country have a tradition of relying on mutual understanding and co-operation rather than on the force of law.

Commerce and industry form one of the biggest and most important sectors of our daily life, and through this sector many prominent and influential people could exercise their influence. Its influence on our national life is tremendous because of its contacts with people of all walks of life through the products that are bought and sold and through the advertisements which persuade or exhort these people to buy the products. It is, therefore, inevitable that whatever is done

in this sector will have repercussions throughout the community which look towards this sector for their welfare and prosperity. Your usage of the National Language will accordingly have wide-felt effects in the outlook of the people towards the National Language.

By 1967, the Government will have made use of only the National Language in its daily administration. This will mean that regulations regarding trade and industry will also be made in this language. Trade information and news will also be circulated in this medium. In fact in so far as all communication between the public and the Government is concerned, the National Language will be the only medium used. By introducing the National Language gradually into your daily activities, you will not only help the Government to implement its policy, but you will also find that when the time comes for the National Language to take over, the change-over will be smooth and without any serious disruption of business.

It is not the Government's intention to ask you to replace your own language with the National Language, but what the Government does ask of you is to give the National Language... its pride of place in your daily activities. I would like to see, for example, sign-boards of offices, shops and factories giving prominence to the National Language by placing it at the top in bold letters, followed if necessary at the bottom by other languages in smaller letters.

Our National Language is still a developing language and one which is undergoing a steady process of growth. Your cooperation and support for it will in effect be an important encouragement and contribution to its growth. As the Language will ultimately be one of the main factors binding the peoples of this country together, and perhaps of Malaysia, you will realise the implications of the support that I am seeking from you...

Reading (c)

THE Yang di-Pertuan Agong has criticised Malaysians who speak Malay only during the National Language Month. Immediately after each campaign is over they revert to the other languages.

His Majesty was speaking at ceremonies marking the end of the second phase of *Bulan Bahasa Kebangsaan* at the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.

Criticising Malays who do not help to encourage the use of the language, the King said, "In promoting the use of the National Language the Malays should not be ashamed to use their own language at any time. As Malays it is their duty to take the lead and to encourage the non-Malays to learn the National Language."

His Majesty expressed confidence that Malay would be the sole

official language of the country by 1967—the target date stipulated in the Constitution.

"If everyone of us realised his responsibilities the language policy could be fully implemented before the target date," he said.

According to the King, there were several ways to promote the National Language among the people in this country. He urged that more books should be published in the National Language so as to cater for the needs of those learning the language. Every effort should be made to improve the standards of Malay songs and dancing as well as production of films in the Malay language because they were important for the promotion of national consciousness.

The King said that he was very much impressed by the standard of proficiency in the National Language attained by the non-Malay participants in the various competitions.

Earlier, the Chairman of the Central Organising Committee, Tuan Syed Nasir bin Ismail, said that it was planned to hold the National Language campaign next year [1963] to last for a longer period. The duration would be increased by one month each year so that by 1967 it would be possible to use the National Language throughout the year. He expressed the hope that next year's language campaign would include the territories which would be joining the new Federation of Malaysia.

IV Singapore and Merger

The idea of a closer union of the Malaysian territories was first suggested by the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in an address to the Foreign Correspondents' Association of South-East Asia in May, 1961. Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, lent his support in June, and later that month the British Commissioner-General in South-East Asia, Lord Selkirk, talked with the British Governors of Sarawak (Sir Alexander Waddell) and North Borneo (Sir Willian Goode) and the British High Commissioner in Brunei (Mr. H. C. White). In November the British government gave its support to the proposal. In the meantime the Prime Ministers of Malaya and Singapore had held an August meeting during which they reached agreement on the proposal for merger. Lee Kuan Yew immediately began to wage his 'battle for merger' in Singapore, where leftist elements opposed any union with Malaya because of the Federation's tight control over internal security. The following reading (a) is taken from the first of a series of twelve radio talks Lee made at the beginning of the long debate in September 1961. Ultimately his methods were successful, for in 1962 Singapore held a

State-wide referendum and voted overwhelmingly for merger. [Lee Kuan Yew, *The Battle for Merger*, Singapore, 1962, 4-7.] Reading (b) is taken from *Current Notes on International Affairs*. [Canberra, XXXIII, September 1962, 65.]

Reading (a)

Soon you will have to decide on your future. In the next few months we shall settle the constitutional arrangements for merger. . . .

Everybody knows that merger is inevitable. The Tungku has said merger is inevitable. The P.A.P. have also said that merger is inevitable. The Communists also admit that merger is inevitable. The inevitable is now happening. Some people can try to postpone the inevitable. But no one can stop it. The artificial division at the Causeway is a temporary one. It is only a matter of time before it is swept aside.

No political party, no one, has dared to raise his voice against merger. But you will see that quite a number of political parties and persons are deliberately being difficult about the terms and conditions in order to frustrate and delay merger between our two territories for as long as they can. It is our duty to put all the facts before you so that you can decide in full knowledge of the truth.

Merger is going to take place not just because it is the desire of the P.A.P. or merely because it is the wish of the Federation Alliance government. It is as inevitable as the rising and setting of the sun. The two territories are so intertwined and interwoven in their economic, political and military complex that no man can keep up the artificial barrier at the Causeway for long.

If merger does not come with the consent of the people of the two territories, then inevitably it will come by the use of force by one territory over the other, because each is vital to the survival of the other.

Everyone knows the reasons why the Federation is important to Singapore. It is the hinterland which produces the rubber and tin that keep our shop-window economy going. It is the base that made Singapore the capital city. Without this economic base Singapore would not survive.

Without merger, without a reunification of our two governments and an integration of our two economies, our economic position will slowly and steadily get worse. Your livelihood will get worse. Instead of there being one unified economic development for Malaya, there will be two. The Federation instead of co-operating with Singapore will compete against Singapore for industrial capital and industrial expansion. In this competition both will suffer.

But Singapore will suffer more, because we have less resources to fall back on. We have no rubber and tin, no large land mass. For 140 years we have grown, developed and prospered because we bought and sold for the Federation. Through Singapore they imported what they wanted from the outside world. Through Singapore they sold their rubber and tin.

Merger means that there will be one integrated economic development, and that the wasteful duplication of facilities in the two territories will come to an end. We have an international airport at Paya Lebar. The Federation is also building an enormous airport costing \$50 million near Kuala Lumpur. But no international airline wants to land its aeroplanes in two such short stops—Kuala Lumpur and Singapore which are 250 miles from each other.

We have an international rubber market in Singapore. The Federation were on the point of setting up their own rubber market to compete with Singapore and take away Singapore's business. With a Singapore separated from the Federation, we will be cutting each other's throats.

Shell Co. has just built an oil refinery at Pulau Bukom in Singapore. Shell is compelled by the artificial division at the Causeway to build one twice as big at Port Dickson in the Federation. There are many such examples.

If we delay merger, Singapore will be restricted in its economic expansion. People here will get worse off, with less income, less employment. They will drift back to the Federation. Half of our population in Singapore has come from the Federation because of the prosperity of Singapore. If that prosperity disappears as a result of unequal competition with the Federation, the reverse process will take place and people will drift from a stagnating Singapore to an expanding Federation.

We cannot survive alone. If we delay merger, everyone of us, no matter whether you are a worker, hawker, clerk, technician or businessman, will suffer. There will be less business. There will be less profits. There will be less pay. There will be fewer jobs.

Now let me tell you why Singapore is vital to the Federation. There is no conceivable way in which Singapore can be completely cut off from the Federation. The Causeway and the Straits of Johore are not the Maginot Line. No iron, rubber or coconut curtain is possible between us. What happens in Singapore must affect the Federation. From Singapore the Federation can be undermined. Singapore is vital to the security and survival of the Federation.

Let me give you an example. In 1960 when a Soviet mission came to Singapore to attend the ECAFE conference, there was a great deal of unhappiness in the Federation because the Russians wanted to set up a rubber-buying mission in Singapore. For the rubber-buying

mission could very easily become a centre for intensive political activity against the Federation.

Singapore saw it just as an additional avenue of trade, but the Federation considered it a dangerous beginning of a Communist offensive against them. This in a minor instance illustrates how vital Singapore is to the Federation's security.

So in any merger arrangement the Federation must insist on security being under central government control. We have already reached agreement in principle. The Federation government considers it basic that external affairs, defence and security should be under the control of the Central Pan-Malayan Government.

Reading (b)

IN a referendum on 1st September the voters in Singapore approved the People's Action Party Government's terms for merging with the Federation of Malaya as part of a Greater Malaysia embracing Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo.

The alternatives offered and the results were:-

- A. Merger under the terms of the Government White Paper. The Federal Government would retain responsibility for internal security, defence and external affairs but would grant Singapore local autonomy in education and labour matters. The Singapore State Legislature would remain in existence and Singapore would be entitled to Malaysian citizenship. (397,626 votes).
- B. Unconditional merger as a Malayan State "in accordance with the constitutional documents" of the existing Federation of Malaya. Parliamentary representation would be in proportion to the number of citizens eligible under the Federation citizenship laws. (9,422 votes).
- C. Entry into Malaysia "on terms no less favourable than the terms for the Borneo territories". (7,911 votes).

On the basis of these results the Singapore Government will shortly negotiate with the Government of the Federation of Malaya regarding details of Singapore's entry into the proposed Malaysian Federation.

V The Cobbold Report

But if Singapore were to merge with the Federation of Malaya, it was essential, for Malaya at least, that the Borneo territories should also do so. The ethnic balance in Malaya between Malays and Chinese

was close, for Chinese comprised 37 per cent of the population, and Malays held 50 per cent of the total. If Malay interests were to be safeguarded, Singapore could not be absorbed, with its one and a quarter million Chinese (75 per cent of the population of the State), without adding an additional element to the population as well. In a union of Singapore and Malaya alone, the Chinese would outnumber Malays by 100,000; but if Sarawak, with its Iban and Malay majority; Brunei, with its 85,000 population, basically Malay; and North Borneo, where Malay is something of a *lingua franca* for the Kadazans and other indigenous groups, could be added, Malays would not be overwhelmed in the enlarged nation. At first there was local opposition to Malaysia in Sarawak, where the United People's Party opposed the plan, and in Brunei, where the only party, Party Ra'ayat, dominated the political scene, but where the Sultan, Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, seemed attracted to the proposal. There had been little political party development in North Borneo, or Sabah, until the Malaysia plan was put forward, and when parties were formed in 1961, the most vocal and strongest were in favour of the merger. In February, 1962, a Commission of Enquiry, chaired by Lord Cobbold, with two British and two Malayan members, visited Sarawak and North Borneo 'to ascertain the views of the peoples' there and to make recommendations.

The following reading (a) is taken from the Cobbold Report, submitted in June. [*Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak*, Kuala Lumpur, 1962, 1-2, 10-14, 34-7, 92-4.] Reading (b) is a joint statement on Malaysia issued by the Prime Ministers of Malaya and the United Kingdom in August. [*Sari Berita, Weekly Digest of the Malay Press*, 11, 2 August, 1962, 1-2.]

Reading (a)

THE idea of a political association between Malaya, Singapore and the three Borneo Territories of North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei has been discussed for many years.

On the 27th May, 1961, the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in a speech at a Press luncheon in Singapore, spoke favourably about the practical possibility of such an association. Tunku Abdul Rahman's constructive proposals were welcomed by the British Government, and it was announced on the 13th October that he had accepted an invitation to come to London in November, 1961, for discussions with the object of reaching an understanding on the broad issues and to prepare the way for consultation with the Borneo territories without which no commitment could be entered into.

In the meantime, on the 23rd August, 1961, broad agreement had

been reached in principle between the Prime Ministers of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore for a merger of the two territories. A Memorandum setting out Heads of Agreement for the proposed merger was published as a Singapore White Paper on the 15th November, 1961.

The London discussions were held from the 20th to 22nd November, 1961, and a Joint Statement by the British and Malayan Governments was issued on the 23rd November, 1961. An extract from the text of the Joint Statement is reproduced below:

'In a series of meetings in London this week British and Malayan Ministers examined the proposal to create a "Federation of Malaysia" which would embrace the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.

In the light of a full study of the problem which has been going on for some months, the British and Malayan Governments are convinced that this is a desirable aim.

* * *

Before coming to any final decision it is necessary to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak. It has accordingly been decided to set up a Commission to carry out this task and to make recommendations. The Commission will be composed of a Chairman and four members, two nominated by the British Government and two by the Malayan Government. In the light of the Commission's report the two Governments will decide what further steps should be taken....

At the same time the views of the Sultan of Brunei are being sought.

In regard to defence matters it was decided that, in the event of the formation of the proposed Federation of Malaysia, the existing Defence Agreement between Britain and Malaya should be extended to embrace the other territories concerned. It was, however, agreed that the Government of the Federation of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain bases at Singapore for the purpose of assisting in the defence and for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia....

HAROLD MACMILLAN
ABDUL RAHMAN

The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission was announced by the British and Malayan Governments on the 16th January, 1962. Great public interest had been aroused by Tunku Abdul Rahman's statement in May, and the Governments of North Borneo and Sarawak issued Papers explaining the purpose of the

Commission and setting out the idea of Malaysia in simple terms in order to assist people to understand the issues on which their views would be sought. There had been much discussion on the subject in the local press which continued throughout our visit. The setting-up of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee following a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Regional Conference in Singapore in July, 1961, also resulted in useful unofficial exchanges of views between representatives from Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak (including unofficial members of the Legislative Council and Council Negri), together with observers from Brunei...

The Chairman and British Members of the Commission met the Malayan Members in Singapore on the 18th February, and the whole Commission arrived at Kuching by air on the 19th February. We held our first full meeting the same afternoon, and began hearings in Kuching on the following day. Prior to our arrival, the Governments of North Borneo and Sarawak had made preparatory arrangements for our travel and accommodation in the two territories. Our Secretary had also visited Kuching and Jesselton during the preceding week...

We have noted earlier the high esteem in which the colonial administration is held in Sarawak. Generous tributes were paid by all communities to the impartiality of colonial administrators and to the progress which has been made since the war. In a multi-racial society the quality of impartiality, and the belief in such impartiality, is exceedingly important. The present officials, moreover, have an intimate knowledge of the people and of the requirements and possibilities of the country. For these reasons, the wish was expressed to us from almost every quarter that any new arrangements should not cause an exodus of the present officials, but should rather encourage them to remain in service in Sarawak until their places can be taken by the local people with the necessary qualifications.

We were made aware of the high respect and affection in which Her Majesty the Queen is held, more especially among native populations in the interior. There was genuine gratification that the Commonwealth links would be maintained with Malaysia.

On a number of occasions during our tour, we were reminded of the 'Nine Cardinal Principles of the Rule of the English Rajahs'. These Principles which had long been observed were enacted by the then Rajah of Sarawak in 1941, and since the cession of the territory to the Crown, have been enshrined in the First Schedule to the Sarawak (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 1956... The eighth of these Principles, to which our attention was most frequently drawn reads as follows:

'That the goal of self-government shall always be kept in mind, that the people of Sarawak shall be entrusted in due course with

the governance of themselves, and that continuous efforts shall be made to hasten the reaching of this goal by educating them in the obligations, the responsibilities and the privileges of citizenship'.

The argument was used by those who opposed the Malaysia proposals that it would be inconsistent with the British Government's obligation to agree to a scheme which did not first grant independence to Sarawak. The Malaysia proposals are regarded in some quarters as an indication that the British Government are no longer prepared to shoulder their responsibilities or honour their commitments. We should record, however, that some of the native population, who at the time of cession had found assurance in these Principles, were at pains to explain to us that they would not wish them to stand in the way of the achievement of Malaysia.

We have found that a very large number of the supporters of Malaysia was influenced by their admiration for the Malayan Prime Minister and his colleagues for their firm leadership and their imaginative policies in rural development. In particular those who had visited the Federation of Malaya were much impressed by the economic and social progress which they had found there and they were anxious that Sarawak should enjoy similar progress within Malaysia. We might, in parenthesis, draw attention to the unfortunate repercussions which may follow if these hopes are not realised.

The firm opposition of the present Malayan Government to Communist designs has also won the admiration of many people of all races. They are increasingly aware of the threat of Communist subversion and infiltration to which we have drawn attention. As transfer of political power in due course is inevitable, they see advantage in independence within a larger community.

At the same time the ideological [*sic*] position of the present leadership in the Federation is also an important factor in the opposition to Malaysia. We have drawn attention earlier to the threat which Malaysia poses for those Chinese who are emotionally or ideologically inclined to China, and to the sedulous efforts of Communist elements to foster opposition among this group and among the Chinese population generally.

Another important factor, giving rise in some cases to opposition and in other cases to doubt, is a dislike of change and a fear of the unknown. The present administration is well liked, considerable economic and social progress has been made, and law and order is maintained. Many people among the native population see no need for the Malaysian proposals and would prefer things to go on as they are. The same is true of a large section of the Chinese business community.

Last but not least, a major strand in the opposition to Malaysia lies in the demand for independence, after the achievement of which

there was general readiness to consider the possibility of Malaysia. This expression of opinion merits serious consideration. It springs from a genuine fear of discrimination after Malaysia, a feeling among the Chinese that their status would be reduced to that of "second class citizens" and among the natives that their customary laws and practices would be affected. Similarly there is concern that Malaysia would entail migration from the other territories of the new Federation, and also that such safeguards as may be given could be removed at a later stage by the Central Government. Assurances were therefore sought on these points. If their misgivings and reservations are met, many of those (both Chinese and native) who are now hostile or doubtful might well come round to support Malaysia.

We have found near-unanimous agreement on some points among those who favour Malaysia; on other points, among all the native populations whether or not strong supporters of Malaysia; and on other points again, among all races except in those groups who were not prepared to discuss Malaysia at all.

Those who favour Malaysia expressed a general desire –

- a. that the formation of Malaysia should be brought about as soon as possible. This arises from a feeling that the present proposals have set in train an intensification of political activity which requires a clear indication of Sarawak's constitutional future as soon as possible. At the same time it is felt that the formation of Malaysia is urgently necessary to combat the increasing threat of Communist subversion and to accelerate efforts to improve the economic future of the natives. Delay might indicate that a disproportionate weight was being given to the views of the opponents of Malaysia;
- b. that the new Federation should have a strong Central Government which could deal effectively, in particular, with matters relating to external relations, defence, internal security and economic development.

Groups from all native population[s] expressed a general desire –

- a. that special privileges should be given to the natives. They were extremely anxious that their position in the new Federation should be analogous to that of the Malays in the present Constitution of the Federation of Malaya. There was general agreement that economic development should be accelerated and increased attention paid to education, with particular reference to the needs of the natives;
- b. that land, forestry and agriculture should be subjects to be controlled by the State Government. Great emphasis was also laid on the need to safeguard customary rights and practices.

Groups of all races, other than outright opponents of Malaysia,

expressed a general desire, in addition to the point already mentioned about the retention of British officers –

- a. that immigration into Sarawak from other territories of the proposed Federation should be under the control of the State authorities. This springs from the fear that, on the establishment of Malaysia, the people of Malaya and Singapore in particular would migrate in large numbers to Sarawak to take advantage of land and opportunities available, to the detriment of the people of Sarawak themselves. Coupled with this general anxiety, there is particular concern about the possible entry of undesirable elements from outside;
- b. that there should be no rapid change in the administrative arrangements affecting the daily life of the people, or in such matters as taxation.

Regarding the Head of Sarawak State, to which reference has been made earlier, there was some conflict between the indigenous people on the one hand, and the Chinese on the other: each group was, nevertheless, near-unanimous in its views. The natives have insisted that only natives should be eligible to be Head of State, while the non-natives have expressed with equal emphasis their desire that the office should be open to anyone born in Sarawak.

On a number of other points there were differences of opinion –

- a. Some elements favour the arrangement that the Head of State of Sarawak should also be eligible to be the Head of the Federation of Malaysia, while others, a smaller element, favour a popularly elected Head of the Federation.
- b. There were differences in attitude towards the acceptance of Islam as the national religion for Malaysia as a whole, and towards its particular application to Sarawak.
- c. There were similar differences in attitude towards Malay as the national language for Malaysia as a whole and towards its application to Sarawak; and also as to official language or languages for Sarawak.
- d. There was conflict regarding the Constitutional allocation of the legislative powers between the Federal and the State Governments in the new Federation, to which is related the question of a formula for representation in the new Federal Parliament. . . .

Both on our first visit to the main centres and on our second visit to the rest of the territories, our tour in North Borneo followed immediately on our tour in Sarawak. We were therefore always conscious of the similarities and dissimilarities between the two territories. . . .

A new-comer to the territories is struck by the fact that there is surprisingly little "come and go" between the two territories them-

selves. This is doubtless due largely to the difficulty of communications and to the low level of import and export between the two territories. Contact between the territories is increasing with developing air services, with common political interests, with an integrated judiciary and progress in integrating other public services, and with the formation of a free trade area. In their relations with the outside world there are many similarities and some dissimilarities. In both territories Malay is the nearest approach to a 'lingua franca', Islam is the religion of around a third of the population, and there are the cultural and historical links of the Malayan Archipelago. The commercial interests of North Borneo, however, particularly in the flourishing Chinese business communities of Sandakan and Tawau, lie more with Hong Kong and Eastwards than with Singapore. Moreover the indigenous races in the two territories are different, although there are naturally some races living on both sides of the boundary.

In North Borneo, as in Sarawak, we were greatly impressed with the background of friendly race relations which clearly has existed in the past and which to a large degree still exists today. . . . [T]his atmosphere of racial harmony is very precious in a multi-racial country and one which must at all costs be preserved if the country is to have a happy and prosperous future. We should like here to draw attention to a most encouraging development. We refer to the process of assimilation by inter-marriage and social contacts generally which has been taking place in the interior between the Chinese and the Dusun or Kadazan peoples. While the offspring of such marriages may require special attention in the constitutional definition of 'native', we are much heartened by this development.

We have drawn attention to the disturbance to race-relations in Sarawak arising at the time of the first elections, which marked the earliest moves towards a transfer of power from the British Government to the people. The subsequent bid for power, as reflected in the formation of political Parties, was intensified by the proposals for Malaysia. In North Borneo, on the other hand, the struggle for power had not yet begun, as there had been no elections or any other suggestion of a transfer of power until the Malaysia proposals were put forward. Only recently have plans been made for elections to District Councils and Town Boards, with the intention that this will lead to a system of indirect election, on the Sarawak pattern, to the Legislative Council.

The conflict of opinion after the Malaysia proposals were put forward follows broadly on similar lines to that in Sarawak with the important and fortunate difference that it has not been bedevilled by the intervention of Communist influence.

In North Borneo, as in Sarawak, a major strand in the opposition to Malaysia among the Chinese lies in genuine fear of discrimination,

which they believe would be practised on them, affecting their education, language and culture generally, and reducing them to the status of what is popularly known as "second-class citizens". These anxieties are honestly held and should receive serious consideration. At the same time, there is fear among the Chinese business community that Malaysia would involve a new and heavier tax structure. At present also, as a racial group, the Chinese enjoy educational, economic and commercial superiority over the indigenous population. They are wary of the prospect that, with Malaysia, they might suffer from competition with Singapore or from discriminatory arrangements made in the process of correcting the present imbalance of economic status between themselves and the indigenous people.

There exists, too, though not to the same extent, the sense of frustration among younger Chinese to which we have called attention in . . . Sarawak. Educated in Chinese schools, ambitious and often with emotional inclinations to China, they foresee few outlets for their abilities and fear that Malaysia would prejudice such prospects as they now have.

With these factors and with the intensification of political activity, it must be recognised that, whilst Communist influence has not yet made itself felt to any extent, there exists fertile material on which Communist infiltration could work in the same way as it is already working in Sarawak. The Communist danger cannot be excluded for the future.

It is in fact the hope that Government action would help to correct the present imbalance of economic status between the Chinese and themselves which constitutes a strong argument among many indigenous people in favour of Malaysia and of its early realisation. In the face of the inevitable prospect that at some time they would have to share political power with the Chinese, they are extremely anxious that they should be able to compete on an equal footing in the economic and commercial fields. There was therefore a unanimous demand by the indigenous people that their position under Malaysia should be analogous to that of the Malays under the present Malayan Constitution. Equally, there was great emphasis on the need for an even more vigorous programme in rural development and in education and great interest in the achievements of Malaya in these directions.

At the same time there is general awareness among the leaders of the principal political parties, many native leaders and not a few Chinese, that an independent North Borneo on its own would be threatened both internally by disruptive tendencies of racial conflict and externally by her more powerful neighbours.

We are bound to record that, even more perhaps than in Sarawak, there are large sections of the population in the interior who have

no real appreciation of the Malaysia proposals. This is partly due to the late publication of the North Borneo Government Paper, partly to the difficulties of communications, and partly to the general level of political consciousness. To these people, any change is necessarily to be looked upon with great suspicion. They are happy under the present colonial administration, they have a high regard for the efficiency and impartiality of the British officers, and they entertain high hopes of progress under their present Government. Their predominating desire therefore is that there should be no radical change in the present way of life. There is a definite fear that any change may bring about a deterioration of conditions.

We have found near-unanimity on some points, and differences on others, on lines identical with those in Sarawak... and for the same reasons. Thus those who support Malaysia agree that Federation should come quickly and should have a strong Central Government to deal in particular with external relations, defence, internal security and economic development. All native populations agree that they should be given analogous treatment to that of the Malays in Malaya, that land, forestry and agriculture should be controlled by the State Government, and that customary rights and practices should be safeguarded. Groups of all races agree that immigration from other parts of the Federation should be controlled by the State Government, that British officers should be encouraged to stay on, and that there should be no rapid change in administrative arrangements affecting the daily life of the people. There is the same unanimous approach by the indigenous people on the one hand and the Chinese on the other to the question of a Head of State for North Borneo. There are the same differences on such matters as the Head of the Federation of Malaysia, national religion, national and official languages, and allocation of powers between Federation and State...

- a. On five matters, to which great importance was attached in the bulk of evidence submitted, the recommendations... were in fact drafted and agreed, subject to the qualifications stated, by the Commission as a whole:
 - i. *Representation in Federal Parliament* – Representation of the Borneo territories in the Federal Parliament should take account not only of their populations but also of their size and potentialities.
 - ii. *Special position of the Indigenous Races* – The native races in the Borneo territories should be placed in a position analogous to that of the Malays in the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya. An Advisory Board should be set up, including representatives of the principal races, to advise on the interpretation and administration of these provisions. The Malayan members feel that the provisions

for the special position of indigenous races should not be subject to review separately from any review of the position of the Malays as a whole. The British members, with whom I agree, feel that the provisions should be reviewed not later than 10 years after they come into force. One British member is opposed to any constitutional provision in this matter.

- iii. *Development* – Special and urgent attention should be given to development in the fields of rural improvement, education, medical and other social services, and training of candidates for administrative and technical posts. The Malayan members see the proposals on development as an integral part of their whole approach. The British members concur generally in these proposals and suggest that, if their recommendation for a transitional period is accepted, development boards should be set up at the outset.
- iv. *Land, Agriculture and Forestry, and Native Customs and Usage* should be under the sole control of the State Government.
- v. At least in the early years, there should be no change in *administrative arrangements in so far as they affect the ordinary lives of the people*.
- b. On a number of other matters . . . there was full discussion in the Commission and general agreement, subject only to the method of approach and to certain minor divergences.
 - i. *The Judiciary* – A separate High Court should be maintained in the Borneo territories and a Federal Supreme Court should have appellate jurisdiction throughout the Federation. . . .
 - ii. *Head of State* – Somewhat divergent recommendations are made, reflecting the different approach on the question of phasing. It is unanimously recommended that in the first instance the appointment should be made by His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the joint nomination of Her Majesty the Queen and His Majesty.
 - iii. *Public Services* – Near-unanimous recommendations are made, with some divergences reflecting the different approach on the question of phasing.
 - iv. *Federal Constitution* – The division in the new Constitution between Federal, State and Concurrent lists should broadly follow the lines of the existing Constitution of the Federation of Malaya. Amendments should be made to the list in the case of Shipping and Navigation, and Fisheries. The British members, with whom I agree,

advocate that special consideration should be given to the question of Labour and Social Security, and that the provision regarding Welfare of Aborigines should not apply to the Borneo territories.

- v. *Finance, Tariffs and Trade* – These matters should be on the Federal list, but integration of Federal and State practice should take place gradually and after careful study by a Working Party. Detailed arrangements are proposed by the Malayan members, with which the British members generally concur.
- vi. *Education* – Education should be on the Federal list, but integration of Federal and State practice should take place gradually after careful study by a Working Party. The British members, with whom I agree, stress the importance of maintaining existing policies regarding the use of English as a medium of instruction.
- vii. *Regionalisation* – The Federal services in the Borneo territories should be regionalised and officers should be appointed in the territories with sufficient authority to deal with local matters. I add a personal recommendation that, when expatriate officers are no longer needed for these posts, they should normally be filled by officers from the Borneo territories.

The British and Malayan members have both concluded that, on the lines of their respective approaches, a Federation of Malaysia is an attractive and workable project and is in the best interests of the Borneo territories. On the assumption that Singapore also joins in the Federation, I strongly endorse this view, adding that the inclusion of the Borneo territories would also be to the advantage of the other participants in the Federation. It is a necessary condition that, from the outset, Malaysia should be regarded by all concerned as an association of partners, combining in the common interest to create a new nation but retaining their own individualities. If any idea were to take root that Malaysia would involve a "take-over" of the Borneo territories by the Federation of Malaya and the submersion of the individualities of North Borneo and Sarawak, Malaysia would not, in my judgment, be generally acceptable or successful. I recommend that, in forthcoming negotiations, Governments should pay close attention to this point, both in its psychological and in its practical aspects.

The principal difference of approach between the British and Malayan members of the Commission... relates to the phasing of arrangements for the new Federation. I consider that a transitional period is most desirable.... I feel that the precise constitutional and other arrangements to govern a transitional period, and in particular

the arrangements relating to Internal Security, must be matters for discussion between Governments. I urge most strongly that any arrangements made for the early years after Federation should provide for continuity of administration in the Borneo territories and should not result in any weakening, either real or apparent, of authority in Kuching and Jesselton.

We were not required by our Terms of Reference to discuss these matters with the Government of the Federation of Malaya or to consider them in relation to the general situation in the area. I therefore recommend that the Governments concerned should discuss these matters as soon as possible in the light of the findings in this Report and of the views expressed in the Report about the special problems of the years immediately following Federation. I regard it as vital that Governments should reach an early decision of principle, subject to debate in, and approval by, the legislative chambers in North Borneo and Sarawak.

I strongly endorse the recommendations that consultative machinery, including joint working parties, should be set up as soon as possible after a decision is taken to proceed with the Malaysia project, in order to work out the details of integration of the Borneo territories into a new Federation.

Reading (b)

THE following joint Statement was agreed between the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, on August 1, 1962:-

1. The British and Malayan Governments have received and studied the Report of the Commission under the Chairmanship of Lord Cobbold, which visited North Borneo and Sarawak earlier this year, to ascertain the views of the inhabitants on the proposal to create the Federation of Malaysia, embracing Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei.
2. The two governments are most grateful to the Commission for their valuable Report and have accepted almost all the recommendations on which the Commission were unanimous. The two governments have noted in particular that the Commission were unanimously agreed that a Federation of Malaysia is in the best interests of North Borneo and Sarawak, and that an early decision in principle should be reached.
3. In the light of this Report and of the agreement reached between the Government of Malaya and the Government of Singapore, the British and Malayan Governments have now decided in principle, that, subject to the necessary legislation, the proposed

Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being by 31st August, 1963.

4. To give effect to this decision, the two governments intend to conclude within the next six months a formal agreement which, among other things, will provide for

- a. the transfer of sovereignty in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore by 31st August, 1963;
- b. provision governing the relationship between Singapore and the new Federation of Malaysia, as agreed between the Governments of Malaya and Singapore;
- c. defence arrangements as set out in the Joint Statement by the British and Malayan Governments dated 22nd November, 1961;

and d. detailed constitutional arrangements, including safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak, to be drawn up after consultation with the legislatures of the two territories.

5. These safeguards will cover such matters as religious freedom, education, representation in the Federal Parliament, the position of the indigenous, control of immigration and citizenship and the State Constitutions.

6. In order that the introduction of the new Federal system may be effected as smoothly as possible and with the least disturbance to existing administrative arrangements, there will be after the transfer of sovereignty the transition period during which a number of Federal powers will be delegated temporarily to the State Governments.

7. An Inter-Governmental Committee will be established as soon as possible on which the British, Malayan, North Borneo and Sarawak Governments will be represented. Its task will be to work out the future constitutional arrangements and the form of the necessary safeguards.

8. The Minister of State for the Colonies, Lord Lansdowne, who will be the Chairman of this Committee, and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Tun Abdul Razak, will proceed shortly to Sarawak and North Borneo to conduct discussions.

9. In order to maintain the efficiency of the administration the British and Malayan Governments are agreed on the importance of retaining the services of as many of the expatriate officials as possible. The Minister of State will discuss with the governments of the territories and with the staff associations how best this can be done.

10. The British and Malayan Governments have informed the Sultan of Brunei of the agreement they have reached and have made

it clear they would welcome the inclusion of the State of Brunei in the new Federation.

VI *The Lansdowne Committee*

An inter-governmental committee was appointed to work out the details of the final Malaysia agreement. Lord Lansdowne served for Britain and acted as Chairman. Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaya, was Vice-Chairman. The North Borneo delegation was led by Donald Stephens, and Dato Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha of Sarawak's Party Negara led the delegation from Sarawak. By the end of 1962 most of the major issues had been resolved, as the following account from *The Sunday Mail*, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, for December 30 indicates.

THE bulk of the work of the inter-governmental committee in preparing the way for the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia has been completed, with agreement reached on essential points.

A few details have still to be worked out and these have been entrusted to an *ad hoc* committee representing the four governments — Malaya, Britain, North Borneo and Sarawak.

No difficulty, however, is expected, and the finalised report of the Inter-Governmental Committee should be ready for submission to the North Borneo and Sarawak legislatures early in the new year.

The communique issued at the end of the committee's meeting in Kuala Lumpur last week did not disclose the points of agreement reached, apart from announcing that the division of the 40 seats in the Malaysian Parliament between North Borneo and Sarawak has been settled.

According to informed sources there was much bargaining between the North Borneo and Sarawak delegations on what the share-out should be.

The original proposal was that Sarawak should get 22 seats, but its representatives pressed for 26.

North Borneo finally offered 24. Sarawak has presumably accepted this as Mr. Donald Stephens, leader of the North Borneo delegation, said before leaving Singapore for home that the State Legislature would send 16 representatives to the Malaysian Parliament.

Earlier, before leaving Kuala Lumpur, Temenggong Jugah, chairman of the Party Pesaka Anak of Sarawak, said the delegation wanted at least 25 seats. It is possible the delegation finally agreed to 24 under protest.

One of the most important points of agreement reached, according to the

sources, is that there shall be no time limit concerning the continued use of English as an official language in North Borneo and Sarawak.

The delegations of these two territories, however, agreed that Malay shall be the national language of Malaysia.

The Cobbold Report itself stated that a majority of opinion favours Malay and English as official languages "without time limit" in the Borneo States.

The chairman and the British members (Sir Anthony Abell and Sir David Watherston) recommended that a provision to this effect be made in the Malaysian Constitution.

The Malayan members on the Cobbold Commission (Inche Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie and Dato Wong Pow Nee), however, recommended that English as an official language be continued to be used along with Malay for ten years after the establishment of Malaysia and thereafter "until such time as the Central Government in consultation with the State Governments concerned provides otherwise".

The inter-governmental committee is also understood to have agreed that the provisions relating to State religion contained in the Malayan constitution shall not apply to North Borneo and Sarawak.

The Malayan constitution declares that Islam is the national religion and certain public expenditure may be incurred for Islamic purposes....

The inter-governmental committee also agreed that North Borneo and Sarawak will maintain sole control of immigration in their respective territories....

On the question of finance, the inter-governmental committee is understood to have reached full agreement on the lines recommended by the Cobbold commission.

The central government, which will have control of finance, is to return to the North Borneo and Sarawak State Governments certain percentages of revenue which they earn and which under the constitution is to go to the Central Government (apart from revenue proceeds solely assigned to them)....

On the question of health and medical services, Sarawak has agreed to Federal control but in the case of North Borneo it will be a concurrent subject....

VII *The Philippine-Borneo Dispute*

In mid-1962 the government of the Philippines claimed sovereignty to North Borneo. Although Malaya had been working in harmony with the Philippines and Thailand through the three-member Association

for South-East Asian states, relations with the Manila government were strained and the idea of Malaysia seemed threatened. The following reading is by a professor from the American University in Washington, D.C., Martin Meadows. ['The Philippine Claim to North Borneo', *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXVII, September 1962, 321-3, 327-35.]

A new territorial controversy emerged on the international scene when, in June, 1962, the government of the Philippines announced its decision to claim ownership and sovereignty over the British Crown Colony of North Borneo. Prior to this event, indications that the Philippines might take such a step had received little attention in the world press, perhaps because it was generally assumed that Great Britain had clear title to North Borneo. Moreover, it seemed likely that any dispute over North Borneo would be settled peacefully. As a result, the matter was overshadowed by other developments, such as the struggle between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West New Guinea. But the North Borneo situation no longer can be ignored, nor can it be dismissed as limited in its effects only to the countries directly concerned. The conflict over the status of North Borneo is of considerable significance in that it may well constitute an obstacle to the formation of the proposed Federation of Malaysia, which is to comprise North Borneo, Malaya, Singapore, Brunei and Sarawak.

Most of Borneo, which is the world's third largest island, has been controlled by Indonesia since the latter became independent in 1950. In the northern quarter of Borneo are the British possessions of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. The territory of North Borneo covers an area of 29,388 square miles. It has a population of approximately 450,000, of whom some 300,000 are Moslems and 100,000 are Chinese. The principal town, Jesselton, is located 600 miles from Manila and 1,000 miles from Singapore. Extending to within a few miles of North Borneo coast are the Sulu Islands, which are part of, and which stretch south-westward from, the Philippines. North Borneo's resources are abundant; its exports, the total value of which exceeded that of its imports by nearly \$27,000,000 in 1960, include timber, rubber, copra and hemp.

While North Borneo would be an asset to the Philippines, and although there has been an upsurge of nationalism in the islands in recent months, the Philippine claim cannot be explained as merely a manifestation of nationalism. Nor does it represent an attempt to divert the attention of Filipinos from internal problems; such difficulties exist, but they are no more serious than usual. Actually, many Filipinos have been urging their government to claim North Borneo ever since the Philippines gained independence in 1946. That this

issue finally has come to a head after so many years is attributable largely to two factors.

One factor was the victory of Diosdado Macapagal in the presidential election of November, 1961. Macapagal has been involved in the North Borneo affair since 1947, when, as a division chief in the Department of Foreign Affairs, he was assigned the task of negotiating with Great Britain for the return to Philippine control of the Turtle Islands, located near North Borneo. As a result of his role in effecting the transfer of the Turtle Islands in 1948, Macapagal soon entered politics and won election to the House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress in 1949. While in Congress Macapagal drafted and co-sponsored a resolution calling upon the government to claim North Borneo; in 1950 this resolution was passed unanimously by the House and concurred in by the Senate.

The second factor stemmed from the efforts of the Philippines *Free Press*, a respected and influential Manila weekly. It is noteworthy that the initial *Free Press* article in its series on the North Borneo matter appeared in its issue of December 30, 1961, on the day Macapagal was inaugurated as President, and the *Free Press* undoubtedly hoped that he would be more willing to take action on North Borneo than were his predecessors. The *Free Press* also was motivated by the consideration that establishment of the Malaysian Federation would present the Philippines with a *fait accompli* with respect to the status of North Borneo. Consequently the *Free Press* launched an intensive campaign designed to spur government action, and results soon were forthcoming.

By mid-April, 1962, the House of Representatives had adopted a resolution calling for the recovery of North Borneo; the legal affairs division of the Department of Foreign Affairs had urged that a formal claim be filed; and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs had begun hearings on the matter. Finally, on June 22, President Macapagal revealed at a press conference that the Philippine government had informed Britain of its intent to formally claim North Borneo....

The key to the Philippine claim to North Borneo involves the terms of the treaty which Baron Overbeck negotiated with Sultan Mahomet Jamal Al Alam of Sulu in 1878. In that treaty the latter agreed either to lease or to cede North Borneo for annual payments of 5,000 Malayan dollars.... The British government contends that, according to its copy of the treaty, the Sultan ceded the territory in perpetuity. The heirs of Sultan Alam maintain that the British copy is forged, and that the Sultan merely leased North Borneo....

In gaining the rights to the extensive lands of North Borneo for such meager annual payments, Overbeck allegedly resorted to threats and deceit. Specifically, he told the Sultan that North Borneo was about to be seized by the Sultan of Brunei and noted that the seizure

could not be prevented because the Spanish attack on Sulu was then in progress. Arguing that Sultan Alam might as well dispose of territory which he would lose anyway, Overbeck offered annual payments of 3,000 Malayan dollars. After thinking over the offer, the Sultan countered with a request for \$8,000, and they finally agreed on a figure of \$5,000.

The Sultan described these negotiations in a letter to the Spanish Governor-General of the Philippines. In this letter, dated July 4, 1878, the Sultan emphasized that he had leased rather than ceded North Borneo, and that he had done so only because of threats and deception on Overbeck's part. A similar account is contained in a letter of October 18, 1878, from the Spanish governor of Jolo (the main island of the Sulu archipelago) to the Governor-General. The Sultan also forwarded to the Governor-General a copy of a letter he wrote Overbeck on July 22, 1878; in it the Sultan informed Overbeck of his desire to cancel the lease contract because Spanish sovereignty extended to North Borneo as well as Sulu. Overbeck protested on the ground that his agreement with the Sultan antedated the latter's treaty with Spain of July, 1878. Overbeck, however, was unaware that, under the 1851 treaty between Spain and Sulu, the Sultan had agreed not to enter into any treaty, commercial agreement or alliance with any European power, company or individual. Thus the 1851 agreement nullified the contract which Overbeck negotiated.

But the most important aspect of the Philippine claim concerns the fundamental question of whether the treaty of 1878 leased or ceded North Borneo. The heirs of Sultan Alam insist that North Borneo was leased, but the original copy of the contract, which belonged to Sultan Alam, was stolen under strange circumstances when his son and successor visited Singapore to try to negotiate more favorable annual rental payments. For its part, the British government declares that North Borneo was ceded, but it refuses to permit any Filipino or third party to examine its copy of the contract. Prior to 1946 the British government explained that it could not force a private company—the British North Borneo Company—to open its files; yet, although the British government acquired those files when it bought out the Company in 1946, it has continued to reject requests by the Philippine Government and by the heirs of Sultan Alam to inspect the British copy of the contract.

In view of these facts, Sultan Alam's heirs hired lawyers to search for a copy of the missing document, as well as for any other relevant records, in the Spanish archives. In the files of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs the lawyers recently discovered a number of key papers, copies of which, certified as authentic by the Spanish government, are now in their possession. These include the treaty, the various letters mentioned above, and several other important items.

All of these documents supposedly support the contention that North Borneo was leased and not ceded.

As enunciated by the *Free Press*, the Philippine argument encompasses a number of additional points. One is that the annual payments made to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu indicate that North Borneo was leased, because payment of rental constitutes an explicit admission of ownership on the part of the lessor by the lessee. The British North Borneo Company paid the yearly rental from 1878 until the death in 1936 of Sultan Alam's successor, Sultan Jamalul Kiram. When the British High Court of North Borneo subsequently decided in December, 1939, that Sultan Kiram had eight joint heirs, the Company resumed its yearly payments. Interestingly, the 1939 decision also stated that Sultan Alam in 1878 was an international person with sovereign rights and could not have sold such rights to private parties; on the other hand, the High Court ruled that, although legally the Philippine government should succeed to the sovereign rights of the late Sultan Kiram, it could not do so because it no longer recognized the existence of the Sultanate of Sulu. Needless to say, this ruling is open to argument.

Further evidence in support of the Philippine case is adduced by the *Free Press* from the fact that Britain did not incorporate North Borneo as a Crown Colony until July 10, 1946, a significant date in that the Philippines became independent six days previously. That the British waited until that time to incorporate North Borneo raises a suspicion among Filipinos that they were "trying to fortify a shaky position in anticipation of a claim that the Philippines, having come into its own, could now prosecute. . . ." It is also strange, the *Free Press* comments, that the British document annexing North Borneo, as printed in the official *London Gazette* on July 19, 1946, makes no reference to the 1878 contract; instead it mentions various documents unrelated to the status of North Borneo.

Still another argument is that the British government honored a contract drawn up in 1903 between the Sultan of Sulu and the British North Borneo Company. This contract, a supplement to the 1878 agreement, leased the Turtle Islands to the Company for additional payments of \$300 annually. . . . [T]he Paris Treaty of 1898 placed the Turtle Islands within Philippine boundaries, but the Company continued to administer them under an agreement signed with the United States in 1907. Britain returned the islands to the Philippines in 1948 in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-American Boundary Convention of 1930. The *Free Press* maintains that by this action Britain "recognized the Sultan of Sulu as the owner of the property and as having leased it to the British North Borneo Company," but it fails to show any connection between the terms pertaining to the Turtle Islands and those affecting North Borneo.

Prior to the Philippine decision to claim North Borneo, much of the British reaction to the possibility of such a move was designed to brush aside the issue as unworthy of comment. For instance, the Governor of North Borneo, Sir William Goode, stated that the claim has "no substance to it". Donald Stephens, leader of a North Borneo political party [United National Kadazan Organization], described the claim as "extremely silly and without any legal backing". And a commonly expressed British view is that the matter is simply a manifestation of Filipino nationalism...

There are, of course, reasoned British arguments against the Philippine claim. One is that Spain surrendered all claim to North Borneo in the 1885 agreement with Britain. Another is that the United States acknowledged the British claim to North Borneo in the terms of the Anglo-American Boundary Convention of 1930. A third is that the Philippine Constitution itself recognized British sovereignty over North Borneo, in that Article 1 of the Constitution accepts the Boundary Convention of 1930, thus in effect excluding North Borneo from its delineation of Philippine territory.

The Philippine rebuttal to the first point is that the Sultan of Sulu was not a party to the 1885 agreement, and that in any case the British North Borneo Company had always recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan of Sulu over North Borneo. As for the role of the United States, the Philippine position is that the American government recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan of Sulu over North Borneo when it took over the Philippines and also in a treaty it signed with the Sultan in 1915; in that treaty the Sultan gave up his temporal power over those of his dependencies which were within American jurisdiction, but he was permitted to retain his spiritual power over those areas and also to keep both his temporal and ecclesiastical authority over those of his dependencies, including North Borneo, which were beyond American jurisdiction.

As far as the Philippine Constitution is concerned, that document was drawn up at a time when the Philippines did not have full control over its own affairs. Just because the Philippine government was unable to assert its claim to North Borneo in 1936, when the Constitution was adopted, does not mean that it should not be able to do so at the present time. Furthermore, the constitutional clause which defines the boundaries of the Philippines was aimed at securing the inclusion of Moslem Mindanao within Philippine territory; in other words, the intent of the clause in question was not to delimit Philippine territory but rather to assure its integrity.

Another series of arguments and counter-arguments involves the relationship of North Borneo to the proposed Malaysian Federation. The British contend that North Borneo, one of the units in the Federation, is bound to the other units by common ties and institutions, since

all of them were or still are under British control. The Philippine response takes two lines: it questions the motives underlying establishment of the Federation, and warns of the possible harmful consequences of the Federation for North Borneo and for the Philippines; and, more positively, it endeavors to show the close bonds between North Borneo and the Philippines.

The Philippines maintains that the Federated States of Malaya and the self-governing state of Singapore are much more favorably inclined toward the idea of a Malaysian Federation than are the less advanced Bornean units of North Borneo and Sarawak, both Crown Colonies, and Brunei, a protectorate. This is because Borneans assertedly fear the dominant position which Malaya would assume in the Federation. In addition, many Borneans are said to regard the proposed Federation as a scheme to enable Britain to retain influence in the Borneo area; in place of former colonies, a new member would be added to the Commonwealth and would be an open market for Britain under the system of imperial preferences.

From the Philippine standpoint, concern over the Federation stems not only from the adverse effect it would have on the Philippine claim to North Borneo, but also from the danger that, in the Federation, Chinese subversives in Singapore would be able to extend their activities into North Borneo, a neighbor of the Philippines. It is noted, too, that the Federation might produce increased racial tension between Malays and Chinese; since one objective of the Federation is to strengthen the position of Malays relative to that of the large Chinese population, this might prompt a Chinese appeal to Red China for protection from possible discrimination and persecution.

The positive Philippine approach is that North Borneo not only is geographically closer to the Philippines than to Malaya, its inhabitants have more in common with the people of the southern Philippines—in customs, religion, race and tradition—than with the people of the proposed Federation. In this regard, the Philippines asserts that an overwhelming majority of the Moslems of North Borneo are in favor of Philippine control, which would reunite them with their co-religionists in the Sulu Islands and elsewhere in the southern Philippines. Furthermore, North Borneo would fare much better under the Philippines than it has under Britain, which allegedly has done little in the way of promoting North Bornean education and political development. Noting that "no Malayan, either in North Borneo or in Malaya, has echoed the British disavowals" of the Philippine claim to North Borneo, the argument concludes that the Philippines could do more for North Borneo than could any other southeast Asian nation.

The nature of the British position was brought out in the British reply to the Philippine note announcing its claim to North Borneo. In that reply the British government refused the Philippine request to enter into talks on North Borneo and rejected the Philippine claim on behalf of the people of North Borneo who, it was said, have nothing in common with the Filipino people and who will soon be members of the Federation of Malaysia. The effectiveness of this kind of argument has been demonstrated by the Indonesian response to the Dutch assertion that the inhabitants of West New Guinea have nothing in common with those of Indonesia.

Apart from the merits of the Philippine claim, the principal question is whether the North Borneo issue will be settled peacefully. The British refusal to discuss the matter certainly was not unexpected by the Philippine government and should not strain the normal friendly relationship between the two countries. It is much more difficult, however, to predict what the Philippine reaction may be as Britain hastens to implement plans for establishing the Malaysian Federation. This development may reveal exactly how strongly the Philippine government feels about its claim to North Borneo. . . .

... [T]he potential consequences of the North Borneo controversy merit close attention.

VIII *Rebellion in Brunei*

A further challenge was offered to Malaysia when the leader of the Party Ra'ayat (The Peoples' Party) in Brunei, Sheik A. M. Azahari, organized a revolt against the Malaysia proposals and demanded a united and independent state of Kalimantan Utara, or North Borneo. Once the rebellion was crushed Azahari fled with his deputy, Zaini bin Haji Ahmad, to Manila, but he promised to continue a guerilla-style war in the Borneo territories. The revolt also added to the strain already existing between Malaya and Indonesia, for President Soekarno of Indonesia lent his moral support to the rebels, and some hinted that, more substantially, he lent arms. Azahari's appeal to the greater glory of Brunei was an appeal to the past as well as to the future. Initially, at least, a non-Communist nationalist, Azahari dreamed of a restoration of the former boundaries of the once large and powerful Brunei Sultanate. The following selections are taken from news accounts and editorials during the Brunei rebellion. [Reading (a) is from *The Sunday Mail*, Kuala Lumpur, 9 December 1962. Readings (b) and (c) are from reports cabled back to the Singapore *Straits Times* by its Editor-in-Chief, Dato Leslie Hoffman, which appeared on 13 and 15 December 1962, respectively. Reading (d)

is taken from the Editorial of the *The Sunday Mail*, 16 December 1962. Reading (e) is from *The Straits Times*, 22 December 1962.]

Reading (a)

SERIA, Sultanate of Brunei, Saturday [8 December 1962].
An insurgent force, known as "the North Borneo National Army" today seized control of this oil town, in armed uprising early this morning.

The insurgents were also apparently in control of the adjoining town of Kuala Belait, and there were reports of street fighting in the Sultanate's capital of Brunei Town.

British troops, spearheaded by two companies of the 1/2 Gurkha Rifles, were being airlifted into the oil-rich Sultanate from Singapore this afternoon "in accordance with treaty obligations" a British army spokesman said.

First reports indicated that the uprising was aimed at preventing Brunei from entering the proposed Federation of Malaysia...

Reading (b)

I have now got as complete a picture as possible of the events leading up to the rebellion...
Officials admit now that the Borneo Bulletin reports as early as last May that training camps of the North Borneo National Army and their uniforms having being [*sic*] found near Lawas in North Borneo, had been investigated. Nothing, they said, had emerged from these reports.

More recently—a month before the rebellion—reports had been received by the intelligence and by individual Malayan and Brunei state officials that an army was being trained in the jungles near Lawas and in some parts of Brunei itself.

Again these reports were either found to be untrue or flimsy and nothing further had been done on them.

Last week, when it was noticed that green cloth was being bought up, that jungle green uniforms were being made in tailor shops in town, and that fishing was almost at a standstill among the fishing folk at Ayer, near the centre of the town, the Chamber of Commerce were contacted. But again nothing further was heard of the results.

Then on Friday (Dec. 7) Lord Selkirk, the British Commissioner for South-East Asia, asked for an interview with the Sultan during a short stopover in Brunei Town on a visit he was making to Jesselton.

He was granted an audience and he spoke to him, the Mentri Besar, Dato Marsal, the State Secretary, Raja Azlan, and the Comsioner [*sic*] of Police, Alan Neal Outram, before he left.

At that conference references were made to Lawas and the fact that it was considered troublesome.

No direct references were made to Brunei or the possibility of trouble here.

Lord Selkirk was asked whether he thought the police strength in Brunei was sufficient to cope with any situation which might arise there. He spoke to Mr. Outram before he left.

In view of what they had heard, officials decided to send a detachment of 20 policemen to the Sultan's palace that night and four policemen to the Mentri Besar's house.

It is significant that at his conference today the Sultan said the first news he had of any trouble which might be brewing was on Friday night.

At two a.m. on Saturday morning, the first shots were heard in Brunei Town.

Simultaneously shots were fired at the Sultan's palace and at the Mentri Besar's house.

Before firing began it was noticeable that power had been cut.

The rebels had done this by walking into the unguarded power house, held up two Malays there and switched off the power.

But because their planning was incomplete or because their leaders were inexperienced or stupid, they did not cut off the radio or telegraphic communications or seize the broadcasting station. . . .

Firing on the police station lasted much longer and the rebels suffered a good number of dead and wounded.

One eye-witness who saw the battle from the roof of a high building overlooking the station said he saw a rebel killed as he was about to throw a grenade.

During a lull in the firing, the rebels called on the police to surrender. For answer Mr. Outram was seen to come out of the front of the station and walk towards the rebels. He told the rebel leader he had to lay down arms. . . .

The rebel leader, who wore the uniform of a captain, immediately put down his gun. The others, almost 100 strong, did the same.

Mr. Outram was at this time completely alone.

Armed policemen then ran out of the station building, surrounded the rebels and marched them into the station compound.

Mr. Outram then drove around the town in a police jeep and stopped any rebels he saw. . . .

It was at this point that Government officials began to filter into the town.

Raja Azlan and Dato Marsal arrived at police headquarters and had various conferences with Mr. Outram.

Dato Marsal got in touch with the Sultan and suggested that he should invoke the Treaty of Protection he had with Britain.

When I asked who was the competent British authority in Brunei in the absence of Sir Dennis White, I got an astounding reply. It was Mr. W. J. Parks, Sir Dennis's A.D.C., an ex-Malayan police officer. It was Parks who signalled Phoenix Park and asked Lord Selkirk to send troops to Brunei.

This was astounding because in the absence of Sir Dennis it was obviously his A.D.C. only who had been the link between the Brunei Government and the British Government during a month which turned out to be so fateful for this rich but dangerously unrestful state.

In ordinary circumstances it would be the competent British authority in conjunction with the Mentri Besar, the State Secretary and the Police Commissioner who should inform Lord Selkirk of the situation, both before and after the trouble had started. . . .

No one could tell me whether Brunei or Phoenix Park was to blame for the initial blunder of sending only two Gurkha companies to Brunei [on the initial day of the rebellion]. . . .

This town has only 40,000 people, the whole state only 80,000. This was more than a riot and 100 Gurkhas would be lost if spread out over the large area of the state.

But there were to be other blunders.

During that dreadful Saturday someone gave the order for all Europeans—men and women and children—to evacuate. I asked Raja Azlan who had done this. He, the State Secretary, had to admit he did not know.

These people were sent to the airport to await transport and together with the wives of some, though not all, Malayan officers, they were sent to Labuan by R.A.F. transport planes. Raja Azlan's family stayed behind.

This—the evacuation—was the reason why Brunei's essential services broke down and why on Sunday and part of Monday the water supply became [a] trickle.

With the arrival of the Gurkhas 19 hours after the rebellion had broken out Brunei's troubles were not yet over.

One company of Gurkhas was sent down the Tutong road towards Seria—a road which runs for 60 miles through jungles and villages where ambushes could be laid with startling ease.

That night the Gurkhas were ambushed. One British officer was wounded and later died; one Gurkha soldier was killed and 18 others wounded.

The next day—Sunday—two visitors called at the Sultan's palace. They were Hafiz Laxamana, vice-president of Party Rakyat, and Pengiran Matassian, a member of the central executive of the party. They were accompanied by two guards. They arrived in a taxi and were stopped from entering the gate by the police.

The Sultan said today he did not know what they had come to see

him about. When he refused to see them they turned tail and ran before they could be arrested....

When he was asked what would happen to the rebels and others who were under detention—they arrested Azahari's wife in Brunei last night—the Sultan said an emergency had been declared yesterday officially in the State and the prisoners would be dealt with in due course.

Leaflets were now being dropped in the jungle areas near where it was thought that remnants of the rebel forces were hiding.

These leaflets bore an appeal to rebels to give themselves up and an offer to deal with them justly....

Reading (c)

ALL main centres of rebel resistance in Brunei and Sarawak fell to British and Gurkha troops today.

Among them—Seria police station, where 45 people had been kept as hostages since last Saturday.

Some of the rescued men had been used as a "human shield" by the rebels on Saturday night in a desperate attempt to take Panaga police station.¹

A Eurasian from Malaya, Mr. Clifford Joseph, was killed in the attack and five Europeans wounded, one seriously.

Today's successes followed the recapture of Seria town late last night.

The whole of the coastal strip from Seria airfield in the east to the Sarawak border has been cleared of rebels.

Limbang, in Sarawak, was retaken by marine commandos in an attack from naval landing craft this morning.

The Commandos lost five killed and five wounded. No casualties were suffered by the Queen's Own Highlanders or Gurkhas in the Seria and Kuala Belait operations.

Sixty rebels were taken prisoners and 10 killed in the Seria area.

The rebel leader in the area is believed to have fled into the jungle two days ago.

Mr. Patrick Linton, managing director of the Shell oilfields at Seria told me they had not been damaged and could be operating again as soon as the military situation allowed and the 2,400-strong labour force was back at work.

* * *

Mr. Ben Bennett, a Shell engineer with five days' growth of beard on his face, smiled broadly as he came up to the perimeter fence of the police station, stretched his hand over the wire, and said: "Welcome to Seria! See that room over there to the right. It measures 10 feet

¹ This statement was not written by Dato Hoffman, but was a regular news release the same day.

by 15. We were put in it last Saturday morning. I was on my way to work at about 7 a.m. when they stopped me and took me in. The compound was full of rebels, some in uniform, some in ordinary clothes. They were quite polite and asked me to stay in the room. All morning more and more people were brought in until I counted 55 people—men, women and children. We could hardly stand. They allowed us to keep the window open, but not the door. Later they allowed a Chinese shopkeeper Yik Fatt, to bring us food. He did a marvellous job for us and all through our confinement he gave us excellent food."

Mr. Bennett went on to relate the events of that fateful night when he, among others, was taken out to be used as a "human shield" at Panaga. Later they brought him back.

"We were kept there all Sunday. During the day, the rebels asked Miss Jean Scott to attend to one of their men who had been wounded and to take the man to hospital. She refused to do this at first. Then she told them she would, provided they allowed her to take all the women and children—there were about 15 of them—with her and see them home. At first, they refused but when they saw she was adamant they told her they would allow her, but she herself would have to return to the police station and be kept in the cell. She took the women and children to Mr. Linton's house and left them there. She returned and has been looking after us since then. What a wonderful person. . . ."

* * *

Sarawak Council Negri member, Mr. Tan Chong Meng, was arrested yesterday as a member of a clandestine Communist Organisation after he had attended the morning session of the council's budget meeting.

Mr. Tan is a central committee member of the Sarawak United People's Party. His wife was also arrested.

In Sibu another SUPP central committee member, Mr. Tieu Sung Seng, was arrested.

There have been many other arrests of suspected Communists under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, which was enforced after the Brunei rebellion.

Reading (d)

HAD the Brunei rebels captured the Sultan and forced him to proclaim his support for the North Borneo National Army and its objectives, the situation today would be very different. Britain would still have acted, because Sarawak was invaded and North Borneo was under threat, but the rebels would have put up stiffer resistance, the people might have reacted less passively and

Indonesia might have backed Azahari with more than words. Azahari himself might now be at the United Nations surrounded by admiring Afro-Asians instead of weeping with rage in Manila.

However, the coup was bungled at its most crucial point. The Sultan eluded capture and went on the air with a message quite different from that intended by the rebel leaders. His denunciation of the revolt and his branding of Azahari as traitor undoubtedly account in large part for the docility with which most of the rebels yielded to the British forces. Azahari led many of his followers to believe that he was acting for the Sultan. The nailing of this lie removed the cause for which these rebels thought they were fighting.

The revolt has been smashed. All towns captured by the rebels have been retaken, with little bloodshed and remarkably little damage to property. But though the authority of the Sultan is being completely restored, the coup came disturbingly close to success and there is need for penetrating post-mortem.

It is scandalous that Azahari should have been able to assemble and train a rebel force as large as the North Borneo National Army and capture by surprise all the main towns in Brunei as well as some of the main population centres in Sarawak's Fifth Division. It is not clear how much blame falls on the intelligence services and how much on those responsible for assessing intelligence information. They share between them a heavy burden of disgrace. . . .

The Brunei revolt also raises many important questions for the future. The rebel army is in tatters, but a hard core is retreating into the jungle. From Manila, Azahari threatens prolonged guerilla war and calls for foreign intervention. There is no likelihood of an Emergency on the Malayan scale—the factors which sustained Chin Peng are not to be found in Brunei.

The Dayaks who inhabit the jungle fringes have no love for the Brunei Malays and will not offer to Azahari's rebels the support which Chin Peng managed to obtain or extort from Chinese squatters. Indonesia is clearly of a mind to help, but rugged mountains separate Brunei from Indonesian Borneo and it will not be easy to give aid in practice.

Nonetheless, a focus of loyalty has been set up in rivalry to the Brunei throne and there must be far-sighted policies if the threat is to be completely smashed.

The Sultan is far from being an oil sheikh of the Middle Eastern genre. He has introduced many enlightened reforms. However, it is clear from the very considerable support Azahari has had that further efforts to advance the welfare of the population are required. More schools must be built and more job opportunities created. Brunei is rightly proud of its hospitals and social services, but these are not enough.

The question of Brunei's relations with Malaysia and of Malaysia's relations with those neighbouring countries which have made their hostility so apparent, is also raised in acute form. But it will not be possible to see any of these larger issues clearly until the dust of the revolt has settled.

Reading (e)

PRESIDENT Soekarno for the second time in two days yesterday expressed Indonesia's sympathy for the Brunei rebels.

Antara news agency reported he told a farmers' congress at Semaring[*sic*], Central Java: "We will continue our struggle against colonialism and imperialism in all their forms, openly and secretly as well.

"We express Indonesia's sympathy to the struggle of the people of north Kalimantan (Borneo)."

Meanwhile the Information Ministry said what was happening in Brunei constitutes a threat towards Indonesia.

The statement said: "Cruel acts by British troops and Malayan police in efforts to defeat freedom fighters in north Kalimantan constitute serious danger towards Indonesia.

"Now the imperialists and their puppets start accusing Indonesia of meddling in the struggle for freedom in north Kalimantan.

"These accusations represent a challenge to Indonesia in view that force has been used to face the freedom fighters there.

"The threat and danger compel Indonesia to keep on the alert to face any eventuality with confidence that a final victory will be at the hands of the new emerging force."

IX The Year of Malaysia

At the beginning of the year of Malaysia, residents of Malaya, Singapore, and Sarawak, at least, had reason to be pleased with their prospects. Major problems remained, but 1962 had been a year big with change and 1963 promised to be equally fruitful. The next reading is from the Malayan Prime Minister's New Year's Eve speech to the nation. [*The Straits Times*, 1 January 1963.]

As Malaysians everywhere celebrate this day, the beginning of the New Year of 1963, we can look forward with hope and confidence to the future because we have good reason to rejoice in the overall achievements of the Federation of Malaya in 1962.

The past twelve months have undoubtedly turned out to be the most exhilarating and exciting period in our history since Merdeka.

It was not only a year of successful progress and achievement at

home but also a time of test and trial of our national unity in the face of surprising and unexpected events in this part of the world. . . .

Looking back on 1962, by far the most outstanding development, dominating both our present and our future, was the striking progress made in the planning and evolution of Malaysia.

There is no doubt at all that the goal of Malaysia caught and captured the imagination and the interest of the great majority of people in the territories concerned.

We have only to recall tours and visits by hundreds of delegates to Malaya from the Borneo territories;

The historic agreement in London last July to decide and proceed with the creation of the new nation;

The success in favour of Malaysia of the referendum in Singapore; and

The many cordial and comprehensive meetings of the Inter-Governmental Committee on the future of Sabah and Sarawak to realise that the Malaysia plan accords with the popular will of the Governments and peoples involved.

All this planning and evolution was known to all the world. The only clouds on the horizon were the undecided attitude of Brunei and the unexpected claim by the Philippines to sovereignty over North Borneo.

Nevertheless, the development of the ideal of Malaysia surpasses all these and the plan proceeds democratically and smoothly.

Then suddenly like a bolt from the blue information flowed in to the effect that certain political parties in Indonesia felt very bitterly opposed to it and were determined to smother it.

Frequent contacts took place between the Communist Party and Partindo in Indonesia with Azahari in Brunei, producing in their train evidence that these parties would give support and aid in fighting Malaysia.

One of the direct results of the rebellion in Brunei has been to strengthen the desire of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak to join Malaysia. . . .

Whatever the stresses or strains that may be imposed upon our diplomacy, it is our firm intention to go right ahead, in a spirit of faith and patience, and if necessary endurance, with the establishment of the new Federation of Malaysia and the development of the Association of South-East Asia. . . .

By coincidence the border war between India and China, a dispute still unresolved, broke out during my own State Visit to India and in fact our country was the very first to declare its sympathy and support for democratic India against this completely unjustifiable aggression by Communist China.

We still regard this border war as a warning to all free Asia.

The outcome of the pressures on Borneo and of the border war between India and China is testing the loyalty of many people in our country, because here we have Malaysians of both Indonesian stock or Chinese origin.

It would have been expected that these people might have adopted a role of outright opposition out of loyalty to countries of their origin, but this was not so.

Except for Communist elements among them the effect of these events on Chinese or Indonesians in Malaya is to remain true to Malaya.

One can see now the truth of the statement that in our diversity we can find unity, and I thank God for the loyalty of our people in this hour.

The Federation of Malaya, quite apart from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London, and the General Assembly of the United Nations, has attended many international meetings, as well as being the host country to such important regional gatherings here as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation and the Asian Broadcasting Conference.

It is our hope that Kuala Lumpur will continue to be a popular venue for international meetings.

In addition, we have the happiest recollections of the State Visits to Malaya of Their Majesties the King and Queen of Thailand, of His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and his Consort, and of the brief but welcome stay of the Prime Minister of Ceylon.

The sweeping success of the Alliance Party in the local elections held throughout the country during the year is solid proof of the faith and confidence of the people in the Government, its policy and administration. . . .

This New Year that lies before us presents to each and all Malaysians a special challenge to our industry and ingenuity because before the year is out the Federation of Malaya as we know it with pride and loyalty today will expand to take in new members of the family in a brand-new nation with a larger area and wider responsibilities and duties—the Federation of Malaysia. . . .

It is the policy of our country to provide our people with food instead of bullets, clothing instead of uniforms and houses instead of barracks. . . .

We have asked nothing more of man or God than to be allowed to live in peace and happiness in our own Malaysian way.

Chapter Eleven

'CONFRONTATION' AND THE SECESSION OF SINGAPORE

The 'Year of Malaysia' brought in its wake old problems in new forms. In August the price of rubber fell to 66 cents per pound, well below the critical point (70 cents per pound) for effective competition with synthetics. In the same month President Soekarno of Indonesia, who had announced his intention to 'confront neo-colonialism' in South-East Asia by destroying Malaysia, won a momentary victory. A team of United Nations observers began a rapid but thorough inquiry in Sarawak and Sabah to learn whether the people of both colonies desired merger with Malaya and Singapore, as Harold Macmillan, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and Lee Kuan Yew said, or whether they preferred independence from Britain outside Malaysia as Soekarno implied. This investigation postponed the creation of Malaysia until September 16 when the United Nations' team having agreed that merger was both logical and desired, the new nation was proclaimed.

I 'Confrontation'

The following readings indicate the degree to which Malaysian activities were dominated in 1963 and 1964 by the problem of 'Confrontation.' Reading (a) quotes the Malaysian Prime Minister's general remarks when presenting a White Paper on Malayan relations with Indonesia and the Philippines to the Malaysian Parliament [Malaysian Information Service, Embassy of Malaysia, Washington, Press Release No[.]M 113, Jan. 17, 1964]; reading (b) is an examination of the internal as well as external problems facing Malaysia in 1964 ['Malaysia and Its Neighbours: Prospects of the New Federation,' *The Round Table*, No. 214, March, 1964, 128-34]; and reading (c) is an assessment of the crisis of confrontation in mid-1964, looking to the future [Seth S. King, 'Sukarno Again Blocks a Malaysian Agreement,' *The New York Times*, June 21, 1964, 4E].

Reading (a)

PRIME Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman in the Malaysian Parliament on 12.11.63 in presenting the White Paper on Malayan relations with Indonesia and Philippines up to Malaysia Day said:

On 16 September of this year, a historic event in the history of Southeast Asia took place with the inauguration of Malaysia. This day saw the fulfilment of the fondest political aspirations of the hitherto subject peoples of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak when they gained their independence through a voluntary association with the 11 States of the former Federation of Malaya, and together formed Malaysia. This day saw the end of British rule in Southeast Asia and the Emergence of the new nation of Malaysia.

The only cloud on the horizon as Malaysia emerged was the unfriendly attitude of two of Malaysia's closest neighbors, namely, Indonesia and the Philippines.

From a perusal of the White Paper now laid before the House, Hon'ble Members will be aware of the many efforts made by the Government to obtain Indonesian and Philippine acceptance of Malaysia. Hon'ble Members will be aware too that the Government went to the extent of taking the highly unpopular decision to defer the proclamation of Malaysia to enable the Secretary General of the United Nations to ascertain the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak in response to the wishes of these two neighbors. But our efforts were in vain, for we are now aware that the sole purpose of Indonesia's participation in the Summit Talks in Manila and her signing of the various agreements on that occasion was merely part of a calculated plan to foil the formation of Malaysia.

The White Paper laid before the House now renders a factual account of the events that led to the severance of diplomatic relations between this country and Indonesia and the Philippines. I therefore feel it incumbent upon me to present to you an account of events that took place between the date of the formation of Malaysia and the present, and an assessment of the factors that prompted such an unfortunate state of affairs. Let me, therefore, deal with this matter separately as indeed it has been dealt with in the White Paper before you. First our misunderstanding with Indonesia.

After it was announced that Malaysia would be formed on the 16 September, Indonesia immediately issued a challenge by refusing to recognise the new nation, stating that this new nation is a British plan to encircle the people of Indonesia and that this is in fact neo-colonialism and Indonesia is out to oppose it at all costs and is determined to crush it. Needless for me to refute, as everybody would know, that even with help from the British, it would be impossible for a mere 10 million people made up of so many races to encircle

people 10 times that number, with an Army of nearly 400,000 soldiers armed with the newest Russian guns, airplanes, ships and submarines. Surely this is a preposterous change [*sic*].

The main argument lies in the fact that there is in existence an Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement which allows the British Government to occupy certain bases in our terr[itu]ry. It will be appreciated that the agreement was freely negotiated and entered into in 1957 and had been in existence for the past 5 years with the knowledge of Indonesia and in these past 5 years it had not been shown that these bases had threatened the security of Indonesia. Again during the existence of this agreement the Indonesian Government entered freely into a Treaty of Friendship with us. Furthermore the Manila Joint Statement clearly allows for such arrangements and the following principles enunciated at Bandung is eloquent testimony of our right to enter into a treaty of obligation with our friends.

I quote, "Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations". But more compelling than all these reasons must surely be the danger that now threatens us from the very country that would have us divest ourselves of such defense arrangements.

On the other hand the presence of American bases in the Philippines had not provoked Indonesia, nor did it occur to her that the American bases in the Philippines are very much larger than the bases here and it was never suggested that the presence of these bases was a danger to Indonesian security. It is obvious to all that the threat which they talked about regarding the presence of British bases and the Treaty of Friendship which we made with Britain is just an idea which they felt could be used against us.

The Indonesian Government committed aggression against the Borneo States in fulfilment of the threats first uttered by Dr. Subandrio [Indonesian minister for foreign affairs] when he referred to the likelihood of "acts of physical violence" occurring on the Indonesian/Malaysian border. Since 12 April of this year, frequent border clashes have taken place between Security Forces and Indonesian trained terrorists including the members of the Tentera Nasional Indonesia and also members of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Captured documents and equipment give irrefutable proof of this. Units and gangs of terrorists that have been contacted have proved to be led by TNI regulars who use the TNKU as a cover for their activities. The TNI apart from providing leadership also provide training, weapons and equipment to units of the TNKU and militant groups of the Clandestine Communist Organisation.

It is significant to note that in the case of the militant groups of the Clandestine Communist Organisation, their leadership is always vested in TNI regulars and the number of the CCO members are

never of such a proportion that will allow this leadership to be questioned. The killing by our military forces of an Army Indonesian Commanding Officer on the Southern Sebatik Island was recently reported in the Press. This is one of the most concrete pieces of evidence of active participation by Indonesian Armed Forces regulars in raids on the borders of the Borneo States. Identity cards, weapons, clothing and equipment taken from killed or captured enemy guerillas show that these guerillas belong to regular units of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

While Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia has produced very little by way of definite achievement it does continue to be of increasing nuisance value. The threat from confrontation may therefore be divided into the following main categories.

- a. Armed attacks across the border from Indonesia;
- b. The despatch of secret agents and trouble makers into Malaysia from Indonesia;
- c. Subversion among Indonesian communities within Malaysia.

By the time the Indonesian Consulates were closed down a large number of Indonesians in Malaysia were actively supporting Confrontation, even to the extent of forming illegal underground organisations aimed at overthrowing the established Government by violence.



The Indonesian Confrontation mounted against us has also taken the form of a propaganda offensive launched against the Malaysian Government. Clandestine radio stations known as Radio Kalimantan Utara and Suara Kesatuan Malaya Merdeka have been set up and daily broadcast false news or grossly distorted versions of actual events not to mention obscenities about Malaysia, about myself and other Malaysian Ministers.

Perhaps the most inhumane part of Confrontation is the attacks on our fisherfolk who are robbed of their catch, plundered of their equipment and their boats set afire, not to mention the physical assaults that are perpetrated on them in international waters and in our own territorial waters. These dastardly acts are perpetrated by personnel of the Indonesian Navy dressed in official kit and riding in Indonesian gunboats. The incidents that take place in the Straits of Malacca are reminiscent of the piracy of 16th century Europe and it is truly regrettable that in the mid-twentieth century our neighbors in Indonesia should still be practising and with official approval the buccaneering practices of 500 years ago. Truly a lament to progress and civilisation. To crown it all their planes are frequently reported to violate our air space and to commit other acts in violation of the law. Soon after the termination of diplomatic relations, the Indonesian Government chose

to sever trade relations with us—veritably a case of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face, for this policy pursued for anything more than a short period could mean economic suicide for Indonesia. Most of Indonesia's raw products were until recently sent to Penang and Singapore for processing before sale in world markets. The self-imposed ban on the export of these goods to Malaysian ports could well cost Indonesia more than \$800 million a year. Her desperate efforts to find alternative means to export these raw materials have failed. . . .

Then the Indonesian Government in an act of bare-faced brigandry issued an edict expropriating to itself all business enterprises belonging to Malaysians in utter disregard to international practice. The premises of our former Embassy's chancery and one of the Embassy residences, both the property of the Malaysian Government, had earlier been taken over by the Djakarta authorities, in the name of Confrontation.

A factor as I see it, that has obviously influenced Indonesia in her decision to oppose Malaysia is the fact that a comparison between the economy and general well-being of the two countries shows up Indonesia in a very bad light. While the Indonesian people are suffering in their millions from starvation and misery, our people are living in peace and prosperity. There is no doubt in my mind that the leaders of the Djakarta regime have betrayed the faith of millions of Indonesians who fought for independence and the thousands who sacrificed themselves for their country's freedom. All they have received instead is bad and corrupt administration through irresponsibilities of their leaders. And so naturally the Djakarta regime is galled by the success of Malaysia. . . .

Honourable members should now be aware that we cannot possibly consider a resumption of relations with Indonesia or even speak to her round a table since these acts of blatant violence and brigandry exist. My Government is not prepared to consider the question at all until border raids cease, confrontation is called off and the Indonesian Government shows by positive act rather than by speech that she genuinely desires our friendship. . . .

Reading (b)

THE foundations of Malaysia have been well laid. Malaysia and its constitution are the work of the political leaders of the constituent States, and those leaders have since secured the endorsement of their peoples through democratic elections based on adult suffrage and a secret ballot. Two years of hard bargaining have gone into making Malaysia. All parties have had to give and take to

secure agreement. This arduous process has bred a mutual understanding and a common attachment to Malaysia which should give great strength for the future.

There is, of course, still much to do to make a nation out of the various peoples who form Malaysia. National pride and national loyalty must be developed to transcend existing loyalties. Meanwhile there is always the danger that friction between State and Central Governments will arouse latent racial feelings. In Malaya the Malays predominate. Singapore is a Chinese city. In Sarawak and Sabah both Malays and Chinese are minority communities compared to the Ibans, Kadazans and other native peoples. Wise leadership must bring all these different peoples to accept each other equally as good Malaysians.

Malaysia's enemies are giving invaluable help to this process of welding the different peoples into one nation. The security forces repelling Indonesia's armed raids across the border in Borneo are drawn from the Malayan armed forces, from the Sabah and Sarawak Police Contingents and Home Guards as well as British troops. They fight side by side against a common enemy. There could be no better fire to weld them together in mutual respect and common loyalty to Malaysia. Indonesian confrontation serves also to bring home to all the inhabitants of Malaysia the dangers that beset them in today's South-East Asia: the territorial ambitions of Indonesia, an unhappy country of 100 million people with the largest Communist Party outside Russia and China; the tide of Chinese Communist domination threatening from the north; and the gradual withdrawal of the British military presence which hitherto has given protection and confidence. The political leaders of all the constituent States of Malaysia realize that they face common dangers, and that they need to pool their resources to survive. The opposition of Indonesia to Malaysia has shown that the alternative to Malaysia is domination by Indonesia, a prospect which horrifies them. In Sabah particularly the opposition of Indonesia and the Philippines to Malaysia has strengthened the people's resolve to make Malaysia succeed. They see that a take-over by Indonesia would be disastrous to their present prosperity and to their high hopes for the future. They reject with derision any suggestion that Sabah should be handed over to the Philippines to settle some academic dispute between Britain and the Philippines over the interpretation of an old treaty with a long defunct Sultanate of Sulu. . . .

Indonesian opposition is . . . serious It must be an affront to Indonesian national pride that two areas on the north coast of the island of Kalimantan should choose to join Malaya 500 miles away across the China Sea rather than take their natural place as part of Indonesia. Sabah and Sarawak belong to Kalimantan by geography and by the racial groups that spread across both sides of a border

which though largely following a natural watershed owes its origin to the colonial past. It is human nature for Soekarno to be jealous of Tunku Abdul Rahman and so unfriendly. In population and resources Indonesia is ten times the size of Malaysia. Soekarno and his colleagues are proud of their achievement in wresting independence from the Dutch by force of arms. They sneer at the Tunku as having never really broken his colonial ties. Yet in the world, particularly in the Western Press, the Tunku is acclaimed as the successful statesman with all the virtues and Malaya as prosperous and efficiently administered; while Soekarno is the bad boy and the Indonesian economy in chaos. Lastly, there are genuine fears that the inclusion of parts of Kalimantan in Malaysia might stimulate disloyalty in Sumatra and the outer islands. Sumatra and the Rhio islands have close links with Malaya and Singapore; the contrast between the prosperity and progress of Malaysia and the insecurity, shortages and inflation in Indonesia is dangerous; and Malaya has given asylum to leading refugee dissidents from Indonesia.

These are continuing causes of Indonesian hostility. The Indonesian attitude to Malaysia is not likely to change in the near future. Nor is it personal to Soekarno and likely to end when he goes. Soekarno, of course, inflames it and uses it for his own political purposes. He is a politician of consummate skill with years of success behind him. His triumph in West Irian is still fresh. He must realize that the circumstances of Malaysia are very different; he is not dealing with the colonial power but with fellow Asians and with peoples who are fully capable of making their wishes known through elections and the use of modern publicity methods. Yet Soekarno may well hope that by skilful political manoeuvring, by well-timed propaganda, and above all by playing on the interests of other nations, he may be able to repeat his West Irian success. The key to his prospects is in American hands. The danger is that American fears of letting 100 million Indonesians fall under a Communist régime will lead them to subordinate Malaysia to keep Soekarno in power. He will certainly exploit this hold on American action with all his skill.

Soekarno will adjust the tempo of confrontation to external circumstances, as he has already demonstrated. Confrontation is not an end in itself; it is a means to frustrate Malaysia. If he judges that abusive propaganda or threats of war or border raids or organizing internal incidents will strengthen his position against Malaysia, he will intensify whichever activity seems to yield the best results at the time. If they fail to arouse world opinion in his support or prejudice his position, he will reduce or abandon them. He will appear as the smiling warm-hearted peacemaker at a summit conference, shrewdly presenting the issues so that the other side finds itself under pressure to make concessions to prevent a breakdown of the talks. Thereafter

he can revert without the slightest compunction to armed attack if that suits his purpose.

Thanks to the standing of Malayan leaders in the United Nations and in Afro-Asian groups, thanks to energetic campaigning by Mr Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, and thanks to discreet diplomacy by Britain, Australia and other friends, confrontation is not so far making any damaging impact on world opinion. Nor does it seem likely that it will. Other issues are more pressing and more congenial. Neither the Russians nor the Chinese show any wish to become too deeply involved in a quarrel between Indonesia and Malaysia. It is not a good issue to influence the uncommitted; Indonesia is an area of rivalry between Russia and China which Soekarno has adroitly exploited; and strong intervention by either Russia or China would be bound to provoke a strong reaction from the United States.

The probability then is that Malaysia will have to live with Indonesian confrontation for some time. This should not cause any intolerable strain to Malaysia. Military Indonesia could, of course, overwhelm Malaysian forces on their own. But Malaysia is not on its own. Britain is committed to the defence of Malaysia and is already actively involved with troops on the ground. Australia and New Zealand have also come out in support of Malaysia, and any attack upon Australia or New Zealand involves the United States by virtue of the ANZUS treaty. U Thant's recent report to the United Nations on the views of the people of Sabah and Sarawak makes it very difficult to pass off any serious invasion of Malaysia as an internal rising. Soekarno must appreciate that any large-scale military operation will be much too dangerous. His better tactic is to continue harassing raids which he can exploit in propaganda and can disown if that is expedient, and to do all he can to foster internal incidents which can be presented to the world as signs of a popular rising against Malaysia.

The military forces now available, British and Malayan, should be fully capable of dealing hard with border raids. British forces assisted by local people have annihilated fighting patrols from Indonesia which attempted deep penetration of Sarawak. Tip-and-run raids across the open frontier in the First and Second Divisions of Sarawak and in the Tawau Residency of Sabah are impossible to stop altogether. They can cause painful individual casualties and the raiders may regain the safety of their own side of the border unscathed. But such raids are a nuisance rather than a serious threat. As long as the overwhelming majority of the people of Malaysia genuinely prefer Malaysia to rule from Djakarta, as they certainly do now, and as long as the big Powers, especially the United States, make it quite clear to Soekarno that any attempt to invade Malaysia will come up against Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, military

confrontation will achieve nothing; and the chances are that Soekarno will gradually reduce it to minor operations to support secret efforts to stage internal incidents.

Meanwhile within Malaysia military attacks from Indonesia strengthen the new loyalty to Malaysia and arouse a hatred of Indonesia which did not exist before. Confrontation distracts public attention from internal difficulties and makes them seem of secondary importance to the outside threat. In reality the internal stresses are more dangerous. It will take all the good sense and all the resources of the Federal Government to forge a united nation out of the [four] partners in Malaysia, and they will need all the help their friends can give them. . . .

In Malaya itself things are not so comfortable as they were. The price of rubber has dropped substantially. This immediately reduces the amount of public money available for development just at the time when the two Borneo States are expecting that Malaysia will accelerate the pace of their development and at the time when Indonesian confrontation calls for an increase in defence expenditure. The Federal Government must take care not to divert to military expansion funds which would be much more usefully spent on economic development. Extra money spent on defence cannot significantly reduce Indonesia's overwhelming superiority in military forces; the same amount can have a decisive effect on the development plans of Sabah and Sarawak. This calls for difficult and probably unpopular political decisions. . . .¹

Nor is all well with the Alliance as a political force. The Malayan Chinese Association, the Chinese partner in the Alliance, has lost much ground in recent years. Its leaders no longer command the support of the younger Chinese who form the majority of the voters in the towns. By-elections and local government elections reveal this clearly enough. The younger generation of Chinese feel outside the present Government; they regard it not as their Government but as a Malay Government. There is little sign of new and more competent leaders who can bring them to understand the political realities for the Chinese in Malaya, as Lee Kuan Yew and his colleagues have educated the Singapore electorate. Moreover, Tunku Abdul Rahman's Government is essentially a conservative government; he himself is of royal birth; and it is predominantly a government of Malays with a barely concealed communal bias. The Socialist opposition parties are successfully exploiting the left-wing leanings of the younger generation; they appeal to the have-nots against the haves

¹ The central issue of the Tunku's 1964 political campaign was 'confrontation' and loyalty to the new nation of Malaysia. In the election the Alliance Party captured 89 of 104 seats in the Federal Parliament (from Malaya's eleven states). With Alliance support from Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah, the Tunku thus led nearly four-fifths of the 159-seat Malaysian legislature.

and to the sense of grievance felt by many young Chinese against Malay privileges. Tunku Abdul Rahman has done much to secure racial harmony in Malaya, to solve the basic problem of getting Malays and Chinese to accept each other equally as Malaysians. In doing this he has inevitably upset the extreme wing of his own United Malay National Organization. Rightly he is adamant that solid Malay support is vital to his own political position. He will feel compelled to slow down measures recognizing the Chinese as genuine Malaysians if his policy is seriously alienating his Malay support. Under the Tunku's genial leadership the Federation of Malaya has gone forward splendidly; but underlying this success there are still real problems and difficulties. . . .

Singapore under Mr. Lee Kuan Yew is another success story. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew won a great victory in last year's Singapore elections. He and his equally able Finance Minister, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, have secured power for another five years. They will give Singapore the firm, competent and honest government it requires to prosper as the commercial centre of Malaysia. They have achieved two very remarkable successes. First, they have beaten the Communists decisively in open political fight. They have broken the mass support previously enjoyed by Communist leaders in Singapore, and they have shown the teeming mass of young Chinese who form Singapore's electorate that the Communists are not the winning side. By this victory they have now established a position of strength for themselves from which they can take firm measures to prevent any revival of the Communist threat. More important, they have given heart to the greater number of moderate, sensible people in Singapore. They have also given hope to the whole of South-East Asia. For the battle against Communism cannot be won by force. Force can contain or repress Communism, but it can only be defeated by winning the ideological battle for men's minds. This Lee Kuan Yew has done in Singapore.

The second success of his Government is that by pursuing hard-headed and honest economic policies with great intelligence they have restored business confidence in Singapore, and this in spite of taking office in 1959 as an extreme left-wing party. They have also hammered home to the trade unions the economic facts of Singapore's livelihood. Singapore is now once again bustling with activity, eagerly preparing through public and private investment to fulfil its rôle as the commercial centre of Malaysia. It looks set for a period of stability and prosperity.

Indonesian confrontation has, of course, hit Singapore's *entrepôt* trade. The effect is serious, but very far from crippling. The loss of trade should be related to the unusually high rate at which it had been running, due to conditions in Indonesia. In any case Singapore was

already turning to industrial development to provide a living for its rapidly growing population, following Hong Kong's example. Nor is this the first time that a Government in Djakarta has attempted to stop trade through Singapore. Hitherto the facts of geography and the irrepressible enterprise of Singapore's Chinese merchants have always won the trade back. This is likely to happen again, probably with the connivance of Indonesian officials who also have to live.

A question of crucial importance for the immediate future of Malaysia is whether mutual respect and confidence can be established between Tunku Abdul Rahman and his Ministers in Kuala Lumpur and Lee Kuan Yew and his Ministers in Singapore. In the making of Malaysia hard words were spoken, particularly by Lee Kuan Yew. He was determined to ensure that the terms for Singapore's entry into Malaysia were sound so that they would stand the test of time. He was also determined to secure his own and his party's political position in the approaching Singapore elections. In achieving these objects he did great damage to his relations with Kuala Lumpur. It was perhaps especially unfortunate that in the Singapore elections Lee Kuan Yew had to humiliate just those Chinese political interests which have the Tunku's staunch . . . loyalty in Malaya. Politically they had previously been discredited in Singapore as self-seeking and corrupt. Many of them sought to return to political life through the Singapore Alliance Party to which the Tunku gave his public support. Lee was determined that they should not blur the issue between him and the Communists or split the vote. In the event the Singapore electorate rejected them decisively; even Malays of Tunku Abdul Rahman's own United Malay National Organization refused to support the Singapore Alliance.

Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee will certainly do their best to establish good relations with Tunku Abdul Rahman. They see clearly that he is the only leader who can rally all in Malaysia behind him. They accept that the Malays must for some time retain political and military power. They urge the Chinese and others to accept this, there being still plenty of room for them in other fields, notably in business and finance. . . . They believe sincerely that the only future for Malaysia lies in creating one nation of Malaysians from the different communities. They want to help the Tunku in this. . . . They understand the problems of the young Chinese in the urban areas; they are experienced in organizing and handling trade unions; they could rally the Chinese vote to the Tunku's leadership. But they are Singapore Chinese, they are socialists, and they are alarmingly able. The Tunku, too, is a man to stay loyal to old friends of the Malayan Chinese Association even though they may have ceased to be useful to him. Lee Kuan Yew has publicly promised that he and his party will not take part in the Malayan elections this year. For the future

he will be less of a political threat to Tunku Abdul Rahman as a member of his Government, drawn into responsibility for unpopular measures such as dealing with Chinese chauvinism, trade unions and the young intellectuals, than he would be as an alternative leader waiting in the wings. It is to be hoped that Tunku Abdul Rahman and his Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, will see the need to work with Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee, to use their talents for the benefit of the Federal Government; they just cannot afford to be at loggerheads. The external threat from Indonesia should help to hold them together; and as the months go by working together should lead to better understanding. The combination of Tunku Abdul Rahman's warm humanity, his gift for handling people and making them happy and Lee Kuan Yew's brilliant intelligence, his forcefulness and his ability to win the minds of the younger Chinese away from China and Communism to a Malaysian outlook and a Malaysian loyalty will give Malaysia the leadership that will carry it safely through all difficulties and hazards.

Reading (c)

A group of Indonesian guerrillas were padding through the half-lit, silent jungle of northern Borneo . . . when they stumbled into an ambush carefully laid by Malaysian security forces. For a few short moments the silence was shattered by gunfire and screams. Ten guerrillas and two soldiers were killed and the rest of the guerrilla band fled toward the border and sanctuary in Indonesian Borneo.

Such brief, often bloody encounters make up the undeclared war that has been going on in the jungles of Sarawak and Sabah for nine months. Days go by when there are no contacts and the sweating, rain-sodden patrols of British and Malaysian troops prowl along the jungle trails or lie for hours in ambushes beside them. . . .

This lonely, uncomfortable, and potentially dangerous war will probably go on, at least for the immediate future. The long-awaited summit conference among leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines failed last night [19 June] at the end of a long, rainy day.

Once again the stumbling block was Malaysia's insistence [in Tokyo] that Indonesia stop all acts of hostility and Indonesia's equally adamant stand that guerrilla activities would be reduced only in conjunction with progress toward an unspecified "political" solution.

Both sides agreed with the Philippine proposal for an Afro-Asian conciliation commission to resolve the differences between them. The Indonesians said they would abide by the committee's findings. But the Malaysians said they would accept it only in principle and so long as all hostile acts were halted.

It was agreed that the Foreign Ministers of the three countries should meet again at some unspecified date and try to lay the groundwork for another summit. The conciliation commission would not be appointed before at least one more meeting of Foreign Ministers.

A large part of Malaysia's small army and at least 10,000 British troops and airmen are stretched along the 800-mile border between Indonesia and Malaysia attempting to find and destroy about 400 guerrillas. . . .

Neither side has been fully successful. The military forces, even with helicopters, radar and the awesome efficiency of Gurkha troops, cannot possibly stop all the incursions.

There is no evidence that those who have succeeded in slipping deep into Sarawak and Sabah have developed any significant support among the [people]. The exception is the aid given them by the Clandestine Communist Organization, the Peking-directed Communist front, which has had considerable appeal for young Sarawak Chinese.

Unless there is a greatly increased effort by the Indonesians, which is possible, or there is a large-scale reinforcement of British troops, which is unlikely, the Borneo war could continue indefinitely with neither side able to force a conclusion.

The raids into northern Borneo apparently have, as their ultimate purpose, the subverting of the people and the secession of Sarawak and Sabah from Malaysia. President Sukarno, who fancies himself the leader of all "new, emerging forces" in Southeast Asia, is convinced that Malaysia was established by the British for two reasons: to maintain their economic advantages in this area and to provide bases from which to support dissident elements in Indonesia that would like to overthrow Mr. Sukarno and break up Indonesia. . . .

Malaysia's position at the conference was basically simple: All she wanted was to have the raids on her territory halted and to be accepted by her neighbors.

Mr. Sukarno's hope of altering the make-up of Malaysia, or at least changing her alignment with the West, is more clearly evident than whatever it was he expected to gain from the conference.

The Indonesian President certainly could not have come to Tokyo expecting Malaysia to agree to break up the federation, but he still insists it is Indonesia's goal to "crush" Malaysia.

II *The Secession of Singapore*

During 1964 and 1965 Malaysia continued to meet the threat of 'confrontation' from Indonesia. Armed conflict continued along the borders of Sarawak and Sabah, and small parties of Indonesians at-

tempted to infiltrate Malaya itself. The military threat of 'confrontation' was contained, but internal pressures in Malaysia continued to develop. Finally, on 9 August 1965, Singapore seceded from the Federation as a result of a secret agreement between the Central and State Governments. The following two readings (a) 'From our correspondent—Kuala Lumpur, August 9' and (b) leading article 'Singapore', extracted from the London *Times* of 10 August 1965, describe the events leading up to the secession and some of its implications.

Reading (a)

SINGAPORE ceased to be a member of Malaysia today by mutual agreement between the Central and State Governments, but cooperation will continue in matters of defence and commerce.

Agreement on the breakaway was reached on Saturday by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malaysian Prime Minister, and Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, the Singapore Premier.

The House of Representatives in Kuala Lumpur heard the news from the Tunku today and a Bill to amend the constitution was approved by 126 votes to nil, with one abstention after a three-hour debate.

In Singapore, in a *Gazette Extraordinary* read from the steps of the City Hall, Mr. Lee declared Singapore a sovereign and democratic nation forever.

Singapore's withdrawal from Malaysia, which was formed on September 16, 1963, is not entirely unexpected. Relations between the Central and State Governments have eroded rapidly in the past few months.

The Tunku told the House that the separation was painful and heartbreaking. Since the formation of Malaysia there had been many differences with the Singapore Government and it had come to a breaking point.

Tun Abdul Razak, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, had sought without success to find an understanding, but as soon as one issue was resolved another cropped up. In the end, he said, there were only two courses of action open. One was to take repressive measures against the Singapore Government for the behaviour of some of their leaders, and the other was to sever all connexion with the State Government.

The position of the Central Government at home and abroad had been mocked in many instances. The peace and happiness of the people in Malaysia depended on good will and understanding. Without them the nation would break up.

Repressive action against a few would not solve the problem, the

Tunku continued, because the seed of contempt, fear, and hatred had been sown in Singapore.

There had been an inclination by some countries to look upon Mr. Lee as an equal partner in the Government of Malaysia and to encourage him indirectly to assert his authority. In a nation there could be only one executive head.

The Tunku said that he had hoped to make Singapore the "New York of Malaysia", and he had urged the politicians there to support this aim. Unfortunately the rivalry and activities of some Singapore politicians had made this impossible. His dream was shattered, and they had come to the parting of the ways. . . . He hoped that Singapore citizens who had supported Malaysia would not feel let down and it had been agreed that they would be given the fullest protection.

The Singapore and Central Governments had agreed to establish a joint defence council for external defence and mutual assistance. The Malaysian Government would afford the Singapore Government Government assistance for external defence, and the Singapore Government would give the Central Government the right to continue to maintain and use the bases and other facilities used by its military forces in Singapore.

Neither Government would enter into any agreement or treaty with a foreign country which might be detrimental to the independence and defence of the territory of the party.

At a press conference tonight the Tunku said that it was his suggestion that Singapore should leave Malaysia. He had met Mr. Lee on Friday and made it clear that there was no hope of compromise. He said Malaysia would sponsor Singapore's admission to the United Nations and the Commonwealth. Britain, Australia and New Zealand had shown great disappointment over the breakaway.

Mr. Lee indicated today that Singapore would establish missions abroad and also announced a Cabinet reshuffle. . . .

From today, to be known henceforth as Singapore Day, all Singapore citizens ceased to be Malaysian citizens and all civil servants, including the police and armed forces, who were employees of the Central Government, reverted to Singapore Government employment.

The turnover tax imposed by the Central Government is abolished, and the Singapore branch of the Bank of China, which was to have been closed on Saturday, will be allowed to continue to operate.

Firecrackers were let off tonight in the Chinese section of Singapore to celebrate its freedom, and police patrols in the Malay areas of the island were strengthened, but there were no incidents. . . . Britain is to recognize Singapore as an independent state, the Commonwealth Relations Office announced in London last night.

Reading (b)

SINGAPORE'S eviction from the Malaysian Federation does not simply reduce its four components to three. The departure—and the emergence as an independent state—of so politically conscious and economically active a unit throws the whole future of the federation into doubt and with it British policies in south-east Asia. The federation arose in the first place as a means of linking Singapore to Malaya. From that grew the idea of adding the Borneo territories as a counter to Singapore's Chinese population—and from those decisions in turn came a rebellion in Brunei and Dr. SUKARNO's noisy and dangerous confrontation. Every party involved—not least the British Government—will feel the repercussions of what has happened and not one party can be sure at this moment what they will be. It is the worst possible time and circumstance in which to recast policies. But some such changes may be unavoidable.

To begin with, there seems little hope of restoring the partnership. MR. LEE KUAN YEW is bitterly disappointed by being cast out. The TUNKU's supporters in the central government seem happy, for the moment at least, to have got rid of the source of their irritation and jealousy. For months the propaganda battle between angry Malays in Kuala Lumpur and MR. LEE's following in Singapore had exposed the weakness of the federation. When he called the Malaysia Solidarity Convention, including representatives from Sabah and Sarawak, early in the summer the battle was on in earnest. Even so the divorce comes as a surprise to everyone, though the agreed settlement seems tidy and sensible. There is no one capable of repairing the damage. The main opposition party in Singapore, the Barisan Socialists, are strongly opposed to Malaysia, and have reminded us how far removed from political reality they are by declaring Singapore's withdrawal to be a British plot. It would be impossible to put together a government in Singapore that could hold power while proving acceptable partners to the central government in the federation.

With Singapore out what are the chances of the federation surviving? There were doubts from the beginning in Kuala Lumpur over absorbing the Borneo territories, and in those territories many who were hopeful two years ago are disappointed now. The decision to hold on in the federation for the moment will very quickly be contested by opposition parties in Sabah and Sarawak even if Singapore remains a silent outside observer of their discontent. Not least, just how highly will Indonesia rate its success in "crushing" Malaysia? One possible outcome of Singapore's secession could be Indonesia's decision to end a policy that had no defined objective. That would certainly simplify the revision of British policy. Is territorial aggrandisement in Borneo Indonesia's motive? When Indonesia talks about

being encircled is this simply a way of expressing suspicion of a pro-western government in Kuala Lumpur? Will Mr. LEE KUAN YEW now function as a mediator? Just what are the confused emotions over strategic involvement, national pride or how far has communist intrigue led to this imbroglio?

The answers to all these questions may only slowly emerge.



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IN THIS BOOK, THE EDITORS HAVE GATHERED together an impressive selection of readings pertinent to Malaysia, skilfully arranging and introducing them so that the evolution of its component countries may be traced throughout five centuries and more.

The readings vary from the indigenous *Sijarah Melayu* describing the founding of Malacca about the year 1400, and Tomé Pires' account of the Portuguese conquest of that city in 1511, taken from his *Suma Oriental*, to some sixty other sources narrating—among many items of interest—the adventures of the Spanish and Portuguese in sixteenth-century Brunei, the rivalry between the different colonial powers, a vivid and critical account of conditions in the east coast states of Malaya from *Hikayat Abdullah*, written about 1840, the arrival of the British in Malaya in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the gradual progress of the several territories, through the years of the Japanese occupation, towards the goal of Malaysia, followed by the secession of Singapore.

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